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  1. Kant and Sellars on the Unity of Apperception.David Landy - manuscript
    That Wilfrid Sellars claims that the framework of persons is not a descriptive framework, but a normative one is about as well known as any claim that he makes. This claim is at the core of the famous demand for a synoptic image that closes, “Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man,” makes its appearance at key moments in the grand argument of, “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind,” and is the capstone of Sellars’ engagement with Kant in, Science and (...)
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  2. The Unity of Cognition, or, How to Read the Leitfaden (A79).Dennis Schulting - manuscript
    In the context of a critique of James Conant’s (2016) important new reading of the main argument of the Deduction, I present my current, most detailed interpretation of the well-known Leitfaden passage at A79, which in my view has been misinterpreted by a host of prominent readers. The Leitfaden passage is crucial to understanding the argument of, not just the so-called Metaphysical Deduction, but also the Transcendental Deduction. This new account expands and improves upon the account of the Leitfaden I (...)
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  3. Apperception, Objectivity, and Idealism.Dennis Schulting - manuscript
    In this paper, I explain why for Kant self-consciousness is intimately related to objectivity, how this intimacy translates to real objects, what it means to make judgements about objects, and what idealism has got to do with all of this.
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  4. Signaling Systems and the Transcendental Deduction.A. Ahmed - forthcoming - In T. Goldschmidt K. Pearce (ed.), Idealism: New Essays in Metaphysics.
    The paper offers a model of Kant's claim that unity of consciousness entails objectivity of experience. This claim has nothing especially to do with thought, language or the categories but is a general truth about arbitrary signaling systems of the sort modeled in the paper. In conclusion I draw some consequences for various forms of idealism.
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  5. Kant and the Significance of Self-Consciousness.Matthew Boyle - forthcoming - Philosophy.
    Human beings who have mastered a natural language are self-conscious creatures: they can think, and indeed speak, about themselves in the first person. This dissertation is about the significance of this capacity: what it is and what difference it makes to our minds. My thesis is that the capacity for self-consciousness is essential to rationality, the thing that sets the minds of rational creatures apart from those of mere brutes. This, I argue, is what Kant was getting at in a (...)
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  6. Self-Consciousness and the Priority Question: A Critique of the 'Sensibility First' Reading of Kant.Addison Ellis - forthcoming - Tópicos: Revista de Filosofía.
    This essay presents a critique of what Robert Hanna has recently called the ‘sensibility first’ reading of Kant. I first spell out, in agreement with Hanna, why the contemporary debate among Kant scholars over conceptualism and non-conceptualism must be understood only from within the perspective of what I dub the ‘priority question’—that is, the question whether one or the other of our “two stems” of cognition may ground the objectivity and normativity of the other. I then spell out why the (...)
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  7. What Does It Mean to ‘Act in the Light of’ a Norm? Heidegger and Kant on Commitments and Critique.Sacha Golob - forthcoming - In Matt Burch & Irene McMullin (eds.), Transcending Reason. Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 79-98.
    This paper examines Heidegger’s position on a foundational distinction for Kantian and post-Kantian philosophy: that between acting ‘in the light of’ a norm and acting ‘merely in accordance with it’. In section 1, I introduce the distinction and highlight several relevant similarities between Kant and Heidegger on ontology and the first-person perspective. In section 2, I press the Kantian position further, focusing on the role of inferential commitments in perception: this provides a foil against which Heidegger’s account can be In (...)
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  8. Apperception and Object. Comments on Mario Caimi's Reading of the B-Deduction.Dennis Schulting - forthcoming - Revista de Estudios Kantianos:xx-xx.
    I critically examine one central line of reasoning in Mario Caimi's book »Kant's B Deduction« (Cambridge Publishing, 2014).
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  9. Apperception, Objectivity, and Idealism.Dennis Schulting - forthcoming - In Proceedings of the 13th International Kant Congress. Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter.
    talk Oslo-Kant congress. In this paper, I explain why for Kant self-consciousness is intimately related to objectivity, how this intimacy translates to real objects, what it means to make judgements about objects, and what idealism has got to do with all of this.
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  10. Kant on Empirical Self-Consciousness.Janum Sethi - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
    Kant is said to be the first to distinguish between consciousness of oneself as the subject of one’s experiences and consciousness of oneself as an object, which he calls transcendental and empirical apperception, respectively. Of these, it is empirical apperception that is meant to enable consciousness of any empirical features of oneself; what this amounts to, however, continues to puzzle interpreters. I argue that a key to understanding what empirical apperception consists in is Kant’s claim that each type of apperception (...)
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  11. Meier, Reimarus and Kant on Animal Minds.Jacob Browning - 2021 - Kantian Review 26 (2):185-208.
    Close attention to Kant’s comments on animal minds has resulted in radically different readings of key passages in Kant. A major disputed text for understanding Kant on animals is his criticism of G. F. Meier’s view in the 1762 ‘False Subtlety of the Four Syllogistic Figures’. In this article, I argue that Kant’s criticism of Meier should be read as an intervention into an ongoing debate between Meier and H. S. Reimarus on animal minds. Specifically, while broadly aligning himself with (...)
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  12. Epistemic Agency and the Self-Knowledge of Reason: On the Contemporary Relevance of Kant’s Method of Faculty Analysis.Thomas Land - 2021 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 13):3137-3154.
    Each of Kant’s three Critiques offers an account of the nature of a mental faculty and arrives at this account by means of a procedure I call ‘faculty analysis’. Faculty analysis is often regarded as among the least defensible aspects of Kant’s position; as a consequence, philosophers seeking to inherit Kantian ideas tend to transpose them into a different methodological context. I argue that this is a mistake: in fact faculty analysis is a live option for philosophical inquiry today. My (...)
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  13. Bewusstsein und Selbstbewusstsein bei Kant: Eine neue Rekonstruktion (Kantstudien-Ergänzungshefte Band 215).Yibin Liang - 2021 - Berlin: De Gruyter.
    Dieses Buch dient einem umfassenden Verständnis von Kants Lehre der Struktur des Bewusstseins und des Selbstbewusstseins. Eine facettenreiche Theorie zu diesem Thema lässt sich mit Hilfe des zeitgenössischen begrifflichen Instrumentariums aus den über das Kantische Opus verstreuten Textressourcen herausarbeiten. Mit dieser Rekonstruktion lassen sich viele, scheinbar unüberwindbare, exegetische Unklarheiten aufhellen.
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  14. Transcendental Philosophy As Capacities-First Philosophy.Karl Schafer - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (3):661-686.
    In this essay, I propose a novel way of thinking about Kant’s philosophical methodology during the critical period. According to this interpretation, the critical Kant can generally be understood as operating within a “capacities‐first” philosophical framework – that is, within a framework in which our basic rational or cognitive capacities play both an explanatorily and epistemically fundamental role in philosophy – or, at least, in the sort of philosophy that limited creatures like us are capable of. In discussing this idea, (...)
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  15. Kant and Rödl on the Identity of Self-Consciousness and Objectivity.Addison Ellis - 2020 - Studi Kantiani:141-158.
    Sebastian Rödl’s 2018 book articulates and unfolds the thought that judgment’s self-consciousness is identical with its objectivity. This view is laid forth in a Hegelian spirit, against the spirit of Kant’s merely formal or transcendental idealism. I review Rödl’s central theses and then offer a criticism of his reading of Kant. I hold that we can agree with Rödl that self-consciousness is identical with objectivity (though only in a ‘formal’ sense). We can also agree with Rödl that this identity enables (...)
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  16. Kant on Self-Consciousness as Self-Limitation.Addison Ellis - 2020 - Contemporary Studies in Kantian Philosophy 5.
    I argue that, for Kant, there is a point at which the notions of self-consciousness and self-limitation become one. I proceed by spelling out a logical progression of forms of self-consciousness in Kant’s philosophy, where at each stage we locate the limits of the capacity in question and ask what it takes to know those limits. After briefly sketching a notion of self-consciousness available even to the animal, we look at whether there could be a notion of self-consciousness available to (...)
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  17. What Do Animals See? Intentionality, Objects and Kantian Nonconceptualism.Sacha Golob - 2020 - In Allais & Callanan (eds.), Kant and Animals. Oxford University Press.
    This article addresses three questions concerning Kant’s views on non-rational animals: do they intuit spatio-temporal particulars, do they perceive objects, and do they have intentional states? My aim is to explore the relationship between these questions and to clarify certain pervasive ambiguities in how they have been understood. I first disambiguate various nonequivalent notions of objecthood and intentionality: I then look closely at several models of objectivity present in Kant’s work, and at recent discussions of representational and relational theories of (...)
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  18. Kant on Cognizing Oneself as a Spontaneous Cognizer.Markus Kohl - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (3):395-412.
    I examine a range of issues concerning Kant's conception of cognitive spontaneity. I consider whether we can cognize or know ourselves as spontaneous cognizers, and why Kant seems to regard the notion of cognitive spontaneity as less problematic than the idea of moral spontaneity. As an organizing theme of my discussion, I use an apparent tension between the A-edition and the B-edition of the first Critique. Against common interpretations, I argue that in the B-edition Kant does not revoke his claim (...)
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  19. Kant on Inner Sensations and the Parity Between Inner and Outer Sense.Yibin Liang - 2020 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 7 (10):307-338.
    Does inner sense, like outer sense, provide inner sensations or, in other words, a sensory manifold of its own? Advocates of the disparity thesis on inner and outer sense claim that it does not. This interpretation, which is dominant in the preexisting literature, leads to several inconsistencies when applied to Kant’s doctrine of inner experience. Yet, while so, the parity thesis, which is the contrasting view, is also unable to provide a convincing interpretation of inner sensations. In this paper, I (...)
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  20. “I Am the Original of All Objects”: Apperception and the Substantial Subject.Colin McLear - 2020 - Philosophers' Imprint 20 (26):1-38.
    Kant’s conception of the centrality of intellectual self-consciousness, or “pure apperception”, for scientific knowledge of nature is well known, if still obscure. Here I argue that, for Kant, at least one central role for such self-consciousness lies in the acquisition of the content of concepts central to metaphysical theorizing. I focus on one important concept, that of <substance>. I argue that, for Kant, the representational content of the concept <substance> depends not just on the capacity for apperception, but on the (...)
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  21. On the Transcendental Freedom of the Intellect.Colin McLear - 2020 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 7 (2):35-104.
    Kant holds that the applicability of the moral ‘ought’ depends on a kind of agent-causal freedom that is incompatible with the deterministic structure of phenomenal nature. I argue that Kant understands this determinism to threaten not just morality but the very possibility of our status as rational beings. Rational beings exemplify “cognitive control” in all of their actions, including not just rational willing and the formation of doxastic attitudes, but also more basic cognitive acts such as judging, conceptualizing, and synthesizing.
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  22. Apperception and Self-Consciousness in Kant and German Idealism.Dennis Schulting - 2020 - London: Bloomsbury.
    blurb from publisher: "In Apperception and Self-Consciousness in Kant and German Idealism, Dennis Schulting examines the themes of reflexivity, self-consciousness, representation and apperception in the philosophy of Immanuel Kant and German Idealism more widely. Central to Schulting’s argument is the claim that all of human experience is inherently self-referential and that this is part of a self-reflexivity of thought, or what is called transcendental apperception, a Kantian insight that was first apparent in the work of Christian Wolff and came to (...)
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  23. Kant, the Transcendental Designation of I, and the Direct Reference Theory.Luca Forgione - 2019 - Theoria : An International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science 34 (1): 31-49.
    The aim of this paper is to address the semantic issue of the nature of the representation I and of the transcendental designation, i.e., the self-referential apparatus involved in transcendental apperception. The I think, the bare or empty representation I, is the representational vehicle of the concept of transcendental subject; as such, it is a simple representation. The awareness of oneself as thinking is only expressed by the I: the intellectual representation which performs a referential function of the spontaneity of (...)
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  24. The Structure of I-Thoughts. Kant and Wittgenstein on the Genesis of Cartesian Self.Luca Forgione - 2019 - Paradigmi. Rivista di Critica Filosofica 3:535-548.
    The analysis of the structure of the I-thoughts is intertwined with several epistemic and metaphysical questions. The aim of this paper is to highlight that the absence of an identification component does not imply that the “I" doesn’t perform a referential function, nor that it necessarily involves a specific metaphysical thesis on the nature of the self-conscious subject. Particularly, as far as the Cartesian illusion concerning the thinking subject’s immaterial nature is concerned, Kant and Wittgenstein seem to share the same (...)
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  25. ‘I Do Not Cognize Myself Through Being Conscious of Myself as Thinking’: Self-Knowledge and the Irreducibility of Self-Objectification in Kant.Thomas Khurana - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (7):956-979.
    The paper argues that Kant’s distinction between pure and empirical apperception cannot be interpreted as distinguishing two self-standing types of self-knowledge. For Kant, empirical and pure apperception need to co-operate to yield substantive self-knowledge. What makes Kant’s account interesting is his acknowledgment that there is a deep tension between the way I become conscious of myself as subject through pure apperception and the way I am given to myself as an object of inner sense. This tension remains problematic in the (...)
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  26. Expansion of Self-Consciousness in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason.Olga Lenczewska - 2019 - Kant-Studien 110 (4):554–594.
    This paper is a novel attempt at reconstructing Kant’s account of self-consciousness in the first Critique by making evident its gradual expository progression, and at identifying the epistemic status of the two modes of self-consciousness: pure and empirical. I trace the gradual exposition of theoretical self-consciousness across three crucial parts of the book: the Transcendental Deduction, the Refutation of Idealism, and the Paralogisms of Pure Reason. In doing so, I show that the account of theoretical self-consciousness is not presented to (...)
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  27. Kant on Reflection and Virtue, by Melissa Merritt. [REVIEW]Colin Marshall - 2019 - Mind 128 (511):1002-1011.
    Kant on Reflection and Virtue, by MerrittMelissa. Cambridge: Cambridge Press, 2018. Pp. xvi + 219.
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  28. The Mind's "I". [REVIEW]Colin McLear - 2019 - European Journal of Philosophy 27 (1):255-265.
  29. Review: Kant on Reflection and Virtue (by Melissa Merritt). [REVIEW]Francey Russell - 2019 - Society for German Idealism and Romanticism 2:60-72.
  30. I, Me, Mine: Back to Kant and Back Again. [REVIEW]Dennis Schulting - 2019 - Philosophical Review 128 (1):107-111.
    review of Béatrice Longuenesse latest book on Kant and self-consciousness I, Me, Mine (Oxford 2017).
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  31. Kant’s Deduction From Apperception: An Essay on the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories.Dennis Schulting - 2019 - Berlin, Germany: De Gruyter.
    In focusing on the systematic deduction of the categories from a principle, Schulting takes up anew the controversial project of the eminent German Kant scholar Klaus Reich, whose monograph “The Completeness of Kant's Table of Judgments” made the case that the logical functions of judgement can all be derived from the objective unity of apperception and can be shown to link up with one another systematically. -/- Common opinion among Kantians today has it that Kant did not mean to derive (...)
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  32. Waxman on Intuition and Apperception. [REVIEW]Colin McLear - 2018 - Critique:NA.
    A critical discussion of Waxman's recent book, Kant's Anatomy of the Intelligent Mind.
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  33. Kant on Reflection and Virtue.Melissa Merritt - 2018 - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    There can be no doubt that Kant thought we should be reflective: we ought to care to make up our own minds about how things are and what is worth doing. Philosophical objections to the Kantian reflective ideal have centred on concerns about the excessive control that the reflective person is supposed to exert over her own mental life, and Kantians who feel the force of these objections have recently drawn attention to Kant’s conception of moral virtue as it is (...)
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  34. Zelfbewustzijn, objectiviteit en idealisme--over Kant's radicale subjectivisme.Dennis Schulting - 2018 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 80 (2):313-322.
    This is a précis of my book Kant's Radical Subjectivism, to be published as part of a symposium dedicated to the book, with critics Hein van den Berg, Karin de Boer, Henny Blomme en Joris Spigt, including a reply by me. The symposium is in Dutch, but the pre-print uploaded here is in English!
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  35. Repliek op de kritiek van de Boer, Blomme, van den Berg en Spigt.Dennis Schulting - 2018 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 80 (2):363-378.
    In this article, I respond to critiques of my book Kant’s Radical Subjectivism: Perspectives on the Transcendental Deduction (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017). I address issues that are raised concerning objectivity, the nature of the object, the role of transcendental apperception and the imagination, and idealism. More in particular I respond to an objection against my reading of the necessary existence of things in themselves and their relation to appearances. I also briefly respond to a question that relates to the debate (...)
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  36. Béatrice Longuenesse, I, Me, Mine: Back to Kant, and Back Again Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017 Pp. Xx+257 ISBN 9780199665761 $45.00. [REVIEW]Curtis Sommerlatte - 2018 - Kantian Review 23 (3):504-510.
  37. Kant, Metaphysical Space, and the Unity of the Subject.Jessica J. Williams - 2018 - In Violetta Waibel & Margit Ruffing (eds.), Proceedings of the 12th International Kant Congress: Nature and Freedom. Berlin, Germany: pp. 1141-1147.
  38. Can't Kant Cognize His Empirical Self? Or, a Problem for (Almost) Every Interpretation of the Refutation of Idealism.Andrew Chignell - 2017 - In Anil Gomes & Andrew Stephenson (eds.), Kant and the Philosophy of Mind: Perception, Reason, and the Self. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 138-158.
    Kant seems to think of our own mental states or representations as the primary objects of inner sense. But does he think that these states also inhere in something? And, if so, is that something an empirical substance that is also cognized in inner sense? This chapter provides textual and philosophical grounds for thinking that, although Kant may agree with Hume that the self is not ‘given’ in inner sense exactly, he does think of the self as cognized through inner (...)
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  39. The Principles of Apperception.Corey W. Dyck - 2017 - In Udo Thiel & Giuseppe Motta (eds.), Immanuel Kant: Die Einheit des Bewusstseins (Kant-Studien Ergänzungshefte). DeGruyter. pp. 32-46.
    In this paper, I argue that there are multiple principles of apperception which jointly constitute the foundation of Kant's argument in the transcendental deduction.
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  40. The Case for Absolute Spontaneity in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason.Addison Ellis - 2017 - Con-Textos Kantianos (6):138-164.
    Kant describes the understanding as a faculty of spontaneity. What this means is that our capacity to judge what is true is responsible for its own exercises, which is to say that we issue our judgments for ourselves. To issue our judgments for ourselves is to be self-conscious – i.e., conscious of the grounds upon which we judge. To grasp the spontaneity of the understanding, then, we must grasp the self-consciousness of the understanding. I argue that what Kant requires for (...)
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  41. Kant and the Simple Representation “I”.Luca Forgione - 2017 - International Philosophical Quarterly 57 (2):173-194.
    The aim of this paper is to focus on certain characterizations of “I think” and the “transcendental subject” in an attempt to verify a connection with certain metaphysical characterizations of the thinking subject that Kant introduced in the critical period. Most importantly, two distinct meanings of “I think” need be distinguished: in the Transcendental Deduction “I think” is the act of apperception; in the Transcendental Deduction and in the section of Paralogisms “I think” is taken in its representational nature. It (...)
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  42. What Does the Transcendental Deduction Prove, and When Does It Prove It? Henry Allison on Kant’s Transcendental Deduction.Paul Guyer - 2017 - Kant-Studien 108 (4):589-600.
  43. Mario Caimi,Kant’s B Deduction, Trans. Maria Del Carmen Caimi. Newcastle Upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2014. Pp. 160 ISBN 9781443865371 (Hbk) £41.99. [REVIEW]Thomas Land - 2017 - Kantian Review 22 (3):509-514.
  44. Kant on Consciousness, Obscure Representations and Cognitive Availability.Yibin Liang - 2017 - Philosophical Forum 48 (4):345-368.
  45. Kant's Transcendental Deduction: An Analytical‐Historical Commentary, by Henry Allison. Oxford University Press, 2015, 496 Pp. ISBN 13: 978‐0‐19‐872485‐8 Hb £75.00. [REVIEW]Colin McLear - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (2):546-554.
  46. Kant and Thought Insertion.Golob Sacha - 2017 - Palgrave Communications 3.
    This article examines the phenomenon of thought insertion, one of the most extreme disruptions to the standard mechanisms for self-knowledge, in the context of Kant's philosophy of mind. This juxtaposition is of interest for two reasons, aside from Kant's foundational significance for any modern work on the self. First, thought insertion presents a challenge to Kant's approach. For example, the first Critique famously held that " The 'I think' must be able to accompany all my representations " (Kant, KrV, B132). (...)
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  47. Mind Critical Notice of Kant's Transcendental Deduction, by Henry Allison.Golob Sacha - 2017 - Mind 126 (501):278-289.
    Critical Notice of Kant's Transcendental Deduction, by Henry Allison. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015. Pp. Xv + 477.
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  48. "Pure Consciousness Is Found Already in Logic": Apperception, Judgement and Spontaneity.Dennis Schulting - 2017 - In Kant's Radical Subjectivism. Perspectives on the Transcendental Deduction. London, UK: Palgrave. pp. 97-114.
  49. Kant's Threefold Synthesis On a Moderately Conceptualist Interpretation.Dennis Schulting - 2017 - In Kant's Radical Subjectivism. Perspectives on the Transcendental Deduction. London, UK: Palgrave. pp. 257-293.
    In this chapter I advance a moderately conceptualist interpretation of Kant’s account of the threefold synthesis in the A-Deduction. Often the first version of TD, the A-Deduction, is thought to be less conceptualist than the later B-version from 1787 (e.g. Heidegger 1991, 1995). Certainly, it seems that in the B-Deduction Kant puts more emphasis on the role of the understanding in determining the manifold of representations in intuition than he does in the A-Deduction. It also appears that in the A-Deduction (...)
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  50. Apperception, Self-Consciousness, and Self-Knowledge in Kant.Dennis Schulting - 2017 - In Matthew Altman (ed.), The Palgrave Kant Handbook. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 139–61.
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