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  1. Why Skepticism Fails.Steven M. Duncan - manuscript
    Do skeptical arguments undermine reason, as Hume supposes? In this paper, I argue that they do not and that skepticism is thus no threat to dogmatism about the possibility of knowledge.
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  2. Darwin versus Kant and Hume.Justin Le Saux - manuscript
    I claim evolution through natural selection is inconsistent with Kantian epistemology, because there is nothing about humans or 'the mind' which does not vary, so its inappropriate to base universal laws of nature on how the variable mind might generates experience. I also claim that the apparent self sufficient world presented by natural selection is at least suspiciously inconsistent with Hume's views that it is impossible to see how anything could itself (be sufficient to) produce anything.
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  3. Foreword to P.f. Strawson's scepticism and naturalism: Some varieties.Quassim Cassam - manuscript
    In that book I had two different, though not unrelated aims. The first chapter was concerned with traditional scepticisms about, e.g., the external world and induction. In common with Hume and Wittgenstein (and even Heidegger) I argued that the attempt to combat such doubts by rational argument was misguided: for we are dealing here with the presuppositions, the framework, of all human thought and enquiry. In the other chapters my target was different. It was that species of naturalism which tended (...)
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  4. David Hume’s skepticism in Thomas Reid’s reading.Vinícius França Freitas - forthcoming - Filosofia Unisinos:1-15.
    The paper advances the hypothesis that, in Thomas Reid's reading, David Hume's skepticism of the Treatise on Human Nature is not solely due to his acceptance of the ‘ideal hypothesis’ – the principle according to which ideas are the immediate objects of the mental operations –, but it has another source, namely, that doubt on the reliability of the faculties of the senses, memory, and reason. Moreover, the paper argues that the suggested distinction between two roots for Hume’s skepticism allows (...)
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  5. Hume's Skeptical Philosophy and the Moderation of Pride.Charles Goldhaber - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    Hume describes skeptical philosophy as having a variety of desirable effects. It can counteract dogmatism, produce just reasoning, and promote social cohesion. When discussing how skepticism may achieve these effects, Hume typically appeals to its effects on pride. I explain how, for Hume, skeptical philosophy acts on pride and how acting on pride produces the desirable effects. Understanding these mechanisms, I argue, sheds light on how, why, when, and for whom skeptical philosophy can be useful. It also illuminates the value (...)
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  6. Kant's Offer to the Skeptical Empiricist.Charles Goldhaber - forthcoming - Journal of the History of Philosophy.
    There is little consensus about whether Kant intends his Critique of Pure Reason to change the mind of a skeptical empiricist such as Hume. I challenge a common assumption made by both sides of the debate. This is the thought that Kant can convince a skeptic only if he does not beg the question against her. Surprisingly, I argue, that is not how Kant sees things. On Kant’s view, skeptical empiricism is an inherently unstable and unsatisfying position, which skeptics cannot (...)
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  7. Hume entre o academicismo eo pirronismo.Lívia Guimarâes - forthcoming - Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy.
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  8. Hume's argument that empirical knowledge cannot be certain, from the Enquires.Michael H. G. Hoffmann - forthcoming - .
    This argument map reconstructs David Hume's famous skeptical argument in logical form. The argument is open for debate and comments in AGORA-net . Search for map ID 9857.
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  9. Radical Scepticism, Stereotypes and the Practical Stance.Anne Meylan - forthcoming - Brill Studies in Skepticism.
    That we have practical reasons to believe certain propositions even if sceptical arguments are cogent is nothing new. As Hume puts it, if sceptical principles were steadily accepted, “men would remain in a total lethargy until their miserable lives came to an end through lack of food, drink and shelter.” (Enquiry, 12, 2). This heart-breaking projection fails to move contemporary epistemologists who, for the most part, brush off pragmatist stances on scepticism. In this paper, I argue that the pragmatist stance (...)
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  10. Hume’s Constitutivist Response to Scepticism.Taro Okamura - forthcoming - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy.
    In the concluding section of the Book One of the Treatise, Hume confronts radical scepticism about the standards of correct reasoning. According to the naturalistic interpretations, Hume resolves this scepticism by appealing to some psychological facts. A common criticism of this interpretation is that the alleged naturalistic epistemic norm seems to be merely Hume’s report of his psychology, and it remains unclear why this seemingly mere psychological description can provide a principled reason to overcome his scepticism. In this paper, I (...)
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  11. Is Hume a Perspectivalist?Sam Zahn - forthcoming - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy.
    Hume notoriously pursues a constructive science of human nature in the Treatise while raising serious skeptical doubts about that project and leaving them apparently unanswered. On the perspectivalist reading, Hume endorses multiple incommensurable epistemic perspectives in the Treatise. This reading faces two significant objections: that it renders Hume’s epistemology inconsistent (or at least highly incoherent) and that it is ad hoc. In this paper, I propose a perspectivalist account of epistemic justification in the Treatise that addresses, to a significant degree, (...)
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  12. Consciousness, Time, and Scepticism in Hume's Thought.Lorne Falkenstein - 2024 - New York: Routledge.
    David Hume’s philosophical work presents the reader with a perplexing mix of constructive accounts of empirically guided belief and destructive sceptical arguments against all belief. This book reconciles this conflict by showing that Hume intended his scepticism to be remedial. It immunizes us against the influence of “unphilosophical” causes of belief, determining us to proportion our beliefs to the evidence. In making this case, this book develops Humean positions on topics Hume did not discuss in detail but that are of (...)
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  13. Mental Faculties and Powers and the Foundations of Hume’s Philosophy.Karl Schafer - 2024 - In Sebastian Bender & Dominik Perler (eds.), Powers and Abilities in Early Modern Philosophy. Routledge.
    With respect to the topic of “powers and abilities,” most readers will associate David Hume with his multi-pronged critique of traditional attempts to make robust explanatory use of those notions in a philosophical or scientific context. But Hume’s own philosophy is also structured around the attribution to human beings of a variety of basic faculties or mental powers – such as the reason and the imagination, or the various powers involved in Hume’s account of im- pressions of reflection and the (...)
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  14. Que faire du scepticisme?Claire Etchegaray - 2023 - Archives de Philosophie 86 (3):91-112.
    Dans la section XII de l’ Enquête sur l’entendement humain David Hume s’interroge sur le sens et de l’absurdité du scepticisme. Il distingue différentes espèces de scepticisme dont nous examinons, pour chacune d’elles, l’intelligibilité. Celle-ci peut en effet être sémantique, pragmatique ou pratique. Un essai de jeunesse de Hume sur l’idéal chevaleresque, jusqu’ici peu exploité, nous y aide. Nous interprétons alors les deux formes de « scepticisme mitigé » en analysant leurs affections caractéristiques : la modestie intellectuelle et le goût (...)
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  15. The Dissatisfied Skeptic in Kant's Discipline of Pure Reason.Charles Goldhaber - 2023 - Journal of Transcendental Philosophy 4 (2):157-177.
    Why does Kant say that a “skeptical satisfaction of pure reason” is “impossible” (A758/B786)? I answer this question by giving a reading of “The Discipline of Pure Reason in Respect of Its Polemic Employment.” I explain that Kant must address skepticism in this context because his warning against developing counterarguments to dogmatic attacks encourages a comparison between the critical and the skeptical methods. I then argue that skepticism fails to “satisfy” [befriedigen] reason insofar as it cannot “pacify” reason’s tendency to (...)
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  16. Hume and the Demands of Philosophy: Science, Skepticism, and Moderation by Nathan I. Sasser. [REVIEW]Charles Goldhaber - 2023 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 21 (3):313–17.
    Nathan Sasser's ‘purely practical reading of Hume’s response to skepticism’ is so natural and compelling that it is almost surprising that his new monograph, Hume and the Demands of Philosophy, offers its first systematic defence. I praise the book's clarity and concision, and then raise concerns about omitted topics, especially concerning Hume's views on the practical value of sceptical philosophy.
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  17. As Conexões Entre o Ceticismo Acadêmico e o Naturalismo Filosófico No Empirismo Radical de David Hume.Leonardo Delatorre Leite, Gerson Leite de Moraes & Carlos Roberto de Melo Almeida - 2023 - Complexitas – Revista de Filosofia Temática 7 (2).
    O presente artigo apresenta como intuito primordial a promoção de uma análise acerca das relações entre o naturalismo filosófico de Hume e a sua oposição ao ceticismo radical, estabelecendo, nesse sentido, uma vinculação entre as teses naturalistas do autor em questão e a sua argumentação em prol do ceticismo moderado. A dissertação, num primeiro momento, abordará sobre os elementos centrais da chamada “geografia mental”, proposta por David Hume na primeira seção de seu livro Investigação sobre o entendimento Humano. Além disso, (...)
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  18. RESENHA de Peter S. Fosl, Hume’s Scepticism: Pyrrhonian and Academic. Edinburg: Edinburgh University Press, 2020, 378pp. [REVIEW]José Raimundo Maia Neto - 2023 - Analytica. Revista de Filosofia 25 (1):157-161.
    Resenha de Peter S. Fosl, Hume’s Scepticism: Pyrrhonian and Academic. Edinburg: Edinburgh University Press, 2020, 378pp.
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  19. Philosophie et scepticisme de Montaigne à Hume: mélanges en l'honneur de Gianni Paganini.Gianni Paganini, Antony McKenna & Gianluca Mori (eds.) - 2023 - Paris: Honoré Champion éditeur.
  20. La unidad del escepticismo humeano.Plínio Junqueira Smith - 2023 - Ideas Y Valores 72.
    Los intérpretes han dividido la filosofía de Hume, su “lógica”, en dos partes: la destructiva, compuesta por sus análisis filosóficos, su crítica del racionalismo y sus momentos escépticos; la constructiva, que contiene su asociacionismo psicológico, su ciencia empírica de la naturaleza humana y sus momentos naturalistas o realistas. Mi intención es cuestionar cualquier interpretación que suponga esa dicotomía, y mostrar que Hume realiza ambas tareas al mismo tiempo, en etapas sucesivas. Muestro la unidad de su filosofía en tres tópicos: un (...)
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  21. Sextus, Montaigne, Hume: Pyrrhonizers, written by Brian Ribeiro.Lucy Alsip Vollbrecht - 2023 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 14 (1):60-65.
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  22. A Study on Hume’s Title Principle. 이현우 - 2023 - CHUL HAK SA SANG - Journal of Philosophical Ideas 90 (90):3-39.
  23. Skepticism, naturalism, pyrrhonism.Otávio Bueno - 2022 - Philosophical Issues 32 (1):148-163.
    Skepticism and naturalism bear important connections with one another. Do they conflict or are they different sides of the same coin? In this paper, by considering the ways in which Sextus and Hume have examined these issues, I offer a Pyrrhonian response to Penelope Maddy's attempt to reject skepticism within the form of naturalism that she calls “second philosophy” (Maddy, 2007, 2017) and to Timothy Williamson's attempt to avoid skepticism from emerging within his knowledge‐first approach (Williamson, 2000). Some lessons about (...)
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  24. Sextus, Montaigne, Hume: Pyrrhonizers by Brian Ribeiro.Peter S. Fosl - 2022 - Hume Studies 47 (2):319-322.
    Brian Ribeiro’s slim volume presents a comparative study of three of the most important figures in the history of skepticism: Sextus Empiricus, Michel de Montaigne, and David Hume. Ribeiro’s rich text, like most of his work, is written in a colloquial, easy style that nearly masks the considerable erudition informing his thought. This text, in fact, gathers, synthesizes, and expands on the substantial work with which Ribeiro has been engaged for decades. Drawing from that precedent research, Ribeiro’s focus here is (...)
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  25. Hume's Real Riches.Charles Goldhaber - 2022 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 39 (1):45–57.
    Hume describes his own “open, social, and cheerful humour” as “a turn of mind which it is more happy to possess, than to be born to an estate of ten thousand a year.” Why does he value a cheerful character so highly? I argue that, for Hume, cheerfulness has two aspects—one manifests as mirth in social situations, and the other as steadfastness against life’s misfortunes. This second aspect is of special interest to Hume in that it safeguards the other virtues. (...)
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  26. Sextus, Montaigne, Hume: Pyrrhonizers by Brian C. Ribeiro.Jerry Green - 2022 - Review of Metaphysics 76 (1):158-160.
    In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Sextus, Montaigne, Hume: Pyrrhonizers by Brian C. RibeiroJerry GreenRIBEIRO, Brian C. Sextus, Montaigne, Hume: Pyrrhonizers. Leiden: Brill, 2021. ix + 165 pp. Cloth, $145.00; eBook, $149.00As the title suggests, this short, engaging work explores a continuity between three major thinkers in the Western skeptical tradition. The label "Pyrrhonizers" is well chosen: What draws Sextus Empiricus, Montaigne, and Hume together is a set of attitudes about the limits of (...)
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  27. Response to My Critics (The Sydney Sessions).Stefanie Rocknak - 2022 - Hume Studies 45 (1):77-93.
    Response to Don Baxter, Don Garrett and Jennifer Marusic regarding my book Imagined Causes: Hume's Conception of Objects; initially delivered at the 2016 Hume Conference in Sydney, Australia as part of the Author Meets Critics session.
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  28. Hume's Scepticism, Pyrrhonian and Academic by Peter S. Fosl. [REVIEW]Stefanie Rocknak - 2022 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 60 (4):700-701.
    Peter Fosl presents an engaging and historically rich account of Hume's skepticism. For those readers interested in deepening their knowledge and understanding of Pyrrhonian and Academic skepticism, both in regard to their origins and their legacy, I highly recommend it. But I also recommend it for those who would like to better understand Hume's skepticism, although I do think there is some tension in Fosl's reading. Before I discuss this tension, a brief summary of the book is in order. Fosl's (...)
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  29. Hume’s Transformation of Academic Skepticism.Aaron Alexander Zubia - 2022 - Hume Studies 47 (2):171-201.
    Abstract:Hume described himself as an Academic skeptic and aligned himself with the skepticism of Socrates and Cicero. I argue, though, that Hume transformed the meaning of Academic skepticism by associating it with an experimental rather than dialectical method. In this essay, I distinguish between those aspects of Cicero’s Academic skepticism that Hume adopted and those he discarded in his presentation of mitigated skepticism in the first Enquiry. I then consider the implications of Hume’s transformation of Academic skepticism for Hume’s polite (...)
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  30. Hume is the Enemy of Pyrrho.Dominic K. Dimech - 2021 - Philosophy 96 (4):651-674.
    I offer reasons against reading Hume as a Pyrrhonian sceptic. I argue that Hume's scepticism is motivated differently, that his sceptical strategies are not analogous to Pyrrhonism's, and that it is profitable to read Hume as a critic of Pyrrhonism. I hold that the most informative point of comparison between Hume and Sextus Empiricus is a point of difference, namely, their stands on the connection between suspension of judgement (epochê) and tranquillity (ataraxia). For Sextus, tranquillity flows naturally from suspending judgement (...)
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  31. How Kant Thought He Could Reach Hume.Charles Goldhaber - 2021 - In Camilla Serck-Hanssen & Beatrix Himmelmann (eds.), The Court of Reason: Proceedings of the 13th International Kant Congress. De Gruyter. pp. 717–726.
    I argue that Kant thought his Transcendental Deduction of the Pure Concepts could reach skeptical empiricists like Hume by providing an overlooked explanation of the mind's a priori relation to the objects of experience. And he thought empiricists may be motivated to listen to this explanation because of an instability and dissatisfaction inherent to empiricism.
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  32. Synthetic a priori judgments and Kant’s response to Hume on induction.Hsueh Qu - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):7131-7157.
    This paper will make the case that we can find in Kant’s Second Analogy a substantive response to Hume’s argument on induction. This response is substantive insofar as it does not merely consist in independently arguing for the opposite conclusion, but rather, it identifies and exploits a gap in this argument. More specifically, Hume misses the possibility of justifying the uniformity of nature as a synthetic a priori proposition, which Kant looks to establish in the Second Analogy. Note that the (...)
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  33. Hume's 'Two Definitions' of Causation and the Ontology of 'Double Existence' (revised) with an Appendix 2021.Paul Russell - 2021 - In Recasting Hume and early Modern Philosophy: Selected Essays. New York, NY, USA: pp. 3-31.
    This essay provides an interpretation of Hume’s “two definitions” of causation. It argues that the two definitions of causation must be interpreted in terms of Hume’s fundamental ontological distinction between perceptions and (material) objects. Central to Hume’s position on this subject is the claim that, while there is a natural tendency to suppose that there exist (metaphysical) causal powers in objects themselves, this is a product of our failure to distinguish perceptions and objects. Properly understood, our idea of causation involves (...)
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  34. Hume's skepticism and the problem of atheism.Paul Russell - 2021 - In Recasting Hume and Early Modern Philosophy. New York, NY, USA: pp. 303-339.
    David Hume was clearly a critic of religion. It is still debated, however, whether or not he was an atheist who denied the existence of God. According to some interpretations he was a theist of some kind and others claim he was an agnostic who simply suspends any belief on this issue. This essay argues that Hume’s theory of belief tells against any theistic interpretation – including the weaker, “attenuated” accounts. It then turns to the case for the view that (...)
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  35. The Beach of Skepticism: Kant and Hume on the Practice of Philosophy and the Proper Bounds of Skepticism.Karl Schafer - 2021 - In Peter Thiekle (ed.), Cambridge Critical Guide to Kant’s Prolegomena. Cambridge. pp. 111-132.
    The focus of this chapter will be Kant’s understanding of Hume, and its impact on Kant’s critical philosophy. Contrary to the traditional reading of this relationship, which focuses on Kant’s (admittedly real) dissatisfaction with Hume’s account of causation, my discussion will focus on broader issues of philosophical methodology. Following a number of recent interpreters, I will argue that Kant sees Hume as raising, in a particularly forceful fashion, a ‘demarcation challenge’ concerning how to distinguish the legitimate use of reason in (...)
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  36. Peter S. Fosl, Hume's Scepticism: Pyrrhonian and Academic. [REVIEW]Miriam Schleifer McCormick - 2021 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 19 (3):280-285.
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  37. Induction Ain’t What It Used to Be: Skepticism About the Future of Induction.Mark Walker & Milan Ćirković - 2021 - Journal of Ethics and Emerging Technologies 30 (1):11-28.
    We argue that, in all probability, the universe will become less predictable. This assertion means that induction, which some scientists conceive of as a tool for predicting the future, will become less useful. Our argument claims that the universe will increasingly come under intentional control, and objects that are under intentional control are typically less predictable than those that are not. We contrast this form of skepticism about induction, "Skeptical-Dogmatism," with David Hume's Pyrrhonian skepticism about induction.
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  38. Revisionism Gone Awry: Since When Hasn't Hume Been a Sceptic?Adam Andreotta & Michael Levine - 2020 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 18 (2):133-155.
    In this paper, we argue that revisionary theories about the nature and extent of Hume's scepticism are mistaken. We claim that the source of Hume's pervasive scepticism is his empiricism. As earlier readings of Hume's Treatise claim, Hume was a sceptic – and a radical one. Our position faces one enormous problem. How is it possible to square Hume's claims about normative reasoning with his radical scepticism? Despite the fact that Hume thinks that causal reasoning is irrational, he explicitly claims (...)
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  39. The Humors in Hume's Skepticism.Charles Goldhaber - 2020 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 7:789–824.
    In the conclusion to the first book of the Treatise, Hume's skeptical reflections have plunged him into melancholy. He then proceeds through a complex series of stages, resulting in renewed interest in philosophy. Interpreters have struggled to explain the connection between the stages. I argue that Hume's repeated invocation of the four humors of ancient and medieval medicine explains the succession, and sheds a new light on the significance of skepticism. The humoral context not only reveals that Hume conceives of (...)
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  40. Hume's Scepticism: Pyrrhonian and Academic by Peter S. Fosl. [REVIEW]Charles Goldhaber - 2020 - Hume Studies 46 (1):171-174.
    Peter Fosl's new monograph offers a bold reading of Hume as a "radical," "coherent," and "hybrid" skeptic, who draws influence from both the Pyrrhonian and Academic skeptical traditions. I press some concerns about whether Fosl's reading of Hume can accommodate his scientific ambitions.
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  41. Sullo scetticismo di Hume.Antonio Pizzuto - 2020 - Palermo: Palermo University Press. Edited by Antonio Pane.
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  42. Hume's Skeptical Definitions of "Cause".David Storrs-Fox - 2020 - Hume Studies 43 (1):3-28.
    The relation between Hume’s constructive and skeptical aims has been a central concern for Hume interpreters. Hume’s two definitions of ‘cause’ in the Treatise and first Enquiry apparently represent an important constructive achievement, but this paper argues that the definitions must be understood in terms of Hume’s skepticism. The puzzle I address is simply that Hume gives two definitions rather than one. I use Don Garrett’s interpretation as a foil to develop my alternative skeptical interpretation. Garrett claims the definitions exhibit (...)
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  43. Précis of Hume's True Scepticism.Donald C. Ainslie - 2019 - Hume Studies 45 (1):95-99.
    In Hume's True Scepticism, I offer a new interpretation of David Hume's epistemology and philosophy of mind as presented in A Treatise of Human Nature.1 I approach this task by developing what I take to be the first comprehensive2 investigation of Part 4 of Book 1. The arguments Hume offers there have frequently been addressed by the secondary literature in a piecemeal fashion, especially his account of personal identity and of our belief in the external world. But I argue in (...)
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  44. Comments on Ainslie's Hume's True Scepticism.Annemarie Butler - 2019 - Hume Studies 45 (1):101-108.
    Donald C. Ainslie's Hume's True Scepticism is a wonderful book—clearly written and forcefully argued—and was deservedly honored with Journal of the History of Philosophy's Book Prize for 2016. The focus of the book is part four of the first Book of Hume's Treatise, "Of the sceptical and other systems of philosophy." Ainslie develops an interpretation that takes seriously Hume's psychological claims, using them to solve puzzles in Hume scholarship, including the extent of Hume's scepticism, the nature of his sceptical crisis, (...)
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  45. Bredo Johnsen. Righting Epistemology: Hume’s Revolution. [REVIEW]Matt Carlson - 2019 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 7 (5):32-38.
  46. Perceptions, Minds, and Hume's Self-doubts: Comments on Ainslie's Hume's True Scepticism.Jonathan Cottrell - 2019 - Hume Studies 45 (1):109-119.
    In Hume's True Scepticism, Donald C. Ainslie offers a highly original, systematic interpretation of Treatise Book 1, part 4, and of much else in the Treatise besides. Along the way, he provides new solutions to two of the main outstanding problems of Hume scholarship: what is the relationship between Hume's skepticism and his commitment to pursuing a naturalistic science of man? And what "very considerable mistake" about personal identity does Hume mean to report in the Appendix? These are fantastic achievements. (...)
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  47. Quasi-Realism and Inductive Scepticism in Hume’s Theory of Causation.Dominic K. Dimech - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (4):637-650.
    Interpreters of Hume on causation consider that an advantage of the ‘quasi-realist’ reading is that it does not commit him to scepticism or to an error theory about causal reasoning. It is unique to quasi-realism that it maintains this positive epistemic result together with a rejection of metaphysical realism about causation: the quasi-realist supplies an appropriate semantic theory in order to justify the practice of talking ‘as if’ there were causal powers in the world. In this paper, I problematise the (...)
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  48. Ideas, Evidence, and Method: Hume’s Skepticism and Naturalism concerning Knowledge and Causation, written by Graciela De Pierris.Peter S. Fosl - 2019 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 9 (4):345-356.
  49. How to solve Hume's problem of induction.Alexander Jackson - 2019 - Episteme 16 (2):157-174.
    This paper explains what’s wrong with a Hume-inspired argument for skepticism about induction. Hume’s argument takes as a premise that inductive reasoning presupposes that the future will resemble the past. I explain why that claim is not plausible. The most plausible premise in the vicinity is that inductive reasoning from E to H presupposes that if E then H. I formulate and then refute a skeptical argument based on that premise. Central to my response is a psychological explanation for how (...)
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  50. Popper and Hume: Two Great Skeptics.Zuzana Parusniková - 2019 - In Raphael Sassower & Nathaniel Laor (eds.), The Impact of Critical Rationalism: Expanding the Popperian Legacy Through the Works of Ian C. Jarvie. Springer Verlag. pp. 207-223.
    Karl Popper explicitly discusses two problems in David Hume’s epistemology. He praises Hume for his critique of induction, specifically for his claim that inductive inferences are logically invalid. He rejects Hume’s psychological account of induction, specifically his theory of belief formation by repetition. Thus, Popper famously concludes that Hume buried the logical gems in the psychological mud and endorsed an irrationalist epistemology. The logical problem of induction gives Popper the impetus for spelling out his new, negative concept of reason, one (...)
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