Abstract

Levinas is almost solely studied from the perspective of phenomenology, and this is evidently quite justifiable by the fact that the philosopher claims to be Husserl’s heir, although it is very importante to consider other influences for a deeper understanding of his thought, such as talmudism and Russian literature. But, in general, an important reference remains forgotten that Levinas never fails to mention in his interviews and even in the preface to the German edition (1987) of his important book Totalité et infini: Bergson’s philosophy. Our objective is to seek the elements of this approach, often mentioned but little explored, between the ethical intuitions of Levinas and Bergson. Although it is not the work Les deux sources de la morale et de la religion that Levinas likes to remember when referring to Bergson, it is what we will evoke to suggest an intuitive communication that connects the bergsonian concept of open and the levinasian concept of the infinite. Levinas takes a step beyond phenomenology when he elaborates one of his fundamental concepts, that of visage, and it is he himself who admits in the conversation with Philippe Nemo entitled Éthique et infini (1984), but we should be surprised if the most important notion of Levinas ethics, that of infinity, would reveal what is most essential in Bergson’s ethics, the sense of openness through which unlimited, in other words, unconditional, responsibility is announced?