Equality and Capabilities

This paper offers a critique of Martha Nussbaum’s description of the capability approach, and offers an alternative. I will argue that Nussbaum’s characterization of the capability approach is flawed, in two ways. First, she unduly limits the capability to two strands of work, thereby ignoring important other capabilitarian scholarship. Second, she argues that there are five essential elements that all capability theories meet; yet upon closer analysis three of them are not really essential to the capability approach. I also offer (...) an alternative description of the capability approach, which is called the cartwheel view of the capability approach. This view is at the same time radically multidisciplinary yet also contains a foundationally robust core among its various usages, and is therefore much better able to make the case that the capability approach can be developed in a very wide range of more specific normative theories. Finally, the cartwheel view is used to argue against Nussbaum's claim that all capabilitarian political theory needs to be politically liberal. (shrink)

In this article, we deal with the evaluation of the losses suffered by persons living in urban areas as a result of energy services. In the first part, we analyse how by adopting different informational foci we obtain contrasting interpersonal evaluations regarding the same loss. In the second part, we distinguish between a diachronic and a hypothetical/moralised threshold for harm in order to assess whether individuals are benefiting from or being harmed by a given energy service. Our argument is that (...) the most accurate evaluation of an individual damage caused by an energy service can be obtained by using capabilities as informational focus, instead of realised wellbeing or means to wellbeing, and by interpreting the loss in relation to a hypothetical/moralised threshold that corresponds to a list of central capabilities. In the last part, we address monetary and non-monetary compensations for a loss that is evaluated in terms of capabilities. Accordingly, we expound how compensation policies can either restore the capabilities lost due to energy services or monetarily compensate the individual for the fact that a given capability (or set of capabilities) has been irremediably lost. (shrink)

Animals who live in cities must coexist with us. They are, as a result, entitled to the conditions of their flourishing. This article argues that, as the boundaries of cities and urban areas expand, the boundaries of our conception of captivity should expand too. Urbanization can undermine animals’ freedoms, hence their ability to live good lives. I draw the implications of an account of “pervasive captivity” against the background of the Capabilities Approach. I construe captivity, including that of urban animals, (...) as affecting a range of animal capabilities, understood as freedoms, and I address some tensions within Nussbaum’s treatment of human-animal conflicts. Using the Capabilities Approach as a guide, I will attempt to motivate a convergence between habitat preservation in urbanized environments, urban design guided by justice, and the individual freedoms of animals. (shrink)

Amartya Sen has suggested that the moral significance of freedom undermines the view that well-being alone possesses fundamental moral worth. Sen’s efforts to establish this claim, however, seem to fall short: he attempts to establish freedom’s independent moral significance by pointing to the value of autonomy, but explains the value of autonomy in terms of its role as an element of well-being. Nonetheless, I take it that Sen is very much on the right track: well-being is not the only fundamental (...) moral value, and an examination of freedom’s moral significance really will bring this out. I thus offer my own version of the freedom-based critique of well-being’s exclusive moral claim, focusing not on autonomy but what Sen has called “well-being freedom.” The value of this variety of freedom derives, I will suggest, not from the value of well-being itself but the value of well-being potential. Well-being freedom matters not only because promoting it is a way of promoting human well-being, but also because respecting it is a way of respecting the dignity of human nature. The freedom-based critique of well-being’s moral uniqueness succeeds even if Sen’s particular version of it does not. (shrink)

The querelle des femmes was an intellectual debate over the status of women that occurred in the early modern period, between the 1400s and 1700s. A common argument for the superiority of men and inferiority of women that appeared during the debate is that women are less physically strong than men, and are therefore inferior. In response, two distinct argumentative strategies were developed by defenders of women. First, some argued that men and women did not in fact differ in physical (...) strength. A second strategy was to deny that physical strength is relevant to the question of superiority. In this case, one would argue that a difference in strength is not normatively relevant to evaluations of worth. I argue that this second strategy was the more effective response to the argument that women were inferior because of their alleged physical weakness compared to men. (shrink)

The social model of disability claims that disadvantage from disability is primarily a result of the social response to bodily difference. Social modellers typically draw two normative conclusions: first, that society has a responsibility to address disability disadvantage as a matter of justice, not charity; second, that the appropriate way of addressing this disadvantage is to change social institutions themselves, to better fit for bodily difference, rather than to normalize bodies to fit existing institutions. This paper offers a qualified defense (...) of both inferences. Social institutions have reasons of justice to fix disability disadvantage, because the choice of institutions that contingently favor those whose bodies are statistically typical incurs responsibilities to compensate those who disfavored, in that choice. Among other things, this responsibility implies that societies should not simultaneously materially disadvantage disabled people, and also withhold symbolic resources, by demanding a presumption in favor of personal transformation – thereby, undermining the social conditions for disability pride. (shrink)

This article argues that access to meaningful sexual experience should be included within the set of the goods that are subject to principles of distributive justice. It argues that some people are currently unjustly excluded from meaningful sexual experience and it is not implausible to suggest that they might thereby have certain claim rights to sexual inclusion. This does not entail that anyone has a right to sex with another person, but it does entail that duties may be imposed on (...) society to foster greater sexual inclusion. This is a controversial thesis and this article addresses this controversy by engaging with four major objections to it: the misogyny objection; the impossibility objection; the stigmatisation objection; and the unjust social engineering objection. (shrink)

Paternalism is widely viewed as presumptively justifiable for children but morally problematic for adults. The standard explanation for this distinction is that children lack capacities relevant to the justifiability of paternalism. I argue that this explanation is more difficult to defend than typically assumed. If paternalism is often justified when needed to keep children safe from the negative consequences of their poor choices, then when adults make choices leading to the same negative consequences, what makes paternalism less justified? It seems (...) true that ordinary adults have capacities enabling them to promote their interests in ways most children lack. This can explain why paternalism is more often justified towards children than adults. What is not explained, however, is why paternalism would be justifiable for children, but not adults, when neither possess the relevant interest-promoting capacities—exactly the cases when paternalism towards adults might be considered. I argue that this dilemma undercuts capacities-based explanations for the belief that childhood is distinctively relevant for the permissibility of paternalism. I then address defenses of both consequentialist and deontological versions of the capacities-based explanation. Absent this capacities-based explanation, I argue that the intuition that less demanding justificatory standards apply to paternalism when directed at children than when directed towards adults presents unresolved problems for egalitarians. (shrink)

In this article, I firstly discuss why a prioritarian clause can rescue the utilitarian doctrine from the risk of exacerbating inequality in the distribution of resources in those cases in which utility of income does not decline at the margin. Nonetheless, when in the presence of adaptive preferences, classic prioritarianism is more likely than utilitarianism to increase the inequality of resources under all circumstances, independently of the diminishing trend of utility. Hence, I propose to shift the informational focus of prioritarianism (...) from welfare to either social income or capabilities in order to safeguard those who are worse off. Following this, I argue that we may have reasons to limit the aggregative logic of priority-amended utilitarianism through one or more sufficiency thresholds, and that we can partially defuse the negative-thesis objection that is usually levelled against sufficientarianism, provided we interpret the threshold(s) as valid only as long as everyone is led above it. (shrink)

In this ambitious book composed of the author’s published articles, he develops practical and theoretical frameworks for social work in disability issues. He explores practical strategies for promoting social and economic participation of disabled people from the perspective of developmental social work, whilst examining the situation of their socioeconomic participation in rural Sri Lanka. Based on these theoretical and practical frameworks, together with policy analysis of community-based rehabilitation (CBR), the field research was undertaken collaboratively with local stakeholders in three districts. (...) The findings suggest that developmental social work practices, including an indigenous approach, social investment, and a multi-sectoral approach, could address the vicious cycle of inadequate education, poverty, and marginalisation. This book also explores the implications of these findings for policy and practice in other contexts. (shrink)

อเมริกาและโลกอยู่ในกระบวนการของการล่มสลายจากการเติบโตของประชากรมากเกินไป, ส่วนใหญ่ของมันสำหรับศตวรรษที่ผ่านมา, และตอนนี้ทั้งหมดของมัน, เนื่องจากผู้คนในโลกที่ 3. การบริโภคทรัพยากรและการเพิ่มขึ้นของ3พันล้าน๒๑๐๐จะยุบอารยธรรมอุตสาหกรรมและนำเกี่ยวกับความอดอยาก, โรค, ความรุนแรงและสงครามในขนาดส่าย. แผ่นดินโลกสูญเสียอย่างน้อย 1% ของดินในทุกปี, เพื่อให้เป็น nears ๒๑๐๐, ส่วนใหญ่ของความสามารถในการเจริญเติบโตของอาหารจะหายไป. พันล้านจะตายและสงครามนิวเคลียร์เป็นทั้งหมดแต่แน่นอน.ในอเมริกา,นี้จะถูกเร่งอย่างรุนแรงโดยคนเข้าเมืองข นาดใหญ่และอพยพการสืบพันธุ์, รวมกับการละเมิดที่ทำได้โดยประชาธิปไตย. มนุษย์จะเปลี่ยนความฝันของประชาธิปไตยและหลากหลายเป็นฝันร้ายของอาชญากรรมและความยากจน จีนจะยังคงครอบงำอเมริกาและโลกตราบเท่าที่มันรักษาระบอบเผด็จการซึ่งจำกัดความเป็นที่ต้องการ สาเหตุรากของการล่มสลายคือความไม่สามารถของจิตวิทยาของเราที่จะปรับตัวให้เข้ากับโลกสมัยใหม่ซึ่งจะนำผู้ค นให้ปฏิบัติต่อบุคคลที่ไม่เกี่ยวข้องเหมือนกับว่าพวกเขามีความสนใจร่วมกัน ความคิดของสิทธิมนุษยชนเป็นจินตนาการที่น่าสนใจที่ส่งเสริมโดย leftists ที่จะดึงความสนใจออกไปจากการทำลายความปรานีของแผ่นดินโดยไม่ยับยั้งการเป็นมารดาของโลกที่3 นี้, บวกกับความไม่รู้ของชีววิทยาพื้นฐานและจิตวิทยา, นำไปสู่วิศวกรรมทางสังคมที่ถูกลบออกของการศึกษาบางส่วนที่ควบคุมสังคมประชาธิปไตย. ไม่กี่เข้าใจว่าถ้าคุณช่วยคนคนหนึ่งที่คุณเป็นอันตรายต่อคนอื่น—ไม่มีอาหารกลางวันฟรีและทุกรายการเดียวที ่ทุกคนใช้ทำลายแผ่นดินนอกเหนือจากการซ่อมแซม. ดังนั้นนโยบายทางสังคมทุกที่จะไม่ยั่งยืนและหนึ่งโดยหนึ่งในสังคมทั้งหมดโดยไม่มีการควบคุมที่เข้มงวดในคว ามเป็นที่ต้องการจะยุบเข้าไปในความโกลาหลหรือเผด็จการ ข้อเท็จจริงพื้นฐานที่สุดเกือบจะไม่เคยกล่าวถึงว่ามีทรัพยากรไม่เพียงพอในอเมริกาหรือโลกที่จะยกระดับเปอร ์เซ็นต์ที่สำคัญของคนยากจนออกจากความยากจนและเก็บไว้ที่นั่น ความพยายามที่จะทำเช่นนี้คือ bankrupting อเมริกาและทำลายโลก ความสามารถของโลกในการผลิตอาหารลดลงทุกวัน, เช่นเดียวกับคุณภาพทางพันธุกรรมของเรา. และบัดนี้, เช่นเคย, โดยไกลศัตรูที่ยิ่งใหญ่ที่สุดของคนยากจนเป็นคนยากจนและไม่ร่ำรวย. ไม่มีการเปลี่ยนแปลงอย่างมากและทันที, มีความหวังสำหรับการป้องกันการล่มสลายของอเมริกา, หรือประเทศใดๆที่ต่อไปนี้ระบบประชาธิปไตย.

Amerika dan dunia sedang dalam proses runtuhnya dari pertumbuhan penduduk yang berlebihan, sebagian besar untuk abad terakhir, dan sekarang semua itu, karena orang dunia 3. Konsumsi sumber daya dan penambahan 3 miliar lebih CA. 2100 akan runtuh peradaban industri dan membawa kelaparan, penyakit, kekerasan dan perang pada skala yang mengejutkan. Bumi kehilangan setidaknya 1% dari humus setiap tahunnya, sehingga mendekati 2100, sebagian besar kapasitas tumbuh makanan akan hilang. Miliaran akan mati dan perang nuklir semua tapi pasti. Di Amerika, ini sedang (...) sangat dipercepat oleh imigrasi besar-besaran dan reproduksi imigran, dikombinasikan dengan pelecehan yang dimungkinkan oleh demokrasi. Sifat manusia yang rusak tak terelakkan mengubah impian demokrasi dan keragaman menjadi mimpi buruk dalam kejahatan dan kemiskinan. Cina akan terus membanjiri Amerika dan dunia, asalkan mempertahankan kediktatoran yang membatasi keegoisan. Akar penyebab runtuhnya adalah ketidakmampuan psikologi bawaan kita untuk beradaptasi dengan dunia modern, yang menyebabkan orang untuk memperlakukan orang yang tidak terkait seolah-olah mereka memiliki kepentingan bersama. Gagasan tentang hak asasi manusia adalah fantasi jahat yang dipromosikan oleh kaum kiri untuk menarik perhatian jauh dari kehancuran tanpa ampun dari bumi oleh ibu yang tidak terkendali dunia ke-3. Ini, ditambah ketidaktahuan dasar biologi dan psikologi, mengarah pada rekayasa sosial delusi dari sebagian berpendidikan yang mengendalikan masyarakat demokratis. Sedikit memahami bahwa jika Anda membantu satu orang yang Anda menyakiti orang lain-tidak ada makan siang gratis dan setiap item yang dikonsumsi orang menghancurkan bumi di luar perbaikan. Akibatnya, kebijakan sosial di mana-mana tidak berkelanjutan dan satu per satu semua masyarakat tanpa kontrol yang ketat pada keegoisan akan runtuh menjadi anarki atau kediktatoran. Fakta yang paling mendasar, hampir tidak pernah disebutkan, adalah bahwa tidak ada cukup sumber daya di Amerika atau dunia untuk mengangkat persentase yang signifikan dari miskin keluar dari kemiskinan dan menjaga mereka di sana. Upaya untuk melakukan hal ini adalah bangkrut Amerika dan menghancurkan dunia. Kapasitas bumi untuk menghasilkan makanan berkurang setiap hari, seperti halnya kualitas genetik kita. Dan sekarang, seperti biasa, sejauh ini musuh terbesar orang miskin adalah miskin lainnya dan bukan orang kaya. Tanpa perubahan dramatis dan segera, tidak ada harapan untuk mencegah runtuhnya Amerika, atau negara yang mengikuti sistem demokratis. (shrink)

Equality as a bare concept refers to two or more distinct things or people being the same in some dimension. Different forms of equality are distinguished by the dimension that is held to be the same. Within political theory, three main forms of equality can be distinguished: moral equality, political equality, and substantive equality. “Moral equality” refers to each individual having the same inherent dignity as a human being, and therefore being worthy of respect. “Political equality,” by contrast, refers to (...) each individual having the same basic rights of involvement in political processes, e.g., by voting or running for office. Modern political theories generally accept that each individual has moral and political equality. The distinguishing feature of egalitarianism is its interpretation of this equal status as requiring substantive equality, i.e., that each individual be placed in the same social or economic conditions. Egalitarianism is an inherently normative view, and more specifically, a view about distributive justice—that is, about the appropriate distribution of benefits and burdens. The account of these benefits and burdens varies from one egalitarian theory to another. For instance, some egalitarians believe that levels of benefit should be measured in terms of resources, others in terms of well-being, and still others in terms of basic capabilities. Egalitarians also disagree on whether benefits should be distributed equally or whether equality of substantive condition in some other sense (i.e., equal opportunity or equal social standing) might be sufficient. Accordingly, each egalitarian theory has its own account of equality. These theories as a whole contrast with non-egalitarian theories, such as right libertarianism or conservativism, which deny that people’s condition should be made equal in any substantive sense. In practical terms, egalitarianism is strongly associated with the political left, but different brands of egalitarianism are associated with different brands of left-wing politics, from traditional socialism or social democracy to a less distribution-focused politics of identity. This article provides an overview of egalitarianism, primarily focusing on its development in contemporary political theory. (shrink)

In this paper, I will draw on the capabilities approach to social justice and human development as advanced, among others, by Martha Nussbaum, and seek to provide some theoretical resources for better understanding our obligations to future persons. My argumentative strategy is as follows: First, I’ll briefly reconstruct a capabilities approach to justice, examining this sort of view’s normative foundations and methodology. Using Nussbaum’s capabilities list as a basis, I will argue that various social and environmental functions which are threatened (...) by climate change are crucial with respect to enabling morally and politically central capabilities for both current and future people. Here, I will draw on recent work by Breena Holland to establish the notion of a sustainable climate system as a necessary precondition for the enablement and protection of these entitlements. Then, I’ll extend this strategy to argue that the capabilities approach provides a uniquely useful threshold conception of harm to inform our thinking about our relationship to our posterity. It is my hope that the capabilities approach so applied can give us a novel way of understanding our responsibilities toward future people in a time where such an understanding is both unfortunately lacking and increasingly dire. Finally, I will discuss some implications of a capability-based account in the intergenerational context and some justifications for applying the approach in this way. Ultimately, I submit that this sort of view seems more well-fitted to this context than other approaches, and that it offers a unique vehicle for understanding our relations and obligations to future people. (shrink)

This paper aims to clarify the status of capability in Sen’s idea of justice. Sen’s name is so widely associated with the concept of capability that commentators often assume that his contribution to the study of justice amounts to a capability theory, albeit underdeveloped. We argue that such a reading is misleading. Taking Sen’s reticence about operationalization seriously, we show that his contribution is inconsistent with a capability theory. Instead, we defend the idea that the capability approach plays a heuristic (...) role: capability is a step in his argument against alternative materials, but is not meant as a definitive end. Sen defends a critical perspective primarily to encourage public reasoning and respect for agency as regards the definition of what should count in the evaluation of social states. (shrink)

The capability approach aims to ensure all individuals are able to form and pursue their own conception of the good, whilst the state remains neutral between them, and has done much to include oppressed and marginalised groups. Liberal neutrality and social inclusivity are worthy goals, yet I argue that Martha Nussbaum’s influential formulation of the capability approach, at least, cannot meet them. Conceptualising capabilities as opportunities to perform specific, valuable functionings fails to accommodate those who do not value, or cannot (...) perform, these functionings. I therefore propose that the capability approach be modified, such that capabilities are conceptualised, instead, as opportunities to exercise control in certain central domains of our life. (shrink)

The capability approach is one of the main contenders in the field of theorizing social justice. Each citizen is entitled to a set of basic capabilities. But which are these? Martha Nussbaum formulated a set of ten central capabilities. Amartya Sen argued they should be selected in a process of public reasoning. Critics object that the Nussbaum‐approach is too perfectionist and the Sen‐approach is too proceduralist. This paper presents a third alternative: a substantive but non‐perfectionist capability theory of justice. It (...) presents a two‐level concept of individual agency as connected to social practices. It then argues basic capabilities are those necessary to for the agency necessary to navigate freely and autonomously between different social practices. (shrink)

Suppose we are about to enter an era of increasing technological unemployment. What implications does this have for society? Two distinct ethical/social issues would seem to arise. The first is one of distributive justice: how will the efficiency gains from automated labour be distributed through society? The second is one of personal fulfillment and meaning: if people no longer have to work, what will they do with their lives? In this article, I set aside the first issue and focus on (...) the second. In doing so, I make three arguments. First, I argue that there are good reasons to embrace non-work and that these reasons become more compelling in an era of technological unemployment. Second, I argue that the technological advances that make widespread technological unemployment possible could still threaten or undermine human flourishing and meaning, especially if they do not remain confined to the economic sphere. And third, I argue that this threat could be contained if we adopt an integrative approach to our relationship with technology. In advancing these arguments, I draw on three distinct literatures: the literature on technological unemployment and workplace automation; the antiwork critique—which I argue gives reasons to embrace technological unemployment; and the philosophical debate about the conditions for meaning in life—which I argue gives reasons for concern. (shrink)

Over the last two decades, the capabilities approach has become an increasingly influential theory of development. It conceptualises human wellbeing in terms of an individual's ability to achieve functionings we have reason to value. In contrast, the African ethic of ubuntu views human flourishing as the propensity to pursue relations of fellowship with others, such that relationships have fundamental value. These two theoretical perspectives seem to be in tension with each other; while the capabilities approach focuses on individuals as the (...) locus of ethical value, an ubuntu ethic concentrates on the relations between individuals. In this article, we ask: to what extent is the capabilities approach compatible with this African ethical theory? We argue that, on reflection, relations play a much stronger role in the capabilities approach than often assumed. There is good reason to believe that relationality is part of the concept of a capability itself, where such relationality has intrinsic ethical value. This understanding of the ethical centrality of relations grounds new normative perspectives on the capabilities approach, and offers a more comprehensive grasp of the relevance of relationships to empirical enquiry. (shrink)

Freedom is one of the central values in political and moral philosophy. A number of theorists hold that freedom should either be the only or at least one of the central distribuenda in our theories of distributive justice. Moreover, many follow Mill and hold that a concern for personal freedom should guide, and limit, how paternalist public policy can be. For the most part, theorists have focussed on a person’s freedom at one specific point in time but have failed to (...) give proper attention to freedom across time. Given that we care about personal freedom now, we have reason to care about future freedom too. But what kind of distribution of freedom across a person’s lifetime should we promote as a matter of legislation and public policy? I argue that none of the candidate principles for the distribution of freedom across time is plausible. Neither a starting gate view, nor a maximisation nor a sufficientarian view is satisfactory, because none adequately reflects our various reasons to value freedom. I show that this result presents a tough challenge for theories of distributive justice and paternalism that set great store by personal freedom. (shrink)

Read Jorge Buzaglo's paper 'Expanding Human Capabilities: Lange's "Observations" Updated for the 21st Century' ›...

The capability approach was developed as a response to the ‘equality of what?’ question, which asks what the metric of equality should be. The alternative answers are, broadly, welfare, resources or capabilities. G.A. Cohen has raised influential criticisms of this last response. He suggests that the capability approach’s focus on individuals’ freedom – their capability to control their own lives – renders its view of well-being excessively ‘athletic’, ignoring benefits achieved passively, without the active involvement of the benefitted individual. However, (...) positing ‘capabilities’ as the appropriate metric of distributive justice need not commit capability theorists to a comprehensive account of well-being, and so not to the athletic conception Cohen ascribes to them. Their aim can, instead, be to delineate legitimate government action and guide egalitarian public policy. Capabilities, in this context, are not just components of individual well-being; they must also be the appropriate goal of just distributive policies. When understood in this way, as a guide to policy, I will argue that the capability approach’s focus on ‘athletic’ individual freedom and control is justified: in the public domain, it is important not just that individuals receive ‘benefits’, but that they participate in their achievement. (shrink)

Poland has produced two of the greatest economists of the past century, namely Michal Kalecki and Oskar Lange. Both worked with a wide and penetrating view of the economy and society, more typical of the great classical economists than of those of their own time. During the post-World War II 'Golden Age of Growth', while Keynes was the patron saint of economic theory and policy in the industrialised capitalist countries, Kalecki and Lange had a similar influence and role among the (...) developing nations and – perhaps to a lesser extent – in socialist countries. Kalecki's 'The problem of financing of economic development', and Lange's 'Some observations on input-output analysis', in particular,deeply influenced the approach to economic and social development of a whole strand of structural economics, both in terms of economic analysis and practical policy. With the end of the Golden Age and the momentous neoliberal reaction then started, they became almost forgotten. The economics of Kalecki, however, has inspired in the last few decades the renaissance of a genuine – albeit still marginal – form of Keynesianism, the so called 'post-Keynesianism'. Oskar Lange, on the other hand, does not yet seem to have been re-discovered to inspire a similar renaissance of advanced analysis and planning of policies for modern structural change and development. This paper proposes such a re-discovery. The main concern of Lange's 'Observations' is the appropriate intersectoral allocation of investment for efficient output growth. While output growth is still one of the main objectives in most societies, the growth of human capabilities should be an increasingly relevant concern, both in its own right, and in view of the existing ecological constraints. Buzaglo postulated the existence of an  matrix, describing the proportions of the different capabilities necessary for the achievement of every particular capability. The present paper is about introducing capabilities within Lange's framework of analysis. A Lange-inspired analysis investigates the appropriate structures and properties of capability-enhancing growth paths. (shrink)

European competition law is predominantly focused on maximizing consumer welfare. This overarching purpose (which is supported by economic theory) leaves little place for safeguarding non-economic values, such as sustainability. This makes it difficult to allow cooperation between companies to contribute to such non-economic goals. In this article we explore whether it is possible to establish a different normative framework, in which such goals can be taken into account and can be balanced against the economic goal of consumer welfare. To answer (...) this question, we take four steps. First, we discuss current EU competition law and the difficulty of fitting non-economic goals into the dominant interpretation of that law. Second, we propose a different normative framework, based on the capability approach advanced by philosopher Martha Nussbaum and economist Amartya Sen. Third, we argue that there are good principled reasons to incorporate non-economic goals into competition law. Fourth, we apply both the capability approach and the consumer welfare approach to three (illustrative) cases in which non-economic goals are at stake. Overall, we argue that the capability framework, although not without difficulties of its own, may provide a more legitimate theory for the interpretation of European competition law. (shrink)

In the past decade or two, philosophies of social protection have shifted away from a nearly exclusive focus on the subjective and the individual (e.g., autonomous choices, utility) and towards values that are more objective and relational. The latter approaches, typified by the well established Capabilities Approach and the up and coming ethic of ubuntu, have been substantially inspired by engagements with the Global South, particularly India and Africa. In this article, part of a special issue titled ‘The Principles and (...) Practice of Social Protection’, I focus exclusively on these two newer normative philosophies of social protection, my main aim being to compare and contrast several of their theoretical and practical implications for a variety of its dimensions. I conclude by also suggesting that the implications of ubuntu are often more attractive than those of the Capabilities Approach, and hence that the former should be taken no less seriously as potentially foundational when thinking about social protection, poverty and related matters of public policy.  . (shrink)

End-of-life care has a number of characteristics that make economic evaluation particularly challenging. These include proximity to death, the improbability of survival gain, individuals’ changing priorities, declining cognition and effects on close persons. In view of these particularities of end-of-life care, some researchers have determined that current ‘extra-welfarist’ approaches to defining do not adequately reflect well-being. As a result, suggestions are being made that would see the QALY approach either replaced or subject to significant redefinition. The purported goal of adopting (...) alternative evaluation approaches is to extend the evaluative space ‘beyond’. The purpose of this chapter is to guide the definition of what should be included in the evaluative space in end-of-life care. (shrink)

Human development is meant to be transformational in that it aims to improve people's lives by enhancing their capabilities. But who does it target: people as they are or the people they will become? This paper argues that the human development approach relies on an understanding of personal identity as dynamic rather than as static collections of preferences, and that this distinguishes human development from conventional approaches to development. Nevertheless, this dynamic understanding of personal identity is presently poorly conceptualized and (...) this has implications for development practice. We identify a danger of paternalism and propose institutionalizing two procedural principles as side constraints on development policies and projects: the principle of free prior informed consent and the principle of democratic development. -/- . (shrink)

Widely hailed as one of the most significant works in modern political philosophy, John Rawls's _Political Liberalism_ defended a powerful vision of society that respects reasonable ways of life, both religious and secular. These core values have never been more critical as anxiety grows over political and religious difference and new restrictions are placed on peaceful protest and individual expression. This anthology of original essays suggests new, groundbreaking applications of Rawls's work in multiple disciplines and contexts. Thom Brooks, Martha Nussbaum, (...) Onora O'Neill, Paul Weithman, Jeremy Waldron, and Frank Michelman explore political liberalism's relevance to the challenges of multiculturalism, the relationship between the state and religion, the struggle for political legitimacy, and the capabilities approach. Extending Rawls's progressive thought to the fields of law, economics, and public reason, this book helps advance the project of a free society that thrives despite disagreements over religious and moral views. (shrink)

Michael Blake’s excellent book 'Justice and Foreign Policy' makes an important contribution to the ongoing debates about the kinds of values that should inform the foreign policy of liberal states. In this paper I evaluate his defence of the view that egalitarianism applies within the state but not globally. I discuss two arguments he gives for this claim - one appealing to the material preconditions of democracy and the other grounded in a duty to justify coercive power. I argue that (...) neither argument succeeds. I then identify a general problem with his approach. If states adopted Blake’s principles for their foreign policy we would have a much better world than currently exists. But it would not – I submit - be a fair world. (shrink)

This paper discusses the question of whether a capability theory of justice (such as that of Martha Nussbaum) should accept a basic “capability to hold property.” Answering this question is vital for bridging the gap between abstract capability theories of justice and their institutional implications in real economies. Moreover, it is vital for understanding the difference between egalitarian and libertarian versions of the capability approach. In the paper, three main arguments about private property are discussed: those relating property to a (...) private sphere of control, to the market system of allocating goods, and to the ability to keep the fruits of one's labor. On the basis of this discussion it is argued that the capability theory of justice should accept a basic capability to hold private property, albeit one that is restricted in scope and has an egalitarian character. Special attention is paid to libertarian arguments about property acquisition, and it is argued that capability theories of justice must reject them because they presuppose a method of justifying capabilities that the capability approach cannot accept. (shrink)

This article explores briefly the practical as well as theoretical issues that arise when Amartya Sen’s evaluation of justice through the capabilities afforded citizens in a society is applied to postcolonies like Jamaica and South Africa. It argues that the application of the capabilities approach to the circumstances of the postcolony gives rise to the need for an expansion of its purview as the informational focus of Sen’s theory of justice. This is so because of the manner in which domestic (...) as well as external forces and interests function so as to limit in particular the material conditions necessary for freedom and self-actualization in the postcolony. As examples the article engages briefly with the way in which multinationals and multilateral lending agencies in pursuit of their interests have adverse impact upon capabilities in Jamaica and South Africa, affecting in turn the quality of material life, as well as that of democratic governance in both states. In doing so it broaches the important issue of the failure to engage thoroughly with the reality of the limited maneuverability, both at the domestic and also the international levels, that issues from the role of the developing state in the global political economy , which I think haunts the utilization of the capabilities approach to understanding justice and development in the postcolony. (shrink)

VULNERABILITY AS A PERCEPTUAL CATEGORY – MARTHA NUSSBAUM’S CAPABILITIES APPROACH FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF POLITICAL AESTHETICS The aim of the paper is to draw politico-aesthetic consequences from Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities approach. It is argued that this can be achieved by focusing on the notion of vulnerability implied by the idea of capabilities. The recognition of the vulnerability of the human good inspires a new model of practical rationality based on perception. This idea, in turn, explores the aesthetic connotations of perception (...) implied by its etymology (the ancient Greek for perception being aesthesis). Thus, political aesthetics is understood as the inquiry into the political consequences of the affinity between ethics and aesthetics, as well as the political relevance of the notion of beauty. (shrink)

Poverty, understood as basic capability deprivation, can only be solved through a process of expanding the freedoms that people value and have reason to value. This process can only begin if the capability to imagine and aspire for an altenative lifestyle worthy of human dignity is cultivated by an education program that develops both the capability to reason and to value. These two facets play a major role in the creative exercise of human agency. This program of humane education can (...) only come from an adequate description of the human agent as a persona that seeks to actualize itself based on his/her understanding of the good. Education must therefore seek to cultivate the capability to have an adequate conception of the good (normative) as well as the capability to constantly re-evaluate one’s conception of the good (evaluative) in order to freely and reasonably choose a life that one values and has reason to value. Education must therefore entail not merely the development of skills nor specialization in a particular field but must concentrate on the integration of the human person as a whole which leads to self-creative praxis. (shrink)

The capability approach described by Amartya Sen illustrates the multiple aspects of injustice in such fields as racially motivated sexual harassment or segregation in urban space. In response to Sen’s pointing out that we should focus not simply on institutions but also on the social realizations they engender, the article illustrates the function of the natural and social environments for racial groups in affecting the distribution of resources necessary to secure justice.

Martha Nussbaum’s “influential capabilities approach” offers us a powerful, universal standard of justice. The approach builds off of pioneering work by Amartya Sen in economic development. Much of the contemporary interest in the capabilities approach has focused upon how we might spell out a list of precisely which capabilities must be made universally available and protected, a list that Sen has not provided himself. Nussbaum’s list of capabilities is arguably the most successful attempt at defining these capabilities. In this paper, (...) I will argue for a new problem with the approach that raises new questions about the capabilities approach more generally. (shrink)

The concept of well being has become the main criterion to assess quality of life in contemporary society. Individual well-being describes the individual quality of life, while social well-being refers to quality of life in a society. Given that well-being has a multitude of dimensions, a unique definition of it is elusive to scholars. In this article social well-being is conceptualised as a dynamic process within the context set by social integration as one?s relationship to society and the community. This (...) includes the quality of interaction between the individual and society and one?s?social actualisation? understood as the realisation of one?s social capacities. Social actualisation also involves one?s ability to influence social processes and to benefit from social cohesion, which consists, in any society, of the quality, organisation and functioning of the social world. Hence the ability to impact society is an integral part of individual well being. This paper suggests that philosophical practice as a new paradigm in the humanities holds out promise for the improvement of both individual and social well-being. (shrink)

Capability theorists have suggested different, sometimes incompatible, ways in which their approach takes account of the value of freedom, each of which implies a different kind of normative relation between functionings and capabilities. This paper examines three possible accounts of the normative relation between functionings and capabilities, and the implications of each of these accounts in terms of degrees of paternalism. The way in which capability theorists apparently oscillate between these different accounts is shown to rest on an apparent tension (...) between anti-paternalism and anti-fetishism. The paper then advances a fourth account, which incorporates a concern with the content-independent or ‘non-specific’ value of freedom. Only the fourth account would remove all traces of paternalism from the capability approach. Whatever reasons advocates of the capability approach might have had for rejecting this fourth account, those reasons are not internal to the capability approach itself. (shrink)

The concept of dignity plays a foundational role in the more recent versions of Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities theory. However, despite its centrality to her theory, Nussbaum’s conception of dignity remains under-theorised. In this paper we critically examine the role that dignity plays in Nussbaum’s theory by, first, developing an account of the concept of dignity and introducing a distinction between two types of dignity, status dignity and achievement dignity. Next, drawing on this account, we analyse Nussbaum’s conception of dignity and (...) contrast it with Kant’s conception of dignity. On the basis of this comparison between Nussbaum and Kant, we highlight tensions between Nussbaum’s Aristotelianism, which is central to her conception of dignity, and her commitment to political liberalism. This leads us to conclude that Nussbaum’s claim that her conception of dignity is only a partial political conception is implausible and that her conception of dignity seems to commit her to a satisficing form of perfectionist liberalism. (shrink)

The purpose of this study is to examine the topic of older people in the world from the perspective of the Social Teaching of the Church. As explained in Christifideles Laici , the Catholic Church believes that the laity is summoned to pave the way for the arrival of God’s Kingdom, and people who are at an advanced age should still respond to God’s calling through their own unique way of contribution. In Familiaris Consortio it is emphasized that the Church (...) should help older people manifest their roles both in families and religious groups. Although it is mentioned in these two apostolic exhortations that older people are blessed with wisdom, it is not explained as they actually acquire such a blessing. In order to address this issue and elaborate on the meaning of older people’s wisdom, Grün’s theory on the nature of older people’s wisdom and where such a blessing comes from is made reference to in this study. Moreover, it is emphasized in the apostolic exhortation of Familiaris Consortio that older people are often marginalized in today’s industrialized and urbanized society and neglected in their families, while also enduring psychological and/or physical pain. Addressing this issue, the value of older people’s work and their unshirkable missions and duties are explained in the present study by examining the nature and value of man’s work as mentioned in Laborem Exercens . Sen’s “capability approach” is also utilized in the present study as a way to examine older people’s values and the deprivation of their capability, allowing an in-depth analysis of this topic. The findings of this study reveal that Grün’s theory of older people’s wisdom being shaped by their life-experiences is significantly complementary to the messages on older people in Christifideles Laici and Familiaris Consortio . While Sen’s capability approach does not offer a complete set of values or cultural system that solves this problem, the approach of “civilization of love” proposed in the Social Teaching of the Church is very useful in helping one contemplate on the problems faced by older people around the world. (shrink)