This Element addresses three questions about Kant's guarantee thesis by examining the 'first addendum' of his Philosophical Sketch: how the guarantor powers interrelate, how there can be a guarantee without undermining freedom and why there is a guarantee in the first place. Kant's conception of an interplay of human and divine rational agency encompassing nature is crucial: on moral grounds, we are warranted to believe the 'world author' knew that if he were to bring about the world, the 'supreme' good (...) would come about too. Perpetual peace is the condition that enables the supreme good to be realized in history. (shrink)

Elaborating on the substantial parallels between Molina’s and Kant’s attempts to reconcile human freedom with divine foreknowledge and natural causal determinism respectively, my aim is to establish a proper historical connection as well. Leibniz is shown to be the crucial mediator in two respects: (i) Kant knew Molina’s account of divine knowledge in general in its Leibnizian version through Baumgarten’s Metaphysica. In this work, scientia media plays no role in the explication as to how God knows absolute future contingents. (ii) (...) In the Critique of Practical Reason Kant resorted to doctrines similar to Molina’s in his criticism of Leibniz’s alternative explication which drew on complete concepts of monads. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to confirm that it was Hamann's translation of Hume's "Treatise" (I.4.7) which triggered Kant's critical turn in 1768/69. If this is indeed so, then Kant's inaugural dissertation must be reassessed, in particular the doctrine, to be found there, that we have cognitive access to the intelligible world. This doctrine is part of a strategy for tackling the problem highlighted by Hume; that there may be conflicting principles at work in the human mind, i.e., an (...) antinomy. The dissertation's strategy failed and so raised the question of how categories can refer to objects. (shrink)

In his new book, Rossi emphasizes the prominent role of enlightened religion in the political project of establishing perpetual peace. My paper discusses Rossi’s stance on the question as to whether Kant, in his later years, moved to an immanentist conception of the highest good. Kant’s own position in this regard can arguably be better described as comprehensive, according to which an immanent and a transcendent conception of the highest good are upheld as realizable side by side. Rossi’s account looks (...) perfectly consistent with such a view. One of the reasons for such a comprehensive reading is that “immanent” and “secular” do not coincide in Kant in the first place. Seen in this comprehensive way, and while a version of the highest good ought to be realized immanently, we cannot be certain that this will indeed happen. If it does indeed happen, the immortality postulate, which Kant never abandoned, renders it rational to believe that the immanent version of the highest good is merely a step towards its transcendent realization. Affinities of Rossi’s approach to the suggestion that Kant subscribes to a political theology based on what has been called “Molinism minimally defined” will also be explored. (shrink)

While Kant’s position concerning human freedom and divine foreknowledge is perhaps the least Molinist element of his multifaceted take on free will, Kant’s Molinism (minimally defined) is undeniable when it comes to the threat ensuing from the idea of creation. In line with incompatibilism and with careful qualifications in place, he ultimately suggests regarding free agents as uncreated. Given the limitations of our rational insight, this assumption is indispensable for granting that finite free agents can acquire their intelligible characters by (...) themselves. Nonetheless, Kant concedes that creation may, as a matter of fact, be compatible with what for Molina is the pre-volitionality of the counterfactuals of freedom. (shrink)

The distinction of things in themselves and appearances is an integral part of Kant’s transcendental idealism, yet it has often been met with rather significant hostility. Moreover, what surely has not contributed to the popularity of this Kantian doctrine is that there are, or at least there appear to be, two distinct models, detectable in Kant’s texts, to account for this distinction. Most commonly, these two models are called the “two aspect view” on the one hand and the “two world (...) view” on the other, but it is possible that these labels themselves invite misunderstandings and obscure rather than clarify what Kant had in mind with his distinction. In this paper, I shall first briefly discuss how these two models could be described and labelled in a more suitable manner, namely as the “one composite entity view” and the “two separate objects view”. Subsequently, I will enquire which of the models is pertinent for Kant’s solution to the 3rd antinomy. I will try to show that although the two models appear to be incompatible, it is at least plausible to read Kant as using both of them in this crucial text of his oeuvre. Moreover, Kant’s strategy in solving the freedom problem on the basis of an indirectly realist account of the divine intellect provides the clue to understanding how these seemingly incompatible models can co-exist without forcing Kant into maintaining contradictory claims. (shrink)

In this paper, I shall try to elucidate the relationship between nature and providence with regard to the function of guaranteeing perpetual peace in Kant's 1795 essay, an issue which, presumably for the very reason of providence being granted some role in the first place, has led to noticeable unease in Kant scholarship. Providence simply does not seem to fit in well into Kant’s philosophical account of history given the emphasis he puts on the notion of human freedom. The main (...) idea grounding my approach is that the notion of providence is not only not a threat to human freedom, but perhaps the most important ingredient in Kant’s solution of the compatibility problem with regard to human freedom and natural causal determinism. This solution of the compatibility problem, as I have argued elsewhere, must be understood along the lines of a so-called “altered law-compatibilism” which makes the special laws of nature dependent on human freedom. The role of providence then is to elucidate or explicate how such a dependency is possible. Moreover, Kant’s own definition of “providence”, which he develops as an alternative to Baumgarten’s, provides the resources of identifying it – in a sense to be qualified below – with nature and hence provides the means for solving a long-standing riddle in Kant’s account. Of course, the compatibility problem does not take centre stage in the guarantor section in any way. Rather, what Kant is doing there can best be understood as presupposing and being closely related to his compatibility argument: He can be read as spelling out the dependency of laws on nature with regard to the course of history. (shrink)

First, I will discuss several reasons as to why there is still almost a reluctance to reading Kant’s philosophy in the context of the scholastic tradition. The focus will be on (i) the label “revolutionary” often attached to Kant’s thought thereby suggesting a radical break with the past, especially with regard to philosophers often perceived as conservative, and (ii) the issue of confessional ramifications (not unrelated to the first point) will also be touched upon, albeit briefly. Then, two examples will (...) be investigated with regard to which a recourse to this context provides important clues to the philosophical points at issue. These are Kant’s claims that on the one hand, existence is not a real predicate, and on the other, that appearances are nothing but representations. (shrink)

This paper is concerned with some aspects of Kant’s transcendental idealism, in particular the claim that objects of experience are nothing but representations in us, and its connection to the distinction of things in themselves and appearances. This claim has prompted phenomenalist readings which have rightly been rejected almost unanimously. Instead it has been suggested to account for Kant’s distinction in terms of mind-dependent or subject-relativized properties and properties which are not mind-dependent or subject-relativized. Along this line, the “nothing but (...) representation”-claim is then sometimes understood in terms of the secondary-quality analogy, which Kant endorses in the Prolegomena, but rejects in the first Critique. As an alternative, I attempt to interpret Kant along the lines of Suárez’s formal/objective distinction and Scotus’s modal explication of being. (shrink)

I pursue a suggestion by Kreimendahl according to which it was Hamann's translation of Section I.4.7 of Hume's "Treatise" which triggered Kant's critical turn in 1768/69. In the section Hume put forward the idea that the principles at work in the human mind might be radically at odds with each other, i.e., that there might be an "antinomy" in the original meaning of the word. My claims are (i) that in his dissertation Kant attempted to solve the problem of antinomy (...) and (ii) that the question as to how categories can refer to objects was raised by the strategy adopted there. (shrink)

The focus of this paper is on Kant and on a text which has often been drawn upon when talking about the present situation of philosophy at university, namely his 'The Conflict of the Faculties' of 1798. Kant’s claims, though not applicable to the contemporary situation directly, can indeed be worked out in a way which can assign a distinct and clearly identifiable role for university-based philosophy. I need to emphasize, though, that I am not suggesting that this is the (...) only way Kant’s thoughts in this respect can be adapted to and utilized for such an account. Quite the contrary, Kant’s text offers a manifold of highly important options here. In my article I will seek to establish the following claims: a) Kant, in his later years, which therefore amounts to something like his “mature” position, subscribed to a conception of a public use of reason which mainly referred to the Faculties of Philosophy at universities. b) Kant’s dismissal of philosophy according to the school conception of it must not be taken as a dismissal of academic philosophy altogether. Philosophy practiced at university by professionals is vital for Kant to build philosophy as a fully worked out discipline and to answer questions revolving around the issue of the compatibility of the theoretical standpoint and Kant’s own moral theory. c) Neither a) nor b) can be immediately applied to the contemporary situation we find ourselves in. Combining elements of a) and b), however, a possible route for the actualization of Kant’s ideas may open up. At least one of the functions for which university-based philosophy is uniquely qualified is the assessment of the implications of progress in the natural sciences for the conception of a moral standpoint in general, and as such for a core element of our self-understanding as rational beings. (shrink)

This paper attempts to shed light on Kant’s distinction between things in themselves and appearances. It draws on the early modern debate about the nature of divine knowledge which resonates in Kant’s lectures on metaphysics and natural theology. The problem as to how divine foreknowledge of human actions is compatible with their freedom is of particular relevance, since the solution to the problem of human freedom is at the core of transcendental idealism. Philosophers such as Molina take divine cognition of (...) free human acts to arise independently of objects external to the divine mind and to be concerned first and foremost with mind-internal ideas. This strategy is crucial for solving an important puzzle, as it shows that a two-world and a two-aspect reading of the distinction are compatible after all, since – at least in the sense of a conceptual possibility – things in themselves have correlates. (shrink)

This book claims that the combined treatment of human freedom and divine creation in the third antinomy is crucial for Kant's solution of the freedom and determinism issue. The idea of the world originating in God's creative reason has a twofold task: (i) to justify the determinism thesis within the regulative use of theoretical reason, (ii) to establish a variant of compatibilism both similar and superior to Boethius's account. Kant's theory of time and his strictly moral conception of the notion (...) of the best possible world allows him to even grant the ability to do otherwise to human beings. (shrink)

Insole claims that the Critical Kant is by and large a mere conservationist, transcendental-idealistically modified through the distinction between things in themselves and appearances. ‘Mere conservationism’ is a position within the debate about the interplay of God as the first cause and the created entities as secondary causes and belongs to the doctrine of divine concursus. For Insole, it is by virtue of this mere conservationism with regard to things in themselves as opposed to appearances, that transcendental freedom of man, (...) required in turn for Kant’s moral theory to prevail, can be upheld. I shall be focusing on two points of disagreement. These concern the so-called compatibility question regarding the threats emerging from God to human freedom. In my view, it is doubtful (i) whether, in this regard, Kant really attempted to establish that human freedom in the strong form required can be upheld by subscribing to mere conservationism regarding things in themselves in the manner Insole suggests, and whether Kant is successful in this attempt. Moreover, (ii) it is not obvious that a so-called ‘concurrentist’ view, i.e. a view according to which God’s causal activities with regard to the world exceed creation and conservation, would commit Kant to a compatibilist view in a more conventional sense. (shrink)

Drawing on recent Aristotelian readings of Kant's notion of natural causality with an emphasis on substances as causes, I will try to explain how persons can make a difference in the world of appearances by virtue of their rationality. For Kant, the clue is that the peculiar mode of a substance's natural causality supervenes on in-itself features, among which is the mode or character of the person's rationality. Thus, a wedge can be driven between natural necessity and metaphysical necessity, opening (...) up space for a strategy both reminiscent of and superior to that of Leibniz. (shrink)

I examine two recent accounts of Kant's version of compatibilism, i.e., Hudson's reconstruction of Kant as an "anomalous monist" avant la lettre, and Wood's interpretation along the lines of a modified version of Boethius's "eternity solution". To retain the advantages of both strategies, yet avoid their respective shortcomings, I suggest approaching Kant's doctrine from his theology lectures and their concept of universal providence. This (probably Molinist) notion, an integral element of the regulative use of reason, allows Kant to regard, in (...) part, the actual laws of nature as a function of the individual characters of human beings. (shrink)

In this review article I critically discuss Hudson's claims that (i) Kant is a Davidsonian anomalous monist avant la lettre and that (ii) Kant's approach provides the resources for undermining van Inwagen's consequence argument. While I disagree with regard to (i) in the face of Kant's causality thesis about reason as something non-physical, I agree with regard to (ii). The attack on van Inwagen, however, only works because Kant, in his account of the regulative use of reason, draws on doctrines (...) pertaining to philosophical theology. (shrink)