Kant: Teleology in History and Politics

What function does the highest good serve in our thinking and doing? I propose a new interpretation that sees its importance as fulfilling a contemplative need to construct a worldview.

Under contract for the series Elements in the Philosophy of Immanuel Kant. -/- The focus of this Element is Kant’s history of human reason: his teleological vision of the past development of our rational capacities from their very emergence until Kant’s own “age of Enlightenment”. One of the goals of this Element is to connect Kant’s speculative account of the very beginning of rationality – a topic which has thus far been largely neglected or at least under-studied in Kantian scholarship (...) – to his well-known theory of humankind’s progress. By doing so, I hope to elucidate Kant’s hopes with regard to reason’s future progress and his guidelines for how to achieve this progress by unifying them with his vision of reason’s past. Another goal of this Element is to bring more attention to Kant’s essay “Conjectural Beginning of Human History” (1786), where a large part of this account is presented, and to show that this “somewhat unusual” (Yovel 1989) text does not stand in conflict with Kant’s critical philosophy and is not merely tangentially related to it, but actually illuminates and complements certain aspects of Kant’s critical philosophy. -/- This Element is divided into three parts. Part 1 introduces Kant’s speculations about the transition our species underwent from non-rational animals into primitive, rational humans. It also shows how these speculations fit with Kant’s broader view of the development of humans’ reason, or of the species’ gradual process of learning how to make a mature (enlightened) use of reason. -/- Part 2 focuses on a text where the speculative account of the beginning of human history is presented in most detail: the “Conjectural Beginning of Human History”. I defend the exegetical importance of this essay for Kant’s practical philosophy by arguing that the claims Kant makes in it are not merely fictional or imaginative, but play a key role in his teleological view of the progression of human history. I also assess the contribution that Kant makes to the conjectural history genre through this essay and discuss how distinct it is from the most prominent and well-studied conjectural histories of the Enlightenment era. -/- Part 3 focuses on what Kant’s account of the history of reason tells us about his political and pedagogical guidelines for the continuance of humanity’s progress toward the fulfillment of its vocation and for the progress of any given individual. I also present and defend my understanding of what it means to think and act in an enlightened (or as Kant also calls it, a “pluralistic”) way, connecting this idea to the three maxims of good thinking, the public use of reason, and the role of interpersonal communication in advancing our rational capacities. (shrink)

The chapter replies to Paul Guyer’s (2020) account of the debate between Mendelssohn and Kant about whether humankind makes continual moral progress. Mendelssohn maintained that progress can only be the remit of individuals, and that humankind only “continually fluctuates within fixed limits”. Kant dubs Mendelssohn’s position “abderitism” and explicitly rejects it. But Guyer contends that Kant’s own theory of freedom commits him, malgré lui, to abderitism. Guyer’s risky interpretive position is not supported by examination of the relevant texts in their (...) intellectual context. I first identify the historical origins of the term abderitism, which here signifies the independence of individual progress from social conditions. By contrast, Kant argues that individual progress cannot be independent of the progress of the species, acting as a corporate agent. This arresting position, I argue, must be understood in light of the Stoic ethical-teleological presuppositions generally accepted in eighteenth-century German discussion of human progress. (shrink)

This paper claims that Kant’s conception of culture provides a new means of understanding how the two parts of the Critique of Judgment fit together. Kant claims that culture is both the ‘ultimate purpose’ of nature and to be defined in terms of ‘art in general’ (of which the fine arts are a subtype). In the Critique of Teleological Judgment, culture, as the last empirically cognizable telos of nature, serves as the mediating link between nature and freedom, while in the (...) Critique of Aesthetic Judgment, the connection between art and morality passes through culture. In either case, Kant offers distinct, yet interdependent, arguments for how culture demonstrates the amenability of nature to its supersensible ground: the central question Kant claims in the Introduction that the work seeks to answer. Thus, not only does this account advance a concept essential to both parts of the work; it also demonstrates how the two parts can be conceived as complementary, with each supplementing the other to solve Kant’s central question. As such, understanding the Critique of Judgment in terms of culture enables us to see how the two parts of the work do not merely share points of similarity or common themes, but presuppose one another in order to understand how nature is amenable to freedom. (shrink)

Journal of Philosophy of Education, EarlyView.

Recent years have seen a surge of interest in the question of whether humans should reproduce. Some say human life is too punishing and cruel to impose upon an innocent. Others hold that such harms do not undermine the great and possibly unique value of human life. Tracing these outlooks historically in the debate has barely begun. What might philosophers have said, or what did they say, about human life itself and its value to merit reproduction? This article looks to (...) Kant, who wrote much on whether, by reproducing, humans do wrong or right morally. It assesses two main arguments: one examining whether perfect or imperfect duties condone reproduction, the other whether Kant’s teleological or, in the opposite sense, his eschatological outlooks can salvage reproduction. These two arguments are essential for building the entire argument. This article finds that, although Kant’s arguments against reproducing are strong, some of his writing seems to support reproduction as a good. Yet, must we must assume an author, even one who strove for systematicity, must be consistent over his entire oeuvre on every issue, especially if not handled directly in a single work? The article concludes that Kant does not sufficiently, systematically support anti-natalism as more moral than pro-natalism. It is best for the current debate to grapple with the very dilemma that daunted Kant. (shrink)

With this paper I analyze Kant’s account of the human vocation to cosmopolitanism discussed in the last section of the Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (7:321-333) and show how Kant’s notion of cosmopolitanism requires the cooperation of pure reason and pragmatic anthropology. My main thesis is that pure reason provides regulative ideas, thereby maintaining a foundational role, and pragmatic anthropology provides empirical evidence, thereby reinforcing the theoretical and practical status of reason’s ideas. In developing my analysis, I argue (...) that Kant reframes the question ‘What is the human being?’ in a non-essential way, foregrounds a moral practical concern, and assigns freedom an unprecedented role. Finally, I relate my analysis to two questions frequently discussed in Kant scholarship, namely the problem of whether the Anthropology has only a pragmatic or also a moral scope and the problem of the relation between the Anthropology and Kant’s critical system. (shrink)

The ideal of the United Nations was first put forward by Immanuel Kant in his 1795 essay Perpetual Peace. Kant, in the tradition of Locke and Rousseau is a liberal who believes that relations between individuals can either be based upon law and consent or upon force and violence. One way that such the ideal of world peace could be achieved would be through the creation of a single world state, of which every human being was a citizen. Such an (...) ideal was advocated by a number of eighteenth century liberals. Kant, however, rejects this ideal and instead argues that the universal rule of law can be achieved through the establishment a federation of independent states. I examine the relevance of Kant’s arguments today, focusing on two questions: Firstly, as advocates of the rule of law, why advocate a federation of independent nations rather than a single world state. Secondly, is this ideal realizable? Is Kant right to think that republics are natural and are likely to live peacefully with one another? Kant’s arguments on this issue have been taken up again in recent decades by defenders of the theory of the “democratic peace”, the theory that democracies are more likely to live at peace with one another. (shrink)

The series Rethinking Kant, now in its fifth volume, has become a mirror of Kantian studies in North America. It gathers papers presented at the various study groups of the North American Kant Society, along with contributions from hosts, session chairs, and keynote speakers. Because of its broad and unique composition, it offers a sample of a whole generation of Kantian thought, ranging from recent Ph.Ds, to up and coming young scholars, to some well-established and influential players in the field. (...) Contributions are subjected to strenuous peer review, and are, without exception, examples of the most innovative and cutting-edge research done in this area. Any one interested in taking the pulse of contemporary Kantian scholarship and engage in the humbling, but rewarding task of rethinking Kant, should consider it. (shrink)

Commentators typically neglect the distinct nature and role of hope in Kant’s system, and simply lump it together with the sort of Belief that arises from the moral proof. Kant himself is not entirely innocent of the conflation. Here I argue, however, that from a conceptual as well as a textual point of view, hope should be regarded as a different kind of attitude. It is an attitude that we can rationally adopt toward some of the doctrines that are not (...) able to be proved from within the bounds of mere reason – either theoretical or practical. This does not mean that hope is unconstrained; there are rational limits, as we shall see. In fact one of my central claims here is that a crucial difference between knowledge, rational Belief, and rational hope is that they are governed by different modal constraints; section II discusses those constraints and the kind of modality involved. In section III, I return to Religion and offer what I take to be Kant’s account of the main objects of rational hope in that text – namely, “alleged outer experiences (miracles)”;a “supposed inner experience(effect of grace)”;and a future collective experience (the construction of a truly ethical society). (shrink)

The fourteen essays in this volume, by leading scholars in the field, explore the relationship between teleology and politics in Kant’s corpus. Among the topics discussed are Kant’s normative political theory and legal philosophy; his cosmopolitanism and views on international relations; his theory of history; his theory of natural teleology; and the broader relationship between morality, history, nature, and politics. _Politics and Teleology in Kant_ will be of interest to a wide audience, including Kant scholars; scholars and students working in (...) moral and political philosophy, the philosophy of history, and political theory and political science; legal scholars; and international relations theorists. (shrink)

In dieser Arbeit werde ich versuchen zu zeigen, dass die Frage nach der Natur der Erde, die eine der ersten Fragen des frühen Kants ist, sowohl in der Kritik der Urteilskraft, als auch in dem schriftlichen Nachlass , wieder zum Zentrum seines philosophischen Denkens kommt. Der späte Kant verbindet diese Frage streng mit dem Prinzip subjektiver Zweckmäßigkeit und kritisiert im Opus postumum, insbesondere im Anschluss an den Übergang von den metaphysischen Anfangsgründen der Naturwissenschaft zur Physik, die übliche Erdauffassung als den (...) Besitz der menschlichen Gattung und findet, aufgrund des Zweckmäßigkeitsprinzips, welches für die teleologische Urteilskraft maßgebend ist, dass es notwendig ist, das menschliche Verhältnis zur Erde wesentlich mit Rücksicht auf die körperlich-geographischen Grenzen unserer Erkenntnis zu überprüfen. In der Kantischen Philosophie finde ich die Idee einer zweckmäßigen Geoethik, die sich mit dem Problem der menschlichen Sesshaftigkeit auf der Erde und mit ihrer räumlich-moralischen Orientierung in der Welt beschäftigt. Die Welt der Vernunftwesen wird sich daher ihrer geo-ethisch-rechtlichen Grenzen bewusst. Daher legt Kants Auffassung der Zweckmäßigkeit die Grundlage für die Formulierung einer Ekopolitik, die nach dem Zusammenwirken zwischen dem Menschen und seiner Umwelt fragt. (shrink)

A focus on the presence of unjustified coercion is one of the central normative concerns of Kant’s entire practical philosophy, from the ethical to the cosmopolitical. This focus is intimately interconnected with Kant’s account of sovereignty, since only the sovereign can justifiably coerce others unconditionally. For Kant, the sovereign is she who has the rightful authority to legislate laws and who is subject only to the laws that she gives herself. In the moral realm (or kingdom) of ends, each citizen (...) is both a member of that realm and an equal co-sovereign of its categorically binding laws (GMS, 4:433-34, Reath 2006, p. 5). As such, each citizen is 'subject to the moral law' only insofar as she is 'at the same time lawgiving with respect to it and only for that reason subordinated to it' (GMS, 4:440). But when Kant comes to think about sovereignty in the political sphere, a number of tensions emerge. These tensions emerge because a doctrine of absolutist popular sovereignty, according to which the people are the ultimate holders of sovereignty, seems to be implied by Kant’s underlying normative theory. However, Kant also makes numerous explicit statements which seem to imply a doctrine of absolutist ruler sovereignty, according to which the ruler is the ultimate holder of sovereignty. And this seems inconsistent. However, despite the appearance of inconsistency I shall argue, by exploring the issues of civil disobedience and cosmopolitan peace, that Kant consistently defends an account of absolutist popular sovereignty which is compatible with his core normative commitments. Exploring these issues will also illuminate Kant’s political teleology by showing us the political ends towards which we should work and the means by which we should pursue them. (shrink)

Kant develops his political philosophy in the context of a teleological conception of both nature and human history. For Kant, political thought must be undertaken in the context of a progressive historical view of humanity’s place in nature. For this reason Kant would strongly agree with John Rawls’s claim that one of the key roles that political philosophy plays in a society’s political culture is that of ‘probing the limits of practicable political possibility. In this role, we view political philosophy (...) as realistically utopian’ (Rawls 2007, pp. 10-11). The fact that political philosophy has this public role helps to explain the close links that exist between politics and teleology in Kant’s work. Teleology is the study of ends and of the purposiveness of both nature and history. One of the key roles of political philosophy is, for Kant, to probe what politics and human societies more generally can, will and should become in the context of the historically developing and purposive natural systems of which humans are part. Politics must be understood in its natural and historical context, but nature (especially human nature) and history must in turn be understood from a progressive political perspective. For Kant, the historical outcome of this purposive natural system, the end of history, is the full development of humanity’s predispositions for the use of reason within a moral and just society. This volume explores these issues. (shrink)

: In this paper, I shall defend the thesis that the idea of a universal history in Kant’s third Critique is not legitimated from a theoretical and systematic point of view but instead from a practical point of view. In order to sustain this interpretation, I shall reconstruct parts of arguments from the entire Critique of Teleological Judgment. First, I shall argue that in the Analytic as in the Dialectic, the external purposiveness can legitimize only a teleological history of nature (...) but not a universal history. Second, I defend that in the Methodology, the idea of a universal history is grounded in an interest of pure practical reason. (shrink)

Antagonism in human relations has been recognised since the beginning of Western history and has beenacknowledged as its driving and progressive force. But how exactly do contest, competition, and warcontribute to the historical progress of humankind? Coming from the position that there are timeless truthsin human history and that there is a human nature, in this paper I examine Kant’s notion of unsocialsociability from his Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose and how this notion relatesto human progress. (...) I explain the Kantian notion of the dynamics of history, his ‘unsocial sociability’, andcritique its problematic relation to his telos of nature: the formation of a universal civil union in perpetualpeace. In order to address this problem of dynamic-telos disparity I go back to the beginnings of Westernhistory, the ancient Greeks, with Nietzsche as a guiding mind. Focusing on his essay Homer onCompetition and also his book, The Birth of Tragedy I examine his uncovering of Greek ‘truth’ in relationto the division of Being in a primordial strife into beings of two opposing forms, the Apollonian andDionysian. I consider how these dual impulses were channelled, according to Nietzsche, into constructivesocial competitions and characterised the development and flourishing of Greek culture. I argue thatNietzsche’s view of human development and progress, via a republic of geniuses, overcomes the Kantiandisparity between the dynamic of history and nature’s end. (shrink)

In the concluding section of his *Anthropology* textbook, Kant offers the outlines of a portrait of the human race and of its collective character and vocation. The section is of interest for students of Kant’s Geschichtsphilosophie because of what it reveals about Kant’s conception of human progress, and the processes responsible for it. On Kant’s view, we can only expect collective progress through incremental political reform, and our expectation of progress rests significantly upon our own, specifically moral, reflections upon human (...) activity. (shrink)

This essay shows that according to Kant the philosophy of history is a division of physical teleology, which only meaning is to be a confirmation of the moral teleology which grounds and seeks in the physical world a natural grounding for the standpoint of ends which nature itself is always powerless to bring about. The teleology of freedom seeks in the teleology of nature grounds for hope and its actual achievement, yet without ever filling the void of the separation that (...) prohibits all natural accomplishment of right. That explains the effects of rupture one can find in the Kantian texts, and which are only a problem for the continuist reading which is here refused. Finally, it is shown that genuine historical events consist rather in that which within history cannot knowingly be deduced from history, because they precisely escape from the natural world that is their invariable context. (shrink)

Among many important claims, Allen Wood in Kant's Ethical ought proposes that Kant's philosophy of history can be grasped as a "naturalist" approach, grounding human nature in biology. I suggest some reservations. First, I question Kant's conception of biology as (a still emergent) science. Second, I question Kant's extension of his notion of "natural predisposition" to reason and freedom. Third, I question the naturalism of Kant's philosophy of history by suggesting the excessive role providence must play in Kant's account. The (...) upshot is to find Kant's philosophy of history one of the less persuasive elements in his system of thought, despite Wood's energetic effort at a contemporary reconstruction. (shrink)

This piece presents an account of Kant's notion of provisional right and connects this conception to his defence of two principles of publicity. The argument is to the effect that understanding the notion of provisional right will enable us to comprehend the Kantian picture of the state of nature, the basis of the transition from such a state to the civil condition and also his treatment of international right. The paper also presents the sketch of a Kantian theory of normatively (...) justified institutions. (shrink)

Kant’s _Critique of Judgment_ is one of the most important texts in the history of modern aesthetics. This _GuideBook _discusses the _Third Critique_ section by section, and introduces and assesses: Kant's life and the background of the _Critique of Judgment_ the ideas and text of the _Critique of Judgment_, including a critical explanation of Kant’s theories of natural beauty the continuing relevance of Kant’s work to contemporary philosophy and aesthetics. This _GuideBook_ is an accessible introduction to a notoriously difficult work (...) and will be essential reading for students of Kant and aesthetics. (shrink)

The goal of this study is to reconstruct and evaluate the systematic role of Kant's views on history within his ‛critical' philosophy. Kant's philosophy of history has been neglected in the literature, largely due to the widespread though mistaken perception that it is at odds with central assumptions of Kant’s ‘critical’ thought. I discuss Kant's most important texts on history and examine the relationship between Kant's view of history and the central tenets of his Critiques (in particular, Kant's conception of (...) teleology, his notion of an 'interest of reason,' and the problem of the possibility of the highest good). I argue that Kant's philosophy of history should be seen as an integral (though not entirely unproblematic) part of his mature philosophy. I show this in part by correcting the standard view of Kant's philosophy of history, and in part by highlighting hitherto neglected aspects of his critical philosophy. (shrink)

Not only today, but also in the 18th century the question whether human history reveals moral progress, is widely discussed. In one of his last writings, the second part of The Contest of Faculties: 'A Renewed Attempt to Answer the Question: Is the Human Race Continually Improving?' (1797), Kant answers this question affirmatively. His main reason for this answer resides in the so-called 'historical sign' (Geschichtszeichen), which proves, as Kant writes, the moral tendency of the human race. In this ‘historical (...) sign’ both the French Revolution and the enthusiasm displayed by those who witnessed this event, play an important role. In this article the author evaluates these two elements and tries to assess their value. Contrary to the interpretation of Arendt and Lyotar,he argues that according to Kant there can only be progress in history by establishing legal relations among citizens and nations. In view of this process the principles of the French Revolution are crucially important. (shrink)

My dissertation is a genealogical examination of the question of history and historical experience in post-Enlightenment thinking. I examine Kant, Hegel and Foucault to determine both how the Kantian-Hegelian tradition has framed the question of history for us and whether, through the genealogical method of Foucault, philosophical thinking can step outside of that structure. My central argument is against the objectification of history that is performed in Kant and then carried to its fruition in the work of Hegel. I turn (...) to the genealogical method, as developed by Foucault out of the work of Nietzsche, for the possibilities of breaking from this post-Enlightenment Reason and its claims of transcendence to historical experience. ;The social, political and ethical ramifications of these developments frame my dissertation. An examination of post-Enlightenment thinking about history necessarily leads to the questions of historicism, relativism and essentialism in post-Enlightenment ethics. I argue that the genealogical method of Foucault opens a way of thinking about historicism that does not reduce it to the ethical chaos of a pure subjectivism or a solipsistic relativism. This kind of swift dismissal of historicism derives from a post-Kantian objectification of history that places historical phenomena in strict opposition to the "universal and necessary" bases of ethical practices. The genealogical method opens the possibility of escaping these reductions: it enacts a different kind of thinking through its engagement with plural, historical discourses. Showing different performances of reason, many of which do not operate through universal, necessary or formal criteria, genealogical thinking opens the possibility of thinking differently about human reason and its ethical enactments in the world. Both the ethical and epistemic implications of this kind of opening can then lead to ways of re-thinking problems currently facing the work of feminists and social-political philosophers. (shrink)

This study of Kant's thought concentrates on those of his works in which the theme of world-history intersects with the fundamental metaphysical concerns out of which the three critiques were written: the constitution of a world we can know, transcendental freedom and the interrelation among the basic human faculties. Kant's earliest presentation of world-history in the Allgemeine Naturgeschichte is considered in relation to his revised presentation of classical metaphysics in the Nova dilucidatio in order to bring out how the former (...) treatise, as it touches on the nature of man and the end of the world, radicalizes and exceeds the Leibnizian presuppositions of the latter; the grounding of both man and the world can no longer simply be comprehended by the principle of reason in its classical formulation. In the second chapter Kant's "Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltburgerlicher Absicht" is similarly brought into conjunction with the first Critique and in particular with the renovation of Leibnizian metaphysics in the Canon of Pure Reason; a consideration of world-history from a cosmopolitan Absicht is shown to prepare the way for the posting of absolute freedom on which morality rests. The third and final chapter turns to the section of the Streit der Fakultaten devoted to the question of progress towards the best world. Kant's attempt to found a philosophical mode of augury is shown to rest on the thesis of absolute freedom and to lead to the disclosure of a world-history sign whose decisive moment is an extraordinary affect that corresponds to the singular feeling in which such freedom manifests itself. The difficulty of disclosing the past, securing the constancy of progress and thus discovering a truly world-history sign is finally brought into relation to the Platonic provenance of metaphysics and brought back to a peculiar anamnesis that depends upon both transcendence and transgression . Only on the condition that there is uprightness can progress take place and only on the basis of an unforgettable affect can it be secured. (shrink)

The body of critical literature on Kant's philosophy of history and religion is examined and criticized for its failure to recognize the consistency of Kant's thought. In opposition to it, a new interpretation based on the critical ideas of freedom, morality and teleology is proposed. The transition from the Critiques to history and religion is justified in terms of the notion of "a priori end" and through the recognition of evil. Kant's ideas are viewed in the historical context of Leibniz, (...) Lessing and Herder. ;Kant conceives history as the process of self-creation whereby man overcomes the split within his being between the rational and sensible. Providence and freedom are complementary grounds of this process. Kant's views on biology and history rely on a revolutionary conception of time as a principle of internal development in life. The development of political wisdom and religious symbols add to rational thought an essentially historical dimension. (shrink)