Kant: Philosophy of Law

The chapter deals with the two most distinctive elements of the Introduction of the Naturrecht Feyerabend, namely the notions of an end in itself and autonomy. I shall argue that both are to be interpreted with regard to the aim of explaining the ground of right. In this light, I suggest that the notion of an end in itself counters a voluntarist conception like Achenwall’s with a claim whose necessity has a twofold ground: First, the representation of an unconditional worth (...) emerges as a structural element of the practical use of reason. Second, that representation concerns the necessary self-understanding of moral subjects. Finally, I argue that the other distinctive element, the occurrence of the notion of autonomy, is best understood as an application of that idea to a specific issue, which Kant addresses by showing that freedom is a self-regulating domain. (shrink)

Intentar explicar el origen, evolución y violación de un tabú considerado casi universal en las sociedades humanas no es una empresa sencilla dado su carácter polifacético; sin embargo, ello no ha impedido que en muchos ordenamientos jurídicos sea empleado ese sentimiento de repulsión o asco como un elemento para criminalizar una relación sexual aparentemente ofensiva. El artículo sostiene que el matrimonio es la única forma en que las prácticas sexuales entre parientes en condición de igualdad pueden tener lugar. Para ello: (...) I. Presentaremos algunas teorías que ofrecen respuestas a las incógnitas en torno al tabú, II. Veremos por qué para Kant el incesto es un crimina carnis contra naturam en un caso, y secundum naturam en el otro. III. Examinaremos qué es el matrimonio para el filósofo y por qué constituye un ideal regulativo-práctico de las relaciones sexuales humanas. Por último, consideramos argumentos en contra de esta propuesta. (shrink)

Whether Kant’s late legal theory and his theory of race are contradictory in their account of colonialism has been a much-debated question that is also of highest importance for the evaluation of the Enlightenment’s contribution to Europe’s colonial expansion and the dispossession and enslavement of native and black peoples. This article discusses the problem by introducing the discourse on barbarism. This neglected discourse is the original and traditional European colonial vocabulary and served the justification of colonialism from ancient Greece throughout (...) the Renaissance to the eighteenth century. Kant’s explicit rejection of this discourse and its prejudices reveals his early critical stance toward colonial judgements of native peoples even before he developed his legal theory. This development of his critical position can be traced in his writings on race: although he makes racist statements in these texts, his theory of race is not meant to ground moral judgements on ‘races’ or a racial hierarchy but to defend the unity of mankind under the given empirical reality of colonial hierarchies. (shrink)

Kant’s essay ‘On a Supposed Right to Lie from Philanthropy’ claims that everyone has an unconditional duty of right not to lie under any circumstances. This claim creates a conflict within the doctrine of right because Kant also claims that each of us is under an unconditional duty of right to obey the positive law in force in the civil condition in all circumstances. In Kant’s specific example, truthfulness would violate the positive law because it would make the speaker an (...) accomplice to a crime. Since both duties flow from the requirement that we not act inconsistently with the possibility of rightful relations among humans, a juridical solution to the conflict must be possible. That solution is to recognize that lying in appropriate circumstances is akin to the use of force in self-defence or defence of a third party. (shrink)

This collection of essays takes as its starting point Arthur Ripstein's Force and Freedom: Kant's Legal and Political Philosophy, a seminal work on Kant's thinking about law, which also treats many of the contemporary issues of legal and political philosophy. The essays offer readings and elucidations of Ripstein's thought, dispute some of his claims and extend some of his themes within broader philosophical contexts, thus developing the significance of Ripstein's ideas for contemporary legal and political philosophy. -/- All of the (...) essays are contributions to normative philosophy in a broadly Kantian spirit. Prominent themes include rights in the body, the relation between morality and law, the nature of coercion and its role in legal obligation, the role of indeterminacy in law, the nature and justification of political society and the theory of the state. This volume will be of interest to a wide audience, including legal scholars, Kant scholars, and philosophers with an interest in Kant or in legal and political philosophy. (shrink)

I suggest that looking at how Kant’s arguments relate to the stand of the discussion on the relationship between right and ethics in his times contributes to a better understanding of his own position in this matter. I contrast the terms of the pre-Kantian debate with Kant’s take on the matter, in order to point out how Kant gains a new perspective concerning the rela- tionship between ethics and right. While the most prominent pre-Kantian view construed right and ethics as (...) either resulting from the application of a general principle to di erent domains or reciprocally independent, Kant’s own account centres on the difference between outer and inner freedom. I argue that Kant thereby only differentiates two relations of freedom to different hindrances, without implying any separation. This distinction allows him to construe right and ethics as sharing the same normative force of moral obligation. Therefore I suggest that Kant’s view understands the relationship between right and ethics neither as dependence nor as independence, but highlights the normative continuity throughout morals. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Kant-Studien Jahrgang: 107 Heft: 2 Seiten: 391-392.

O presente trabalho tem por objetivo fornecer uma resposta à crítica direcionada pelo jurista Fábio Konder Comparato ao formalismo jurídico de Kant. Explicarei porque essa crítica se equivoca quando identifica, na Doutrina do Direito de Kant, uma Teoria do Direito incompleta e insatisfatória. Para tanto, pretendo mostrar que o propósito do filósofo alemão não era apresentar uma teoria do direito, mas sim uma Metafísica do Direito. O que explica, por conseguinte, a razão para o direito ter sido concebido como um (...) conceito puro. Além disso, a fim de determinar o significado do formalismo jurídico, ocupar-me-ei da crítica hegeliana ao suposto formalismo ético de Kant, bem como da resposta a essa crítica. (shrink)

The central concept in Kant's _Doctrine of Law_ is the concept of a _person_. This very concept is intimately connected with Kant's theory of transcendental freedom and thus with his Transcendental Idealism. Hence the conceptual framework of the _Doctrine of Law_ and with it the 'Universal Principle of Right' are inseparably connected to Kant's _critical_ moral philosophy and require especially the moral law as their foundation. But nevertheless this does not entail that legal coercion requires the personality of those who (...) are subject to it: A Kantian state would be possible even for a people of devils. (shrink)

Resumo Neste artigo, o autor analisa o significado específico, atribuído por Kant, a certas noções fundamentais da sua Filosofia do Direito, dando especial atenção às implicações mais relevantes, que podem ser inferidas da sua caracterização das noções de liberdade, contracto, Estado e república, enquanto “ideias de razão pura”. A análise do estatuto ideal de tais noções deverá não só contribuir para um melhor entendimento do caracter normativo da doutrina jurídica de Kant, mas também permitir abordar questões difíceis relativas à possibilidade (...) de uma realização factual de tais ideias. Como será sugerido, em ordem a correctamente interpretar o estatuto peculiar das ideias jurídicas mencionadas, dever-se-á observar a distinção entre os conceitos puros do entendimento e ideias transcendentais da razão . Estas distinções desempenham um papel importante na caracterização das noções jurídicas como ideias da razão pura, ideias essas que devem guiar a nossa praxis política. Palavras-chave : contracto, estado, função reguladora, ideias, liberdadeIn this paper it is analyzed the specific meaning that Kant assigns to certain fundamental notions of his Philosophy of Law, paying special attention to the most relevant consequences that can be inferred from his characterization of the notions of freedom, contract, State and republic as “ideas of pure reason”. The analysis of the ideal status of such notions should not only contribute to a better understanding of the normative character of Kant’s juridical doctrine, but may also allow us to tackle difficult issues concerning the possibility of a factual realization of such ideas. As it will be suggested, in order to correctly interpret the peculiar status of the mentioned juridical ideas, we should focus on the critical distinction between pure concepts of understanding and transcendental ideas of reason . These distinctions play an important role for the characterization of juridical notions as ideas of pure reason, ideas which should guide our political praxis. Keywords : contract, freedom, ideas, regulative function, state. (shrink)

O objetivo deste artigo é examinar a hipótese de que a teoria kantiana do direito público seja estruturalmente antinômica, a despeito de que Kant só lhe tenha admitido o aspecto paradoxal. Com efeito, a teoria kantiana do direito público simultaneamente sustenta: (i) que o ingresso dos homens em um estado juridicamente organizado depende da obediência ao comando da razão que nos ordena celebrar o pactum unionis civilis e aceitar a submissão a uma ordem constitucional civil; (ii) que devemos aceitar como (...) nosso legítimo soberano a quem quer que tenha condições de efetivamente impor seu poder sobre nós. Bons intérpretes como Bouterwek e Hermann Cohen pensaram, contudo, que a verdadeira dificuldade dessa análise é uma desconcertante confusão dos conceitos de soberano e de soberania. A hipótese que procuramos explorar neste artigo é a de que se obterá um melhor entendimento da posição de Kant se admitirmos que os dois planos de análise e as teses conflitantes a que se acaba de aludir estão em uma posição reciprocamente equivalente à que se encontram tese e antítese nas antinomias dinâmicas analisadas na "Crítica da razão pura". The aim of this paper is to examine the hypothesis that Kantian theory of public rights is founded on an antinomic conceptual structure, even though Kant only admitted the paradoxical character of his doctrine. Kant's theory on public right states, at the same time, that: (i) the access to a rightful condition is dependent on our compliance to the command of reason to celebrate the pactum unionis civilis and the corresponding submission of the citizens under a civil constitution; (ii) we shall accept as our legitimate sovereign whoever is able to impose his power over us. Good interpreters, as Bouterwek and Hermann Cohen thought, however, that the true difficulty with his analysis is that it contains an astonishing confusion of the concepts of sovereign and sovereignty. The hypothesis I would like to explore in this paper is that perhaps a better understanding of Kant's position on this theme can be obtained by admitting that the two levels of analysis and the conflicting thesis we found in his doctrine of public rights are in a position reciprocally analogous to that occupied by thesis and antithesis in the dynamical antinomies assessed in the Critique of Pure Reason. (shrink)

This article aims to show the objections made by Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860) to Immanuel Kant’s doctrine of right (1724-1804). Based on the main Schopenhauer’s work we’ll be able to explain the five points of disagreement between Schopenhauer and Kant: (i) Kant tries to separate right sharply from ethics; (ii) the definition (Bestimmung) of the concept of right; (iii) the right to property (what is the basis of this right and if its exists outside the State); (iv) the purpose of the (...) State; and (v) the right to punish. (shrink)

El propósito central de este artículo es hacer un análisis desde una perspectiva constructivista del concepto de derecho de dos de los principios más importantes de la filosofía política de Kant: el principio del derecho y la idea del contrato original. El texto comienza con una breve exposición de lo que significa el constructivismo kantiano. A continuación se hace un análisis del concepto de derecho y de los atributos que definen a la ciudadanía, a saber: la libertad, la igualdad y (...) la independencia civil. En la última parte, se examina la concepción kantiana del contrato original y se trata de mostrar que hay, para Kant, deberes políticos tanto de derecho como de virtud. (shrink)

The review is available online on Estudos Kantianos.

This volume of new essays provides a comprehensive and structured examination of Kant's justification of norms, a crucial but neglected theme in Kantian practical philosophy.

Thomas E. Hill, Jr., interprets and extends Kant's moral theory in a series of essays that highlight its relevance to contemporary ethics. He introduces the major themes of Kantian ethics and explores its practical application to questions about revolution, prison reform, and forcible interventions in other countries for humanitarian purposes.

There is no question Arthur Ripstein’s Force and Freedom is an engaging and powerful book which will inform legal philosophy, particularly Kantian theories, for years to come. The text explores with care Kant’s legal and political philosophy, distinguishing it from his better known moral theory. Nor is Ripstein’s book simply a recounting of Kant’s legal and political theory. Ripstein develops Kant’s views in his own unique vision illustrating fresh ways of viewing the entire Kantian project. But the same strength and (...) coherence which ties the book to Kant’s important values of independence blinds the work to our shared moral ties grounded in other political values. Ripstein’s thoughts on punishment are novel in that he embeds criminal law, both in its retributivist and consequentialist facets, into Kant’s overarching political philosophy to show how criminal law can be seen as one aspect of the supremacy of public law. But a criminal law solely focused on the preservation of freedom takes little notice of the ways criminal law need expand its view to account for how a polity can restore the victim of a crime back to civic equality, reincorporate offenders after they have been punished and cannot leave past offenders isolated and likely to reoffend, resulting in the rotating door prison system and communities of innocents who remain preyed upon by career criminals. Lastly, a political theory that does not prize our civic bonds will ignore the startling balkanization of our criminal punishment practices, where policing, arresting and imprisonment become tools of racial and social oppression. In illustrating the benefits in viewing criminal law as a coherent part of Kant’s political theory of freedom, Ripstein also highlights what is absent. It then becomes clear that though Kant presents one important facet of punishment, only a republican political theory can meet the most pressing moral demands of punishment by reminding us that criminal law must be used to preserve and strengthen civic society. (shrink)

British Journal for the History of Philosophy, Volume 19, Issue 3, Page 549-560, May 2011.

Ripstein’s Kantian argument for the authority of the state purports to demonstrate that state authority is a necessary condition of each individual’s freedom. Ripstein regards an individual as free just in case her entitlement to control what is hers is not violated. After questioning whether his approach adequately distinguishes standards of legitimacy from standards of ideal justice, I argue for the superiority of an alternative conception of freedom. On the view that I defend a person is free just in case (...) she is able to move her body in space unimpeded by others. I argue that this conception allows for a more convincing version of the Kantian argument. (shrink)

There are at least five ‘core’ notions of community found in Kant's works: 1. The scientific notion of interaction. This concept is introduced in the Third Analogy and developed in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science. 2. A metaphysical idea. The idea of a world of individuals (monads) in interaction. This idea was developed in Kant’s precritical period and can be found in his metaphysics lectures. 3. A moral ideal. The idea of a realm of ends. 4. A political ideal. (...) The idea of a juridical community (or community of communities) governed by juridical laws. 5. A theological ideal. What Kant calls ‘the kingdom of heaven’, and which can be thought of as a community of holy beings, or angels. In this paper I focus on the relationship between the first, second and fourth of these notions. My argument is that Kant’s notion of a juridical community governed by juridical laws is modelled on the metaphysical idea of the world. This metaphysical idea of a world is, in turn, modelled on the category of community introduced in the first Critique and developed in his logic lectures. (shrink)

The nature of Kant's legal philosophy is highly controversial: some consider it to be a positivist account of law, while others claim it should be classified as a non-positivist theory. The question on whether Kant should be classified as a positivist or a non-positivist depends on the equally polemic question whether there is, for Kant, a right to resist unjust requirements of the positive legal order or the duty to obey it is absolute. This essay advocates that, according to Kant, (...) the citizens have no right at all to resist unjust positive orders, but it also recognizes that there can be, in Kant, a form of resistance, which is passive an can be performed from Parliament against the ruler. This, however, is insufficient to guarantee an actual control on the ruler, for there is, in Kant's theory, a conflation of powers, with the ruler being the one who ultimately decides what is going to be enforced. This is inconsistent with Kant's principle of right and with his moral philosophy in general, but is not sufficient to classify Kant as a positivist, for Kant's concept of law is, at least in the Metaphysics of Morals, derived out of morality. (shrink)

This superb, exemplary account of Immanuel Kant’s legal and political philosophy is essential reading not only for Kant scholars, but also for political philosophers and philosophers of law. Lucidly reasoned and written with crystalline clarity, the book is both accessible to non-specialists and a pleasure to read. Ripstein reveals the coherent, systematic structure of thought in Kant’s obscurely written Doctrine of Right, and goes beyond illumination to defense and development of Kant’s conception of equal freedom. In the course of doing (...) all of this, he not only presents Kant in historical context, but also brings to light important differences between Kant’s views and those of other political philosophers and philosophers of law, including John Locke, John Stuart Mill, H. L. A. Hart, and Ronald Dworkin, often enriching the discussion by referring to decisions or arguments made by courts in the U.S. or elsewhere. Ripstein shows that it is unjustifiable to exclude Kant from the primary canon of political philosophy, as is typical of current English-language teaching and scholarship. (shrink)

It is common to interpret Kant’s idea of public reason and the Enlightenment motto to ‘think for oneself’ as incompatible with the view that testimony and judgement of credibility is essential to rational public deliberation. Such interpretations have led to criticism of contemporary Kantian approaches to deliberative democracy for being intellectualistic, and for not considering our epistemic dependence on other people adequately. In this article, I argue that such criticism is insufficiently substantiated, and that Kant’s idea of public reason is (...) neither at odds with deference to a certain kind of authority, nor with making judgements of character in rational deliberation. This view is corroborated by recent work on Kant’s epistemology of testimony. (shrink)