The prelims comprise: The Teleological Conception of the Practicable Good Human Function The Final Account of Human Good Conclusions Acknowledgments Notes References Further reading.

Philippa Foot is one of the most original and widely respected philosophers of our time; her work has exerted a lasting influence on the development of moral philosophy. In tribute to her, twelve leading philosophers from both sides of the Atlantic have contributed essays exploring the various topics in moral philosophy to which she has made a distinctive contribution--virtue ethics, naturalism, non-cognitivism, relativism, categorical requirements, and the role of rationality in morality.

It is the famous first thesis of Anscombe's ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’ that we should lay aside moral philosophy—indeed ‘ banish ethics totally from our minds’! —‘until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology’. By a ‘philosophy of psychology’ I understand Anscombe to mean grammatical investigations into various psychological concepts that hold the key to ethics. Anscombe herself instances ‘action’, ‘intention’, ‘pleasure’, ‘wanting’ . Without such an understanding, she thinks we will simply go astray.

Wisdom is to have correct views of the goods and bads of human life, and of their relative worth and standing: to understand how to navigate one’s way through these, in the situations in which one finds oneself, so as always to end in a correct judgment of how best to act—successfully, wisely. Lacking it, one is in danger of living a life in some way bad or defective. It may be a really corrupt, wicked life. Or it may be (...) simply a wasted one, where the agent squanders talents and time, without doing anything so terribly bad, certainly not to others. Admittedly, we can perhaps speak of the wicked as in a certain way shallow, although that would need elaboration ; less contentiously, we can speak of the unjust life of an unjust person as one wasted. Our talk of waste, etc., is typically more particular– where the issues are rather with idleness, triviality, and superficiality, with failures to appreciate, pursue, or be moved by, things of real human worth: it points to a more specific range of defects and misjudgements of worth, etc. This paper explores the notions of depth and shallowness as they figure in Foot’s reflections on the good, and then considers the implications of these notions for our understanding of what it is to live well or badly and what it is to have lived happily or unhappily. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Initial Survey: The Role of the Human Excellences in Aristotle's Practical Philosophy The Nature of Virtue and the Doctrine of the Middle/Mean (DOM) Notes Bibliography Further Reading.

This chapter contains sections titled: The first phase (1950s to mid‐1960s): the Wittgensteinian defence of the possibility of naturalism The second phase (1970s): unease over morality and the rejection of (2) The third phase (1980s–1990s): rejecting (3); objective morality, objectivity rationality, and the facts of human life.