Artificial intelligence is increasingly being developed for use in medicine, including for diagnosis and in treatment decision making. The use of AI in medical treatment raises many ethical issues that are yet to be explored in depth by bioethicists. In this paper, I focus specifically on the relationship between the ethical ideal of shared decision making and AI systems that generate treatment recommendations, using the example of IBM’s Watson for Oncology. I argue that use of this type of system creates (...) both important risks and significant opportunities for promoting shared decision making. If value judgements are fixed and covert in AI systems, then we risk a shift back to more paternalistic medical care. However, if designed and used in an ethically informed way, AI could offer a potentially powerful way of supporting shared decision making. It could be used to incorporate explicit value reflection, promoting patient autonomy. In the context of medical treatment, we need value-flexible AI that can both respond to the values and treatment goals of individual patients and support clinicians to engage in shared decision making. (shrink)

This paper reviews the ethical literature on conflicts between health professionals and parents about medical decision-making for children. We present the results of a systematic review which addressed the question ‘when health professionals and parents disagree about the appropriate course of medical treatment for a child, under what circumstances is the health professional ethically justified in overriding the parents’ wishes?’ We identified nine different ethical frameworks that were put forward by their authors as applicable across various ages and clinical scenarios. (...) Each of these frameworks centred on a different key moral concept including harm, constrained parental autonomy, best interests, medically reasonable alternatives, responsible thinking and rationality. (shrink)

In jurisdictions where voluntary assisted dying is legal, eligibility assessments, prescription and administration of a VAD substance are commonly performed by senior doctors. Junior doctors’ involvement is limited to a range of more peripheral aspects of patient care relating to VAD. In the Australian state of Victoria, where VAD has been legal since June 2019, all health professionals have a right under the legislation to conscientiously object to involvement in the VAD process, including provision of information about VAD. While this (...) protection appears categorical and straightforward, conscientious objection to VAD-related care is ethically complex for junior doctors for reasons that are specific to this group of clinicians. For junior doctors wishing to exercise a conscientious objection to VAD, their dependence on their senior colleagues for career progression creates unique risks and burdens. In a context where senior colleagues are supportive of VAD, the junior doctor’s subordinate position in the medical hierarchy exposes them to potential significant harms: compromising their moral integrity by participating, or compromising their career progression by objecting. In jurisdictions intending to provide all health professionals with meaningful conscientious objection protection in relation to VAD, strong specific support for junior doctors is needed through local institutional policies and culture. There are no data in this work. (shrink)

The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the risks that can be involved in healthcare work. In this paper, we explore the issue of staff safety in clinical work using the example of personal protective equipment in the COVID-19 crisis. We articulate some of the specific ethical challenges around PPE currently being faced by front-line clinicians, and develop an approach to staff safety that involves balancing duty to care and personal well-being. We describe each of these values, and present a decision-making framework (...) that integrates the two. The aim of the framework is to guide the process of balancing these two values when staff safety is at stake, by facilitating ethical reflection and/or decision-making that is systematic, specific and transparent. It provides a structure for individual reflection, collaborative staff discussion, and decision-making by those responsible for teams, departments and other groups of healthcare staff. Overall the framework guides the decision maker to characterise the degree of risk to staff, articulate feasible options for staff protection in that specific setting and identify the option that ensures any decrease in patient care is proportionate to the increase in staff well-being. It applies specifically to issues of PPE in COVID-19, and also has potential to assist decision makers in other situations involving protection of healthcare staff. There are no data in this work. (shrink)

Birchley9s critique of the harm threshold for overriding parental decisions is successful in demonstrating that the harm threshold, like the best interests standard, suffers from the problem of indeterminacy. However, his focus on critiquing empirical rather than normative arguments for the harm threshold means that his broad conclusion that it is ‘ill-judged’ is not justified. Advocates of the harm threshold can accept that the concept of harm to a child is indeterminate, yet still invoke strong normative arguments for this way (...) of responding to parental decisions that conflict with medical recommendations. I suggest that Birchley9s discussion, rather than showing that the harm threshold is mistaken, instead highlights the importance of developing a comprehensive account of children9s interests, for proponents of a best interests approach and for advocates of the harm threshold. (shrink)

Clinical ethics has been developing in paediatric healthcare for several decades. However, information about how paediatricians use clinical ethics case consultation services is extremely limited. In this project, we analysed a large set of case records from the clinical ethics service of one paediatric hospital in Australia. We applied a paediatric-specific typology to the case referrals, based on the triadic doctor–patient–parent relationship. We reviewed the 184 cases referred to the service in the period 2005–2014, noting features including the type of (...) case, the referring department(s) and the patient9s age at referral. The two most common types of referral involved clinician uncertainty about the appropriate care pathway for the child (26% of total referrals) and situations where the child9s parents disagreed with the doctors’ recommendations for the child9s care (22% of total referrals). Referrals came from 28 different departments. Cancer, cardiology/cardiac surgery and general medicine referred the highest numbers of cases. The most common patient age groups were children under 1, and 14–15 years old. For three controversial areas of paediatric healthcare, clinicians had initiated processes of routine review of cases by the clinical ethics service. These insights into the way in which one very active paediatric clinical ethics service is used further our understanding of the work of paediatric clinical ethics, particularly the kinds of ethically challenging cases that paediatricians view as appropriate to refer for clinical ethics support. (shrink)

In contrast to Di Nucci’s characterisation, my argument is not a technoapocalyptic one. The view I put forward is that systems like IBM’s Watson for Oncology create both risks and opportunities from the perspective of shared decision-making. In this response, I address the issues that Di Nucci raises and highlight the importance of bioethicists engaging critically with these developing technologies.

In their analysis of the eligibility criteria for assisted dying in Canada, Downie and Schuklenk put forward a strong argument for the ethical defensibility of including mental illnesses and disabilities as underlying conditions driving a person’s request for assisted dying.1 In this commentary, we add a view on these debates from our home state of Victoria, Australia, where voluntary assisted dying has been legal since June 2019. We highlight the more conservative approach to eligibility in our setting compared with Canada, (...) and argue for debates about eligibility criteria to be conceptualised as part of a broader discussion about access to assisted dying that includes clinicians’ roles and perspectives. In our view, clinicians’ perspectives may have a significant impact on individuals’ ability to access assisted dying, regardless of legislative or other changes made to any system. ‘Voluntary assisted dying’ is the terminology used in our context, rather than Medical Assistance in Dying, so we will use that term when referring to the Victorian system. There are several key differences between the Canadian and Victorian approaches that are important in relation to the debates addressed by Downie and Schuklenk. First, the emphasis in Victoria is on patient self-administration of the VAD …. (shrink)

Young children with cancer are treated with interventions that can have a high risk of compromising their reproductive potential. ‘Fertility preservation’ for children who have not yet reached puberty involves surgically removing and cryopreserving reproductive tissue prior to treatment in the expectation that strategies for the use of this tissue will be developed in the future. Fertility preservation for prepubertal children is ethically complex because the techniques largely lack proven efficacy for this age group. There is professional difference of opinion (...) about whether it is ethical to offer such ‘experimental’ procedures. The question addressed in this paper is: when, if ever, is it ethically justifiable to offer fertility preservation surgery to prepubertal children? We present the ethical concerns about prepubertal fertility preservation, drawing both on existing literature and our experience discussing this issue with clinicians in clinical ethics case consultations. We argue that offering the procedure is ethically justifiable in certain circumstances. For many children, the balance of benefits and burdens is such that the procedure is ethically permissible but not ethically required; when the procedure is medically safe, it is the parents’ decision to make, with appropriate information and guidance from the treating clinicians. We suggest that clinical ethics support processes are necessary to assist clinicians to engage with the ethical complexity of prepubertal fertility preservation and describe the framework that has been integrated into the pathway of care for patients and families attending the Royal Children’s Hospital in Melbourne, Australia. (shrink)

Young children with cancer are treated with interventions that can have a high risk of compromising their reproductive potential. ‘Fertility preservation’ for children who have not yet reached puberty involves surgically removing and cryopreserving reproductive tissue prior to treatment in the expectation that strategies for the use of this tissue will be developed in the future. Fertility preservation for prepubertal children is ethically complex because the techniques largely lack proven efficacy for this age group. There is professional difference of opinion (...) about whether it is ethical to offer such ‘experimental’ procedures. The question addressed in this paper is: when, if ever, is it ethically justifiable to offer fertility preservation surgery to prepubertal children? We present the ethical concerns about prepubertal fertility preservation, drawing both on existing literature and our experience discussing this issue with clinicians in clinical ethics case consultations. We argue that offering the procedure is ethically justifiable in certain circumstances. For many children, the balance of benefits and burdens is such that the procedure is ethically permissible but not ethically required; when the procedure is medically safe, it is the parents’ decision to make, with appropriate information and guidance from the treating clinicians. We suggest that clinical ethics support processes are necessary to assist clinicians to engage with the ethical complexity of prepubertal fertility preservation and describe the framework that has been integrated into the pathway of care for patients and families attending the Royal Children’s Hospital in Melbourne, Australia. (shrink)

Moen targets a view about the intrinsic harmfulness of prostitution that he sees as widespread in healthcare, academia and public policy.1 He argues that the exchange of sex for money is not intrinsically harmful by systematically rejecting various possible proposed harms. He further suggests that it is the social context of discriminating laws and stigma that accounts for the harms experienced by prostitutes, rather than any intrinsic feature of exchanging sex for money.One striking aspect of his argument is the particular (...) way in which he characterises the common view about the harmfulness of prostitution. Consider the following two possible versions of the claim that prostitution is harmful: "The intrinsic claim: The exchange of sex for money is intrinsically harmful to the seller." "The contingent claim: Prostitutes are currently likely to experience significant harm."The intrinsic claim is …. (shrink)

The articles in this issue direct our attention to the role of concepts in medical ethics. The issue includes research that defines a concept,1 research that applies concepts to illuminate the moral aspects of various elements of medicine,2 3 and research investigating the appropriate set of concepts to teach medical students.4 In their in-depth exploration of the concept of disease in this issue, Powell and Scarffe argue that our understanding of a concept should be ‘tailored to the role that the (...) concept plays in the institutional settings in which it is deployed’.1 Their methodology takes seriously the institutional context in which a concept operates. This approach to thinking about concepts is potentially applicable very broadly in medical ethics. What is the institutional role that a concept plays? What is the work that we need the concept to do? The feature article by Powell and Scarffe proposes a new definition of a foundational concept in medicine, that of disease. On their view, ‘a biomedical state is a disease only if it implicates a biological dysfunction that is, or would be, properly disvalued’.1 They describe their definition as involving both a moral criterion and a biological criterion. A number of commentators engage with Powell and Scarffe’s proposal. Tekin focuses on the moral criterion, through the example of grief and depression. …. (shrink)

In their essay arguing for ethical review of social research, Sheehan et al write: > Inquiry and human life are intertwined and interdependent. To be human is to be curious, to ask questions about yourself, the world, and your place in the world. This process of inquiry is undertaken individually, but is a social activity.1 As researchers in medical ethics, all the authors in this issue have chosen to ask a particular type of question about the world: questions about ethical (...) complexity and justification. Their inquiries are rich and diverse. We can see each as an individual piece of scholarship, contributing to our knowledge of a specific topic. But we can also see medical ethics as a social activity—one undertaken by a community of authors and readers, debating and reasoning together. What is striking when we think of medical ethics in this second way is the diversity of approaches to research that are useful in our discussions. Understanding ethics in healthcare is furthered by very different types of research, and this issue of the journal clearly illustrates this breadth of approaches to scholarship in medical ethics. The three articles on transplant ethics provide an excellent example of this diversity of scholarship in medical ethics. All explore ethical aspects of transplantation but using different approaches. Ladin and colleagues2 identify an ethical problem through empirical inquiry. Their research examines the requirement that a patient have adequate social support in …. (shrink)

The articles in this issue explore a number of difficult choices in medical care and research. They investigate ethical complexity in a range of decisions faced by policymakers and clinicians, and offer new evidence or normative approaches for navigating this complexity. In this issue’s feature article, Ford and colleagues engage with an ethical challenge faced by policymakers in relation to health research: should free text data contained in medical records be shared for research purposes?1 While some types of data from (...) electronic medical records are used widely in health research, privacy concerns have limited the use of free text data specifically. Ford and colleagues highlight the richness of the clinical information in free text and its centrality to some areas of healthcare such as mental health and primary care. In their view, while text analytic technology is developing rapidly, ‘policy makers routinely judge that the risk of re-identifying patients from text data is too high for these data uses’. Their citizens’ jury study in the UK found that participants were largely in favour of medical free text data being shared outside the NHS for research using an opt-out model: ‘the majority of jurors believed the benefits of sharing data for research outweighed the privacy risks’. In their commentary on this research, Largent and Morain raise some important issues about policymakers’ use of empirical findings …. (shrink)

BackgroundWhile fertility preservation is recommended practice for paediatric oncology patients, it is increasingly being considered for transgender children and young people in paediatric care. This raises ethical issues for clinicians, particularly around consent and shared decision-making in this new area of healthcare.MethodsA systematic review of normative literature was conducted across four databases in June 2020 to capture ethical considerations related to fertility counselling and preservation in paediatric transgender healthcare. The text of included publications was analysed inductively, guided by the Qualitative (...) Analysis Guide of Leuven.ResultsTwenty-four publications were identified for inclusion. Four key ethical considerations emerged from this literature: access to fertility preservation, conscientious objection, decision-making capacity of children and young people, and shared decision-making.ConclusionIn the identified literature, there is consensus that transgender children and young people should not be refused access to fertility preservation services solely due to their gender identity, and that clinicians with conscientious objections to fertility preservation for this group have an obligation to refer on to willing providers. Factors that create ethical complexity in this area of paediatric care include the child’s age, mental health, and parents’ views. (shrink)

The COVID-19 pandemic will generate vexing ethical issues for the foreseeable future and many journals will be open to content that is relevant to our collective effort to meet this challenge. While the pandemic is clearly the critical issue of the moment, it’s important that other issues in medical ethics continue to be addressed as well. As can be seen in this issue, the Journal of Medical Ethics will uphold its commitment to publishing high quality papers on the full array (...) of medical ethics. At the same time, JME aims to be a premiere home for ground-breaking scholarship on the ethical issues raised by COVID-19. Toward this end, we have a number of papers that are freely available online and for which production has been fast-tracked.1–5 A challenge for authors who want to write about the pandemic is the rapidly evolving nature of the situation and the time it takes for journal content to be reviewed and published, even when fast-tracked. For that reason, all authors who would like to submit a paper on the pandemic can also submit a post to the JME blog prior to submitting a full paper to the journal. Those interested in writing for the JME blog should contact one of its editors, Hazem Zohny or Mike King. Over the last 3 weeks, 30 high-quality commentaries on the pandemic have been posted to the blog. These posts are circulated widely via the JME Twitter and Facebook feeds and have stimulated significant …. (shrink)

In this article, we analyse the novel case of Phoenix, a non-binary adult requesting ongoing puberty suppression to permanently prevent the development of secondary sex characteristics, as a way of affirming their gender identity. We argue that the aim of OPS is consistent with the proper goals of medicine to promote well-being, and therefore could ethically be offered to non-binary adults in principle; there are additional equity-based reasons to offer OPS to non-binary adults as a group; and the ethical defensibility (...) of facilitating individual requests for OPS from non-binary adults also depends on other relevant considerations, including the balance of potential benefits over harms for that specific patient, and whether the patient’s request is substantially autonomous. Although the broadly principlist ethical approach we take can be used to analyse other cases of non-binary adults requesting OPS apart from the case we evaluate, we highlight that the outcome will necessarily depend on the individual’s context and values. However, such clinical provision of OPS should ideally be within the context of a properly designed research study with long-term follow-up and open publication of results. (shrink)

Emergent scholarship on the most radical technological invention of our time confirms what most of us know from first-hand experience - that the internet has fundamentally altered our perceptions and our knowledge, as well as our sense of subjectivity, community and agency (see for example Vries, 2002: 19). The American scholar of religion and communications, Stephen O'Leary, one of the first scholars to analyze the role of the new media for religious communities, claims that the advent of the internet has (...) been as revolutionary for religious growth and dissemination as was the invention of the printing press (O'Leary, 1996). (shrink)

The bulk of this book is made up of four substantial papers, originally presented at a conference in 1966, followed by comments from fellow-symposiasts. Three of the papers are formal and/or technical; the fourth is an excellent piece of analysis by Donald Davidson followed by illuminating remarks from the late E. J. Lemmon.

An understanding of human nature has been central to the work of some of the greatest philosophical thinkers including Plato, Descartes, Hume, Hobbes, Rousseau, Freud and Marx. Questions such as 'what is human nature?', 'is there such a thing as an exclusively human nature?', 'through what methods might we best discover more about our nature?', and 'to what extent are our actions and beliefs constrained by it?' are of central importance not only to philosophy, but to our general understanding of (...) ourselves as part of the human species. This volume addresses such questions through the inclusion of special commissioned essays by specialists including John Cottingham, Hans-Johann Glock, P. M. S. Hacker, Wolfram Hinzen, Rosalind Hursthouse, Peter Kail, Sarah Patterson and Richard Samuels. (shrink)

An understanding of human nature has been central to the work of some of the greatest philosophical thinkers including Plato, Descartes, Hume, Hobbes, Rousseau, Freud and Marx. Questions such as 'what is human nature?', 'is there such a thing as an exclusively human nature?', 'through what methods might we best discover more about our nature?', and 'to what extent are our actions and beliefs constrained by it?' are of central importance not only to philosophy, but to our general understanding of (...) ourselves as part of the human species. This volume addresses such questions through the inclusion of special commissioned essays by specialists including John Cottingham, Hans-Johann Glock, P. M. S. Hacker, Wolfram Hinzen, Rosalind Hursthouse, Peter Kail, Sarah Patterson and Richard Samuels. (shrink)

This paper is a critical examination of the so-called slippery slope argument for the conservative position on abortion. The argument was discussed in the philosophic literature some time back, but has since fallen into disfavor. The argument is first exposed and a general objection to it is advanced, then rebutted. Rosalind Hursthouse's more detailed and stronger objection is next aired, but also found less than convincing. In the course of discussing her objection, the correct form of the argument is (...) identified, and it's noted that rejection of the argument requires finding fault with its inductive premise. That, in turn, requires either (a) identifying and defending a cutoff point other than conception, or (b) not identifying a cutoff point but directly attacking the argument's conclusion. As far as (a) is concerned, all except one alternative cutoff point have severe problems that have been well discussed in the literature. The one that doesn't, the appearance of the ‘primitive streak’, is examined in detailed, but ultimately rejected. As for (b), five different grounds for rejecting the conclusion are identified and discussed, but none is found plausible. Variations on the slippery slope argument, concerning different conclusions that it may have, are then distinguished, related to each other, and critically discussed, and the paper ends with some cautionary remarks about the defense of the argument tendered. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Rosalind Franklin is best known for her informative X-ray diffraction patterns of DNA that provided vital clues for James Watson and Francis Crick's double-stranded helical model. Her scientific career did not end when she left the DNA work at King's College, however. In 1953 Franklin moved to J. D. Bernal's crystallography laboratory at Birkbeck College, where she shifted her focus to the three-dimensional structure of viruses, obtaining diffraction patterns of Tobacco mosaic virus (TMV) of unprecedented detail and clarity. (...) During the next five years, while making significant headway on the structural determination of TMV, Franklin maintained an active correspondence with both Watson and Crick, who were also studying aspects of virus structure. Developments in TMV research during the 1950s illustrate the connections in the emerging field of molecular biology between structural studies of nucleic acids and of proteins and viruses. They also reveal how the protagonists of the “race for the double helix” continued to interact personally and professionally during the years when Watson and Crick's model for the double-helical structure of DNA was debated and confirmed. (shrink)

This paper offers some comments on bioethical debates about resource allocation in healthcare. It is stimulated by Rosalind McDougall’s argument that it is an affront to the human dignity of people with below “liberties-level” health to fund human reproductive cloning. McDougall is right to underline the relevance of resource prioritisation to the ethics of research and provision of new biomedical technologies. This paper argues that bioethicists should be careful when offering comments about such issues. In particular, it emphasises the (...) need to represent accurately the reality of the situation—especially when we are passing judgement on technologies that are in their infancy and whose practical application is yet to be confirmed. The paper also emphasises the importance of the actual context to bioethical debate, and note that it would be better to talk about resource expenditure rather than resource allocation when it comes to discussing the rights and wrongs of how money is spent. It also reiterates the claims made by other writers that social and political philosophy need to have a transparent and considered role in debates about resources. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Rosalind Franklin is best known for her informative X-ray diffraction patterns of DNA that provided vital clues for James Watson and Francis Crick's double-stranded helical model. Her scientific career did not end when she left the DNA work at King's College, however. In 1953 Franklin moved to J. D. Bernal's crystallography laboratory at Birkbeck College, where she shifted her focus to the three-dimensional structure of viruses, obtaining diffraction patterns of Tobacco mosaic virus (TMV) of unprecedented detail and clarity. (...) During the next five years, while making significant headway on the structural determination of TMV, Franklin maintained an active correspondence with both Watson and Crick, who were also studying aspects of virus structure. Developments in TMV research during the 1950s illustrate the connections in the emerging field of molecular biology between structural studies of nucleic acids and of proteins and viruses. They also reveal how the protagonists of the “race for the double helix” continued to interact personally and professionally during the years when Watson and Crick's model for the double-helical structure of DNA was debated and confirmed. (shrink)

This essay, by the editor of Common Knowledge, introduces the sixth and final installment of “Fuzzy Studies,” the journal's “Symposium on the Consequence of Blur.” Suggesting that “Fuzzy Studies” should be understood in the context of a desultory campaign against zeal conducted in the journal for almost twenty years, he explains that the editors' assumption has been that any authentic case for the less adamant modes of thinking, or the less focused ways of seeing, needs to be unenthusiastic and carefully (...) ramified. To establish the distinction between overenthused and unemphatic approaches to blur, he contrasts the ecstatically amorphous “Blur building” with examples of classical Chinese landscape painting. Elizabeth Diller and Richard Scofidio, in their book blur: the making of nothing, chronicle the development of their plans for the Blur building and, in the process, inadvertently show that, to overbear various negative associations of blur and fog, the authors/architects grew self-contradictorily emphatic about the need to produce de-emphasis in architecture and in modern life. Perl shows how this self-contradiction appears also in phenomenology-inflected writings on blur by T. J. Clark, Yve-Alain Bois and Rosalind Kraus, J.-P. Sartre, and Georges Bataille, but not in the work of the phenomenologist François Jullien, whose book The Great Image Has No Form analyzes the role of blur in classical Chinese art theory and practice. Where traditional Western painting, Jullien argues, calls for voyeuristically intense focus, traditional Chinese painting stimulates “dé-tente, relaxation or ‘untensing’.” Intense focus on a blur is still, Perl observes, an intense focus. In describing a painting by the Yuan Dynasty master Ni Zan, Perl concludes that the only way to be un-self-contradictorily positive about fuzziness, whether in logic or aesthetics, is to de-reify and de-differentiate with the aim of achieving blandness. (shrink)

Philippa Foot is one of the most original and widely respected philosophers of our time; her work has exerted a lasting influence on the development of moral philosophy. In tribute to her, twelve leading philosophers from both sides of the Atlantic have contributed essays exploring the various topics in moral philosophy to which she has made a distinctive contribution--virtue ethics, naturalism, non-cognitivism, relativism, categorical requirements, and the role of rationality in morality.

Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak's original essay "Can the Subaltern Speak?" transformed the analysis of colonialism through an eloquent and uncompromising argument that affirmed the contemporary relevance of Marxism while using deconstructionist methods to explore the international division of labor and capitalism's "worlding" of the world. Spivak's essay hones in on the historical and ideological factors that obstruct the possibility of being heard for those who inhabit the periphery. It is a probing interrogation of what it means to have political subjectivity, to (...) be able to access the state, and to suffer the burden of difference in a capitalist system that promises equality yet withholds it at every turn. Since its publication, "Can the Subaltern Speak?" has been cited, invoked, imitated, and critiqued. In these phenomenal essays, eight scholars take stock of the effects and response to Spivak's work. They begin by contextualizing the piece within the development of subaltern and postcolonial studies and the quest for human rights. Then, through the lens of Spivak's essay, they rethink historical problems of subalternity, voicing, and death. A final section situates "Can the Subaltern Speak?" within contemporary issues, particularly new international divisions of labor and the politics of silence among indigenous women of Guatemala and Mexico. In an afterword, Spivak herself considers her essay's past interpretations and future incarnations and the questions and histories that remain secreted in the original and revised versions of "Can the Subaltern Speak?"—both of which are reprinted in this book. (shrink)

This paper argues for a new understanding of Strawson’s distinction between personal, impersonal, and self-reactive attitudes. Many Strawsonians take these basic reactive attitude types to be distinguished by two factors. Is it the self or another who is treated with good- or ill-will? And is it the self or another who displays good- or ill-will? On this picture, when someone else wrongs me, my reactive attitude is personal; when someone else wrongs someone else, my reactive attitude is impersonal; and when (...) I wrong someone else, my attitude is self-reactive. Against this account, I argue that the basic reactive attitude types are better distinguished according to whether they express partial or impartial concern. This fits Strawson’s discussion in “Freedom and Resentment”, and it allows us to see an important point that the alternative approach obscures. Namely, while attitudes like resentment, gratitude, shame, and pride can arise as responses to our own treatment and behavior, they can also arise as third-party responses to the treatment and behavior of our family members, romantic partners, and close friends. Similarly, attitudes like moral indignation and disapprobation also have a wider scope than is often acknowledged; they can arise as responses to others’ treatment, but they can also arise as responses to our own treatment when we react impartially to circumstances involving ourselves. (shrink)

Written in a readable, accessible style, with plenty of up-to-date examples Psychoanalysis and Culture provides a brilliant introduction to key issues in the area of application of psychoanalytic theories to culture. The author argues that we cannot grasp the complexity of contemporary global issues without understanding some of the unconscious processes which underlie them. After introducing some major modern and postmodern psychoanalytic approaches, Minsky offers a broad-ranging critique of Lacan's theory of culture and the unconscious. She explores a range of (...) crucial and topical questions: how should we explain women's historical subordination and what is now often seen as a crisis in male identity? What constitutes 'masculinity' apart from power and control? How important is the father, actually and symbolically in children's development in the context of lone-parent families? Why is contemporary culture often still so violent and destructive? Why is consumer culture so attractive to so many and why is it so difficult to put limits on economic growth in the interests of preventing environmental disaster? This book will be of great interest to students and scholars in sociology, women's studies, cultural studies, psychology and history as well as psychoanalytic studies. It will also appeal to the general reader interested in the psychology of cultural change. (shrink)

From a clinical ethics perspective, I explore several traditional arguments that deem deception as morally unacceptable. For example, it is often argued that deception robs people of their autonomy. Deception also unfairly manipulates others and is a breach of important trust-relations. In these kinds of cases, I argue that the same reasons commonly used against deception can provide strong reasons why deception can be extremely beneficial for patients who lack mental capacity. For example, deception can enhance, rather than impair, autonomy (...) in certain cases. I argue that deception ought to only be used after considering several key morally relevant factors and provide a practical and morally justifiable framework for exploring these issues. (shrink)

Virtue ethics is perhaps the most important development within late twentieth-century moral philosophy. Rosalind Hursthouse, who has made notable contributions to this development, here presents a full exposition and defense of her neo-Aristotelian version of virtue ethics. She shows how virtue ethics can provide guidance for action, illuminate moral dilemmas, and bring out the moral significance of the emotions.

Virtue ethics is currently one of three major approaches in normative ethics. It may, initially, be identified as the one that emphasizes the virtues, or moral character, in contrast to the approach that emphasizes duties or rules (deontology) or that emphasizes the consequences of actions (consequentialism). Suppose it is obvious that someone in need should be helped. A utilitarian will point to the fact that the consequences of doing so will maximize well-being, a deontologist to the fact that, in doing (...) so the agent will be acting in accordance with a moral rule such as “Do unto others as you would be done by” and a virtue ethicist to the fact that helping the person would be charitable or benevolent. (shrink)