17th/18th Century British Philosophy, Misc

Draft for Wolfe and Symons (ed.), History and Philosophy of Materialism. This chapter looks at the discussion of materialism in John Locke’s Essay concerning Human Understanding, and then at parts of the Anglophone reaction to those discussions. It considers the early criticisms of Locke by Edward Stillingfleet and the anonymous author of three sets of Remarks on Locke’s Essay. It then looks at some other ways in which readers reacted to Locke’s discussions: the views of Anthony Collins and John Toland, (...) which one might be tempted to think of as Lockean materialism; William Carroll’s reading of Locke as a Spinozistic materialist; and the dualistic Lockeanism of William Duncan’s Lockean logic textbook. (shrink)

Mary Shepherd and the Causal Relation - Part One -/- Part One gives context to the life and work of Lady Mary Shepherd. It weaves together the stories of her ancestors, her own stories and the wider social, historical and philosophical context. The aim is to evoke a world from which to mark the emergence of Mary Shepherd, Scotland’s first female philosopher.

Une présentation de la monographie de 1674 de Hooke présentant l'idée de la gravitation universelle est apparue dans Philosophical Transactions de 1674, et puis plusieurs lettres contenant des observations, dont celle de Huygens. Mais évidemment, après la publication du Principia en 1687, la priorité de Hooke dans la proposition de la gravitation universelle a été oubliée. Après avoir entendu parler de la demande de Hooke de reconnaître sa priorité, Newton a supprimé les nombreuses références à Hooke dans Principia. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.27734.40009.

Dans sa correspondance avec Richard Bentley, Newton a rejeté la possibilité d'une action à distance, bien qu'il l'ait acceptée en Principia. L’environnement introduit par Newton à la question 21 d'Opticks se compose d’une part de corps matériels extrêmement petits, séparés dans l’espace, et d’un principe actif non mécanique produisant et médiatisant les forces de répulsion entre ces corps. À la question 28, il a clairement fait valoir qu'un environnement mécanique devrait être rejeté. L'éther traverse les corps, il est donc sans (...) importance. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.23101.41446. (shrink)

In Newton’s correspondence with Richard Bentley, Newton rejected the possibility of remote action, even though he accepted it in the Principia. Practically, Newton’s natural philosophy is indissolubly linked to his conception of God. The knowledge of God seems to be essentially immutable, unlike the laws of nature that can be subjected to refining, revision and rejection procedures. As Newton later states in Opticks, the cause of gravity is an active principle in matter, but this active principle is not an essential (...) aspect of matter, but something that must have been added to matter by God, arguing in the same Query of Opticks even the need for divine intervention. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.16732.44162 . (shrink)

Dans une note intitulée « Un état vrai de l'affaire et la controverse entre Sr Isaak Newton et le Dr Robert Hooke comme priorité de cette noble hypothèse du mouvement des planètes autour du Soleil en tant que leurs centres » non publié au cours de sa vie, Hooke a décrit sa théorie de la gravité. Pour soutenir sa « priorité », Hooke cite ses conférences sur les mouvements planétaires du 23 mai 1666, « Une tentative de prouver le mouvement (...) de la Terre à partir d'observations » publiées en 1674 et la correspondance avec Isaac Newton en 1679. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.26375.24485. (shrink)

Una din cele mai disputate controverse privind prioritatea unor descoperiri științifice este cea privind legea gravitației universale, între Isaac Newton și Robert Hooke. În acest eseu extind o lucrare mai veche pe aceeași temă, ”Isaac Newton vs. Robert Hooke în legea gravitației universale”. Hooke l-a acuzat pe Newton de plagiat, preluându-i ideile exprimate în lucrările anterioare. În această lucrare încerc să arăt, pe baza unor analize anterioare, că ambii oameni de știință au greșit: Robert Hooke pentru că teoria sa nu (...) era în fond decât idei care nu s-ar fi materializat niciodată fără suportul matematic al lui Isaac Newton; iar acesta din urmă a greșit nerecunoscând niciun merit al lui Hooke în elaborarea teoriei gravitației. Mai mult, după moartea lui Hooke și preluarea prezidenției Societății Regale, Newton a înlăturat orice urmă din instituție a fostului președinte, Robert Hooke. De asemenea, La negarea contribuției lui Hooke a contribuit și statutul său social ”inferior”, fiind poreclit de contemporani ”mecanicul”, spre deosebire de Sir Isaac Newton cel nobil. Pentru aceasta detaliez acuzațiile și argumentele fiecăreia dintre părți, și cum a fost percepută această dispută de către contemporanii celor doi. Finalizez lucrarea cu concluziile desprinse din cuprins. (shrink)

A presentation of Hooke’s 1674 monograph introducing the idea of universal gravity was included in the Philosophical Transactions (Royal Society 1775) and subsequently several letters containing observations, including one of Huygens. But obviously, after the publication of Principia in 1687, Hooke’s priority in proposing universal gravitation was forgotten. Hooke, considered as a “mechanical genius” rather than a scientist, was often at a social disadvantage to Newton, the noble theorist, or Huygens. Hooke’s inferior social status did not allow him to identify (...) with “free and unconfin’d” gentlemen such as Boyle, for example. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.13746.45763. (shrink)

Based on Galileo's experiments, Newton develops the theory of gravity in his first book Philosophiæ Naturalis Principia Mathematica ("Principia") of 1686. Immediately after, Robert Hooke accused Newton of plagiarism, claiming that he unduly assumed his "notion" of "the rule of the decrease of Gravity, being reciprocally as the squares of the distances from the Center". But, according to Edmond Halley, Hooke agreed that "the demonstration of the curves generated by it" belongs entirely to Newton.

One of the most disputed controversy over the priority of scientific discoveries is that of the law of universal gravitation, between Isaac Newton and Robert Hooke. Hooke accused Newton of plagiarism, of taking over his ideas expressed in previous works. In this paper I try to show, on the basis of previous analysis, that both scientists were wrong: Robert Hooke because his theory was basically only ideas that would never have materialized without Isaac Newton's mathematical support; and the latter was (...) wrong by not recognizing Hooke's ideas in drawing up the theory of gravity. Moreover, after Hooke's death and taking over the Royal Society presidency, Newton removed from the institution any trace of the former president Robert Hooke. For this, I detail the accusations and arguments of each of the parts, and how this dispute was perceived by the contemporaries of the two scientists. I finish the paper with the conclusions drawn from the contents. -/- Keywords: Isaac Newton, Robert Hooke, law of gravity, priority, plagiarism -/- CONTENTS -/- Abstract Introduction Robert Hooke's contribution to the law of universal gravitation Isaac Newton's contribution to the law of universal gravitation Robert Hooke's claim of his priority on the law of universal gravitation Newton's defense The controversy in the opinion of other contemporary scientists What the supporters of Isaac Newton say What the supporters of Robert Hooke say Conclusions Bibliography -/- DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.19370.26567 . (shrink)

L'une des controverses les disputées sur la priorité des découvertes scientifiques est celle de la loi de la gravitation universelle, entre Isaac Newton et Robert Hooke. Hooke a accusé Newton de plagiat, de reprendre ses idées exprimées dans des travaux antérieurs. J'essaie de montrer, sur la base d'une analyse précédente, que tous les deux scientifiques avaient tort: Robert Hooke parce que sa théorie n'était fondamentalement que des idées qui ne se seraient jamais matérialisées sans l'appui mathématique d'Isaac Newton; et ce (...) dernier avait tort de ne pas reconnaître les idées de Hooke dans l'élaboration de la théorie de la gravité. En outre, après la mort de Hooke et son accession à la présidence de la Royal Society, Newton a retiré de l'institution toute trace de l'ancien président Robert Hooke. Pour cela, je détaille les accusations et les arguments de chacune des parties, et comment ce différend a été perçu par les contemporains des deux scientifiques. Je termine le papier avec les conclusions tirées du contenu. -/- TABLE: -/- Abstract Introduction La contribution de Robert Hooke à la loi de la gravitation universelle La contribution d'Isaac Newton à la loi de la gravitation universelle La revendication de priorité de Robert Hooke sur la loi de la gravitation universelle La défense de Newton La controverse dans l'opinion des scientifiques contemporains Ce que disent les supporters d'Isaac Newton Ce que disent les supporters de Robert Hooke Conclusions Bibliographie Notes -/- DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.20313.06245. (shrink)

Paper presented to the Twenty-seventh Hume Society Conference, 26 July 2000, Williamsburg, Virginia. -/- At the time I thought there was a stronger link between Maclaurin and Hume, but in discussions at and after the meeting, decided Hume was not taking his mechanics out of Maclaurin’s Account. Although I still have found Maclaurin useful in interpreting Hume -- see Sapadin 1997 for a discussion of popular Newtonianism in Hume's day -- I suspect my draft suffers somewhat from ambivalence. There are (...) still similarities, and possible avenues of influence, arguing that Hume was not ignorant of the new mechanics, but it also becomes clear that he did not understand it: although he adopts the Newtonian measure of force, he misapplies it. (shrink)

1: T. C. SMOUT: Introduction 2: JENNY WORMALD: O Brave New World? The Union of England and Scotland in 1603 3: KEITH BROWN: A Blessed Union? Anglo-Scottish Relations before the Covenant 4: JOHN MORRILL: The English, the Scots, and the Dilemmas of Union, 1638-1654 5: CLARE JACKSON: Judicial Torture, the Liberties of the Subject, and Anglo-Scottish Relations, 1660-1690 6: CHRISTOPHER A. WHATLEY: Taking Stock: Scotland at the End of the Seventeenth Century 7: JOHN FORD: The Law of the Sea and (...) the Two Unions 8: PAUL LANGFORD: South Britons' Reception of North Britons, 1707-1820 9: COLIN KIDD: Eighteenth-Century Scotland and the Three Unions 10: BOB HARRIS: Scottish-English Connections in British Radicalism in the 1790s 11: T. M. DEVINE: Scottish Élites and the Indian Empire, 1700-1815 12: ROSEMARY ASHTON: Anglo-Scottish Relations: the Carlyles in London 13: I. G. C. HUTCHISON: Anglo-Scottish Political Relations in the Nineteenth Century, c.1815-1914. (shrink)

The reception of Newton's Principia in 1687 led to the attempt of many European scholars to ‘mathematicise' their field of expertise. An important example of this ‘mathematicisation' lies in the work of Irish-Scottish philosopher Francis Hutcheson, a key figure in the Scottish Enlightenment. This essay aims to discuss the mathematical aspects of Hutcheson's work and its impact on British thought in the following centuries, providing a case in point for the importance of the interactions between mathematics and philosophy throughout time.

This paper explores Locke’s thinking specifically about syllogisms and more generally about logic and proper logical method. Locke’s texts display a mixed attitude toward syllogisms. On the one hand, he was highly critical of syllogisms and their central role in Scholastic disputation. On the other hand, he sometimes allowed that syllogisms could effectively capture valid forms of inference and could be useful in certain contexts. This paper seeks to explain Locke’s mixed attitude by showing that he believed syllogisms were useful (...) in the context of explanation but not in the context of discovery. Syllogisms could help to formalize and evaluate arguments already constructed using informal psychologistic methods, but they would not help to generate new arguments or to make new discoveries. The second part of the paper examines substantial changes to the fourth edition of the Essay in which Locke expands his critical remarks on syllogisms and related topics. Evidence is presented that strongly suggests Locke made these changes to the Essay in response to works published by John Sergeant. This discovery is important because it indicates Locke’s willingness to consider the views of his adversaries and reformulate his own views accordingly. (shrink)

This paper provides the first systematic interpretation of the moral theory developed in Newcome’s Enquiry Into the Evidence of the Christian Religion (1728, revised 1732). More importantly, it shows that Newcome’s views constitute a valuable but overlooked contribution to the development of utilitarianism. Indeed, she is arguably the first utilitarian. Her ethical views are considered in two stages. The paper first explores her hedonist approach to the good and then turns to her consequentialist account of right action. The paper then (...) situates Newcome’s work within the context of the pre-Bentham utilitarian movement. Strikingly, Newcome lived and worked in close proximity to other prominent early utilitarians and was well-positioned to have exerted an influence on the development of their views. Newcome has never been discussed in connection with the history of ethics. This paper constitutes an argument for her inclusion in our narratives about the development of a major moral theory. (shrink)

Summary of contribution to history of ideas in Scotland in context of debates on self-determination.

It is common wisdom in intellectual history that eighteenth-century science of man evolved under the aegis of Newton. It is also frequently suggested that David Hume, one of the most influential practitioners of this kind of inquiry, aspired to be the Newton of the moral sciences. Usually this goes hand in hand with a more or less explicit reading of Hume’s theory of human nature as written in an idiom of particulate inert matter and active forces acting on it, i.e. (...) essentially that of Newton’s Principia. Hume’s outlook on the mental world is thus frequently described in terms of conceptual atoms whose association is compared to interparticulate attractions analogous with Newtonian forces in general, and gravity in particular. In the present paper I argue that Hume’s theory can indeed be understood in Newton’s wake, but not in the context of the Principa’s reception but that of the Opticks, which exerted a more significant influence on natural inquiry in eighteenth-century Scotland. I intend to show that Hume speaks a language and represents an outlook on human matters convergent with “philosophical chemistry” in Scotland at that time, and particularly to his later friend and physician William Cullen. (shrink)

We look at some interesting and important episodes in the life of early modern Epicureanism, focusing on natural philosophy. We begin with two early moderns who had a great deal to say about ancient Epicureanism: Pierre Gassendi and Ralph Cudworth. Looking at how Gassendi and Cudworth conceived of Epicureanism gives us a sense of what the early moderns considered important in the ancient tradition. It also points us towards three main themes of early modern Epicureanism in natural philosophy, which we (...) then discuss at greater length: atomism, materialism about the mind or soul, and the denial of providence, which was often accompanied by deflationary explanations of religious belief. (shrink)

For the large public, the only enduring legacy of Dugald Stewart (1753–1828) is the choragic monument on Calton Hill commissioned by the Royal Society of Edinburgh soon after his death, in 1828, an...

In this chapter, I explore this complex and somewhat neglected tradition of the early modern common notion. I focus on three thinkers, two of them innatist in some sense, one of them not; all (mostly) products of the English context; all arguably part of the background for Locke’s critique of common notions and innate ideas in the first book of the Essay; and all related to each other in various and complicated ways. They are: Edward Herbert of Cherbury (1582–1648), Kenelm (...) Digby (1603–1665), and Nathaniel Culverwell (1619–1651). I show how they deployed three different theories of common notions that we can describe, respectively, as gnoseological, rhetorical, and allegorical. (shrink)

In this chapter, I explore the complex and neglected tradition of the early modern common notion. I focus on three thinkers, two of them innatist in some sense, one of them not; all (mostly) products of the English context; all arguably part of the background for Locke’s critique of common notions and innate ideas in the first book of the Essay; and all related to each other in various and complicated ways. They are: Edward Herbert of Cherbury (1582–1648), Kenelm Digby (...) (1603–1665), and Nathaniel Culverwell (1619–1651). I show how they deployed three different theories of common notions that we can describe, respectively, as gnoseological, rhetorical, and allegorical. (shrink)

So wohl Campbell als auch Whately sind sehr besorgt um die verschiedenen argumentations Formen zu analisieren, aber nicht in seiner abstrecten Vielfalt, sondern den verschiedenen Ableihungen des gebrauches oder der gegenwärtigen argumentations absicht im Entwurf jedes Arguments. In seiner Analyse haben sie beobachtet, dass die etische Begründung bemerkensmert verschieden als die Wissenschafliche. Beide Verfasser sind damit einverstanden dass es einen grossen Unterschied gibt zwischen: der existenten Prämisse in der Wissenchaftlichen Probe, und zweitens, die Form in der die Prämissen im induktiven (...) (oder moralen) Begründung verbunden sind, wiel in diesen letzten verschaffen die Prämissen getrennter Wiese eine Kosistenz auf dem Abschluss, aber sie müsen zusammen bleiben damit der Abschluss beweisbarer ist. Dieser Unterschied zwischen den art die Wharheit oder probabilität zwischen Wissenschaft und Humanität zu erzeugen, ist eines der grossen Themen der Philosophie aber das hermeneutische Paradigma zweifalt über die wissenschaftliche Folgerung, sind die Prämissen nicht doch der gleichen art vorgestellt, wer weiss, mit einer gewiss logischen Interdependenz zwischen inhnen und eine extralogische argumentative last die sie verbindet dem Anlass die Schlussfolgenung konsistente zu machen. (shrink)

Si l'on s'accorde à voir dans l'ouvrage du clergyman mélancolique Robert Burton paru en 1621 une sorte d'aboutissement et de consécration de la mode mélancolique, l'on a toutefois tendance à négliger le fait que l'anatomiste utilise le discours médical et la tradition mélancolique pour attirer l'attention de ses contemporains sur l'existence d'un désordre qui se manifeste, au niveau de la collectivité, par une crise religieuse, politique, sociale et économique. C'est sous le patronage de l'un des premiers représentants du courant mercantiliste (...) que Burton se place pour justifier l'emploi de la notion de « mélancolie politique » : celui de Giovanni Botero. La lecture de la « Préface » de L'Anatomie de la Mélancolie permet de constater l'existence d'une forte convergence entre les méthodes et les analyses des premiers mercantilistes anglais et le diagnostic de Robert Burton sur la crise économique que traverse l'Angleterre de Jacques Ier. Comment expliquer alors la coexistence dans le même texte de ce discours économique qui propose des réformes concrètes pour remédier à une situation de crise et d'un discours utopique qui préconise une forme autoritaire et disciplinaire de pouvoir comme remède à la mélancolie politique tout en affirmant le caractère chimérique et irréalisable de tout changement radical ? The Anatomy of Melancholy (1621), written by the melancholic clergyman Robert Burton, is considered as a climax of the melancholic fashion. Nevertheless it is rarely underlined that Burton has recourse to the medical discourse and the melancholic tradition to draw his contemporaries's attention to a collective disorder which reveals itself in a religious, political, social and economical crisis. Robert Burton uses the authority of one of the first names associated to the mercantilist movement -Giovanni Botero -to justify his use of the notion of a « political melancholy ». Reading the « Preface » of The Anatomy of Melancholy, one notices a strong convergence between the first English mercantilists's methods and analyses and Burton's diagnosis on the economic crisis which marks the reign of James the first. Thus is raised the question of a possible coexistence in the same text of the economic discourse, which suggests concrete reforms to face a crisis, with a utopian discourse which recommends an authoritative and disciplinary power as a remedy against political melancholy while asserting at the same time that any radical change is fanciful and impracticable. (shrink)

In 1705, Mary Astell and Damaris Masham both published works advocating for women's use of individual judgment in matters of religion. Although both philosophers advocate for women's education and intellectual autonomy, and both are adherents of the Church of England, they differ dramatically in their attitudes to religious authority. These differences are rooted in a deeper disagreement about the nature of epistemic authority in general. Astell defends an interpersonal model of epistemic authority on which we properly trust testimony when the (...) testifier is answerable for its truth. Masham holds an evidence model of epistemic authority on which testimony is treated as an ordinary piece of empirical evidence. Central to Masham's argument is her contention that religious beliefs based on the kind of authority recognized by Astell could never serve as a stable source of moral motivation. Because of their different theories of epistemic authority, Masham's defense of women's intellectual autonomy leads to a radical anti-clericalism, while Astell's defense is fully consistent with her insistence on deference to the established church. (shrink)

Contemporary discussions of the epistemology of testimony are often framed in terms of the disagreement on this topic between Hume and Reid. However, it is widely assumed that, prior to Hume, philosophers in the grip of Enlightenment individualism neglected philosophical questions about testimony, simply treating testimony as ordinary empirical evidence. In fact, although the evidential model of testimony was popular in early modern philosophy, it was also the subject of vigorous debate. This chapter examines Locke's defence of the evidential model (...) of testimony along with the opposing views of three early critics of Locke: G. W. Leibniz, Mary Astell, and Peter Browne. (shrink)

In her last known piece of work Lady Mary Shepherd’s Metaphysics (1832), Mary Shepherd writes that “mind, may inhere in definite portions of matter […] or of infinite space” (LMSM 699). Shepherd thus suggests that a mind – a “capacity for sensation in general” (e.g., EPEU 16) – may have a spatial location. This is prima facie surprising given that she is committed to the view that the mind is unextended. In this paper, we argue that Shepherd can consistently honor (...) both of these commitments. We argue, first, that even though finite minds, due to their unextendedness cannot, to use Shepherd’s term, ‘occupy’ space as material bodies do, such minds can nonetheless be said to have a spatial location in virtue of what we call their presence, or what Shepherd calls ‘inherence’, in a material body. Second, we argue that, in a similar way, the divine mind is present throughout the whole of space and is thus omnipresent. We then argue that, in contrast to finite minds, the divine mind does not require a body to be present in space. Rather, we contend, God’s omnipresence might be best understood in a ‘holenmerist’ sense, where the divine mind is wholly present in every part of creation. (shrink)

Mary Shepherd (1777–1847) was a fierce and brilliant critic of Berkeley and Hume, who moreover offered strikingly original positive views about the nature of reality and our access to it which deserve much more attention (and credit, since she anticipates many prominent views) than they have received thus far. By way of illustration, I focus on Shepherd's 1824 Essay Upon the Relation of Cause and Effect, Controverting the Doctrine of Mr. Hume, Concerning the Nature of that Relation (ERCE). After a (...) brief setup, I canvas certain of her trenchant objections to Hume’s argumentation; I then present the positive core of her response to Hume, which consists in providing novel accounts of how reason alone or reason coupled with experience can justify, first, that every effect must have a cause, and second, that it is necessary that like causes produce like effects. Among other contributions here, Shepherd provides a distinctively metaphysical argument for the claim that nothing can begin to exist 'of itself' (going beyond an appeal to the Principle of Sufficient Reason, in particular), and leverages difference-making considerations to make the case that a single 'experimentum crucis' can justify causal belief (anticipating Mill's 'method of difference'). I close by highlighting salient features of Shepherd's metaphysics of causation, whereby causation is singularist and local (anticipating Ducasse and Anscombe) and involves synchronic interactions (anticipating Mill's and certain contemporary accounts), and according to which objects are essentially characterized by their causes and effects (anticipating contemporary causal or dispositional essentialist positions). (shrink)

Despite being much less famous, Price's 'A Review of the Principal Questions in Morals' can stand up to comparison with the greatest classics of eighteenthth-century Anglo-Saxon ethics, such as Hume's 'Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals' or Adam Smith's 'Theory of Moral Sentiments'.

Il deismo unisce all’attestazione di una “religione naturale” e alla difesa della tolleranza religiosa la critica all’autorità ecclesiastica e il rifiuto di ogni rivelazione divina, secondo un orientamento metodologico di chiara matrice lockiana. Tutti aspetti rinvenibili in questo libro in cui sono tradotti per la prima volta in italiano due pamphlet di Anthony Collins, seguiti in Appendice dalle lettere che John Locke gli scrisse a testimonianza della profonda amicizia tra i due. Il primo, Difesa degli attributi divini, tratta il problema (...) del male proponendo un’etica deista contrapposta alle soluzioni oscure e contraddittorie degli uomini di Chiesa. Il secondo, Il perfetto inganno del clericalismo, colpisce la tradizione in genere, ricostruendo la presunta contraffazione di una clausola dei Trentanove Articoli di religione – le basi dottrinali della confessione anglicana. Si delinea la possibilità di ricostruire sulla base della ragione una teologia laica e una vera religione. (shrink)

This paper affirms the central role of religion in Adam Ferguson's practical thought by offering a new reading of his view on the interrelations between true religion, science, moral progress, and immortality. Fergusonian true religion, it is shown, originates in the understanding of wise, benevolent Providence which the physical and moral sciences offer when they become comprehensive. This understanding, in turn, grounds a neo-Stoic religious ethic. Having true religion then means: knowing the providential order, and virtuously acting upon a proper (...) understanding of one's place, potential, and limits in this order. For Ferguson, it is argued, it is each individual's own responsibility to morally progress on the basis of true religion. The paper thus opposes interpretations of Ferguson's view of moral progress as the irreversible result of the species’ ever-increasing insight in the details of nature as a providential order. Human societies can only offer a fertile backdrop that enables individuals to live rationally and virtuously. The highest possible degree of human moral-religious progress is to be realized in the afterlife – if the individual has lived sufficiently virtuously on earth so as to merit entrance to the afterlife's progressive scene. Nevertheless, Ferguson's focus remains firmly on religion's value for this life. (shrink)

This essay traces the development of the philosophical debates concerning active powers and human agency in eighteenth-century Scotland. I examine how and why Scottish philosophers such as Francis Hutcheson, George Turnbull, David Hume, and Henry Home, Lord Kames, depart from John Locke’s and other traditional conceptions of the will and how Thomas Reid and Dugald Stewart reinstate Locke’s distinction between volition and desire. Moreover, I examine what role desires, passions, and motives play in the writings of these and other Scottish (...) Enlightenment philosophers on human agency and draw attention to their underlying disputes concerning liberty and necessity. I end by reflecting on how classifications of principles of actions changed in eighteenth and early nineteenth-century Scottish philosophy. (shrink)

As a leading judge of seventeenth century Scotland, Viscount Stair (1619−1695) was a significant public figure in the immediate period before the Scottish Enlightenment. Indeed, he offers a vital but often overlooked insight into the intellectual life of Scotland during his lifetime. However, as Stair never published anything specifically on moral philosophy, this article asks if it is possible to reconstruct a moral theory on his behalf based on his printed legal and theological works. On the assumption that this is (...) feasible, this article examines how Stair’s moral theory relates to the Scottish variant of natural jurisprudence. In response to these questions, the analysis offered here argues that one can constructure answers to central questions of moral philosophy from Stair’s printed works, and further that it is possible to classify his moral theory as an early example of Scottish natural jurisprudence. Although there are acknowledged challenges in reconstructing his moral theory, it is suggested by the argument below that, to fully grasp the intellectual life of seventeenth century Scotland, we may need to engage more deeply with the theological works of seventeenth century Scots as well as adopt resourceful methods to build a picture of seventeenth century ideas relating to morality. (shrink)

In 1704, Mary Astell, known by many scholars as the “first English feminist,” published Moderation Truly Stated, her contribution to the national debate over “occasional conformity.” This was the practice of periodic participation in the sacraments of the Church of England—above all, taking communion—in order to become eligible for public office. This practice was defended as an exercise of the virtue of “moderation,” viewed as the opposite of zeal and associated with politeness and reasonableness. In this article I recover Astell’s (...) critique on this new notion of moderation, as well as her own alternative conception of the virtue of moderation as scripture moderation, which she envisioned as zeal and indifference towards the right ends. My aim is threefold. First, to explore the dangers of conceiving of moderation as an “antidote to zeal,” which Astell argued would be detrimental to truth, salvation, and moral progress. Second, to demonstrate that her own conception of moderation as zeal and indifference towards the right ends was a radical subversion of the discourse on moderation at the time. Third, to shed light on the role of the Occasional Conformity debate in the transformation of moderation from a Christian virtue of temperance and control into a “modern” virtue construed as politeness and opposed to zeal, which was to become dominant in eighteenth-century England. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Scottish Philosophy after the Enlightenment by Gordon GrahamDeborah BoyleGRAHAM, Gordon. Scottish Philosophy after the Enlightenment. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2022. xvii + 254 pp. Cloth, $110.00Histories of Scottish philosophy typically focus on the school of "common sense" from the eighteenth century, beginning with Francis Hutcheson and ending with Dugald Stewart. As Gordon Graham notes in the preface to this volume, nineteenth-century Scottish philosophy is "an area of the (...) history of philosophy that has generally gone almost entirely unexplored." His collection of eleven standalone essays (only one of which has been previously published) argues that something recognizable as "Scottish philosophy" continued into the nineteenth century—although Graham thinks it ended, then, too—and suggests conceptions of Scottish philosophy that go beyond the old trope of "common sense."Unusually for a work in the history of philosophy, the first chapter is autobiographical. Graham recalls that as an undergraduate studying moral philosophy at St. Andrews in 1968, the only Scottish philosopher he was assigned to read was Hume, whose work was taught in the ahistorical manner that dominated philosophy at that time, and that upon his appointment to the Regius Chair of Moral Philosophy at Aberdeen in 1995 he found little appreciation for the university's most famous former professor, Thomas Reid. Thus began Graham's establishment of the Reid Project at the University of Aberdeen (later the Centre for the Study of Scottish Philosophy and now the Institute for the Study of Scottish Philosophy), the founding of the Journal of Scottish Philosophy, and his editorship of several book series on Scottish philosophy. The story of Graham's scholarship over the years is really the story of the recovery of the history of Scottish philosophy after its near-total neglect in the twentieth century.Graham seems wary of the contextualist turn that historians of philosophy have embraced since around the 1980s, which he likens to "antiquarianism," but at the same time he notes that our current philosophical interests are "not an infallible or even an especially reliable guide to what is intellectually significant" from the past. His solution is to look for intellectual "trajectories" in the history of philosophy—although not with the Whiggish view that these culminate in the present—and to locate particular figures within those trajectories. Thus he is especially interested in identifying the various themes—not just "common sense"— [End Page 551] that can unite the work of different philosophers born and working in Scotland in order to provide a more expansive account of Scottish philosophy.Scottish Philosophy after the Enlightenment provides a close look at the lives and work of major figures of this period, with a chapter devoted to each: William Hamilton (chapter 2), James Frederick Ferrier (chapter 3), Alexander Bain (chapter 4), Thomas Carlyle (chapter 5), Alexander Campbell Fraser (chapter 9), and Andrew Seth Pringle-Pattison (chapter 10). Although Graham argues that Pringle-Pattison's work marks the culmination and end of distinctively Scottish philosophy, he devotes the final chapter to the work of twentieth-century philosopher John McMurray on the grounds that McMurray's conception of human agency is rooted in Scottish debates from the previous two centuries over realism and idealism (chapter 11). Along the way, the book helpfully introduces other thinkers currently much less well known, such as Edward Caird, Henry Calderwood, Henry Jones, James Hutchison Stirling, John Tulloch, and John Veitch.Instead of thinking of Scottish philosophy as simply equivalent to common sense philosophy, Graham offers various alternative conceptions of Scottish philosophy, characterized as various "trajectories" that can be seen as originating in the eighteenth century and developing through the nineteenth: as a concern with realism and idealism that developed in the nineteenth century into responses (whether critical or favorable) to Hegelianism (chapter 6); as a prolonged conversation about the relationship between science and philosophy and the possibility of progress in the scientific study of the mind (chapter 7); and as the continuation of eighteenth-century post-Humean Scottish philosophers' aim of defending theism, even in the face of Darwin's findings (chapters 8 and 9). Presenting Scottish philosophy through these different lenses is highly illuminating and makes a persuasive case for the need for further... (shrink)

In arguing against the likelihood of consciousness in non-human animals, Descartes advances a slippery slope argument that if thought were attributed to any one animal, it would have to be attributed to all, which is absurd. This paper examines the foundations of Thomas Willis’ comparative neuroanatomy against the background of Descartes’ slippery slope argument against animal consciousness. Inspired by Gassendi’s ideas about the corporeal soul, Thomas Willis distinguished between neural circuitry responsible for reflex behaviour and that responsible for cognitively or (...) consciously mediated behaviour. This afforded Willis a non-arbitrary basis for distinguishing between animals with thought and consciousness and those without, a methodology which retains currency for neuroscience today. (shrink)

In recent years evidence has emerged of the considerable influence of Scotist metaphysics on the Reformed scholasticism of the seventeenth century. One of the figures often named in connection with this Scotist revival is Samuel Rutherford (1600–61), who was one of the most important Scottish theologians of the seventeenth century. Focussing on Rutherford’s maximalist doctrine of providence, this article demonstrates his profound debt to key Scotist philosophical devices. In structuring these concepts, however, it is demonstrated that Rutherford is influenced not (...) so much by Scotus directly but rather much more by the modified Scotism of Thomas Bradwardine, the fourteenth-century Augustinian theologian. In particular, Bradwardine is revealed as the key influence on Rutherford’s modal theory and his sophisticated account of divine concourse. The paper concludes by arguing that Bradwardine’s influence on Rutherford suggests the need to take a broader view of the late medieval influence on Reformed scholasticism than is currently the case. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Catharine Macaulay's Republican Enlightenment by Karen GreenAlan CoffeeKaren Green. Catharine Macaulay's Republican Enlightenment. London: Routledge, 2020. Pp. 276. Hardback, $160.00.Though she was once one of the most recognizable and celebrated public intellectuals in Britain and was read avidly in both revolutionary America and France, after her death in 1791, Catharine Macaulay's work fell into almost total obscurity for around two hundred years. This began to change in the (...) 1990s, since which time interest in Macaulay from historians, philosophers, and feminist scholars has gathered pace. In the last decade and a half, no one has likely done more to advance this scholarship than Karen Green, who has published numerous journal articles and book chapters probing deeply into Macaulay's thought and intellectual context, and who helpfully edited The Correspondence of Catharine Macaulay (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), which had not previously been easily available to readers. As one would expect, Green's Catharine Macaulay's Republican Enlightenment builds on this depth of research. For a relatively slim volume, this is the most complete and detailed intellectual biography of Macaulay that I know of, an impressive feat given Macaulay's voluminous output.The aims of the book are twofold: first, to provide a narrative biography following Macaulay's life and the development of her works as they unfolded across her life, and second, to offer an overview and exposition of her ideas in their social and political context (4). These aims are important to bear in mind, since they establish what the book [End Page 158] is able to do and what it stops short of giving us. The volume is organized chronologically, divided into seven main chapters, each representing a short period in Macaulay's life, with an introduction and concluding chapter that considers her legacy, bringing the total chapters to nine. In each of the substantive chapters, Green mixes a biographical account of Macaulay's life with an often detailed analysis of one or more of her main works written during that period, as well as an assessment of how these works both engaged with, and were received within, some of the political and intellectual debates at the time. This is expertly done, with Green drawing on her intimate acquaintance with Macaulay's correspondence with many of the key figures of the period. The book, therefore, would make an excellent companion to anyone reading through the Correspondence as well as for those studying any of Macaulay's historical volumes, treatises, and tracts.An especially strong aspect of Green's book is the way she weaves an ongoing dialogue between Macaulay and several influential figures from her intellectual world across the chapters. One of these is David Hume, who, like Macaulay, had written an ideologically situated—even if both authors claimed impartiality—multivolume History of England. Though Hume's series was completed before Macaulay's had begun, hers can be seen as a philosophical and political rival to his. While the two would only correspond directly once on the subject, Green compares the impact that their respective philosophies have on their resulting political positions. In the 1760s, Green argues, Hume's naturalism, empiricism, and skepticism gave rise to a social conservative politics, whereas Macaulay's theological rationalism provided the basis for her optimistic and radical politics (50). By the 1790s, however, when Macaulay was writing her Letters on Education, Green detects some elements of a Humean philosophy of mind coming to influence Macaulay, albeit likely through David Hartley, particularly concerning the importance of sympathy on our moral psychology, even if there remain important differences between them (180–82). Green also analyzes Macaulay's engagement with Thomas Hobbes in her Loose Remarks and her two formal Observations on writings by Edmund Burke. Of particular value to historians of republicanism is Green's tracing and examination of Macaulay's ongoing intellectual relationship with key political figures, such as John Wilkes in Britain; Benjamin Franklin, Benjamin Rush, John and Abigail Adams, James Otis, Mercy Otis Warren, and George Washington in America; Anne-Robert Jacques Turgot and Jacques-Pierre Brissot de Warville in France, among many others. Though Macaulay's reputation as an influential political writer... (shrink)

In the history of Western philosophy, dialetheism – the view that some sentences are both true and false – has been unpopular. This paper recovers a previously overlooked episode in the history of dialetheism. Specifically, it reconstructs a section of Robert Greville's The Nature of Truth (1640) in order to show that he was a dialetheist. Greville's consideration of the view that evil is a privation led him to endorse the claim that sinful acts are contradictory; they are the subjects (...) of both being and non‐being. The paper also explores responses to Greville from John Wallis and Nathaniel Culverwell. (shrink)

The English Catholic philosopher Sir Kenelm Digby (1603–1665) has enjoyed a recent spate of scholarly attention as a prodigious traveller, political figure, and man of diverse intellectual interests. This article contributes to this scholarship by assessing the commentary on salvation at the heart of Digby’s philosophy of the soul and the historical contexts in which it was produced. It argues that Digby’s thinking on the soul was a meditation on the worldly interactions a Catholic must undertake or avoid in order (...) to achieve salvation. As such, our intellectual historical understanding of Digby is much improved when he is viewed as a scholar who constructed an identity as a thinker adept at advising others on the correct path to beatitude. This article also makes the broader argument for salvation as an important conceptual tool for early modern intellectual historians wishing to accurately map the complex relationship between theology, scholarly argument, and scholarly ambition in the seventeenth century. (shrink)

For the relatively small number of scholars who have worked on him, the English Catholic philosopher, courtier, and pirate Sir Kenelm Digby (1603–1665) has proven a difficult figure to study compre...

Sir Kenelm Digby (1603–1665) was an aristocratic English Catholic philosopher who has been the subject of several recent studies, each of which has sought to demonstrate his intellectual originalit...

A History of Scottish Philosophy is a series of collaborative studies by expert authors, each volume being devoted to a specific period. Together they provide a comprehensive account of the Scottish philosophical tradition, from the centuries that laid the foundation of the remarkable burst of intellectual fertility known as the Scottish Enlightenment, through the Victorian age and beyond, when it continued to exercise powerful intellectual influence at home and abroad. The books aim to be historically informative, while at the same (...) time serving to renew philosophical interest in the problems with which the Scottish philosophers grappled and in the solutions they proposed. -/- This is a companion volume to Scottish Philosophy in the Eighteenth Century, Volume I. Where Volume I covered Scottish Enlightenment contributions to morals, politics, art, and religion, this second volume covers philosophical method, metaphysics, and the philosophy of mind. It includes a comprehensive account of the teaching of philosophy in Scottish universities in the eighteenth century. Particular attention is given to Scottish achievements in the science of the mind in chapters on perception, the intellectual powers, the active powers, habit and the association of ideas, and language. (shrink)