The present edition provides a detailed and accessible discussion ofhis theories and adds an account of the immediate responses to the book on publication.

Virtue ethics has been dogged by the objection that it lacks the ability to provide adequate action-guidance, that it is agent-centered rather act-centered. Virtue ethics has also been faulted for devolving into moral cultural relativism. Rosalind Hursthouse has presented an action-based, naturalistic theory of virtue ethics intended to defuse these charges. Despite its merits, I argue that Hurthouse’s theory fails to successfully solve the problems associated with action guidance and relativism precisely because her attempt to provide a non-cultural basis for (...) virtue ethics undermines the possibility of using virtue ethics to derive useful action-guidance. The action-guiding power of virtue is derived from culture; seeking to avoid the cultural grounding of virtue merely brings one back to the problem of how virtue ethics can provide action-guidance. (shrink)

What if wilderness is bad for wildlife? This question motivates the philosophical investigation in Wilderness, Morality, and Value. Environmentalists aim to protect wilderness, and for good reasons, but wilderness entails unremittent, incalculable suffering for its non-human habitants. Given that it will become increasingly possible to augment nature in ways that ameliorates some of this suffering, the morality of wilderness preservation is itself in question. Joshua S. Duclos argues that the technological and ethical reality of the Anthropocene warrants a fundamental (...) reassessment of the value of wilderness. After exposing the moral ambiguity of wilderness preservation, he explores the value of wilderness itself by engaging with anthropocentricism and nonanthropocentrism; sentientism, biocentrism, and ecocentrism; and instrumental value and intrinsic value. Duclos argues that the value of wilderness is a narrow form of anthropocentric intrinsic value, one with a religio-spiritual dimension. By integrating scholarship from bioethics on the norms of engineering human nature with debates in environmental ethics concerning the prospect of engineering non-human nature, Wilderness, Morality, and Value sets the stage for wilderness ethics—or wilderness faith—in the Anthropocene. (shrink)

Organoids and specifically human cerebral organoids (HCOs) are one of the most relevant novelties in the field of biomedical research. Grown either from embryonic or induced pluripotent stem cells, HCOs can be used as in vitro three-dimensional models, mimicking the developmental process and organization of the developing human brain. Based on that, and despite their current limitations, it cannot be assumed that they will never at any stage of development manifest some rudimentary form of consciousness. In the absence of behavioral (...) indicators of consciousness, the theoretical neurobiology of consciousness being applied to unresponsive brain-injured patients can be considered with respect to HCOs. In clinical neurology, it is difficult to discern a capacity for consciousness in unresponsive brain-injured patients who provide no behavioral indicators of consciousness. In such scenarios, a validated neurobiological theory of consciousness, which tells us what the neural mechanisms of consciousness are, could be used to identify a capacity for consciousness. Like the unresponsive patients that provide a diagnostic difficulty for neurologists, HCOs provide no behavioral indicators of consciousness. Therefore, this article discusses how three prominent neurobiological theories of consciousness apply to human cerebral organoids. From the perspective of the Temporal Circuit Hypothesis, the Global Neuronal Workspace Theory, and the Integrated Information Theory, we discuss what neuronal structures and functions might indicate that cerebral organoids have a neurobiological capacity to be conscious. (shrink)

Charles Darwin's On the Origin of Species is unquestionably one of the chief landmarks in biology. The Origin (as it is widely known) was literally only an abstract of the manuscript Darwin had originally intended to complete and publish as the formal presentation of his views on evolution. Compared with the Origin, his original long manuscript work on Natural Selection, which is presented here and made available for the first time in printed form, has more abundant examples and illustrations (...) of Darwin's argument, plus an extensive citation of sources. (shrink)

At the very beginning of L’Homme-Machine, La Mettrie claims that Leibnizians with their monads have “rather spiritualized matter than materialized the soul”; a few years later Pierre-Louis Moreau de Maupertuis, President of the Berlin Academy of Sciences and natural philosopher with a strong interest in the modes of transmission of ‘genetic’ information, conceived of living minima which he termed molecules, “endowed with desire, memory and intelligence,” in his Système de la nature ou Essai sur les corps organisés. This text first (...) appeared in Latin in 1751 under the title Dissertatio inauguralis metaphysica de universali naturae systemate, with the pseudonym Dr Baumann; it was translated by Maupertuis in 1754 as Essai sur la formation des corps organisés and was later included in his 1756 Œuvres under the title Système de la nature. Now, it is clear that Maupertuis was a kind of Leibnizian; and that his molecule possessed higher-level, ‘mental’ properties. In that sense he falls under the first category described by La Mettrie. But he was also involved in a debate on this issue with Diderot, who put forth a sustained critique of Maupertuis’ theory of the molecule in the additions to his 1753 Pensées sur l’interprétation de la nature. Where Maupertuis attributes higher-level properties to his living minima, Diderot argues that these properties are ‘organizational’, i.e., they can only be properties of the whole. At issue here is the degree of commitment to a form of materialism. (shrink)

In his Philosophical Inquiry concerning Human Liberty (1717), the English deist Anthony Collins proposed a complete determinist account of the human mind and action, partly inspired by his mentor Locke, but also by elements from Bayle, Leibniz and other Continental sources. It is a determinism which does not neglect the question of the specific status of the mind but rather seeks to provide a causal account of mental activity and volition in particular; it is a ‘volitional determinism’. Some decades later, (...) Diderot articulates a very similar determinism, which seeks to recognize the existence of “causes proper to man” (as he says in the Réfutation d’Helvétius). The difference with Collins is that now biological factors are being taken into account. Obviously both the ‘volitional’ and the ‘biological’ forms of determinism are noteworthy inasmuch as they change our picture of the nature of determinism itself, but my interest here is to compare these two determinist arguments, both of which are broadly Spinozist in nature – and as such belong to what Jonathan Israel called in his recent book “the radical Enlightenment,” i.e. a kind of underground Enlightenment constituted by Spinozism – and to see how Collins’ specifically psychological vision and Diderot’s specifically biological vision correspond to their two separate national contexts: determinism in France in the mid-1750s was a much more medico-biological affair than English determinism, which appears to be on a ‘path’ leading to Mill and associationist psychology. (shrink)

Kierkegaard’s ideal supports a radical form of “deep diversity,” to use Charles Taylor’s expression. It is radical because it embraces not only irreducible conceptions of the good but also incompatible ones. This is due to its paradoxical nature, which arises from its affirmation of both monism and pluralism, the One and the Many, together. It does so in at least three ways. First, in terms of the structure of the self, Kierkegaard describes his ideal as both unified (the “positive (...) third”) and plural (a “negative unity”). Second, he affirms a process which brings together unity, as implied by the linear notion of “stages”, with plurality, in the form of “spheres of existence” (aesthetic, ethical, and religious). And third, the culmination of the process implies that we should embrace both a unified dialectic (“Religiousness A”) alongside the plural remnants of the ethical/aesthetic, that is, both the infinity of the former and the finitudes of the latter. Unsurprisingly, while Kierkegaard describes those who are able to exemplify his ideal in practice as “always joyful,” he also considers the ideal to be “extremely hard, the hardest task of all.” This is why those such as Hubert L. Dreyfus are wrong to claim that it provides an experience of bliss; on the contrary, those who realize it “are always in danger.” As I shall show, one form this danger takes is that it threatens to dirty the hands of those who manage to uphold Kierkegaard’s ideal. Moreover, it does so in ways that, I claim, tend to be missed by Kierkegaard himself. Nevertheless, the danger is also essential to the creativity of his approach, and I conclude by pointing out how this creativity makes it capable of tackling one of the profoundest challenges in contemporary ethics: that arising from what just war theorists call a “supreme emergency.” . (shrink)

In book Λ. of the Metaphysics, Aristotle suggests that an unmoved, unmoving being (God) is the source of all movement in the cosmos. He explains that this being instigates movement through desire. But how does desire affect movement? And what would make Aristotle’s God an object of desire? I attend to both questions in this paper, arguing that God’s existence as pure actuality (energeia) is crucial to understanding God’s status as the primary and ultimate source of wonder, and that it (...) is as the ultimate source of wonder that we can make sense of how God affects desire. (shrink)

This book provides a novel interpretation of the ideas about language in Ludwig Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations. Travis places the "private language argument" in the context of wider themes in the Investigations, and thereby develops a picture of what it is for words to bear the meaning they do. He elaborates two versions of a private language argument, and shows the consequences of these for current trends in the philosophical theory of meaning.

In this paper I identify and respond to four persistent objections to the idea of wilderness: empirical, cultural, philosophical and environmental. Despite having dogged the wilderness debate for decades, none of these objections withstands scrutiny; rather they are misplaced criticisms that hinder fruitful discussion of the philosophical ramifications of wilderness by needlessly complicating the idea itself. While there may be other justifiable concerns about the idea of wilderness, it is time to move beyond the four discussed in this paper.

This book is an examination of the inattention of business schools to moral education, addressing lessons learned from the most recent business corruption scandals and financial crises, and also questioning what we're teaching now and what should be considering in educating future business leaders to cope with the challenges of leading with integrity in the global environment"--Provided by publisher.

I argue that Kant thought his Transcendental Deduction of the Pure Concepts could reach skeptical empiricists like Hume by providing an overlooked explanation of the mind's a priori relation to the objects of experience. And he thought empiricists may be motivated to listen to this explanation because of an instability and dissatisfaction inherent to empiricism.

Ce livre étudie, à travers une série d'épisodes allant de la philosophie des Lumières à notre époque, le problème du matérialisme dans l'histoire de la philosophie et l’histoire des sciences. Comment comprendre les spécificités de l’histoire du matérialisme, des Lumières à nos jours, au sein de la grande histoire de la philosophie et de l’histoire des sciences ? Quelle est l’actualité de l’opposition classique entre le corps et l’esprit ? Qu’est-ce que le rire ou le rêve peuvent nous apprendre du (...) matérialisme ? En traversant l’histoire de ce concept jusqu’à l’émergence d’un « nouveau matérialisme » contemporain, l’ouvrage vise à revitaliser le matérialisme et sa lecture. -/- . (shrink)

El libro que estableció la teoría de la separación de poderes -afirmando la independencia del poder judicial con respecto al ejecutivo y el legislativo, para asegurar la libertad del pueblo- es una de las obras clave del pensamiento político, jurídico, sociológico e histórico de todos los tiempos.Aquella teoría enunciada por Charles-Louis de Secondat, barón de La Brède y de Montesquieu -"No hay libertad si el poder judicial no está separado del legislativo y executivo"- es tan sólo uno de los (...) momentos cumbres de este libro{ probablemente, el más importante de todo el siglo XVIII y un verdadero clásico desde que se publicó en Ginebra en 1748.Montesquieu tardó cerca de viente años en escribir "Del espíritu de las leyes"{ obra ingente que "empecé y dejé" en numerosas ocasiones, entregando "mil veces á los vientos las hojas que había escrito" y que, finalmente, concluyó, con más de 1.000 páginas -hojas perennes- que le ofrecen una lectura imprescindible.Lex Nova pone ahora a su disposición, por primera vez, este cuidado facsímil que reproduce, en tres tomos, la edición que publicó el anónimo licenciado M.V.M. en Madrid, París y Londres -respectivamente- en 1821, traduciendo aquella obra "libremente al español".Un verdadero lujo a su alcance. (shrink)

Discusses heaven, the Creation, forgiveness, vanity, the theology of romantic love, responsibility, and the life of Jesus.

Abstract:Therapeutic misconception (TM)—when clinical research participants fail to adequately grasp the difference between participating in a clinical trial and receiving ordinary clinical care—has long been recognized as a significant problem in consent to clinical trials. We suggest that TM does not primarily reflect inadequate disclosure or participants’ incompetence. Instead, TM arises from divergent primary cognitive frames. The researchers’ frame places the clinical trial in the context of scientific designs for assessing intervention efficacy. In contrast, most participants have a cognitive frame (...) that is personal and focused primarily on their medical problems. To illustrate this, we draw on interview material from both clinical researchers and participants in clinical trials. We suggest that reducing TM requires encouraging subjects to adjust their frame, not just add information to their existing frame. What is necessary is ascientific reframingof participation in a clinical trial. (shrink)

Self-authorship is fundamental to respecting the dignity of persons, and epistemic credibility depends upon impartial review. While these claims may seem obviously true, they arguments for them are rarely given. In a supposedly "post-truth" world in which respect for individual rights is under attack, the obvious must be argued for and reiterated. To that end, I mine sources from the European Enlightenment (Bacon, Hume, Kant, and Mill) to make the case for self-authorship and impartial review.

Previous studies have found Forsyth’s Ethical Position Questionnaire (EPQ) to vary between countries, but none has made a systematic evaluation of its psychometric properties across consumers from many countries. Using confirmatory factor analysis and multi-group LISREL analysis, this paper explores the factor structure of the EPQ and the measurement equivalence in five societies: Austria, Britain, Brunei, Hong Kong and USA. The results suggest that the modified scale, measuring idealism and relativism, was applicable in all five societies. Equivalence was found across (...) Britain, Brunei and USA, but the original scale cannot be used validly. (shrink)

In this article I present and analyze three popular moral justifications for hunting. My purpose is to expose the moral terrain of this issue and facilitate more fruitful, philosophically relevant discussions about the ethics of hunting.

Should religious reasons be used in political discourse? Habermas argues that religious reasons can enter the public sphere so long as they undergo a translation that meets the standards of public reason. I argue that such a translation may be either unnecessary or impossible. Habermas does not sufficiently consider the possibility that religious reasons are already publicly accessible such that no translation is required. Moreover, Habermas entirely fails to consider the possibility that, if he is right about religious reasons not (...) being publicly accessible, these reasons may be of a kind such that they cannot be translated into a publicly accessible idiom as he supposes they can be. (shrink)

Hume seems to contend that you can’t get an ought from an is. Searle professed to prove otherwise, deriving a conclusion about obligations from a premise about promises. Since (as Schurz and I have shown) you can’t derive a substantive ought from an is by logic alone, Searle is best construed as claiming that there are analytic bridge principles linking premises about promises to conclusions about obligations. But we can no more derive a moral obligation to pay up from the (...) fact that a promise has been made than we can derive a duty to fight a duel from the fact that a challenge has been issued – just conclusions about what we ought to do according to the rules of the relevant games. Hume suggests bridge principles that would take us from the rules of the games to conclusions about duties, but these principles are false. My argument features an obstreperous earl, an anarchist philosopher and a dueling Prime Minister. (shrink)

Le suicide collectif apparaît comme une aberration sociale, une extrême anomalie de la culture. Et si c'était au contraire l'aboutissement de toute collectivisation achevée? Si c'était la destinée cachée - sectaire et mystique - de toute histoire commune, de toute pensée unique? Admettons-le, ne serait-ce qu'un moment. Nous sommes alors contraints de bouleverser notre perception de la vie sociale et politique. Celle-ci ne devrait pas sa survie à la recherche d'unité bien-gérée, mais aux " trous " dans le collectif ; (...) à la résistance des corps vivants, et non à l'Esprit qui tente de les fondre en une mortelle idéalité commune. La théorie freudienne du " lien de masse " rend compte de cette dérive fatale des collectifs idéalisés. Sous- estimée par les sciences sociales, elle permet de lire ce qu'il advient aujourd'hui de nos sociétés saisies dans l'imago d'une " secte-monde ", et du péril majeur qui les y guette. Elle permet aussi, rétroactivement, d'analyser l'histoire occidentale comme une suite d'oscillations entre la capture fatale par l'Idéal et le retour à la pluralité vivante des Corps. Est-ce dans ce balancement, cette danse entre Corps et Esprit, que la culture humaine résiste au cours des temps à la fascination narcissique? (shrink)

Le prétexte de ce livre est la nature. Celle qui est aujourd'hui entrevue dans sa fragilité et sa finitude, et non la " sauvagerie ", naguère encore déclarée l'ennemie par excellence de toute civilisation. Mais l'objet véritable du propos est la société actuelle ; mieux : la culture, dans son effort pour se faire planétaire, rencontrant ainsi un nouveau visage de la nature. Dans ce miroir à la fois multiple et unique, nous sommes peut-être en train de redécouvrir un trait (...) nécessaire et durable de toute culture humaine : nos contructions collectives ne peuvent demeurer supportables que si elles " laissent être " quelque chose qui leur soit extérieur, quelque réalité qui échappe à leurs fictions et à leurs artifices. Certes, nous allons inventer la nature : mais l'opposition culture/nature qui en résultera ne sera pas plus artificielle - ni moins inévitablement paradoxale - que celle dont Claude Lévi-Strauss oberva naguère le caractère fondateur des sociétés dites primitives. C'est en effet toujours à cette séparation que tient la persistance de la prohibition des confusions, dont celle de l'inceste fut - et demeure - le paradigme. A l'envers de l'argent qui circule entre nous, divisant tous les objets pour les soumettre à un partage absolu (dont l'effet le moins paradoxal est qu'il nous isole à terme dans un solipsisme brutal, une déréliction sans espoir), la nature ne circule pas. C'est nous qui circulons à sa surface, à l'intérieur de son unité vitale. La nature ne se partage pas. C'est nous qui nous partageons à son contact, révélant l'irréductibilité de nos passions distinctes : celle de ranger, celle de dominer, celle d'évoquer l'interdit, celle enfin, de nous identifier à de purs sujets des actes. En nous indiquant la limite commune de ces sentiments incoercibles, et leur indispensable séparation par l'espace non domestiqué, la nature nous ouvre un champ politique inédit, et peut-être salvateur. Un champ qui ressemble à ce que poète pourrait nommer : " une politique de l'amour ", s'il ne savait que l'amour, au-delà de la nature, évoque l'insaisissable, l'impolitisable dans l'être humain. A tout le moins, la nature, en divisant la culture, nous rappelle qu'aucune société humaine ne peut vivre sans que l'Etre ne lui échappe. (shrink)

En 1980 dans Mille Plateaux (p.470) Deleuze exprimait la crainte que son celtisme et son intérêt pour l’Orient ne mènent Kenneth White vers un aristocratisme fascisant et un folklore fantasmant. Je montre dans cet essai que pour le poète écossais la celtitude est d’ordre mental et culturel, pas du tout ethnique, et que sa vaste et précise connaissance des cultures tao-bouddhiques débouche sur “un sol ontologiquement plus riche” (La Figure du dehors, p. 49).

One of the greatest merits of Dr. Sherover's excellent book is that it enables us to see Heidegger's thought- in one direction, at least- as an organic outgrowth from his reading of Kant. It thus helps to remove on common misapprehension that Heidegger's thought is odd, idiosyncratic, and not rooted- as in fact it is- in the mainstream of philosophy. Dr. Sherover is able to remove this misunderstanding in great part through the admirable clarity of his exposition; he has succeeded (...) in conveying Heidegger's most abstruse points into plain and understandable English, and so has overcome the formidable barrier of terminology that has blocked so many Heideggerian interpreters. This book is in fact the clearest exposition that I have read of Heidegger's thought at one states of its development. But beyond this valuable job of clarification, by bringing the light of Heidegger to bear upon Kant, this book is also a significant contribution to Kantian scholarship. And that means, of course, a contribution to philosophy itself. (shrink)

Il a souvent été remarqué que Pascal produit une pensée inquiétante de la condition humaine, mais plus rarement qu’il est aussi et surtout un penseur fondamental de l’inquiétude en elle-même. À partir d’une étude systématique de cette dernière notion dans les Pensées, nous voulons montrer qu’elle admet plusieurs visages mais aussi plusieurs usages sous la plume de l’apologiste. Si elle manifeste toute la misère de l’homme dans la réflexion anthropologique, l’inquiétude fonctionne également comme un outil apologétique et rhétorique visant à (...) toucher le lecteur. Enfin, Pascal prescrit le modèle d’une saine inquiétude spirituelle, lui conférant un rôle normatif et régulateur dans la conversion. Nous défendons ainsi que l’inquiétude livre le cœur de la vision pascalienne de l’homme, mais qu’elle figure surtout le seul chemin possible pour se tourner vers Dieu. (shrink)

The ‘dehuman’ and the inhuman are not, even partially, exterior to the human, as are the material and the living, the animal and the bestial; they represent rather the extremes, the very limits of the human. The inhuman forms the interior facet of the boundary which makes us human and concerns us as such. In that sense, it is never exterior to us.

L’idée s’est imposée que le droit du travail pouvait assurer auprès des entreprises la promotion de modèles de gestion responsables. En donnant au modèle le caractère de la règle, le législateur a cherché à informer directement la pratique des acteurs économiques. La Gestion prévisionnelle de l’emploi et des compétences représente aujourd’hui la bonne pratique à imiter. À partir de cet exemple, l’article montre que la façon dont les acteurs jouent avec la règle de droit déçoit les perspectives d’appropriation du modèle (...) tracées par le législateur. Entre les usages qui s’attachent à un objet et son régime juridique, les rapports sont fragiles et la déconnection toujours possible. La question est alors savoir comment soutenir les capacités d’imputation du droit pour rénover les rapports d’obligation qu’il était censé instaurer. (shrink)

À quelles conditions la distribution d’un revenu universel pourrait-elle être émancipatrice pour les femmes? Les présentations du revenu universel par ses promoteurs en font un moyen de choix de ses activités, sans tenir compte des contraintes sociales auxquelles les femmes sont soumises. Ce n’est pas parce qu’une mesure est prise en théorie en faveur de tout le monde qu’elle touche tout le monde de la même manière. On manque encore de recherches sur ces questions. Comment éviter que le revenu universel (...) ne soit qu’un accompagnement vers l’ubérisation? (shrink)

During dreaming, as well as during wakefulness, elaborative encoding, indexing and ancient art of memory techniques, such as the method of loci, may coincide with emotion regulation. These techniques shed light on the link between dreaming and emotional catharsis, post-traumatic stress disorder, supermemorization during sleep as opposed to wakefulness, and the developmental role of rapid eye movement sleep in children.

Charles Sanders Peirce has been characterized as the greatest American philosophic genius. He is the creator of pragmatism and one of the founders of modern logic. James, Royce, Schroder, and Dewey have acknowledged their great indebtedness to him. A laboratory scientist, he made notable contributions to geodesy, astronomy, psychology, induction, probability, and scientific method. He introduced into modern philosophy the doctrine of scholastic realism, developed the concepts of chance, continuity, and objective law, and showed the philosophical significance of the (...) theory of signs and mathematical logic. The present series is the first published edition of his systematic works. (shrink)

Human consciousness is widely understood to be underpinned by rich and diverse functional networks, whose breakdown results in unconsciousness. Candidate neural correlates of anesthetic-induced unconsciousness include: (1) disrupted frontoparietal functional connectivity; (2) disrupted brain network hubs; and (3) reduced spatiotemporal complexity. However, emerging counterexamples have revealed that these markers may appear outside of the state they are associated with, challenging both their inclusion as markers of conscious level, and the theories of consciousness that rely on their evidence. In this study, (...) we present a case series of three individuals in disorders of consciousness (DOC) who exhibit paradoxical brain responses to exposure to anesthesia. High-density electroencephalographic data were recorded from three patients with unresponsive wakefulness syndrome (UWS) while they underwent a protocol of propofol anesthesia with a targeted effect site concentration of 2 μg/ml. Network hubs and directionality of functional connectivity in the alpha frequency band (8–13 Hz), were estimated using the weighted phase lag index (wPLI) and directed phase lag index (dPLI). The spatiotemporal signal complexity was estimated using three types of Lempel-Ziv complexity (LZC). Our results illustrate that exposure to propofol anesthesia can paradoxically result in: (1) increased frontoparietal feedback-dominant connectivity; (2) posterior network hubs; and (3) increased spatiotemporal complexity. The case examples presented in this paper challenge the role of functional connectivity and spatiotemporal complexity in theories of consciousness and for the clinical evaluation of levels of human consciousness. (shrink)