The paper focuses on the notion of disability in the documents of selected international organisations. The social model approach to disability has been implemented since the second half of the 20th century and consequently such terms as ‘invalid’, ‘madman’, ‘dumb’, ‘cripple’, ‘paralytic’, ‘the lame’ or ‘the blind’ were removed from the literature, legal acts, or documents of international organisations. Notions like ‘disability’, ‘disabled person’, or ‘a person with disability’ are considered ‘politically correct’ now. It is (...) worth highlighting however that great emphasis is put to replace the term ‘a disabled person’ with the term ‘a person with a disability or disabilities” as the latter notion does not refer to the person’s characteristics with one adjective only, hence it does not stigmatize him/her either. The trend is reflected in the terminology used in the documents and acts introduced at the international level. Nevertheless, there are still a lot of difficulties with translation into other languages, which is also the Polish case. (shrink)

The Idea of Disability in the Eighteenth Century is a wide-ranging collection of essays that explores philosophy, biography, and texts about and by disabled people living in the eighteenth century. The book, which introduces and affirms the notion that disability studies predates most United States and United Kingdom findings by more than a hundred years, will be of interest to philosophers, historians, sociologists, and literary scholars.

In this paper I review how the notion of gender is understood in psychiatry, specifically in the fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5). First, I examine the contraposition between sex and gender, and argue that it is still retained by DSM-5, even though with some caveats. Second, I claim that, even if genderqueer people are not pathologized and gender pluralism is the background assumption, some diagnostic criteria still conceal a residue of gender dualism (...) and essentialism. Third, I consider gender dysphoria, which is characterized by an incongruence between one’s experienced or expressed gender and one’s assigned gender; since this condition pertains to distress and disability, not to the incongruence per se, it does not pathologize transgender people. Still, I contend that it should be removed from DSM-5 for theoretical reasons. (shrink)

The Idea of Disability in the Eighteenth Century is a wide-ranging collection of essays that explores philosophy, biography, and texts about and by disabled people living in the eighteenth century. The book, which introduces and affirms the notion that disability studies predates most United States and United Kingdom findings by more than a hundred years, will be of interest to philosophers, historians, sociologists, and literary scholars.

The Idea of Disability in the Eighteenth Century is a wide-ranging collection of essays that explores philosophy, biography, and texts about and by disabled people living in the eighteenth century. The book, which introduces and affirms the notion that disability studies predates most United States and United Kingdom findings by more than a hundred years, will be of interest to philosophers, historians, sociologists, and literary scholars.

Complex social and ethical problems are often most effectively solved by engaging them at the messy and uncomfortable intersections of disciplines and practices, a notion that grounds the InVisible Difference project, which seeks to extend thinking and alter practice around the making, status, ownership, and value of work by contemporary dance choreographers by examining choreographic work through the lenses of law, bioethics, dance scholarship, and the practice of dance by differently-abled dancers. This article offers a critical thesis on how (...) bioethics has come to occupy a marginal and marginalizing role in questions about the differently-abled body. In doing so, it has rendered the disabled community largely invisible to and in bioethics. It then defends the claim that bioethics – as a social undertaking pursued collaboratively by individuals from different disciplines – must take much better notice of the body and the embodied individual if it is to better achieve its ends, which include constructing a moral and just society. Finally, this article considers how the arts, and specifically dance, provides us with rich evidence about the body and our ability to respond positively to normally ‘othered’ bodies. It concludes that greater attention to empirical evidence like that being generated in InVisible Difference will help to expand the reach and significance of bioethics, and thereby its relevance to important questions about the status of bodies and bodily differences, which must be considered as central to its ambitions. (shrink)

The Middles Ages are often portrayed as a time in which people with physical disabilities in the Latin West were ostracized, on the grounds that such conditions demonstrated personal sin and/or God’s judgment. This was undoubtedly the dominant response to disability in various times and places during the fifth through fifteenth centuries, but the total range of medieval responses is much broader and more interesting. In particular, the 13th-15th century treatment of three groups (martyrs, mothers, and mystics - whose (...) physical ‘defects’ were often understood as signs of special connection to God in this life, and who were often represented as retaining these signs in the life to come) challenge standard notions of beauty, disfigurement, and bodily perfection, particularly as the notion is applied to eternal life and our ultimate end. (shrink)

This paper charts the concepts of grip and the bodily auxiliary in Maurice Merleau-Ponty to consider how they find expression in disability narratives. Arguing against the notion of “maximal grip” that some commentators have used to explicate intentionality in Merleau-Ponty, I argue that grip in his texts functions instead as a compensatory effort to stave off uncertainty, lack of mastery, and ambiguity. Nearly without exception in Phenomenology of Perception, the mobilization of “grip” is a signal of impending loss, (...) and is offered as a strategy for managing failure rather than as an example of sure-footed mastery. I read Merleau-Ponty alongside Mary Felstiner's Out of Joint: A Public and Private Story of Arthritis to explore these other, attenuated dimensions of grip. Finally, the paper turns to Harriet McBryde Johnson's memoir Too Late to Die Young as an example of a way of thinking disabled embodiment otherwise. (shrink)

The practice of terminating a pregnancy following the diagnosis of a fetal abnormality raises questions about notions of bodily normality and the ways these shape ethical decision-making. This is particularly the case with terminations done on the basis of ostensibly minor morphological anomalies, such as cleft lip and isolated malformations of the limbs or digits. In this paper, I examine a recent case of selective termination after a morphology ultrasound scan revealed the fetus to be missing a hand . Using (...) the work of Georges Canguilhem, I show that a person with acheiria could be considered normal. Further, I show that this case reveals a kind of “undecidability” in the significance of fetal sex/gender and disability in termination. From this, I consider the conceptual interaction of disability with sex/gender, to argue that the ethics of disability termination are not as distinct from those of sex/gender selection as is commonly supposed. (shrink)

This essay treats the field of philosophy and the study of disability such that each may be conceived of in terms of the other, perhaps to the extent that they may be thought of as one. First, it examines the bases and methods of various documents in the study of disability, finding that such study may be conceived of as essentially philosophical, even as the philosophical nature of disability studies threatens such studies’ practice. Then philosophy is depicted (...) as that discourse which necessarily interrogates its bases and methods -that is, as discourse that engages its own ability. The two fields are presented as exemplary of the interrogation of ability, particularly of discursive ability. The essay’s primary influence is Emmanuel Levinas, mainly for the emphasis he places on the nature of language in his approach to philosophical critique. Developing the notion of im/possibility -the simultaneous emergence of a discourse’s conditions of possibility with those of its impossibility -the essay focuses on “dis/ability” as the central notion in the convergence of philosophy and disability studies. (shrink)

El autor intenta mostrar que el concepto de ley es totalmente innecesario y que solo sirve para crear confusiones y generar falacias. Para ello muestra que la supuesta “ley de la causalidad” es inconsistente y que la ciencia no requiere de ella más que en una primera fase. Las ciencias maduras usan relaciones, en concreto, relaciones mediante ecuaciones diferenciales para desempe\ nar el papel que se le quiere otorgar a la ley de la causalidad. Despues de hacer esto, el autor (...) presenta varias confusiones relacionadas con el concepto de causa, y su solución si se asume lo anteriormente dicho. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Accurate Self-Assessment, Autonomous Ignorance, and the Appreciation of DisabilityJoel Anderson (bio) and Warren Lux (bio)In their thoughtful commentaries on our essay, "Knowing your own strength: Accurate self-assessment as a requirement for personal autonomy," George Agich, Ruth Chadwick, and Dominic Murphy (2004) provide both criticisms and insights that give us a context in which to clarify further our claim that one's autonomy is impaired when one is unable to appreciate (...) whether one has the capacities required for tasks one is undertaking. We focus on two issues: the extent to which our account of autonomy suggests a problematically "externalist" or "objective" approach and the issue of whether our talk of accurate self-assessment entails an overdemanding requirement that one know numerous facts about oneself to count as autonomous.The External Point of ViewFor many, the idea that specific regions of the brain might be relevant to a person's autonomy evokes nightmarish, startlingly reductionist visions of a world in which informed consent is decided on the basis of neuroimaging. In arguing that a capacity for self-assessment is essential for autonomy and also presupposes executive function that is often impaired by prefrontal damage, we do not wish to engage in such reductionism by suggesting that there is any straightforward, one-to-one mapping comparable to that presupposed by the nightmare scenarios. Given what we know about the brain's plasticity, the prospects (although limited at present) for neurorehabilitation, the multiplicity of the instantiation of autonomy-related capacities, and, especially, the constitutively moral/normative dimensions of these capacity concepts, such mappings are clearly problematic. This is true even in the easy cases, which, as Murphy points out, include our case of "John." This is all the more true with regard to the more complicated psychiatric cases, including disorders such as depression where the normative dimensions and the greater interpretive leeway in diagnosis preclude reductionist solutions (See Anderson 2004). For these reasons and for independent philosophical reasons, we are uncomfortable with the label "externalist," [End Page 309] although we acknowledge and confirm our view that externally applied neuroscientific notions—and evidence—can inform these matters. Nonetheless, we do not wish to argue for a fully externalist point of view, especially when paired with the idea that we are advocating a "smooth naturalistic picture of the cognitive basis of autonomy" (Murphy 2004, 303). Murphy puts us in some terrific company with the likes of John Doris, Shaun Nichols, and—we would add—himself, and this is welcome and flattering. But, to avoid any misunderstanding of an issue that we do not actually take up in our essay, we should caution that we do not endorse a program of naturalizing the normativity on which many of central autonomy-related concepts are based. The notion, for example, of what it is to assess competently one's chances of success cannot be replaced with a set of nomological regularities or a self-applying list of necessary and sufficient conditions.Appreciating Disability and Knowing the FactsOne of the central challenges we face in presenting our approach is to distinguish our requirement of "accurate self-assessment" from an implausible requirement that one have no false beliefs about one's capacities. In different ways, all three commentaries make it clear that our argument would benefit from further clarification of this distinction.In her commentary, Chadwick suggests that our approach may commit us to requiring too much self-knowledge, specifically, that it seems to require accurate knowledge of things like our genetic makeup as a requirement for autonomy. To begin with, it is worth underscoring again that the requirement we have introduced is explicitly task specific: we are focused here on whether an agent has an understanding of things that are relevant for undertaking an intended task, and declarative knowledge of facts, genetic or otherwise, about oneself is relevant only insofar as they bear on that understanding.But Chadwick's point clearly goes deeper. In that regard, it is particularly important to underscore that ours is actually a requirement that has less to do with knowing facts—even task-specific ones—about oneself and much more to do with having the ability to incorporate available... (shrink)

In this paper I reflect upon my personal experience of chronic progressive multiple sclerosis in order to provide a phenomenological account of the human experience of disability. In particular, I argue that the phenomenological notion of lived body provides important insights into the profound disruptions of space and time that are an integral element of changed physical capacities such as loss of mobility. In addition, phenomenology discloses the emotional dimension of physical disorder. The lived body disruption engendered by (...) loss of mobility includes a change in the character of surrounding space, an alteration in one's taken-for-granted awareness of objects, the disruption of corporeal identity, a disturbance in one's relations with others, and a change in the character of temporal experience. The loss of upright posture is of particular significance since it not only concretely diminishes autonomy but affects the way one is treated by others. Such a change in posture is, therefore, particularly disruptive in the social world of everyday life. An understanding of the lived body disruption engendered by disability has important applications for the clinical context in devising effective therapies, as well as for the social arena in determining how best to resolve the various challenges posed by chronic disabling disorders. (shrink)

The sexual assault of persons with mental disabilities occurs at alarmingly high rates worldwide. These assaults are a form of gender-based violence intersecting with discrimination based on disability. Our research on the treatment of such cases in the Canadian criminal justice system demonstrates the systemic barriers these victims face at the level of both substantive legal doctrine and trial procedure. Relying on feminist legal theory and disability theory, we argue in this paper that abuses of trust and power (...) underlie most sexual assaults of women with mental disabilities. We argue that existing Criminal Code provisions in Canada are inadequate to address this type of exploitation because courts have consistently failed to recognize that such abuses of power and trust are fundamentally inconsistent with any notion of voluntary consent. (shrink)

The notion of being a burden to others is mostly discussed in the context of care‐intensive diseases or end‐of‐life decisions. But the notion is also crucial in decision‐making at the beginning of life, namely regarding prenatal testing. Ever more sophisticated testing methods, especially non‐invasive prenatal testing (NIPT), allow the detection of genetic traits in the unborn child that may cause disabilities. A positive result often influences the decision of the pregnant women towards a termination of the pregnancy. Thus, (...) critics claim that these testing methods send a negative message to people with disabilities. At the core of this is what we call the burden assumption. This assumption claims that children with disabilities are necessarily a burden to others, especially to their parents and other family members. In this paper, we discuss what being a burden to others means in this context and how such an attitude can be avoided without restraining reproductive autonomy. A closer examination shows that the burden assumption is mostly based on misinformation and a false model of disability. Empirical studies as well as narrative evidence from parents who raise a child with disabilities show that the burden assumption is wrong. Raising a child with disabilities does not necessarily mean a decrease in the quality of life. We show how the burden assumption can be challenged through an advanced genetic counselling that combines empirical evidence with narratives from a first‐person perspective. (shrink)

Abstract:How might identity and identity politics inform music teachers' practices and assumptions about disability? In this article, we engage in a critical discussion about how music educators might respond to disability. This article is presented in three parts as a collaborative dialogue between the two authors, using the landscape of identity politics to frame the discussion. In the first part, Warren Churchill discusses Tobin Siebers' theorizing of "the ideology of ability" as it relates to music education's dominant response (...) to disability. Building on his idea of "complex embodiment," Siebers lays out a justification for disabled individuals to actively engage in identity politics for self-advocacy. Churchill connects Siebers' ideology to Joseph Abramo's epistemology of sound. In the second part, Cara Faith Bernard makes a counter-argument against deploying identity politics in the music classroom, drawing upon Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak's notion of strategic essentialism to examine its potential risks with regards to music education curricula, in which essentialism may lead to establishing detrimental "best practices" for students. Thereafter, in Part Three, the authors join together to make sense of these seemingly contradictory philosophical outlooks on identity politics, in the hope of furthering conversation about music education's ongoing response to disability. (shrink)

Scholars in language and social interaction have long been concerned with the role of texts in institutional settings, studying, for example, how interview schedules actively shape conversational dynamics between participants. While texts have been acknowledged as active in this way, their generative capacity remains largely overlooked. This article argues that like human subjects, texts in interaction enact agency. One text in particular, a screening form used to diagnose the learning disability attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder, is analyzed to claim that this (...) text brings about the very condition it is designed to measure: a learning disability. Drawing from work in discursive psychology, I show how the measurement requires the client to adopt certain speaking positions, which then enables the text to speak for the client. I also demonstrate how the text constructs otherwise normal behavior as pathological through punctuation and nominalization. Finally, I illustrate how the spatial organization of the text constrains clients’ choices for interacting with it. This article claims that texts produce, rather than reflect, cognitive phenomena, and it moreover encourages that the notion of text as agent be taken seriously, especially when it presents the capacity to disable. (shrink)

The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities is increasingly seen as driving a paradigm shift in mental health law, particularly in relation to the understanding that it requires a shift from substituted to supported decisions. This article identifies two competing moral commitments implied by this shift, both of which appeal to the notion of autonomy. It is argued that because of these commitments the Convention is in tension with more general calls in the medical ethics literature for (...) preserving patient autonomy through support. The competing commitments within the Convention also present a particular challenge in putting the support it requires into practice. A discursive control account of freedom is used to develop some practical guidelines for navigating this new moral territory. (shrink)

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Franklin G Miller recently argued that the wrongness of killing is best explained by the harm that comes to the victim, and that ‘total disability’ best explains the nature of this harm. Hence, killing patients who are already totally disabled is not wrong. I maintain that their notion of total disability is ambiguous and that they beg the question with respect to whether there are abilities left over that remain relevant for the goods of (...) personhood and human worth. If these goods remain, then something more is lost in death than in ‘total disability,’ and their explanation of what makes killing wrong comes up short. But if total disability is equivalent with death, then their argument is an interesting one. (shrink)

This article questions the notion of a disembodied theology which can provide ultimate answers about an absolute God. It places this questioning within the truly challenging arena of mental health. While issuing challenge to theology the author calls for a pastoral theology that is willing to cross boundaries, those that were perhaps not even previously imagined. This is a daring, moving and embodied challenge to the more constraining and controlling areas of theology and pastoral care.

Disagreement about the properattitude toward disability proliferates. Yetlittle attention has been paid to an importantmeta-question, namely, whether ``disability'' isan essentially contested concept. If so, recentdebates between bioethicists and the disabilitymovement leadership cannot be resolved. Inthis essay I identify some of the presumptionsthat make their encounters so contentious. Much more must happen, I argue, for anydiscussions about disability policy andpolitics to be productive. Progress depends onconstructing a neutral conception ofdisability, one that neither devaluesdisability nor implies that persons withdisabilities (...) are inadequate. So, first, I clearaway the conceptual underbrush that makes usthink our idea of disability must bevalue-laden. Second, I sketch someconstituents of, and constraints upon, aneutral notion of disability. (shrink)

The visible condition of a person in bodily pain or of a person who has lost autonomy, social status or self–representation, reveals to some degree an invisible reality which is present in every human being. Assuming the validity of this premise, my primary purpose in the following paper is first to reflect upon social and cultural attitudes that consider disability and vulnerability as a boundary and a threat; and secondly, to propose an alternative in transgressing the differences of socio (...) - anthropological boundaries in order to enable dynamic communication with fellow human beings, and ultimately, to bring about the true human flourishing. The structure of my argument is threefold. In a first part my focus is stressed upon concerns of those living with a physical condition of disability and a mainstream socio–cultural attitudes towards it. In the second part, my attention will be on the meaning of vulnerability associated with, but distinct from the notion of disability. Thirdly, I will elucidate my argument with concrete examples from the L´Arche community - where people with and without disabilities are living together in mutual interdependency and cooperation. (shrink)

Theories of social justice are necessarily abstract, reaching beyond the particular and the immediate to the general and the timeless. Yet such theories, addressing the world and its problems, must respond to the real and changing dilemmas of the day. A brilliant work of practical philosophy, Frontiers of Justice is dedicated to this proposition. Taking up three urgent problems of social justice neglected by current theories and thus harder to tackle in practical terms and everyday life, Martha Nussbaum seeks a (...) theory of social justice that can guide us to a richer, more responsive approach to social cooperation. The idea of the social contract--especially as developed in the work of John Rawls--is one of the most powerful approaches to social justice in the Western tradition. But as Nussbaum demonstrates, even Rawls's theory, suggesting a contract for mutual advantage among approximate equals, cannot address questions of social justice posed by unequal parties. How, for instance, can we extend the equal rights of citizenship--education, health care, political rights and liberties--to those with physical and mental disabilities? How can we extend justice and dignified life conditions to all citizens of the world? And how, finally, can we bring our treatment of nonhuman animals into our notions of social justice? Exploring the limitations of the social contract in these three areas, Nussbaum devises an alternative theory based on the idea of capabilities. She helps us to think more clearly about the purposes of political cooperation and the nature of political principles--and to look to a future of greater justice for all. (shrink)

In recent times, phenomena of conversational asymmetry have become a lively object of study for linguists, philosophers of language and moral philosophers—under various labels: illocutionary disablement and silencing, discursive injustice :440–457, 2014; Lance and Kukla in Ethics 123:456–478, 2013), illocutionary distortion. The common idea is that members of underprivileged groups sometimes have trouble performing particular speech acts that they are entitled to perform: in certain contexts, their performative potential is somehow undermined, and their capacity to do things with words is (...) distorted or even annulled. In this paper I will assess this idea, focusing on Rebecca Kukla’s and Rae Langton’s accounts; in particular, I will criticize the role the notion of uptake plays in their accounts, and claim that it may ultimately undermine the very idea of discursive injustice. While, according to Kukla and Langton, members of disadvantaged groups are victims of a kind of uptake failure, leading to illocutionary disablement and even silencing, in the account I present they are victims of a kind of communicative disablement. My overall aim is to develop a notion of discursive injustice that is more plausible and more effective for our broader purposes of criticising the structures of power and oppression. (shrink)

In his recent Ars Disputandi article, ‘Some Difficulties for Amos Yong’s Disability Theology of the Resurrection,’ Ryan Mullins argues that Yong’s proposals are fundamentally misguided by Stanley Hauerwas’ dictum – which states that to ‘eliminate the disability means to eliminate the subject’ – and that therefore Yong’s disability theology of the resurrection body encounters potentially insuperable difficulties or is not sufficiently justified in the face of more traditional accounts. In response to Mullins’ criticisms, clarifications are offered with (...) regard to both the role of Hauerwas’ notion in Yong’s theology and the theological basis for claims regarding the persistence of the marks of impairment in the resurrection body. (shrink)

In his recent Ars Disputandi article, ‘Some Difficulties for Amos Yong’s Disability Theology of the Resurrection,’ Ryan Mullins argues that Yong’s proposals are fundamentally misguided by Stanley Hauerwas’ dictum – which states that to ‘eliminate the disability means to eliminate the subject’ – and that therefore Yong’s disability theology of the resurrection body encounters potentially insuperable difficulties or is not sufficiently justified in the face of more traditional accounts. In response to Mullins’ criticisms, clarifications are offered with (...) regard to both the role of Hauerwas’ notion in Yong’s theology and the theological basis for claims regarding the persistence of the marks of impairment in the resurrection body. (shrink)

This paper examines the ethical issues of the inclusion of workers with disabilities in the workplace with a cross-fertilization approach between organization studies, the ethics of care, and a movement from the field of architecture and design that is called Universal Design (UD). It explores how organizations can use UD to develop more inclusive workplaces, first by applying UD principles to workspaces and second by showing how UD implies an integrative understanding of inclusion from the workspace to the workplace. Moreover, (...) this paper discusses the ethical challenges and complexities that this design practice faces in regard to its applicability to diverse organizations and industries. Finally, this paper demonstrates that inclusion requires abandoning any notion of a perfect, productive body and, therefore, recognizing our shared vulnerability and fundamental interdependence in the workplace. (shrink)

The claim that we have a moral obligation, where a choice can be made, to bring to birth the 'best' child possible, has been highly controversial for a number of decades. More recently Savulescu has labelled this claim the Principle of Procreative Beneficence. It has been argued that this Principle is problematic in both its reasoning and its implications, most notably in that it places lower moral value on the disabled. Relentless criticism of this proposed moral obligation, however, has been (...) unable, thus far, to discredit this Principle convincingly and as a result its influence shows no sign of abating. I will argue that while criticisms of the implications and detail of the reasoning behind it are well founded, they are unlikely to produce an argument that will ultimately discredit the obligation that the Principle of Procreative Beneficence represents. I believe that what is needed finally and convincingly to reveal the fallacy of this Principle is a critique of its ultimate theoretical foundation, the notion of impersonal harm. In this paper I argue that while the notion of impersonal harm is intuitively very appealing, its plausibility is based entirely on this intuitive appeal and not on sound moral reasoning. I show that there is another plausible explanation for our intuitive response and I believe that this, in conjunction with the other theoretical criticisms that I and others have levelled at this Principle, shows that the Principle of Procreative Beneficence should be rejected. (shrink)

This article critiques the analysis of the comic and the tragic in disability discourse and the text by Ian Stronach and Julie Allan, using the work of Mikhail Bakhtin on the theory of the novel, of language and of speech genres. Taking Bakhtin's notion that to speak or to write is always essentially dialogic, the article introduces particular dimensions of audience, disability, feminism and poststructuralism in an attempt to explore the social organization of disability discourse and (...) to move beyond the artifice of the text's stasis. It argues that unless critical theory is matched with critical response, institutionalized inequality demands that the authority of an individualized `disability' text written by non-disabled authors remains intact - even when it is accompanied by an undermining discussion of itself. The text is commonly decontextualized and remote, and the role of the disable reader, especially their role as audience, is reduced to a `simple' one - a vessel into which the authors' authority is poured. This represents a particular kind of audience experience that maximizes the distance between the reader and the text's performance and, in the case of Stronach and Allan's work, ultimately destabilizes their arguments. (shrink)

Some humanist theologians within the French Reformed Church in the 17th century developed the notion that a disability of the intellect could exist in nature independently of any moral defect, freeing its possessors from any obligations of natural law. Sharpened by disputes with the church leadership, this notion began to suggest a species-type classification that threatened to override the importance of the boundary between elect and reprobate in the doctrine of predestination. This classification seems to look forward (...) to the natural history of mind that emerged later in the century. (shrink)

This book uses insights from disability studies to understand in a deeper way the ethical implications that genetic technologies pose for Christian thought. Theologians have been debating genetic engineering for decades, but what has been missing from many theological debates is a deep concern for persons with genetic disabilities. In this ambitious and stimulating book, Devan Stahl argues that engagement with metaphysics and a theology of nature is crucial for Christians to evaluate both genetic science and the moral use (...) of genetic technologies, such as human genetic engineering, gene therapy, genetic screenings, preimplantation genetic diagnosis, and gene editing. Using theological notions of creation ex nihilo and natural law alongside insights from disability studies, the book seeks to recast the debate concerning genetic well-being. Following the work of Stanley Hauerwas, Stahl proposes the church as the locus for reimagining disability in a way that will significantly influence the debates concerning genetic therapies. Stahl's project in "genethics" proceeds with an acute awareness of her own liberal Protestant tradition's early embrace of the eugenics movement in the name of scientific and medical advancement, and it constructively engages the Catholic tradition's metaphysical approach to questions in bioethics to surpass limitations to Protestant thinking on natural law. Christianity has all too frequently been complicit in excluding, degrading, and marginalizing people with disabilities, but the new Christian metaphysics developed here by way of disability perspectives provides normative, theological guidance on the use of genetic technologies today. As Stahl shows in her study, only by heeding the voices of people with disabilities can Christians remain faithful to the call to find Christ in "the least of these" and from there draw close to God. This book will be of interest to scholars in Christian ethics, bioethics, moral theology, and practical theology. (shrink)

Ned Block argues that the higher-order (HO) approach to explaining consciousness is ‘defunct’ because a prominent objection (the ‘misrepresentation objection’) exposes the view as ‘incoherent’. What’s more, a response to this objection that I’ve offered elsewhere (Weisberg 2010) fails because it ‘amounts to abusing the notion of what-it’s-like-ness’ (xxx).1 In this response, I wish to plead guilty as charged. Indeed, I will continue herein to abuse Block’s notion of what-it’s-like-ness. After doing so, I will argue that the HO (...) approach accounts for the sense of what-it’s-like-ness that matters in a theory of consciousness. I will also argue that the only incoherence present in the HO theory is that generated by embracing Block’s controversial notion of what-it’s-like-ness, something no theorist of any stripe ought to do. Block is famous for (among other things) having introduced the notion of ‘phenomenal consciousness’ into contemporary philosophy of mind (Block 1995). This term is widely employed in the philosophical literature and it even appears in the empirical literature. But wide-speared usage has brought about divergent interpretations of the term. We can distinguish a ‘moderate’ and a ‘zealous’ reading of ‘phenomenal consciousness’. On the moderate reading, ‘phenomenal consciousness’ just means ‘experience’. Many people have embraced this sense of the term and use it to roughly pick out conscious experience involving sensory quality (states like conscious visual experiences or conscious pains, for example).2 On the zealous reading, however, phenomenal consciousness is held to be ‘distinct from any cognitive, intentional, or functional property’ (Block 1995: 234). That is, any explanation of phenomenal consciousness in exclusively cognitive, intentional, or functional terms will fail to capture, without remainder, what is really distinctive about phenomenal consciousness. Block, of course, is fully clear about embracing the zealous reading; indeed, his initial introduction of the notion is in those terms. The same ambiguity occurs with the much-used (and abused) idea of ‘what-it’s-like-ness’.. (shrink)

This chapter seeks to advance two central claims: 1) that the therapy-enhancement distinction is not an absolute one; and 2) that the social model of disability can be applied as at least one possible criterion for evaluating the ethics of enhancement. First, I address the limits of the therapy-enhancement distinction by showing that some accepted forms of therapy are indeed enhancements in their own right. The line between enhancement and therapy in medicine is therefore not clear-cut, but nor is (...) the difference between enhancement and disability straightforward either, as I argue. I discuss how some forms of apparent enhancement may in fact make people disabled from a social point-of-view, for they would not be able to function well in a society “fine-tuned” towards the current average range of abilities. Enhancement is therefore a slippery notion, and one that brings into relief questions of equity and of oppression. If enhancement is meant to be a key stepping stone on the path towards a posthuman condition, as some claim, then the ambiguous nature of enhancement surely throws into the question the coherence of the “post” in “posthuman.”. (shrink)

This essay examines dominant notions of reproductive identity in feminist bioethics from a queer-crip perspective by considering the “reproductive situation” in Germany of people who are classified as disabled and people who are classified as queer. I analyze the ways in which such people are excluded from the understandings of reproductive identity that figure prominently in German feminist bioethics, and argue that feminist bioethics in Germany, which has become a well-established part of important bioethical institutions, reflects many, if not most, (...) of the neo-eugenic developments that characterize more recognizably mainstream bioethics. I also show that feminist bioethics constitutes the reproductive subject as nondisabled, intelligibly gendered, and heterosexual. (shrink)

In asking scholars to reflect on the structures and practices of academic knowledge that render alternative knowledge traditions irrelevant and invisible, as well as on the ways these must change for the academy to cease functioning as an instrument of westernization rather than as an authentically global and diverse intellectual commons, the editor of this special issue of the Journal of Academic Ethics is envisaging a world much needed and much resisted. A great deal of the conversation about diversity in (...) higher education emphasizes, rightly, the need for an international and ethnically diverse population of scholars and students. Less attention is paid to the value of cognitive diversity—the diversity of cognition generated by cognitive disabilities. As one aspect of intellectual diversity, cognitive diversity promises novel ways of thinking and new understandings of what knowledge is, who makes it, and how it is made. The unique value of cognitive diversity is its insistence on a radical shift in our conception of who can know and who can produce knowledge. Insisting on the inclusion, as scholars, of persons with minds labelled disabled, an epistemology of disability pushes us to reform the much criticized but still dominant notion of the expert and scholar as able-bodied and hyper-rational. (shrink)

In recent years, the international commons movement has increasingly joined forces with the global movement of municipalities, putting common ideas on the political agenda in many western countries. Commons have been widely discussed in literature. Broadly understood, commons refers to the practices for collective development, ownership, management, and fair access to resources and artifacts (social, cultural, economic, political, environmental, and technological). However, the concept remains vague, complex, and unclear, especially when it comes to different contexts in which new definitions are (...) needed to better understand the societal and cultural dimensions of urban commons. Decolonizing the notion of urban commons brings into visibility the unseen cultures, infrastructural systems, and communities showing where de-growth and separation can take place. Therefore, this analysis can provide new insights, opportunities, and the need for new theoretical, methodological, and shared approaches. There is a gap in transnational research and cultural understanding within the field of urban commons. This research opens new lines of inquiry relating to the definitions of commons in non-European countries. This may include longitudinal research on the decolonization and potential fragmenting of the commons and in particular 'commoning' mindset, more detailed empirical evidence of the cultural and communal concepts, and how these cultural diversities and new interpretations can be implemented in collaborative governance in a wider variety of non-western contexts. By challenging existing frameworks, this study facilitates the emergence of differentiated, dynamic, and non-linear forms of social and political subjectivity within various sociospatial domains. (shrink)

I argue that, if it is thought desirable to avoid the collapse of disability into generic social disadvantage, it is necessary to draw a distinction between impairment (a bodily configuration) and disability (the way in which the environment prevents someone with an impairment from undertaking certain kinds of activities), as in social models of disability. I show how to draw such a distinction by utilizing a distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties. I argue further that, using this (...) distinction, it is possible to define ‘impairment’ in ways that do not appeal to notions of the normal, and to define ‘disability’ in terms of ‘impairment.’. (shrink)

This essay draws on two emerging fields—the study of comics or graphic fiction, and disability studies—to demonstrate how graphic fictions articulate the embodied, ethical, and sociopolitical experiences of impairment and disability. Examining David B’s Epileptic and Paul Karasik and Judy Karasik’s The Ride Together, I argue that these graphic novels unsettle conventional notions of normalcy and disability. In so doing, they also challenge our assumed dimensions and possibilities of the comics genre and medium, demonstrating the great potential (...) comics hold for disability studies. (shrink)

Like their Jewish and Christian co-religionists, Muslims have grappled with how God, who is perfectly good, compassionate, merciful, powerful, and wise permits intense and profuse evil and suffering in the world. At its core, Islamic Theology and the Problem of Evil explores four different problems of evil: human disability, animal suffering, evolutionary natural selection, and Hell. Each study argues in favor of a particular kind of explanation or justification (theodicy) for the respective evil. Safaruk Chowdhury unpacks the notion (...) of evil and its conceptualization within the mainstream Sunni theological tradition, and the various ways in which theologians and philosophers within that tradition have advanced different types of theodicies. He not only builds on previous works on the topic, but also looks at kinds of theodicies previously unexplored within Islamic theology, such as an evolutionary theodicy. Distinguished by its application of an analytic-theology approach to the subject and drawing on insights from works of both medieval Muslim theologians and philosophers and contemporary philosophers of religion, this novel and highly systematic study will appeal to students and scholars, not only of theology but of philosophy as well. (shrink)

Did Jesus ever do anything wrong? Judging by the vast majority of books on New Testament ethics, the answer is a resounding No. Writers on New Testament ethics generally view Jesus as the paradigm of human standards and behaviour. But since the historical Jesus was a human being, must he not have had flaws, like everyone else? The notion of a flawless human Jesus is a paradoxical oddity in New Testament ethics. According to Avalos, it shows that New Testament (...) ethics is still primarily an apologetic enterprise despite its claim to rest on critical and historical scholarship. The Bad Jesus is a powerful and challenging study, presenting detailed case studies of fundamental ethical principles enunciated or practised by Jesus but antithetical to what would be widely deemed 'acceptable' or 'good' today. Such topics include Jesus' supposedly innovative teachings on love, along with his views on hate, violence, imperialism, animal rights, environmental ethics, Judaism, women, disabled persons and biblical hermeneutics. After closely examining arguments offered by those unwilling to find any fault with the Jesus depicted in the Gospels, Avalos concludes that current treatments of New Testament ethics are permeated by a religiocentric, ethnocentric and imperialistic orientation. But if it is to be a credible historical and critical discipline in modern academia, New Testament ethics needs to discover both a Good and a Bad Jesus. (shrink)

This article presents an archaeological inquiry into the early histories of Quality of Life measures, and takes this as an occasion to rethink the concept of the ‘medical model of disability’. Focusing on three instruments that set the ground for the emergence of QoL measures, namely, the Karnofsky Performance Scale, and the classification of functional capacity as a diagnostic criterion for heart diseases and as a supplementary aid to therapeutic criteria in rheumatoid arthritis – I discuss how medicine, throughout (...) the emergence of QoL, began to expand its gaze beyond the confines of the body to what that body does in daily life. Building upon Armstrong et al.’s notion of ‘distal symptoms’ and Wahlberg’s idea of ‘knowledge of living’, I propose the notion of disabilitization to encapsulate this expansion of the clinical gaze, through which medicine has come to articulate diseases and their treatments in new ways, and in so doing, has inadvertently created disability as a new kind of knowledge category in itself – a category that is defined not through its reduction to mere pathology, but through its dispersal into everyday life. I present this concept not as a periodization, but as a provocative discontinuity with the totalizing history assumed within the medical model of disability, and in so doing, ask what, in fact, holds ‘the medical model’ together, and whether there might be other ways of understanding medicine’s complex relationship to disability than what the concept of the medical model allows us to envisage. (shrink)

Disability has remained on the fringes of research in Africa in general and Southern Africa in particular, especially in the field of theology. Its glaring absence constitutes an indictment against both church and society, revealing in the process both the church's and society's penchant for a dependence paradigm which has been the paradigm with respect to issues of disabilities and people with disabilities. Using the participatory method with its proclivity for bringing to the fore the voice of the 'other' (...) and the marginalised, both the dependence and independence paradigms within the context of disability are put under scrutiny. In the process and through the voice of people with disabilities, the practical theological paradigm of interdependence emerges as the most appropriate and friendliest one, as it resonates with both the New Testament notion of koinonia through love and the African notion of botho through interconnection. The practical theology of holding each other in arms resonates with the theology of embrace that has been popularised by Volf within the context of much hatred and alienation. All these different dimensions of the theology of interdependence become the bedrock for inclusive and respectful treatment of each other irrespective of race, gender, religion, ability and social class. (shrink)

This paper is dedicated to the first universities and mendicant schools, where thousands of students began to converge during the thirteenth century. Logic played an unpreceded role in basic and higher education. A “Parisian logical model” of education was shaped at the University of Paris, adopted by mendicant Orders in their schools of logic, diffused in all disciplines, and progressively spread in Southern Europe. Medieval education became heavily based upon logical, and even “logician” practices, with the “syllogization” of exegetical, disputational, (...) and evaluation practices.The notion of logical skill conveniently captures this unique situation for the discipline of logic, as well as the way medieval thinkers conceived of logic as a universal, transdisciplinary method, a natural operation of the mind, a modality of knowledge, the very form of teaching and graduating, a “habitus,” a technique and a science.The divisions of Aristotelian logic, the “artificial logic,” were for the first time naturalized and projected on the very structure of human mind, which was thereby “logicalized” and ascribed a “natural logic.” A strong anthropological dimension was bestowed on logic. The discipline of logic was deemed a necessary instrument in the philosophical “perfection” and the Christian “reparation” of man as an intellectual creature by a group of logically skilled, professional philosophers and theologians, whereas men deprived of logical education were described as “logically disabled,” and stuck into inferior forms of humanity.The world of medieval intellectual elites displayed a variety of social uses of logic, beyond academic circles, especially in the performance of pastoral duties. The possible historical records of the social usefulness of logic are explored: for students, the majority in medieval universities, who left university without a degree, but with a solid logical education, for ordinary mendicant friars, dedicated to preaching and confession, who frequented logical schools, and for members of the parish clergy sent to the faculties of arts. (shrink)

This paper examines the movement for independent living among the Japanese with disabilities from the perspective of multiculturalism and human rights. The IL movement questions the conventional idea, widely held by Japanese without disabilities, that disabled people are in need of special care and cannot live independently in ordinary communities. The IL movement advocates: 1) the reinterpretation of “disability” as mere “difference”, 2) the equal right to autonomy and social participation for the disabled, and 3) the unique right to (...) care and support that enable the disabled to be autonomous. The IL movement thus projects a new “disability culture” that assigns different meanings to disability and calls for radical change in social relationships. The IL movement then is one of many forces that celebrates diversity and advocates pluralism in Japanese society in defiance of the myth of a “homogeneous monocultural” Japan. The IL movement highlights the right to care as a basic human right which is a precondition for the right to autonomy. Consequently, the IL movement reinterprets the notion of autonomy and enriches the concept of “human rights.”. (shrink)

This book critically investigates the notion of democracy without demos by unravelling the link that modern history has established between the concepts of democracy and the sovereignty of the people. This task is imposed on us by globalization. The individualization of the subject of rights is the result of the destruction of regimes of special rights of ancient societies by the centralizing action of a territorial power. This individualization, because it implies equality, has created a new form of political (...) subjectivity that has been the driving force of the democratization of democracies during the 19th and 20th centuries. Democracy and subjective rights discusses how asserting itself as the only guarantor of rights, the modern state has also nationalized citizenship. However, the author argues, the legal and judicial monopoly of the nation-state is weakened today by the multiplication and heterogeneity of the powers on which the rights of individuals depend. This situation forces us to denationalize citizenship without sacrificing, however, the specific form of political subjectivity that the individualization of rights has made possible. (shrink)

The aim of this dissertation is to build a concept of epistemic responsibility that takes seriously insights from feminist epistemology, addiction studies, and disability theory. I use John Greco’s knowledge-as-achievement account as a starting point, and demonstrate how an ability-centred account such as Greco’s can be undergirded with these insights to create a concept of epistemic responsibility that better captures the complex social and political nature of our epistemic practices. I begin in Chapter 1 by outlining the contours of (...) the project and making an argument for the importance of projects that create porousness between feminist epistemology and mainstream epistemology. In Chapter 2 I outline five key insights in feminist epistemology that I use both in assessing Greco’s theory and in guiding reconstruction. I argue that accommodating these insights will require, at a minimum, a thoroughly social/non-individualistic concept of epistemic responsibility. The strategy that I take to build such a concept is threefold. First, in Chapter 3, I provide a theoretical background of currently existing social/non-individualistic concepts of responsibility that serve to lay a groundwork for my notion of epistemic responsibility. The goal is not to provide a comprehensive survey of the work on responsibility, but rather to draw out tools and frameworks that are helpful in thinking through epistemic responsibility. Second, in Chapter 4, I develop an extended analysis of a concrete phenomenon that I take to be a thoroughly social/non-individualistic context of responsibility ascription: responsibility for addiction, or rather for the harms associated with drug use. And finally, in Chapter 5, taking all of the insights and tools that I have gathered in Chapters 2-4, I embark on the project of theory reconstruction. I begin by outlining the strengths and weaknesses in Greco’s theory with respect to the insights I have highlighted. I then bring in disability theory in order to shore up the notion of ability operative in Greco’s account which I argue allows us to better account for the social and political complexities of epistemic practice. (shrink)