Henri Bergson

Em sua última obra, As Duas Fontes da Moral e da Religião, Henri Bergson investiga as origens, o desenvolvimento e a manutenção da sociedade humana por meio da distinção entre a sociedade fechada, baseada nos instintos primitivos de conservação da vida, e a sociedade aberta, fundada sobre a aspiração que impulsiona o homem à construção de uma vida em sociedade mais harmoniosa. Segundo o autor, os ideais democráticos são frutos da abertura de que as sociedades necessitam para seu progresso, o (...) qual, aos poucos, abrandaria a pressão das exigências impostas pela natureza para a conservação da vida em sociedade e possibilitaria aos homens conviverem mais livremente e mais afetuosamente com vistas a uma sociedade mais justa e sem tantos conflitos e mortes. Contudo, como escapar às determinações que a natureza impôs para que a vida em sociedade se mantivesse e conseguir que os homens se abram a outro tipo de vivência em conjunto? É esta a questão que o presente artigo procura investigar. Palavras-chave: Bergson, moral, política, mística. (shrink)

In this paper, I discuss Gaston Bachelard’s criticism of Henri Bergson’s employment of intuition as the specific method of philosophy, and as a reliable means of acquiring knowledge. I locate Bachelard’s criticism within the reception of Bergsonian intuition by rationalist philosophers who subscribed to the Third Republic’s ethos. I argue that the reasons of Bachelard’s rejection of Bergsonian intuition were not only epistemological, but also ethical and pedagogical. His view of knowledge as mediated, social, and historical, cannot be separated from (...) his conceptions of society, education, and the human being. (shrink)

The similarities between William James’ Stream of Consciousness and Henri Bergson’s La durée réelle have often been noted. Both emphasize the fundamentally temporal nature of our conscious experience and its constant flow. However, in this article, I argue that despite surface similarities between the OP theories, they are fundamentally different. The ultimate reason for the differences between the theories is that James believed that we should reject psychological explanations that depend on synthesis within the mental sphere. This is because such (...) explanations are incompatible with empiricism. Instead, we should look to the physiological mechanisms underpinning mental states. In contrast, Bergson was an adamant defender of a form of mental processing which he called qualitative synthesis. Duration itself, for Bergson, is a form of qualitative synthesis. However, in 1906, less than five years before James died, Bergson convinced him to change his mind. This results in a huge shift in James’ thought. Unless we understand how far apart James and Bergson were prior to this shift, we will not have a proper picture of the full influence of Bergson on James’ thought, nor of the major changes to James’ philosophy that occurred near the end of his life. (shrink)

« Percevoir, dit Bergson, finit par n'être plus qu'une occasion de se souvenir. » De se souvenir ou de réfléchir? De Descartes à Bergson, toute la différence est là. Et, dans le fond, les deux doctrines sont si proches que l'une ne tarde pas à nous paraître comme la variation de l'autre. Qu'on réfléchisse ou que l'on se souvienne, la perception se fait comme un oubli de ce que l'on perçoit. Mais, tôt ou tard, il faut bien que les choses (...) reviennent et qu'on en tienne compte: cela se voit au bout du souvenir, chez Bergson, au bout de cinq méditations, chez Descartes. Et, rétablies dans leur juridiction, elles nous forcent de penser d'autre façon ce que l'intelligence seule imaginait de concevoir. Du côté de Descartes comme dans celui de Bergson, la philosophie se présente alors comme l'effort pour composer un équilibre entre ces deux postulations adverses, celle de la perception et celle de la réflexion. « Endlich, sagt Bergson, ist die Wahrnehmung nur eine Gelegenheit zurückzudenken. » Zurück- oder nachzudenken? Darin besteht, zwischen Descartes und Bergson, die ganze Verschiedenheit. Und im Grunde genommen, sind die zwei Lehrgebäude so nahe verwandt, daß nicht viel daran fehlt, die eine als eine Veränderung der anderen erscheinen zu lassen. Ob man nun nachdenkt, oder sich erinnert, so stellt sich die Wahrnehmung als ein Vergessen dessen dar, was man vernimmt. Über kurz oder lang aber, müssen die Sachen wiederkommen und darauf muß man Wert legen: das geschieht, bei Bergson, am Ende der Erinnerung, bei Descartes, am Ende von fünf Meditationen. Und in ihrer Gerichtsbarkeit wiederhergestellt, zwingen sie (d. h. die Sachen) uns auf eine andere Weise zu denken was der Verstand allein zu fassen ersonnen hat. Seitens Descartes, sowie seitens Bergson, stellt sich die Philosophie dar als die Anstrengung ein Gleichgewicht zu bilden, zwischen jene zwei gegensätzlichen Forderungen, die der Wahrnehmung und die der Überlegung. (shrink)

Recent philosophy has witnessed a renewed interest in the works and ideas of Henri Bergson (1859–1941). But while contemporary scholarship has sought to rehabilitate Bergson’s insights on time, memory, consciousness, and human freedom, comparatively little attention has been paid to Bergson’s relationship to pantheism. By revisiting the ‘pantheism’ controversy surrounding Bergsonian philosophy during Bergson’s lifetime, this article argues that the panentheistic notion of ‘being-in-God’ can serve as an illuminating framework for the interpretation of Bergson’s philosophy. By examining the ‘pantheist’ readings (...) of Bergson and comparing and contrasting Bergson’s philosophy of life with Spinoza’s panentheistic metaphysics, this paper shows that an account of ‘being-in-Life’ is key to Bergson’s metaphysical outlook as well as his account of philosophy as a practice of ‘intuitive’ thinking. In so doing, this paper highlights some of the implicit religious motifs not only in Bergson’s metaphysical outlook but also in his conception of the task of philosophy. (shrink)

L'actualité de la pensée de Bergson serait liée non pas à un ensemble de thèses mais à l'insistance d'une interrogation qu'il aurait formulée pour la première fois dans sa radicalité. Cette interrogation est celle qui met à jour la difficulté d'un commencement proprement et seulement humain de la réflexion. The current importance of Bergson's thought is not due to any set of theorems, but to the urgency of an inquiry, whose radical nature he would have been the first to consider, (...) and which remains pressing to day. This inquiry brings to light the difficulty of a beginning of a reflexion wich is rightfully and solely human. (shrink)

In this paper, we argue that the French philosopher Henri Bergson was a hidden interlocutor in Susan Stebbing’s critique of Arthur Eddington in her Philosophy and the Physicists. First, we outline Stebbing’s critique of Eddington’s philosophical- physical writings with a particular emphasis on her case against Eddington’s account of the passage of time. Second, we provide evidence that Eddington’s philosophy is, at its core, Bergsonian and make the case that Eddington was directly influenced by Bergson’s philosophy of la durée. Third, (...) we lay out Stebbing’s critique of Bergsonism in her Pragmatism and French Voluntarism and identify important similarities with her critique of Eddington over twenty years later. In doing so, we show that it is Eddington’s Bergsonism that she is attacking. Finally, we situate Stebbing’s criticisms of both Eddington and Bergson within two wider conflicts that emerged in early twentieth century British philosophy: one between an objectively describable time of physics and subjective temporal experience, and the other between science and intuition. (shrink)

Resumo: Tendo como contexto as mudanças paradigmáticas da Atualidade, o objetivo deste artigo é refletir sobre os fundamentos filosóficos de uma educação com as diferenças a partir do conceito de duração desenvolvido por Henri Bergson. A teoria bergsoniana da duração instaura uma visão radical das diferenças humanas, baseada nos seguintes aspectos: a dimensão viva e pulsante das temporalidades dos diversos sujeitos; a irredutibilidade das diferentes temporalidades humanas a signos matemáticos; a totalização da temporalidade no âmbito da memória; e, enfim, seu (...) potencial de liberdade e criação. Partindo dos referidos fundamentos filosóficos, o artigo defende que uma educação com as diferenças precisa repensar a noção de sujeito ideal, as práticas de ensino e avaliação baseadas em quantificações e classificações, as lógicas fragmentadas e impessoais de produção de conhecimento e, finalmente, a ideia de formação para a liberdade e a responsabilidade ética. Palavras-chave: Duração; Henri Bergson; Educação; Diferenças. The duration in Henri Bergson: foundation of education with the differences: Taking the current paradigmatic changes as a context, the aim of this article is to reflect on the philosophical foundations of an education with the differences based on the concept of duration developed by Henri Bergson. The bergsonian theory of duration establishes a radical view of human differences, based on the following aspects: the living and pulsating dimension of the temporalities of the different subjects; the irreducibility of different human temporalities to mathematical signs; the totalization of temporality within the scope of memory; and, finally, its potential for freedom and creation. Based on these philosophical foundations, the article argues that education with the differences needs to rethink the notion of ideal subject, teaching and evaluation practices based on quantifications and classifications, fragmented and impersonal logics of knowledge production and, finally, the idea of formation for freedom and ethical responsibility. Key-words: Duration; Henri Bergson; Education; Differences. La duración en Henri Bergson: fundamento de la educación con las diferencias Resumen: Tomando como contexto los cambios paradigmáticos actuales, el objetivo de este artículo es reflexionar sobre los fundamentos filosóficos de una educación con las diferencias basada en el concepto de duración desarrollado por Henri Bergson. La teoría bergsoniana de la duración establece una visión radical de las diferencias humanas, basada en los siguientes aspectos: la dimensión viva y pulsante de las temporalidades de los diferentes sujetos; la irreductibilidad de diferentes temporalidades humanas a signos matemáticos; la totalización de la temporalidad en el ámbito de la memoria; y, finalmente, su potencial de libertad y creación. Con base en estos fundamentos filosóficos, el artículo sostiene que la educación con las diferencias necesita repensar la noción de sujeto ideal, prácticas de enseñanza y evaluación basadas en cuantificaciones y clasificaciones, lógicas fragmentadas e impersonales de producción de conocimiento y, finalmente, la idea de formación para la libertad y la responsabilidad ética. Palabras clave: Duración; Henri Bergson; Educación; Diferencias. Data de registro: 27/10/2021 Data de aceite: 19/01/2022. (shrink)

Deconstruction and duration are arguably the two most important theories of time to emerge from French philosophy in the twentieth century. Yet, despite the resurgence of interest in Bergson, scholars have ignored Derrida’s own discussions of Bergson, both positive and negative, throughout his career. This lack of attention obscures an important influence on Derrida’s early thought, and hampers our ability to understand the nature of Derrida’s relationship to fields such as new materialism, posthumanism, and affect studies, that frequently turn to (...) Bergson for inspiration. This paper addresses this gap by tracking Derrida’s readings of Bergson and comparing two related pairs of their concepts: duration and différance, and intuition and spacing. The paper concludes by arguing that Derrida’s critical engagement with Bergson leads to an anti-presentist model of life, which gains new relevance in the Anthropocene. (shrink)

This work aims to highlight the continuous game and the paradoxical relationship established between memory and forgetfulness based on the contributions of Friedrich Nietzsche and Henri Bergson. We will follow the hypothesis that the origin of memory and consciousness in Nietzsche is very close to that made by Bergson in Matter and Memory. I will try to expose how memory in Bergson arises in the interval between action and reaction, at the moment when man hesitates, organizes and selects the new (...) movement. The same hesitation movement occurs in Nietzsche, when man abandons the "animalistic" realm of the instant and begins to calculate and plan his actions. In the meantime, when man acquires the capacity to remember and distances himself from the instinctive animals, forgetfulness becomes vitally important, according to Nietzsche, since an excess of memory can resent and sadden the body. In Bergson, on the other hand, the brain mechanism - an organ of attention to life - also occupies a prominent place, from the moment it temporarily removes the totality of memories, and allows only some of them to become conscious. To this end, we will observe that what is behind this infinite game between memory and forgetfulness is the maintenance of a healthy body that does not get lost in excesses - of remembering too much or forgetting everything. A body that knows how to remember, but also how to forget in order to live. (shrink)

El presente trabajo explora la postura bergsoniana en torno a la imagen, toda vez que es constituida, de fondo, por la pregunta ¿qué se puede conocer? A propósito del tema Bergson se ubica en un punto intermedio entre el idealismo y el realismo, considera que la imagen es aquello que es más que una representación pero menos que la cosa en sí que el realismo pretende mostrar como objeto de conocimiento. La comprensión de la imagen no sólo lleva a escenarios (...) epistemológicos, también posibilita observar que ahí donde hay una perspectiva ocurre un enfoque interesado de cierto tema. De tal forma que la relación objeto-sujeto se ve trastocada por la implementación de la imagen, como disposición afectiva del mundo que rodea al humano. Si sólo se conocen imágenes, la pertinencia de las distintas ramas científicas cambia según estas estudien imágenes interiores o exteriores. Para nada la actividad mental, puede ser el propiciador de las imágenes mentales, únicamente es una imagen más del conjunto de imágenes. En lo subsecuente, habrá un desarrollo del conocimiento de las imágenes, una propuesta teórica que ofrece una posibilidad distinta a la científica, pero que no es contradictoria. Palabras clave: Bergson - Imagen - Conocimiento - Idealismo - Realismo - Percepción. (shrink)

Abstract In Creative Evolution (1907/1911), a pivotal discussion is the extreme complexity of instinctual behavior. As one of many examples, a member of the Hymenoptera “knows” precisely the three locations of motor-neuron complexes at which to sting a cricket such that it is paralyzed, yet remains fully alive for the wasp’s larvae. Two points: a) This behavior is as much an “irreducible” complex of acts as the structural organization of the wasp’s body, and just as inexplicably formed by natural selection, (...) and, b) the instinctual behavior is actually at the same level as the vital processes of the organism. This is to say that any theory of evolution, be it selection, self-assembly or self-organization, is equally bound to address not only the origin-problem of an organism’s structure, but the correlated functional problem of instinct. Instinct, however, was Bergson’s prime source for holding, firstly, that we must see Consciousness as the impetus behind evolution and secondly, that it is only by utilizing the essence of instinct, conjoined with intellect – his “intuition” – that mind and science can penetrate these mysterious evolutionary processes. This double thesis of the role of Consciousness and the role of intuition likely helped to cause Bergson’s neglect in the biological world, but subsequently there has emerged the current sharp awareness of the “Hard Problem” of Consciousness (Chalmers, 1995). The ongoing failure on a solution to this problem – its very, very unresolved status – should give us pause. In fact, integral to the argument of Creative Evolution, though always only obliquely referenced, was Matter and Memory (1896/1912), and in this work was a remarkable solution to the Hard Problem – when understood, an amazing feat of “intuition.” This, we will see, casts Bergson’s view of the role of Consciousness in evolution, and the nature of instinct as one of evolution’s lines of development, in a new light. (shrink)

The forms of having morality in close and open societies are examined through the concept of morality in Bergson. Moreover, how static and dynamic moralities come into existence and what kind of enforcements they have in the social sphere are discussed. In this book, Bergson explained how close or open morality obtained and what kind of cultural effects it has in the social sphere. He set forth the forms of close and open moralities by the terms of below or above (...) consciousness. In addition, Bergson divides religions into two such as static religion and dynamic religion. According to him static religion is the religion of the city-state, which has the feature of being close and belongs to the society. On the other hand, dynamic religion is an open religion and it belongs to the humanity. In that respect he makes a general review of the forms of relations between the forms of morality, societies and religions. (shrink)

El presente trabajo explora la postura bergsoniana en torno a la imagen, toda vez que es constituida, de fondo, por la pregunta ¿qué se puede conocer? A propósito del tema Bergson se ubica en un punto intermedio entre el idealismo y el realismo, considera que la imagen es aquello que es más que una representación pero menos que la cosa en sí que el realismo pretende mostrar como objeto de conocimiento. La comprensión de la imagen no sólo lleva a escenarios (...) epistemológicos, también posibilita observar que ahí donde hay una perspectiva ocurre un enfoque interesado de cierto tema. De tal forma que la relación objeto-sujeto se ve trastocada por la implementación de la imagen, como disposición afectiva del mundo que rodea al humano. Si sólo se conocen imágenes, la pertinencia de las distintas ramas científicas cambia según estas estudien imágenes interiores o exteriores. Para nada la actividad mental, puede ser el propiciador de las imágenes mentales, únicamente es una imagen más del conjunto de imágenes. En lo subsecuente, habrá un desarrollo del conocimiento de las imágenes, una propuesta teórica que ofrece una posibilidad distinta a la científica, pero que no es contradictoria. Palabras clave: Bergson - Imagen - Conocimiento - Idealismo - Realismo - Percepción. (shrink)

Resumen: Este artículo pretende abordar aspectos esenciales del pensamiento de Henri Bergson en la dimensión de las prácticas políticas. Específicamente, esta indagación se centrará en un análisis del sentido de la democracia en Les Deux Sources de la morale et de la religion, en las escuetas, pero decisivas porciones de texto donde esta es abordada. Bajo este objetivo, se podrá extender una discusión de fondo, de carácter ontológico, en torno al rendimiento de una noción de Acontecimiento que pretende servir de (...) reflexión basal en torno al dominio de un concepto de lo político atribuible a este filósofo francés.: This article aims to address essential aspects of Henri Bergson’s thought in the dimension of political practices. Specifically, this inquiry will focus on an analysis of the meaning of democracy in Les Deux Sources de la morale et de la religion, in the succinct, but decisive portions of the text where it is focussed. Under this point, it will be possible to extend a substantive discussion, of an ontological nature, around the performance of a notion of Event that aims to serve as a basal reflection on the domain of a concept of the political attributable to this French philosopher. (shrink)

El análisis que presentamos pretende exponer las líneas generales de la concepción de la Filosofía que propone Bergson tomando el problema de la metodología como hilo conductor. Analizando y reconstruyendo el camino que ha recorrido a lo largo de sus ensayos hasta llegar a formular su propuesta metodológica para la ciencia y la filosofía podremos perfilar su concepción de la filosofía de la duración, de la ciencia y la relación que ambas pueden tener, es decir, podremos entender la tarea que (...) Bergson asigna a las diferentes formas de conocimiento para su desarrollo futuro. (shrink)

During the first quarter of the twentieth century, the French philosopher Henri Bergson became an international celebrity, profoundly influencing contemporary intellectual and artistic currents. While Bergsonism was fashionable, L. Susan Stebbing, Bertrand Russell, Moritz Schlick, and Rudolf Carnap launched different critical attacks against some of Bergson’s views. This book examines this series of critical responses to Bergsonism early in the history of analytic philosophy. Analytic criticisms of Bergsonism were influenced by William James, who saw Bergson as an ‘anti-intellectualist’ ally of (...) American Pragmatism, and Max Scheler, who saw him as a prophet of Lebensphilosophie. Some of the main analytic objections to Bergson are answered in the work of Karin Costelloe-Stephen. Analytic anti-Bergsonism accompanied the earlier refutations of idealism by Russell and Moore, and later influenced the Vienna Circle’s critique of metaphysics. It eventually contributed to the formation of the view that ‘analytic’ philosophy is divided from its ‘continental’ counterpart. (shrink)

مداخلة مترجمة عن الفرنسية للفيلسوف الفرنسي جيل دولوز.

This book is an intellectual history of intuition.

What does it mean to see time in the visual arts and how does art reveal the nature of time? Paul Atkinson investigates these questions through the work of the French philosopher Henri Bergson, whose theory of time as duration made him one of the most prominent thinkers of the fin de siècle. Although Bergson never enunciated an aesthetic theory and did not explicitly write on the visual arts, his philosophy gestures towards a play of sensual differences that is central (...) to aesthetics. This book rethinks Bergson's philosophy in terms of aesthetics and provides a fascinating and original account of how Bergsonian ideas aid in understanding time and dynamism in the visual arts. From an examination of Bergson's influence on the visual arts to a reconsideration of the relationship between aesthetics and metaphysics, Henri Bergson and Visual Culture explores what it means to reconceptualise the visual arts in terms of duration. Atkinson revisits four key themes in Bergson's work - duration; time and the continuous gesture; the ramification of life and durational difference - and reveals Bergsonian aesthetics of duration through the application of these themes to a number of 19th and 20th-century artworks. This book introduces readers and art lovers to the work of Bergson and contributes to Bergsonian scholarship, as well as presenting a new of understanding the relationship between art and time. (shrink)

In public discourse trauma is predominantly framed as an overwhelming event undergone by the individual. In this article I first provide a brief genealogy to trace the emergence of what is now the dominant temporal framework of psychological catastrophe. I supplement this evental nosology with a durational consideration of trauma by drawing on the works of Henri Bergson and his articulation of duration, memory, and lived experience. Durational trauma accommodates liminal and ongoing experiences of the catastrophic that are equally devastating (...) to the paradigmatic exemplars of PTSD. This alternate account entails different modalities of reparation and responsibility to the systemic traumatization of others. For this I draw on Levinas and his intersubjective ethics drawing out the relevancy his work has for this concept of durational trauma. Levinas’s emphasis on expiation avoids the reification of the trauma of the other as spectacle and draws into focus one’s own participation in the circulation and continuation of ongoing traumatic networks. This contributes to the emergent alchemy of reading Bergson and Levinas together, but likewise, to philosophy of trauma and the ethical responsibility and temporality of ongoing systemic harm. (shrink)

première partie. Le maître et son disciple : une amité improbable -- deuxième partie. Deux acteurs de la vie publique -- troisième partie. Un renouvellement de la pensée philosophique.

This book brings together papers from a conference that took place in the city of L'Aquila, 4–6 April 2019, to commemorate the 10th anniversary of the earthquake that struck on 6 April 2009. Philosophers and scientists from diverse fields of research debated the problem that, on 6 April 1922, divided Einstein and Bergson: the nature of time. For Einstein, scientific time is the only time that matters and the only time we can rely on. Bergson, however, believes that scientific time (...) is derived by abstraction, even in the sense of extraction, from a more fundamental time. The plurality of times envisaged by the theory of Relativity does not, for him, contradict the philosophical intuition of the existence of a single time. But how do things stand today? What can we say about the relationship between the quantitative and qualitative dimensions of time in the light of contemporary science? What do quantum mechanics, biology and neuroscience teach us about the nature of time? The essays collected here take up the question that pitted Einstein against Bergson, science against philosophy, in an attempt to reverse the outcome of their monologue in two voices, with a multilogue in several voices. (shrink)

In in the second half of the 1940s, Jan Patočka emphasized the essentially negative character of human existence. He thus found himself in the neighborhood of Sartre’s existentialism, Heidegger’s philosophy of being, and Hegel’s dialectic, and at the same time in opposition to schools of thought which either completely reject the substantive use of “the nothing,” such as Carnap’s positivism, or relativize it, like Bergson. It is the latter polemic, Patočka’s with Bergson, which is discussed in this article. The concept (...) of negativity in Patočka basically refers to the idea that human existence is defined by a capacity to adopt a distance toward what is pre-given, be it the reality of the physical world or the established habits and rules of a particular society. Negativity qua distance has in Patočka an absolute character. It is this claim that he defends in his critique of Bergson. The article attempts to reconstruct Patočka’s position. I claim that the wager on absolute negativity does not make Patočka a nihilist, but a philosopher of a negative holism, and, in a sense, even a moralist. Above a reconstruction of Patočka’s stance, I spell out some reservations focused especially on the systematic meaning of Patočka’s recourse to negativity. I suggest that negation is an indispensable part of a more complex existential structure Patočka is aiming at. The terms he uses for this structure include “thirst for the absolute,” “thirst for reality,” “restlessness of the heart” and “desire.” To translate these allusions onto a general plan, it is useful to talk about the capacity to establish differences that matter. As general as it seems, this turn of phrase can grasp both Patočka’s emphasis on negativity, and his emphasis on the absolute, the latter – nevertheless – not residing in a distance from being, but in differences established, maintained and abandoned by ourselves within being. (shrink)

This article attempts to grasp the relationship between the film Queen Lear and élan vital drawing on the kinship of life as a creative evolution with art as a free act, which was established by Henri Bergson. According to Bergson, the élan vital, as the creative force of life, which is in a state of constant change and formation, is an invisible bond that passes through all living things. It is a free and creative flow. The qualities of élan vital, (...) opening a door to aesthetic comprehension and helping us to gain a deeper understanding as to the relationship between artistic creation and life, trigger our conceptions about cinema. In this context, the film Queen Lear, which creates an aesthetic experience concerning the change and the transformation proceeded by élan vital, is discussed with the guidance of the intuition method and the cinephilosophical approach. Intuition is a method that offers a holistic insight that captures the unique and inexpressible within the subject; the cinephilosophical approach has also enabled the film to move forward and interact with it. Queen Lear makes the élan vital visible and palpable as the peasant women who do theater; as the director and the film. The film deals with the élan vital against the limits, inertia and habits imposed by social conditions, by focusing on the process, not the end, but the being, flow and change. The film joining the permanent flow between past, present and future, reveals the movement in duration. Making the transference movement of vital impetus between individuals and facts visible, turns the film into a transitional space. Images oscillating between women’s life, acting and the staging process of the play, higlights the production process of the film. At the same time they make the coexistence and relationality of life obvious. Consequently, as a living tissue that stimulates intuition, the film motivates to participate in the creative effort of the director. Bringing the audience closer to the direct vision of the reality, the film makes the audience feel the being and real movement in life. (shrink)

Des premières lignes qu'il ait écrites aux toutes dernières, Bergson milite avec une constance remarquable, quoique rarement commentée, pour l'invention d'un nouveau mode d'expression en philosophie. Un mode qui, sans renier le langage ordinaire, s'emploie à le faire fonctionner autrement.00Le philosophe, écrit-il, doit œuvrer ± dans le même sens que l'art?.00Prendre au sérieux cette résolution, ce n'est pas seulement rendre à Bergson une élémentaire justice - le lire en somme comme un écrivain -, c'est aussi décider de voir dans la (...) philosophie un genre littéraire parmi d'autres, et qui comme les autres fait aux images, aux figures, à la fiction, aux créatures imaginaires même - les fantômes par exemple - une place qu'on aurait tort de dire anecdotique.00C'est enfin inviter à une manière inédite d'enseigner la philosophie - et pas seulement celle de Bergson. (shrink)