Max Horkheimer

During the late 1930s, the failed attempt at collaboration between the Frankfurt School and the Vienna Circle culminated in Horkheimer’s 1937 paper ‘The Latest Attack on Metaphysics’. Horkheimer ([1937] 1972), relying on a caricature of positivism as espousing an uncritical myth of the given, drew far-reaching conclusions concerning positivism’s conservative prohibition of the radical questioning of appearances. Horkheimer (1940) later applied some of these criticisms to Dilthey’s conception of Verstehen, while presenting Logical Empiricism as dismissing Dilthey’s proposals nothing more than (...) poetry. By examining Neurath’s unpublished reply to Horkheimer, and drawing on Uebel’s (2019) account of Logical Empiricism’s stance towards Verstehen, this chapter will attempt to dispel Horkheimer’s caricature. I will highlight a parallel between Neurath’s attitude towards (i) claims about Verstehen in social science and (ii) Horkheimer’s proposals for the use of Vernunft by a ‘supra-scientific’ Critical Theory. Neurath argues that once Horkheimer’s objections to ‘positivism’ are reformulated in non-metaphysical terms, they point towards a genuine problem concerning science’s relation to social praxis. For Neurath, the problem can be addressed from within (rather than, as Horkheimer would have it, from above) empirically-minded investigations in the history and sociology of science. (shrink)

Presentation to the translation of Max Horkheimer's "On the Sociology of Class Relations".

Was meinen wir, wenn wir soziale Konstellationen als »möglich« bezeichnen? Diese Frage wurde allzu oft nur randständig beleuchtet, obwohl »Möglichkeit« seit Aristoteles zum grundbegrifflichen Repertoire der praktischen Philosophie zählt. Umso unverständlicher wirkt die Zurückhaltung von Horkheimer und Adorno, den Begriff gesellschaftstheoretisch zu explizieren. Gösta Gantner zeigt, inwiefern die Vorstellungen des »Andersseinkönnens« und der »Potentialität« die Kritische Theorie nahezu unbemerkt dominieren. Als Schlüsselbegriff trägt »Möglichkeit« dazu bei, aktuelle Varianten kritischen Denkens in ihrem leitenden Erkenntnisinteresse und ihrer praktischen Ausrichtung zu schärfen: Im (...) Lichte der Kritik des Gegebenen geht es um das, was anders sein kann. (shrink)

The role of metaphysics in critique stands as a defining issue for the Frankfurt School theorists. Max Horkheimer himself claims that metaphysics serves as an instrument of domination, leading him to develop an interdisciplinary mate- rialism as a postmetaphysical alternative. Critics such as Georg Lohmann con- tend, however, that Horkheimer’s critique of instrumental reason is aporetic insofar as it undermines all metaphysical claims while implicitly making them. Since Horkheimer narrowly equates metaphysics with identity thinking, this article argues that his appeal (...) to nonidentity thinking as the foundation for critique is better understood as a form of antimetaphysics. This, however, leaves Horkheimer no better situated, since antimetaphysics remains a variant of metaphysics. While Horkheimer reproduces the techniques of domination he sought to avoid, this lapse into metaphysics warns of the difficult path that postmetaphysical thinking must navigate between the antipodes of metaphys- ical and antimetaphysical positions. (shrink)

During the 1930s, while both movements were fleeing from persecution by the Nazis, the Vienna Circle and the Frankfurt School planned to collaborate. The plan failed, and in its stead Horkheimer published a critique of the Vienna Circle in “The Latest Attack on Metaphysics” (written in collaboration with Adorno, though he is not credited as an author). This paper will analyse Horkheimer’s (and Adorno’s) article, and the ensuing dialogue with Neurath. The Frankfurt School’s critical stance towards the Vienna Circle can (...) be traced back to Adorno’s earlier objections to the ‘positivist’ myth of the given. In response to Carnap’s attack on Heidegger, Horkheimer (and Adorno) criticized both metaphysics and its ‘scientistic’ overcoming. Their critique employs a number of overgeneralisations about ‘logical positivism’. Neurath’s unpublished reply proposes corrections to the Frankfurt School’s portrayal of ‘positivism’, pointing towards a partly conciliatory direction within the framework of Unified Science. The attempted collaboration between the Vienna Circle and the Frankfurt School ended when Horkheimer refused to publish Neurath's reply to his article in the Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung. Horkheimer subsequently made anti-positivism a central concern for critical theory, setting the tone of subsequent polemics in the Positivismusstreit of the 1960s. (shrink)

This dissertation thematizes the reception of Nietzsche's philosophy in Horkheimer's critical theory from the 1930s and 1940s, investigating how it is appropriated for an analysis of the obstacles to social emancipation situated in subjectivity, with reference to the concept of internalization [Verinnerlichung]. In the 1930s, the fixation of the individuals on authority and the manipulation of the masses are investigated through an analysis of the effects of the renunciation and the internalization of instincts, in the context of an anthropology of (...) the bourgeois society. In the 1940s, Horkheimer and Adorno explicit the entailment of enlightened reason on domination, arising from the domination of oneself and of others that permeated the subjective formation since its pre-history, described with the resource to the idea of internalization of sacrifice. This dissertation intends to disclose the role of Nietzsche's philosophy in Horkheimer's thought, arguing, in the first place, that it goes back to the 1930s and it is not a consequence of Adorno's influence in the process of elaboration of the Dialects of Enlightenment, and, secondly, that the contradictions internal to this philosophy and its contradictions with critical theory are productive for Horkheimers philosophy. (shrink)

In Capitalism, Alienation and Critique Asger Sørensen offers a wide-ranging argument for the classical Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School, thus endorsing the dialectical approach of the original founders (Horkheimer, Adorno, Marcuse) and criticizing suggested revisions of later generations (Habermas, Honneth). Being situated within the horizon of the late 20th century Cultural Marxism, the main issue is the critique of capitalism, emphasizing experiences of injustice, ideology and alienation, and in particular exploring two fundamental subject matters within this horizon, namely economy (...) and dialectics. Apart from in-depth discussions of classical political economy and Hegelian dialectics, the explorative and inclusive argument also takes issues with Émile Durkheim’s theory of value, the general economy of Georges Bataille and the dialectics of Mao Zedong. -/- - See below link to the book's homepage at the publisher Brill. - See also link to a Youtubevideo from a seminar on the book in Belgrade, November 2019. (shrink)

Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno’s Dialectic of Enlightenment laid indispensable groundwork for critiquing instrumental rationality and the power dynamics embedded in discursive logic. Especially relevant for feminist theorists is the pair’s excursus on Homer’s Odyssey, which reads the hero’s epic journey as an allegory for the emergence of subjectivity. Horkheimer and Adorno interpret Homer’s female characters as sensual forces of nature that Odysseus must resist in his quest for homecoming. Yet, conspicuously absent from Horkheimer and Adorno’s analysis—and previous feminist commentaries (...) on their analysis—is Homer’s paragon of feminine sensuality: Helen of Argos and Troy. This article rereads the treacherous beauty through Horkheimer and Adorno’s critical perspective, arguing that despite Helen’s exclusion from the text of Dialectic of Enlightenment, she is central to its thesis. As much as the poem’s eponymous hero, Helen exhibits the incipient features of an individuated (and alienated) protobourgeois subject. Ultimately, this article contends that Horkheimer and Adorno undertheorize women’s experience of subjectivity, which seems to explain why they exclude Helen from their analysis. (shrink)

This article investigates the reception of Nietzsche’s philosophy in Horkheimer’s critical theory of the 1930s. In his 1936 writings, “Egoism and Freedom Movement: on the Anthropology of the Bourgeois Era” and “Authority and the Family”, Horkheimer applies the concepts of internalization of instincts, bad conscience, nihilism, and resentment from On the Genealogy of Morality to bourgeois society aiming to expose how the psychic effects of repression obstruct the potentials for social emancipation even in the present. After relating Horkheimer’s interest in (...) Nietzsche’s philosophy to his understanding of the historical phenomena of his time, this paper analyses the relationship between a certain interpretation of Nietzsche’s philosophy and key elements of critical theory: Marxist theory, interdisciplinary materialism, and the orientation towards emancipation. (shrink)

Una reseña de un libro en el que participé.

This paper considers the aporia in Dialectic of Enlightenment in two aspects of the self-destruction and self-critique of enlightenment and then emphasizes the dual vision which Horkheimer and Adorno hold on rationality. Firstly, it traces the explanation of the self-destruction of enlightenment so as to make explicit that it results in another form of the aporia, the self-critique of enlightenment. This is followed by formulating the criticism into two aspects, that Horkheimer and Adorno’s aporia leads them to be confronted by (...) a self-contradiction. I argue that the criticism neglects their narrative strategy of history as critique and the methodology of immanent critique of Horkheimer and Adorno. In conclusion, it is elucidated that Horkheimer and Adorno rightly posit their aporia and suggest a proper solution, by which we could take the dual vision on rationality and their own model of immanent critique as its significances. (shrink)

Herbert Marcuse was one of the most influential political philosophers in the 20th century. After his death, his popularity started decreasing and the philosopher somewhat sank into oblivion. This dissertation intends to investigate the Marcusean contribution to the subject of technics, so imbricated on his political philosophy, and demonstrate that it deserves reappraisal. We shall analyse the theoretical context of Marcuse’s work and put opposing stances, both technophobe and technophile, up for debate. The intent is to not only present the (...) topics that organized this discussion back in its day, but also to set Marcuse apart from such hardline approaches. We shall then elucidate the Marcusean criticism of the capitalist technological system of advanced industrial societies and present the fundamental lines of its new historical project, supported by a qualitative change made possible by the ambivalence of technics. Since, in Marcuse’s view, technics configure the basis for the organisation of the status quo, and also the basis which might modify it if duly reoriented, the ambivalent character which the philosopher identifies in technics becomes the nuclear idea in his thesis; it is the very foundation upon which he builds his philosophy of technics. The marcusean thoughtshall then be exposed to critique: we shall examine the most relevant objections raised against it, but also its most fruitful ideas. Through the contributions of Gorz and, more specifically, of Feenberg, we intend to confirm the relevance of Marcuse’s thought in the context of the hodiern technological reality. (shrink)

The work of the Hungarian Marxist Georg Lukács is a constant source of controversy in the history of the Frankfurt School. All leading thinkers of that theoretical tradition have struggled with Lukács’s theory. On the one hand, it was an inspiration for their attempts to come to terms with the oppressive features of capitalist modernity. On the other hand, both its political conclusions and Lukács’s actual philosophical submission to Soviet orthodoxy seemed to show that his theoretical framework was deeply flawed (...) in one aspect or another. (shrink)

Owen Hulatt has written an exceptional book. As truth takes a beating at the hands of late capitalism, Theodor W. Adorno's assessment of the modern world and of truth becomes intimately relevant. There is a lot to recommend in this book, and it is a bold contribution to understanding Adorno.Following Adorno, Hulatt suggests that there is a connection between epistemology and aesthetics, that the objects of both admit of being true. As he puts it, "art is itself a kind of (...) knowledge". Hulatt's strategy is to begin with epistemology and focus on the emergence of conceptuality. Following Adorno and Max Horkheimer's account in Dialectic of Enlightenment, Hulatt develops a novel reading of that... (shrink)

The following introduction has two parts: the first part provides a sketch of the Frankfurt School’s history, highlighting the circumstances under which the authors discussed in this issue engaged philosophically with matters of economy. We thereby follow the prevailing periodization, starting with the school’s foundation in 1924 and ending with Theodor W. Adorno’s death in 1969 and the school’s preliminary dissolution. The second part of the introduction explores the legacy of the Frankfurt School’s philosophical critique of economy. Max Horkheimer’s writings (...) thereby serve as a model case for such a critique and become the point of departure for the discussion of contemporary critical theories of the economic. (shrink)

This article proposes an analysis of the aphorisms of Dämmerung, which were written byHorkheimer between 1926 and 1931, considering the posterior development of this philosophy in the1930s. Such an investigation aims to clarify, in the aphorisms, the presence of themes and theoreticalinfluences that can be found in posterior works and to comment the importance of the concept ofreification and its relation with the themes mentioned by the author.

The Institute for Social Research, or Frankfurt School, is an interdisciplinary research center associated with the University of Frankfurt in Germany and responsible for the founding and various trajectories of Critical Theory in the contemporary humanities and social sciences. Three generations of critical theorists have emerged from the Institute. The first generation was most prominently represented in the twentieth century by Max Horkheimer, Herbert Marcuse, Theodor W. Adorno, Walter Benjamin, Leo Löwenthal, and also for some time Erich Fromm. The so-called (...) ‘second generation’ of the Institute is centrally represented by Jürgen Habermas, whose work has functioned as the focal point of a wide range of critical theorists. The third generation of the Frankfurt School is represented by Axel Honneth who emerged as a new center, with different strands or readings of who else belongs to the third generation, some in Germany, some internationally, and some more in sociology and social and political theory than philosophy. (shrink)

This article makes the case for the necessity of a multi-focal conception of violence in religion and peacebuilding. I first trace the emergence and development of the analytical concepts of structural and cultural violence in peace studies, demonstrating how these lenses both draw central insights from, but also differ from and improve upon, critical theory and reflexive sociology. I argue that addressing structural and cultural forms of violence are concerns as central as addressing direct (explicit, personal) forms of violence for (...) purposes of building just and sustainable peace. Moreover, religiously informed and/or motivated peacebuilders are especially well-appointed and equipped to identify and address violence in its structural and cultural manifestations. I the examine how concepts of structural and cultural violence, in effect, centrally inform the efforts of Martin Luther King and Cornel West to cultivate just and sustainable peace in a context as putatively peaceful and prosperous as the United States. (shrink)

This paper re-examines the relationship between power, reason and history in Horkheimer and Adorno’s "Dialectic of Enlightenment." Contesting Habermas’ highly influential reading of the text, I argue that "Dialectic of Enlightenment," far from being a dead-end for critical theory, opens up important lines of thought in the philosophy of history that contemporary critical theorists would do well to recover. My focus is on the relationship that Horkheimer and Adorno trace between enlightenment rationality and the domination of inner and outer nature.

O intuito deste texto pode ser retratado através de duas tarefas principais que se propõe. De um lado, realiza um balanço - limitado e parcial, na medida em que trata de um recorte bastante circunscrito - da reflexão da teoria crítica da sociedade de Max Horkheimer acerca do problema da universidade, notadamente, no período imediatamente posterior ao fim da Segunda Guerra Mundial, e do modo como se relaciona com o conceito de formação , bastante caro à tradição da universidade alemã (...) moderna. Completado esse passo, o qual estabelece laços com o papel ocupado pela socialização nessa ótica teórica, visa-se, ao final, delinear algumas reflexões preliminares a propósito da contemporaneidade que, entende-se, podem beneficiar-se do enfoque concedido ao problema, com base na situação singular em que o pensamento de Horkheimer foi formulado. This text sets itself two main tasks. First, it offers a limited evaluation of Horkheimer's reflections, especially in the period directly after the end of the Second World War, on the problem of the university and how it relates to the concept of formation , a concept fundamental to the tradition of the modern German university. Second, the role exercised by socialization in this viewpoint is examined. The objective is to elaborate reflections on contemporaneity that benefit from the focus conceded to the problem in the singular situation in which Horkheimer's thinking was formulated. (shrink)

In his pathbreaking analysis of the formation of an ideological “white” self-consciousness among American workers in the nineteenth century, David Roediger relies on a theoretical synthesis of historical materialism and psychoanalysis. This paper explores the parallels in methodology and content between Roediger’s work and the critical theory of Max Horkheimer, Erich Fromm, and Herbert Marcuse, which was also based on a synthesis of Marx and Freud. The paper seeks to place Roediger’s arguments in a broader theoretical context and to highlight (...) the ongoing relevance of early Frankfurt School critical theory to contemporary discussions in critical race theory. (shrink)

ExcerptA new manifesto for the radical Left is vital, and it is to emerge from whispers, riddles, and aphorisms without lapsing into dogma, pure utopia, or party politics. Its focus will be on practice and action, but will refuse to take command of the future. A new manifesto is, if it is to be all of these things at once, improvisation. These are a few of the basic features and premises of Adorno and Horkheimer's 1956 dialogue, posthumously titled, Towards a (...) New Manifesto. Writing and dialoguing in the wake and in the midst of fascist reign in Western Europe and…. (shrink)

This article focuses on Max Horkheimer’s criticism of Husserl’s phenomenology in basic philosophical matters such as method, theory, logic, truth, metaphysics, etc. Horkheimer objects to Husserl’s conception of philosophy as a mathesis universalis and of science as relativistic research. However, he finds Husserl’s criticism of scientific rationalism the most important step for the legitimacy of philosophy. According to him, Husserl’s method is intended to be a science of apriority. But his understanding of apriority is static, is radically abstract, and overlooks (...) the dialectical relation. Therefore, his method is ahistorical and undialectical. Horkheimer does not interpret Husserl’s idealism in the sense of classical idealism. However, he believes that the positivistic and Cartesian implications in Husserl’s philosophy made his method less fruitful in concrete situations. Consequently, he calls Husserl’s phenomenology abstract positivism, traditional theory and a bourgeois ideology. Horkheimer’s critique focuses on Husserl’s early period of phenomenology. (shrink)

Through a focus on four rubrics: emancipatory rationality, anthropology, metaphysics and religion, the dissertation demonstrates clearly that with similar resources yet different emphases, Paul Tillich, Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno uniquely structure what are largely complementary critical interpretations of a modernity which they see to be diseased, and whose subjects are unable to realize the promises of enlightenment. They shine similar lights on the 'steel-hard cage' of a modernity which they hope to overcome, and possibly to redeem, in largely (...) compatible ways. In demonstrating this, the dissertation unearths some striking similarities shared by the three thinkers, and simultaneously reveals clear lines of dissimilarity between them in other key areas. This includes important distinctions between Adorno and Horkheimer, not only in the 1930s, but also in the 1940s, by which time they claimed to be writing with a single mind and purpose. Key similarities which will be disclosed include an initial reliance upon Hegel’s dialectical structure and Marx’s emancipatory social vision and a trenchant critique of the reifying and dehumanizing forces of capitalism. The modern subject thinks itself free but cannot achieve the liberation promised by enlightenment; instead, the subject experiences alienation and estrangement. Central shared goals include an increase in justice and the hope for not only ending barbarism and the suffering it causes, but also holding the memories of those who have died without justice alive. In a similar manner, major differences arise from common sources and hopes. The drive for transcendence takes a very different form in Tillich’s theological system than it does in the secular-Jewish longing for a hypothetical messianic moment found in the work of Adorno and Horkheimer during the period 1929-50, on which this study focuses. When the writings of Adorno, Horkheimer and Tillich are placed along side of one another, and in conversation with one another, something greater than demonstrable intellectual influence is revealed. Despite some substantial differences in methodology and assumptions, there are remarkable consonances between the types of critical social theory developed, and when read in concert, new insights into each thinker’s oeuvre become clearer and increasingly reveal a kaleidoscopic consonance. (shrink)

Machine generated contents note: Introduction; 1. Coming of age in Wilhelmine Germany; 2. Student years in Frankfurt ; 3. A materialist interpretation of the history of modern philosophy; 4. The beginnings of a critical theory of contemporary society; 5. Horkheimer's integration of psychoanalysis into his theory of contemporary society; 6. Horkheimer's concept of materialism in the early 1930s; 7. The anthropology of the bourgeois epoch; 8. Reflections on dialectical logic in the mid-1930s; Excursus I. The theoretical foundations of Horkheimer's split (...) with Erich Fromm in the late 1930s: Fromm's critique of Freud's drive theory; Excursus II. Divergence, estrangement, and gradual rapprochement: the evolution of Horkheimer and Adorno's theoretical relationship in the 1930s; 9. State capitalism - the end of Horkheimer's early critical theory; Epilogue: toward a historicization of Dialectic of Enlightenment and a reconsideration of Horkheimer's early critical theory. (shrink)

Max Horkheimer does not generally receive the scholarly attention given to other ‘Frankfurt School’ figures. This is in part because his early work seems contradictory, or unphilosophical. For example, Horkheimer seems, at various points (to use contemporary metaethical terms), like a constructivist, a moral realist, or a moral skeptic, and it is not clear how these views cohere. The goal of this article is to show that the contradictions regarding moral theory exist largely on the surface, and that one can (...) go below the surface to reconstruct a coherent position. Part I will examine Horkheimer’s skeptical critique of morality, and show that it leads to the realist position discussed in part II. Part III then shows that such realism can only be understood within a larger constructivist project, which elaborates on a minimal normativity present in human experience. This reconstruction should make sense of Horkheimer’s work, and show its contemporary relevance. (shrink)

I critically engage Max Horkheimer’s “Art and Mass Culture” from Critical Theory. I split Horkheimer’s essay into three parts, which correspond to the three sections of my essay. The first section details the objective historical conditions that have lead up to Horkheimer’s diagnosis. The second section describes the change in consciousness that corresponds to these conditions, and the third section outlines Horkheimer’s critique of Mortimer Adler and art that belongs to “the amusement industry.” I describe the basic elements of Horkheimer’s (...) aesthetic theory, use several pieces of art as examples of the application of the theory, andprovide contemporary analogues in order to illustrate the relevance of the essay to today’s world. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to investigate the connection between the Frankfurt School and the events of 1968. Accordingly, the paper focuses only on those important members of the School whose philosophical, ideological or practical influence on the events is clearly detectable. This means dealing with four thinkers in three sections: the influence of Adorno and Horkheimer is treated in the same section, whereas the work of Marcuse and Habermas is examined in separate sections. The three sections represent three (...) different approaches. Adorno and Horkheimer are passive onlookers of the events their passivity being rooted in their skeptical philosophical thinking. The initially also passive and pessimist Marcuse slowly rises to the role of the ’prophet’ of the students. And the early Habermas’ critical analysis paves the way for his initially pessimist, but later more optimistic reformist attitude. The paper is structured accordingly: after introductory thoughts, the mentioned thinkers are treated in separate sections that contain historo-philosophical analysis of their relevant works. (shrink)

Frankfurt School critical theory has long opposed metaphysical philosophy because it ignores suffering and injustice. In the face of such criticism, proponents of metaphysics (for example Dieter Henrich) have accused critical theory of not fully investigating the questions is raises for itself, and falling into partial metaphysical positions, despite itself. If one focuses on Max Horkheimer's early essays, such an accusation seems quite fitting. There he vociferously attacks metaphysics, but he also develops a theory that pushes toward metaphysical questions. His (...) work can thus seem laden with unpacked metaphysical baggage, and fraught with contradiction. The aim of this paper is to show that Horkheimer's critique of metaphysics makes sense and is not contradicted by a surreptitious metaphysics. To show this, Horkheimer's views will be compared with Bas van Fraassen's in The Empirical Stance . Ultimately, the paper should show that Horkheimer's early philosophy can be reconstructed in such a way that it employs a 'materialist stance'. (shrink)

[Excerpted From Editor's Introduction] Matthew Crippen takes this up in a Marcusian critique of Wittgenstein that attends, among other things, to the place of silence in that discourse. Referring to Horkheimer’s citation of the Latin aphorism that silence is consent, Crippen is critical of Wittgenstein’s admonition that we must pass over in silence those matters of which we cannot speak. This raises fascinating questions for critical theory that Crippen explores particularly with reference to Marcuse’s concept of one-dimensionality. To the extent (...) that Wittgenstein’s philosophy is “therapeutic,” it may effectively contain dissent by “helping” dissenters become “well-adjusted.” Marcuse, of course, was particularly concerned with the power of Total States— and particularly those engendered by advanced industrial capitalism—to contain dissent precisely by using therapeutic techniques to maintain adjustment. Bringing Marcuse and Wittgenstein together here has particularly explosive possibilities. In the context of a Total State, transformation depends on the possibility of calling the State into question from the inside (since “total” States systematically eliminate “outsides”). This is the point at which Wittgenstein’s silence becomes most intriguing. What is it, we must ask, that we cannot say? Silence may be (as Martin Luther King, Jr. said) more than consent: there comes a time when silence is betrayal. But this is one of many places where it pays to look at what is done as much as what is said. What game, we might ask, is Wittgenstein playing? And, more to the point, what is the field of play that joins Wittgenstein and Marcuse? John Cage famously said “I have nothing to say and I am saying it and that is poetry as I need it...” Crippen begins a process (via Wittgenstein) of putting poetry into play that has important implications for the public work of philosophers. (shrink)

Historically, blatantly untrue and defamatory conspiracy theories had disastrous consequences for those who were portrayed in them as evil-doers. At the same time, conspiratorial agreements at the expense of the common good between powerful groups in society do exist and have occasionally been uncovered. Against this background, the article describes different ways in which critical theory has looked at conspiracies. First, an attempt is made to show that Max Horkheimer's notes on `rackets' are an ambitious but flawed attempt to theorize (...) conspiracy. It is argued that Horkheimer's theory is imbued by the very conspiracy thinking that he proposed to criticize. Second, the author suggests recovering Franz Neumann's concept of `political alienation' as a more appropriate starting point to think critically about the ethical and epistemological questions raised by conspiracy theories. (shrink)