_Explores the ancient and perennial notion of the four elements as environmental ideas._.

이 논문은 ‘플라톤이 『티마이오스』에서 펼친 자연철학에서 아리스토텔레스는 무엇을 배웠나’라는 물음에 대한 하나의 대답이다. 우리는 아리스토텔레스가 『생성소멸론』에서 물질의 기본 단위로 제시한 네 종류의 요소들에 관한 이론의 경우를 주로 살펴볼 것이다. 아리스토텔레스에 따르면, 달의 천구 아래에 펼쳐진 우리의 감각대상의 세계인 ‘월하계’의 요소들은 영원한 운동과 변화 속에 있는 것이 사실이다. 그러나 질료-형상의 복합체인 구체적 개별자로서의 실체와는 다르지만, 그럼에도 불구하고 요소들은 내부 성격쌍의 역동적인 상호 역할, 즉 토대가 되는 “쉼볼론”(symbolon)의 질료 역할과 그 위에서 주고받는 두 대립자의 형상 역할로 인하여 최종적인 “실체적 상태”로 불릴 수 (...) 있으며 따라서 물질적 사물들의 굳건한 토대가 된다. 뤽 브리송은 아리스토텔레스가 플라톤의 『티마이오스』에 나타나는 자리(chōra) 개념에 대해 비판한 것에 반대하면서, 『자연학』 제4권의 한 구절에서 발견한 “제일 질료”를 공격한다. 즉, 그는 아리스토텔레스가 플라톤의 자리(chōra) 개념을 비판하고 있지만 아리스토텔레스의 제일 질료 개념은 오히려 그 자리 개념과 유사한 것이라고 반격하고 있다. 그런데 브리송의 해석을 따라 가면, 궁극적인 실체로서 사물들의 변화의 계열에서 제일의 기체가 되는 것은 요소들이 아니라 요소들의 자리들이 될 것으로 보인다. 사실 전통적인 입장에 서 있는 해석들은 요소 변환에 관한 아리스토텔레스의 이론에서 “쉼볼론”이라는 중요한 개념을 간과하고 있다. 만일 브리송이 요소 이론의 맥락에서 ‘기체’로서의 질료라는 아리스토텔레스의 개념을 공격하기를 원했다면, 그는 다름 아닌 “쉼볼론”을 겨냥했어야 했다. 왜냐하면 요소 변환에서 ‘기체’의 역할을 하는 것은 변환에 임한 두 요소의 공통 성격인 이 “쉼볼론”이지 요소들의 텅빈 '자리'가 아니기 때문이다. 그리고 그가 “쉼볼론”을 겨냥했다면, 그것이 두 요소의 상호 변환에서 공통의 ‘기체’ 역할을 하지만, 이것이 “궁극적인 물체적 수용자”도 아니고, “순수 가능태”로서의 제일 질료도 아니라는 사실이 드러날 것이며, 따라서 그의 반론은 과녁을 잃게 될 것이다. (shrink)

In order to develop a hermeneutic-phenomenological analysis of testimony, this essay will first argue that testimony is “said in many ways” without being homonymous and that contemporary epistemological approaches to testimony are not capable of accounting for all paradigmatic forms of testimony. Second, it is argued, following and extending the work of Paul Ricoeur, that by emphasizing the sense of engagement or Bezogenheit as a basic characteristic of testimony, we may find another approach to testimony that offers a phenomenological alternative (...) to the observational model of witnessing and the accompanying conception of testimony as report. Third, this approach is further developed and analyzed in terms of the four elements of testimony, namely, subject matter, witness, act of testifying, and addressee. (shrink)

The purpose of the article is to present an interpretation in the light of which one can read a characteristic aspect of the understanding of being in Presocratic philosophy. The starting point is to emphasize the idea of ​​a place within the etymology of the verb “be”: “to be” generally means ‘to be in the world’. Then the world is characterized as something _implicite_ existing (i.e. beyond the human mind) and having a “second plane”: order hidden behind phenomena. Attempts (...) to understand it were called investigations into the nature (of “things”), which meant the real foundation of the world and its active source – something that internally constitutes all sensual objects, providing building materials, structures and laws of development. Against this background (interpretive context), the understanding of being is defined as an element of nature – something identifiable in a distributive way and always in connection with (dependent) with self-contained nature. This element can be understood in two ways: as an object accessible to the senses taken together with the constituting nature, e.g. concrete tree, or the very internal nature, e.g. fire (Heraclitus) or four basic elements (Empedocles) from which sensual objects originate or consist. (shrink)

In the following paper, I discuss the adjectival uses of the English word ‘right’, in ethical and nonethical settings. I distinguish four distinct but related uses. In the central use, which includes the typical ethical applications, what is right is what conforms to a norm, or rule. The emphasis can be on the norm itself, or on the conforming to the norm. The view I offer is not original. It is to be found in the works of T.M. Scanlon, (...) T.H. Green, R.M. Hare and W.D. Ross.1. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to synthesize four major elements of aesthetic experience that have previously appeared isolated whenever an attempt at conceptualization is made. These four elements are: Immanuel Kant’s disinterested pleasure, Robin G. Collingwood’s emotional expressionism, the present writer’s redemptive emotional experience, and, lastly, Plato’s concept of Beauty. By taking these four abstracted elements as the bedrock for genuine aesthetic experience, this article aims to clarify the proper role of art as (...) distinct from philosophy and intellectualization. Rather than a medium conducive to intellectual understanding, it is argued that the sphere these four elements of aesthetic experience demarcate is one in which art leads to an emotional understanding that transforms the human condition and it imbues it with new meaning only to be found in a moment of aesthetic experience. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to synthesize four major elements of aesthetic experience that have previously appeared isolated whenever an attempt at conceptualization is made. These four elements are: Immanuel Kant’s disinterested pleasure, Robin G. Collingwood’s emotional expressionism, the present writer’s redemptive emotional experience, and, lastly, Plato’s concept of Beauty. By taking these four abstracted elements as the bedrock for genuine aesthetic experience, this article aims to clarify the proper role of art as (...) distinct from philosophy and intellectualization. Rather than a medium conducive to intellectual understanding, it is argued that the sphere these four elements of aesthetic experience demarcate is one in which art leads to an emotional understanding that transforms the human condition and it imbues it with new meaning only to be found in a moment of aesthetic experience. (shrink)

Philosophy has four forms: wonder, faith, doubt and scepticism. These are not separate categories, but separate ideal possibilities. Modern academic philosophy has fallen, for several centuries, into an error: which is the error of supposing that philosophy is only what I call doubt. Philosophy may be doubt: indeed, it is part of my argument that this is undeniably one element of, or one possibility in, philosophy; but doubt is only one of four points (...) of the compass. In this essay I indicate the nature of each point of the compass as it has been found in the history of philosophy. (shrink)

There is considerable dispute in the literature as to how much, in Aristotle's universe, living things and artifacts really have in common. To what extent is the relation between form and matter in living things comparable to the relation between form and matter in artifacts? Aristotle no doubt employs artifact-analogies rather frequently in describing the workings of living things. But where does the usefulness of these analogies reach its limits? In this paper, I argue that Aristotle's artifact-analogies are frequently over-extended (...) in such a way that important asymmetries between living things and artifacts are lost in the process. One such asymmetry of crucial importance is the relation between form and matter. Although form and matter in living organisms and artifacts alike are related via hypothetical necessity, it does not apply to both in the same way. I consider particular examples of body-parts and argue that, in each case, a particular kind of matter is picked out by hypothetical necessity. In this way, living things contrast with artifacts which are related via hypothetical necessity only to a disjunction of suitable material; each member of the disjunction is related to the form in question only contingently. In the case of living things, on the other hand, Aristotle is not committed to Multiple Realizability, in contrast to what the functionalist interpretation of Aristotle has claimed. (shrink)

The traditional concept of prime matter – a purely potential substratum that persists through substantial change and serves to constitute the generated substance – has played a dwindling part in Aristotelian scholarship over the centuries. In medieval interpretations of Aristotle, prime matter was thought to play these two roles in all substantial changes, not only in changes at the level of the four elements. In more recent centuries, traditional prime matter was relegated only to the context of substantial (...) changes between the four elements. And in the last few decades of Aristotelian scholarship, it has become common either to downplay or even to eliminate prime matter’s role in elemental changes too. I will support the traditional concept of prime matter by showing that it aligns Aristotle’s view of elemental change with one of the central constraints on matter imposed in his Physics to a degree that cannot be achieved on the non-traditional interpretations: the need for matter to be in potentiality in a way that avoids the two problematic extremes of mere persistence, on the one hand, and destruction, on the other. This point will be supported by Aristotle’s rejection of both monism and pluralism in On Generation and Corruption. Second, I will argue that Aristotle calls for precisely the same kind of potentiality in a very different context: his critique of Anaxagoras’s view of matter in the Generation of Animals. Here the very same problematic extremes of mere persistence and destruction that plague the alternate views to traditional prime matter also plague the dominant views on the matter for animal generation. Especially since Aristotle takes living things to be paradigmatic substances, these comparisons suggest that the apparent idiosyncrasies of elemental transformation which have motivated interpreters to depart from traditional prime matter may not be so idiosyncratic after all. And if that is so, it may be that the problem lies not so much with traditional prime matter as with our assumptions about how persistence and constitution work in substantial change according to Aristotle. In the end, this line of argument opens the door to three new potential interpretations of the matter for substantial generation in Aristotle, interpretations which align with his concept of potentiality and – to varying degrees – with traditional prime matter as well. (shrink)

The Fifth Element (1997) is a French science-fiction film in English, directed and co-written by Luc Besson. The title and the plot of the film refer to a central notion of Greek philosophy, that is, pemptousia, or quintessence. Pre-Socratic philosophers such as Thales, Anaxagoras, Anaximenes and others, were convinced that all natural beings – in fact, nature itself – consist in four primary imperishable elements or essences (ousiai), i.e., fire, earth, water, and air. To these four, (...) Aristotle added aether, a fifth essence (pemptousia). The introduction of aether gave birth to a great tradition in late Antique and Medieval philosophy, and eventually it came to signify not an additional primary element, but the core-essence of all beings, their fundamental ontological structure. Besson’s film draws its inspiration on this philosophical tradition but its cinematographic rendering of the concept of Quintessence is typical of the contemporaneous views on the core characteristics of matters. The modernity that stimulates the film is equally anti-transcendentalist and anti-essentialist. Thus, the fifth element of the film is existentially personified and genderized making the traditional philosophical significance of the term to be adjusted by modernity in an immanent and temporal context where in addition aesthetics plays a crucial role. (shrink)

The article describes Mieczysław Albert Krąpiec's perspective on four classic philosophical images of man and the resulting theoretical and practical implications for the nursing profession. The first three images, namely man as a set of elements, man as a soul imprisoned in the body and man as a rational animal, are regarded by Krąpiec as reductionist anthropologies and are thus inadequate for nursing. The first image reduces man to a biological element. The second one reduces man to a (...) soul and treats a body as something an obstacle in personal development. The third image absolutizes reason in man. While the body is not rejected in this image, it is viewed as an indifferent mass. The last image, which regards man as a person, is an adequate image for nursing. The exceptional character of man emphasized in this image is determined by the following personal qualities: the ability for cognition, freedom, love, religiousness, dignity, subjectivity to law and completeness. These characteristics reveal the specificity of personal being in both the body and the spirit. By viewing man as a person, a nurse discovers a wide range of possibilities of providing effective help to the patient. (shrink)

This paper begins the last instalment of a six-part project correlating the key aspects of Kant’s architectonic conception of philosophy with a special version of the Chinese Book of Changes that I call the “Compound Yijing”, which arranges the 64 hexagrams (gua) into both fourfold and threefold sets. I begin by briefly summarizing the foregoing articles: although Kant and the Yijing employ different types of architectonic reasoning, the two systems can both be described in terms of three “levels” of (...) elements. Starting at an unnumbered level devoid of any element (the tao or thing in itself), the system proceeds by elaborating a key fourfold distinction (or “quaternity”) on the first level, a twelvefold distinction on the second level, and twelve quaternities (grouped in four quadrants, each with a set of three quaternities) on the third level. Each set of three quaternities (i.e., each quadrant) on the third level corresponds to one of the four “faculties” of the university, as elaborated in Kant’s book, The Conflict of the Faculties. Previous papers have examined the correlations between three key quaternities that Kant defends in relation to each of three faculties (philosophy, theology, and law) and the 12 gua that correspond to that faculty in the Compound Yijing. The final step is to explore the fourth quaternity on the third level, the 12 gua corresponding to the medical faculty. The “idea of reason” in Kant’s metaphysics that guides this wing of the comparative analysis is freedom, and the ultimate purpose of this faculty of the university is to train doctors to care for people’s physical well-being, as free agents imbedded in nature. But this paper will focus only on the four gua that correspond to four basic concepts in Kant’s theory of medicine. The two quaternities in the “yin-yang” (medical) quadrant of the Compound Yijing that will be skipped here are as follows. First, Kant’s account of the idea of freedom itself, which gives rise to the area of traditional metaphysics known as rational cosmology, comes in the first Critique’s Dialectic, in the section on the Antinomy of Reason (CPR A405-567/B432- 595). There he examines four irresolvable issues: whether the world has a beginning in time; whether composite substances consist of simple parts; whether a causality of freedom operates in the natural world; and whether an absolutely necessary being exists. Later I will argue that these correspond to the quaternity consisting of gua 15, 22, 36, and 52. (shrink)

ABSTRACT‘Excellence’ underpins debates within sports ethics from the nature of sport to the permissibility of doping. Despite the central role that excellence occupies in ethical reasoning about sport, it has garnered more support than scrutiny in the literature. Little has been said about how this value can be advanced or undermined. This paper addresses that lacuna by demonstrating that excellence has a complexity that has previously gone unnoticed. Specifically, excellence has four distinct elements: the ‘cluster of excellence’, the (...) ‘quantum of excellence’, the ‘clarity of excellence’, and the ‘balance of excellence’. Correspondingly, excellence can be advanced or undermined in any of four ways. This analysis yields the ‘Excellence Principle’ – a principle that provides a desideratum for any broad internalist (i.e. interpretivist) theory of sport and a normative framework with which to undertake excellence-based reasoning in sports ethics. (shrink)

Proclus defends the Platonic view that the heavens consist in (the highest gradations) of all four elements. He attacks Aristotle's view that the heavens consist in a distinct, fifth element.

Discover the many layers of bead embroidery. Through 14 astonishingly beautiful projects, including one from Sherry Serafini and one from Margie Deeb, Heidi Kummli guides beaders to a greater understanding of how to infuse their jewelry with deeper meaning. From animal totems, to the four elements, to the healing power of gemstones, beaders will create pieces that reveal how the natural world can enhance their jewelry-making journey.

The Elements of Logic is conceived as an academic textbook that includes mainly material for a basic course in logic for students. Based on his own reflections as well as national and foreign literature on the subject. Dr. Józef Bremer, S.J., presents in the following four chapters systematized knowledge of the problems embraced by the titles of each part of the book. The main aim of the author is the presentation of the problem of deductive reasoning. Another aim (...) of this book is not only to teach how to formalize, but also to show why we generally do formalize. The Elements of Logic is a successful attempt to answer this question. Chapter I contains material related to logic and its understanding. In this chapter the author presents some texts on the historical development of the question: „what is logic about?" He also presents short texts on three related sciences: syntax, semantics and pragmatics. (shrink)

In Kant’s “Doctrine of Right” there is a philosophical and interpretive puzzle surrounding the translation of a key concept: Gewalt. Should we translate it as “force,” “power,” or “violence”? This raises both general questions in Kant’s legal-political philosophy as well as puzzles regarding Kant’s definitions of “barbarism,” “anarchy,” “despotism,” and “republic” as the four possible political conditions. First, I argue that we have good textual reasons for translating Gewalt as “violence”—a translation which has the advantage that it answers (...) these questions and puzzles convincingly. Translating Gewalt as “violence” has two further, somewhat surprising advantages. It allows us to explain how human beings can be caught in situations with no morally good ways out, and it gives us an ideal Kantian refutation of the death penalty. I then explore Kant’s account of the establishment of public authorities by means of an analogy between the birth and development of a natural person (a human being) and an artificial one (a state). This analogy helps to clarify the difference between the necessary coercive element involved in ideally establishing a state and the likely violence involved in actually establishing one. The third and final section uses the ideas of barbarism, anarchy, despotism, and republic to identify four different types of political forces operating at any given time in actual historical societies. Once we use Kant’s theory to improve our understanding of the various challenges our historical societies present, we also realize the importance and usefulness of philosophical precision when we translate Gewalt as “violence” and correctly define barbarism, anarchy, despotism, and republic. (shrink)

In 1980, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari published what would become their most famous book: A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. The result of seven years of hard labor, this new work was intended to expand the reflection they had initiated in their first four-handed book Anti-Oedipus, published in 1972 with the same subtitle. By deepening the notions of “flow” and “desire” but going this time beyond the sole discussion of Freudianism and Marxism, it provided a completely - Philosophie (...) – Nouvel article. (shrink)

The search for moral objectivity has been constant throughout the history of philosophy, although interpretations of the nature and scope of objectivity have varied. One aim of the pursuit of moral objectivity has been the demonstration of what may be termed its epistemological thesis, that is, the claim that the truth of assertions of the goodness or rightness of moral acts is as legitimate, reliable, or valid as the truth of assertions involving other forms of human knowledge, such as (...) common sense, practical expertise, science, or mathematics. Another aim of the quest for moral objectivity may be termed its pragmatic formulation ; this refers to the development of a method or procedure that will mediate among conflicting moral views in order to realize a convergence or justified agreement about warranted or true moral conclusions. In the ethical theories of Aristotle, David Hume, and John Dewey, theories that represent three of the four variants of ethical naturalism that are surveyed in this essay, the epistemological thesis and the pragmatic formulation are integrated or combined. The distinction between these two elements is significant for the present essay, however, since I want to show that linguistic naturalism, the fourth variant I shall examine, has provided a demonstration of the epistemological thesis about moral knowledge, even if the pragmatic formulation has not been successfully realized. (shrink)

Transcendental Pragmatics and Discourse Ethics. Elements and Perspectives of Apel's Discourse-Philosophy. The author follows Apel's intellectual biography and shows the conception of a critique of meaning qua ‘reflection upon the discourse within the discourse’ to be the centre of Apel's language-pragmatic ‘Transformation of Philosophy’. Beginning with an explication of the situation of a speaker/thinker, especially of the situation of a philosophising speaker/thinker, Apel reconstructs a two fold apriori of communication: Every thought is situated within the context of (...) a particular, historically evolved, community of language and interaction. At the same time, however, the validity-claims of thoughts transcend the context of their origin towards an unlimited community of argumentation. On the basis of the first apriori Apel criticises the methodical solipsism as well as the objectivism of modern philosophy and theory of science. Drawing upon the second apriori he develops a universalist critique of meaning of relativism and contextualism. In the sixties and seventies Apel worked out a differentiated theory of the – more or less – communicatively cognizing humanities and set it apart from the theory of the causal-explanatory natural sciences, thus challenging the objectivism of a Theory of Unified Science. Building upon this work Transcendental Pragmatics, as developed by Apel and others, sets philosophy primarily two tasks: firstly, a internal reconstruction of argumentative discourse as the situation of speech and thought which seeks to elucidate the conditions of the meaningfulness, i. e. the presuppositions, of discourse. These presuppositions comprise, thus Apel with Habermas, the four validity-claims to intelligibility, sincerety/credibility, truth and normative rightness/legitimacy. Their moral content consists, thus Apel, not only in the recognition of the equality of all beings capable of discursive reasoning but also in their recognition of a co-responsibility for the realizability of discourses and of responsibility. The author argues that the existence of a co-responsibility of this kind is indisputable because the discursive claims to validity are intertwined with a set of ‘primordial promises of dialogue’. Only with the elucidation and explication of these promises can the reconstruction of the internal conditions of discourse be completed.The second task of a pragmatics of argumentation isthe strict resp. actual reflection of the thinker upon the presuppositions of the discourse in which he currently engages. This reflection has a Socratic character and can only be done in the form of discussion and debate with critics of the reconstruction. In this context, the author proposes a method of Socratic reflection upon the presuppositions of dialogue which suspends the usual, theoretically oriented, attitude of the scientist and the philosopher in favour of an actual reflective attitude. Within a dialogue with a sceptic who doubts one of the results of the internal reconstruction of dialogical presuppositions, say X, it is tested whether his doubt as to the unrestricted validity of X can be understood as a sincere contribution to the current dialogue or whether this particular sceptical thesis does not make sense, because it is incompatible with the role of a sincere participant of argumentation which, after all, the sceptic cannot refuse to claim for himself.Finally the author explains Apel's characterization of the tension between “Discourse and Responsibility”. In the course of discussions with Max Weber, Lawrence Kohlberg, Hans Jonas et al., Apel formulates and justifies an ethics of responsibility and gives an affirmative answer to the crucial question of whether the fulfilment of the moral obligations connected with the recognition of co-responsibility can be demanded within the non-dialogical circumstances of social reality. Apel's answer employs the idea of counter-strategies which are morally legitimate in virtue of their being worthy of argumentative consensus. (shrink)

This study examines the Critique of Pure Reason to determine its importance for Kant's ethical philosophy. It discusses Kant's many remarks on ethical matters in the First Critique and also the ethical significance of his arguments in that work. In its Prefaces Kant explains that the argument of the Critique is a two-sided one that limits reason in its speculative employment, while at the same time opening up and establishing a field for reason's practical employment. This study examines the (...) neglected positive side of Kant's argument. It shows how many of the concepts central to Kant's account of practical reason are already presented in his description of pure reason. The focus of this study is on the theme of freedom as it is presented in the First Critique. I show how one can find three descriptions of freedom in this work: the freedom necessary for the activity of thought, the transcendental freedom Kant describes as an idea of pure reason, and the practical freedom exhibited in free will. ;The thesis consists of an Introduction, four chapters, and a Conclusion. Chapter one shows how Kant's statement of his project in the Prefaces and Introduction indicates the importance in the First Critique of discussions of freedom and other practical matters. Chapter two analyzes the significance of the Transcendental Aesthetic for Kant's conception of freedom and practical reason. Chapter three discusses further developments from the Transcendental Analytic, most importantly, its descriptions of both the active and categorical structure of human reason. Chapter four explores Kant's discussions of transcendental and practical freedom in the Antinomy and Canon of Pure Reason. Throughout this study I point out evidence for Kant's claim that pure and practical reason are "the same," by indicating both where and how concepts presented in the First Critique are repeated and developed in Kant's ethical works. In chapters two, three, and four of this study I also discuss Martin Heidegger's published writings and lectures on the First Critique because Heidegger offers an interpretation that highlights the ethical significance of Kant's arguments in the Critique. (shrink)

Recently Kretchmar attempted to apply and to explore Husserl’s transcendental phenomenological method in relation to clarifying, in the context of sport particularly, the main features of competition. He concludes with the strong claim that competition is unintelligible unless understood in relation to the four elements of plurality, comparison, normativity, and disputation. Roughly, the idea is that competition needs to be understood as a context in which more than one competitor is involved; where competitors are compared; that comparisons are (...) evaluations of their performance/entry in the competition; and that the expected result of the latter is a matter of dispute between or among contestants. In investigating these points some refinement of this basic outline is attempted against occasional reference to others who in the past made similar claims about the conditions of competition. I conclude that Kretchmar’s claims are mistaken. (shrink)

Scientific observation has led to the discovery of recurring patterns in nature. Symmetry is the property of an object showing regularity in parts on a plane or around an axis. There are several types of symmetries observed in the natural world and the most common are mirror symmetry, radial symmetry, and translational symmetry. Symmetries can be continuous or discrete. A discrete symmetry is a symmetry that describes non-continuous changes in an object. A continuous symmetry is a repetition of an object (...) an infinite number of times. A consequence of continuous symmetry is the existence of conservation laws. A natural system with discrete and continuous symmetries displays several physical properties, such as the existence of long-range order. Geometric shapes exhibit symmetry as mirror reflections of each other. Symmetry in nature has been a model of beauty since the beginning of civilization. Since the earliest times, nature itself has manifestly been a model, evincing regularity in sundry forms and occurrences–from minerals and plants to the anatomy of living beings, to the regularly recurring stellar constellations. For Ancient Greek philosophers, proportion, symmetry, and harmony, were the basics to determine whether something is beautiful or not. Ancient Greek philosophers were known for bringing logic and rational thinking to phenomena that were previously explained by mythology and Gods. They observed the natural world around them and used their knowledge to answer questions about the proportion in observable objects and the origin of Earth. The Greek words _summetria_ and _summetros_ appear frequently in the Timaeus, defined as parts with each other and with the whole. Plato has a very rough concept of symmetry, and when he uses “beauty” to characterize the so-called Platonic Solids in the Timaeus, he seems to be emphasizing their regularity and indirectly their symmetry. Plato believes the four elements (earth, air, fire, water) have been constructed by the Demiurge, or a divine craftsman who appoints order in an otherwise chaotic universe. Minerals are representative examples of beauty, order, and symmetry in inorganic materials. Well-formed minerals (crystals) are a collection of equivalent faces related by symmetry. The goal of this paper is to relate the perspective of symmetry in ancient Greek philosophy with the modern scientific evidence of the geometric description of crystal structures. The five Platonic solids are ideal models of geometrical patterns that occur throughout the world of minerals. In this paper, minerals serve as a model of connecting the symmetry theory in Plato’s philosophy and modern advances in mineralogy. (shrink)

This essay sheds light on Plato’s Seventh Epistle. The five elements of Plato’s epistemological structure in the Epistle are the name, the definition, the image, the resultant knowledge itself (the Fourth) and the proper object of knowledge (the Form, or the Fifth). Much of contemporary Western philosophy has obsessed over Plato’s Fifth, relegating its existence to Plato’s faulty imagination after skillful linguistic analyses of the First (name) and the Second (definition). However, this essay argues against this reduction of (...) knowledge to linguistic propositions, proposing that it is critical for the purposes of philosophical rectification to draw present attention to the 'Fourth', a final cognitive experience that Plato called ‘knowledge.’ In the Seventh Epistle, it is argued, Plato attempts to show that knowledge is possible which is not reducible to semantics or conventional definitions. For Plato, to acquire knowledge of the circle required a process of cogitation that continually thought about the different elements until it became clear that the knowledge of a circle could not be reduced to one of its elements (i.e., name or definition). The essay then suggests that the Fourth consists of the union of meaning, and the consciousness or understanding of that meaning that is the knowledge of the Eidos. The 'meaning' must be apprehended by the philosopher, and it is the very apprehension of the meaning that constitutes the knowledge experience for the philosopher. If students of philosophy are encouraged to experience and rediscover great moments of philosophical insight, a better understanding of the purpose of philosophical inquiry and a greater admiration for the work of past philosophers can be gained. At the same time, a new path can be paved and a substantial direction can be posited for the discovery of new philosophical truths, which will be the task of all philosophers of the future. (shrink)

Due to the fact that advertising is produced, distributed, and received together with other elements of mass media, it stands to reason to include advertising in the media system – as did Niklas Luhmann. Given that most advertising is for commercial purposes, however, one might as well model advertising as a subsystem of the economica system – as did Siegfried J. Schmidt. Most advertising is indeed commercial, yet advertising is not necessarily limited to commercial purposes. Advertising neither follows the (...) guiding values of the media system nor those of the economic system exclusively. Therefore, advertising can reasonably be regarded as an autonomous social system – as did Guido Zurstiege. To emphasize the fact that, as a service provider, advertising has to account for different system logics, it can also be considered a zone in which the guiding principles of different systems are brought down to a common denominator – Gabiel Siegert and Dieter Brecheis have explicated this approach. Against the background of these four different systems theoretical approaches to advertising research this paper focuses on the power struggles and conflicts inherent in the advertising process. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Martin Warner PHILOSOPHICAL POETRY: THE CASE OF FOUR QUARTETS I FOR plato the quarrel between philosophy and poetry was already an ancient one. Since his day strenuous efforts have been made to eliminate it by circumscribing each widiin carefully specified boundaries, on die principle that strong fences make good neighbors, and allowing die one to venture onto the territory of the other only as licensed. Thus until (...) recently assessments of the literary quality of a philosopher's writing have commonly been treated as extraneous to its value as philosophy, and philosophical probing of die thought of a poem as irrelevant to a literary critic's final assessment ofit. For some works, however, such compromises seem forced; Four Quartets is a case in point. Here we have a sustained effort to explore issues of a philosophical and theological nature in poetic terms — in a manner that challenges our understanding and lays claim to our assent. The poetry does not merely encapsulate a theoretical position, but enacts a process ofthought perceived as bearing on diese topics at least as significandy as do those processes commonly termed "philosophical," and diereby raises by implication more general issues concerning die status of those "philosophical" modes themselves. F. R. Leavis is well known both for his engagement with the poetry of T. S. Eliot, and for his insistence on a clear separation between literary criticism and philosophy; dius his raising of philosophical questions as an integral and decisive element in his final and most extensive analysis ofthe Quartets is particularly striking: That Four Quartets offers us thought, searching, basic and rigorous, we have our assurance in the first ten lines of"Burnt Norton".... As thought, it aspires to a general validity.... 222 Martin Warner223 The questions, how must reality be conceived, and what is the nature of the human situation, have been raised in a way diat compels one to determine and verify one's own ultimate beliefs.1 Of course, Leavis is clear that the manner in which die poem raises these questions is not that traditionally associated with philosophy: "The 'music' of Four Quartets challenges a criterion that is not logic, but something equivalent in the field of total meaning. We can only tell what it is by intelligent self-exposure to the poetry" (p. 159). Similarly his mode of"determining " and "verifying" his own beliefs in response is that proper to literary criticism. But the questions are plainly philosophical ones, and one does not need the authority of Leavis to see that the poem raises them. From a philosophical point ofview, the interesting questions are the status of the manner in which it does so and the nature of the "criterion that is not logic" which is said to have an internal relation to that "intelligent selfexposure to the poetry" which Leavis in his critical practice seeks to exemplify. Unfortunately, this late commentary on Eliot's poetry is among the weakest in the Leavis corpus, precisely lacking "intelligent self-exposure to the poetry";2 but this should not lead us to dismiss its more general claims. In earlier and far stronger criticism Leavis had already argued that "Burnt Norton" does "by strictly poetical means the business ofan epistemological and metaphysical inquiry" ("Eliot's Later Poetry," p. 65). Further, die most distinguished recent criticism of Eliot's poetry is probably that of A. D. Moody,3 and he too finds himself driven to place his own "ultimate beliefs" in relation to it. On the one hand, "There is likely to be at least some degree of essential conformity between the way we live now and die way in which the poem would order life; and to that extent the poem can be said to express, and to give a form to, the sensibUity ofits age" (p. 264). But on the other, "It is a neurotic vision, one arising from some disorder or disease of the personality — or of his culture.... It is not easy to attain a detached view of die neurosis which is like a dominant gene in our culture. It is a matter... of the alienation ofman from mat to which he properly, of his nature, belongs — his being cut off from... (shrink)

The blind bandit -- Zuko alone -- The chase -- Bitter work -- The library.

In this essay I argue that Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature combines four elements. Hegel develops (1) an a priori account of the logical determinations immanent in and peculiar to nature—determinations that incorporate (but are not reducible to) (2) the determinations set out in the Logic. Hegel then points to (3) the empirical phenomena corresponding to each determination and so proves indirectly that such phenomena are necessary. Finally, he draws attention to (4) those aspects of nature that cannot (...) be explained by nature’s immanent logic and so are contingent. In this way, I argue, Hegel demonstrates a priori that certain natural processes are made necessary by the distinctive logic of nature, but he also recognizes that there are contingencies in nature that only empirical science can discover. (shrink)

: This article connects two of Dewey's generic traits of existence—stability and precariousness—to four elements specified in his preface to Democracy and Education (democracy, evolution, industrialization and the experimental method) and one element specified in his preface to How We Think (childhood). It argues that Dewey's metaphysics of stability and precariousness is implicit in his philosophy of education and provides a unifying aspect to his philosophy of education that is relevant to the modern world. The article (...) then briefly looks at whether Dewey developed a metaphysics at all and concludes that Dewey did indeed develop a metaphysics—a new metaphysics of human experience—which needs to be further analysed in relation to various aspects of his philosophy of education. (shrink)

In this essay I argue that Hegel’s Philosophy of Nature combines four elements. Hegel develops an a priori account of the logical determinations immanent in and peculiar to nature—determinations that incorporate the determinations set out in the Logic. Hegel then points to the empirical phenomena corresponding to each determination and so proves indirectly that such phenomena are necessary. Finally, he draws attention to those aspects of nature that cannot be explained by nature’s immanent logic and so are (...) contingent. In this way, I argue, Hegel demonstrates a priori that certain natural processes are made necessary by the distinctive logic of nature, but he also recognizes that there are contingencies in nature that only empirical science can discover. (shrink)

ABSTRACT. The author looks at two themes in the writings of four African scholars: E. Bolaji Idowu, John Mbiti, Okot p’Bitek and Kwame Appiah. She surveys their ideas about the existence of truth and of a High God. For each theme, she outlines the significance of each author’s work. In the conclusion the coherence between both themes is shown with the help of two varieties of philosophical positions and aesthetic styles, notably: modern-ism and postmodernism She shows why Idowu and (...) Mbiti should be categorized as mod-ernist. She argues that Okot p’Bitek’s view of God-as-dead shows him to be a modernist and why his deconstruction of the work of previous scholars also makes him a postmod-ernist avant la lettre. Finally, she argues that Appiah’s postmodern vision on the non-existence of one single truth has been conducive to his vision on identity as a bricolage of traditional and modern elements of culture. KEY WORDS. African religion, Appiah (Kwame), discourse, High God, Idowu (Bolaji), Mbiti (John), modernism, Okot p’Bitek, postmodernism, truth. (shrink)

As we read his work, John Rawls was developing an innovative approach to political philosophy, and Political Liberalism struggles with different ways to model these new insights. This article presents four models of political liberalism, particularly focusing on understanding the nature of overlapping consensus and its relation to public reason. Beyond clarifying Rawls’s insights, we aim to spur readers to reassemble the rich elements of Political Liberalism to produce tractable and enlightening models of political life among free (...) and equal citizens under conditions of deep diversity to advance the public reason project. (shrink)

Contrary to the widespread view that Hegel excluded Africa from what he called world history proper, the specifically African element of Egypt was indispensable to his account of the pivotal dialectical moment that saw spirit's release from its immersion in nature. Hegel's racist caricature of Africans in the early part of the lectures was not gratuitous, something that commentators can leave to one side. It was integral to his dialectical account of world history because it served to generate the contradiction (...) that saw the Persian Empire give way to Greece. This understanding is confirmed by the newly completed four-volume edition of Hegel's Lectures on the Philosophy of World History in the Gesammelte Werke. These new volumes also enable us to gain critical insight into how the editors of the first two published versions of the lectures, Eduard Gans and Karl Hegel, sought in their different ways to shape the reception of Hegel's lectures. (shrink)

In this article I argue that the heart of Aristotle’s philosophy was his doctrine of pneuma, which connected his psychology, biology, cosmology and theology, and which was central to his (lost and extant) works and should be taken into account, even where it is less explicitly discussed. Pneuma is not a sixth elementary physical body. It is the manifestation of the divine ether but always mixed with the other four elements within the sublunary sphere.

Part of the Elements Philosophy of Religion series, this short book focuses on the spiritual dimensions of life’s meaning as they have been discussed in the recent English and mainly analytic philosophical literature. The overarching philosophical question that this literature has addressed is about the extent to which, and respects in which, spiritual realities such as God or a soul would confer meaning on our lives. There have been four broad answers to the question, namely: God or (...) a soul is necessary for meaning in our lives; they are not necessary for it; one or both would enhance the meaning in our lives; and they would detract from it. These views have been largely advanced in chronological order through the history of Western philosophy, with the view that life would be meaningless without God and a soul having been most prominent in the medieval period, the rejection of this claim having arisen in the modern era, and then sophisticated positions about enhancement or reduction having appeared in earnest only in the past 20 years. This book addresses all four positions, paying particular attention to the more recent views. Beyond familiarizing readers with these positions, it presents prima facie objections to them, points out gaps in research agendas, and suggests argumentative strategies that merit development. (shrink)

This book, called "Hindu Philosophy of Life: Meaning of Life in Hinduism," stands out in multiple ways from the usual introductions to Hindu thought. Its salient four-point definition of Hinduism is just the start. It shows that the Hindu philosophy of life envisages a rounded and balanced life of physical, social, moral and spiritual fulfillment for all who would claim to benefit by what it offers. Accordingly, meaning of life in Hinduism consists of achieving diversified fulfillment arranged (...) to move progressively toward increasingly more challenging and more fulfilling levels. It culminates in terminally fulfilling level called moksha or spiritual freedom. Nine outstanding features of Hinduism are related at the outset, showing how Hinduism stands out rather than fits in the received prevalent religious schemes. What attributes an ideal or model religion should have? A modern Hindu is asked that question to elicit a list of desired attributes. Nine-item wish list is developed. Noting that even those who say they are proud of being Hindu have a hard time saying what they are proud of and observing that even scholars of Hinduism have that problem, the great importance of defining Hinduism is demonstrated. An unusual but accurate definition of Hinduism is developed in four points. This is further enriched and expanded into sixteen elements or foundations of Hinduism to incorporate a full-fledged philosophy of life as typically offered by Hindu spiritual thought. It is shown how it fulfills the Hindu’s wish list. Its great strength, tenacity and resilience are made obvious, which helped it to survive impossible odds it faced through its long history. Its humanity, flexibility, wide coverage and applicability to all aspects of human life in general are shown for its potential to heal a polarized and conflicting society’s ills at this and all times. In sum, the book "Hindu Philosophy of Life: Meaning of Life in Hinduism" more than fulfills the promise its title offers. (shrink)

Dramatic changes in the understanding of nature and turbulent debates in religion marked seventeenth century moral philosophy. Many of the most important works of the century were attempts to defend new moral concepts or to recast old ones, as a way of responding to new doctrines in religion, epistemology, ad metaphysics. Many others were attempts to show that traditional conceptions of value, or elements of them, did not after all require revision. Moral concepts depend, or might be taken (...) to depend, upon our conception of the world in various ways. The first section of this chapter presents a basic form of a challenge to traditional views arising from new conceptions of God and the world in the seventeenth century together with four basic questions that arise out of this challenge. The second and third sections present responses to these questions drawn from the most revisionary and systematic moral doctrines of the century, those of Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) and Benedictus Spinoza (1632-1677). The final sections uses these philosophers as points of reference for the understanding of major trends of seventeenth century moral philosophy. Very roughly, moral philosophy in the century presents an arc of radicalism, with earlier figures such as Grotius and Descartes building toward criticism of traditional views, Hobbes and Spinoza presenting the most biting and direct revisions, and later figures such as Cumberland, Pufendorf, and Locke working to reconcile traditional views and new scientific and theological doctrines. (shrink)

This book offers an original new account of one of Aristotle's central doctrines. Freudenthal He recreates from Aristotle's writings a more complete theory of material substance which is able to explain the problematical areas of the way matter organizes itself and the persistence of matter, to show that the hitherto ignored concept of vital heat is as central in explaining material substance as soul or form.

Noch heute bekannt ist das aus der Antike uberkommmene Schema der vier Elemente (Erde, Wasser, Luft, Feuer) und ihrer Eigenschaften. Es war eine der wesentlichen Ordnungsformen im Weltbild der mittelalterlichen Menschen. Entstehung und Bestimmung der Natur und der Lebewesen, Gesundheit und Krankheit, Gut und Bose lieaen sich aus ihr erklaren, Gott bediente sich ihrer zur Ordnung der Schopfung und sie gab den Rahmen vor fur die Entfaltung menschlichen Willens. Im ausgehenden Mittelalter, der Renaissance, wurde dieses Denken aufgebrochen. Die Eigenart von (...) Lebewesen und Naturvorgangen oder die Handlungsmoglichkeiten der Menschen konnten jetzt auch als Kraftubertragung oder durch die Gunst der Stunde erklart werden. Vollig aufgegeben wurde die Ordnungsvorstellung der vier Elemente wahrend des Mittelalters aber nie. Inhalt: Naturphilosophie: Antike Tradition - hochmittelalterliche Ausformung (Wilhelm von Conches, Albertus Magnus) u spatmittelalterliche Gestaltung (Raimund von Sabunde) und Veranderung (Marsilio Ficino, Leonardo da Vinci, Giordano Bruno, Paracelsus). Politisches Denken: spatmittelalterliche Gestaltung (Marsilius von Padua ) und Veranderung (Leonardo Bruni, Machiavelli). (Franz Steiner 1994). (shrink)

The paper argues for the necessity of building up a philosophy of the Internet and proposes a version of it, an «Aristotelian» philosophy of the Internet. First, an overview of the recent trends in the Internet research is presented. This train of thoughts leads to a proposal of understanding the nature of the Internet in the spirit of the Aristotelian philosophy i. e., to conceive the Internet as the Internet, as a totality of its all aspects, as (...) a whole entity. For this purpose, the Internet is explained in four (easily distinguishable, but obviously connected) contexts: we regard it as a system of technology, as an element of communication, as a cultural medium and as an independent organism. Based on these investigations we conclude that the Internet is the medium of a new mode of human existence created by late modern man; a mode that is built on earlier (i. e., natural, and social) spheres of existence and yet it is markedly different from them. We call this newly formed existence web-life. Finally using two enlightening cultural-historical analogies (the reformation of knowledge and the formation of web-life) several fundamental characteristics of the web-life is presented. (shrink)