Elizabeth Anscombe is well-known for her insistence that there are absolutely prohibited actions, though she is somewhat obscure about why this is so. Nonetheless, I contend in this paper that Anscombe is more concerned with the epistemology of absolute prohibitions, and that her thought on connatural moral knowledge – which resembles moral intuition – is key to understanding her thought on moral prohibitions. I shall identify key features of Anscombe’s moral epistemology before turning to investigate its sources, examining the roots (...) of connaturality in Aquinas and comparing it with rationalist ethical intuitionism, which Anscombe differs from in rejecting “good” as a simple, non-natural property. I then develop a two-stage argument about absolute prohibition: The first will be loosely Thomistic, while the second will suggest how Anscombe’s absolute prohibitions can be seen as a continuation of Wittgenstein’s anti-scepticism in On Certainty. I develop an account of absolute prohibitions as a form of Wittgensteinian hinge proposition – they are not the conclusions of deductive arguments, but the foundations for intelligibility in action. (shrink)

This essay will reflect on the importance of Catholic social teaching in public health ethics, especially in the context of the global COVID-19 pandemic. Catholic social teaching will be presented as being continuous with Catholic moral teaching—while the latter sets out norms and prohibitions often in relation to individual agents and their actions, the Church’s social doctrine invites us to think of the community and social dimension of the moral good. To illustrate this continuity of doctrine, I will argue that (...) the COVID-19 pandemic has shown a need for a serious evaluation of the relationship between public health and the common good, in light of the far-reaching and long-lasting public health measures that have been used around the world, such that the good of health has dominated considerations of almost all other aspects of life. (shrink)

This chapter seeks to advance two central claims: 1) that the therapy-enhancement distinction is not an absolute one; and 2) that the social model of disability can be applied as at least one possible criterion for evaluating the ethics of enhancement. First, I address the limits of the therapy-enhancement distinction by showing that some accepted forms of therapy are indeed enhancements in their own right. The line between enhancement and therapy in medicine is therefore not clear-cut, but nor is the (...) difference between enhancement and disability straightforward either, as I argue. I discuss how some forms of apparent enhancement may in fact make people disabled from a social point-of-view, for they would not be able to function well in a society “fine-tuned” towards the current average range of abilities. Enhancement is therefore a slippery notion, and one that brings into relief questions of equity and of oppression. If enhancement is meant to be a key stepping stone on the path towards a posthuman condition, as some claim, then the ambiguous nature of enhancement surely throws into the question the coherence of the “post” in “posthuman.”. (shrink)

Pierre Manent is professor emeritus of political philosophy at the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, and is outspoken public intellectual in France. His book La loi naturelle et les dro...