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  1. Nietzsche versus Kant on the possibility of rational self-critique.Markus Kohl - forthcoming - In Edgar J. Valdez (ed.), Rethinking Kant: Volume VII.
    I consider an epistemological, methodological dispute between Nietzsche and Kant about the possibility of rational self-critique: an activity where the intellect reflects on its cognitive powers, demarcates the proper use and limitations of these powers, and thereby achieves a systematically complete insight into what we can and cannot know. Kant affirms whereas Nietzsche denies that we can successfully conduct such a self-directed rational enquiry. By reconstructing the central argumentative moves that Nietzsche and Kant do or could make to defend their (...)
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  2. Kant’s Offer to the Skeptical Empiricist.Charles Goldhaber - 2024 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 62 (3):421–47.
    There is little consensus about whether Kant intends his Critique of Pure Reason to change the mind of a skeptical empiricist such as Hume. I challenge a common assumption made by both sides of the debate. This is the thought that Kant can convince a skeptic only if he does not beg the question against her. Surprisingly, I argue, that is not how Kant sees things. On Kant’s view, skeptical empiricism is an inherently unstable and unsatisfying position, which skeptics cannot (...)
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  3. The Dissatisfied Skeptic in Kant's Discipline of Pure Reason.Charles Goldhaber - 2023 - Journal of Transcendental Philosophy 4 (2):157-177.
    Why does Kant say that a “skeptical satisfaction of pure reason” is “impossible” (A758/B786)? I answer this question by giving a reading of “The Discipline of Pure Reason in Respect of Its Polemic Employment.” I explain that Kant must address skepticism in this context because his warning against developing counterarguments to dogmatic attacks encourages a comparison between the critical and the skeptical methods. I then argue that skepticism fails to “satisfy” [befriedigen] reason insofar as it cannot “pacify” reason’s tendency to (...)
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  4. Kant on Freedom and Rational Agency.Markus Kohl - 2023 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
    In "Kant on Freedom and Rational Agency", I aim to give a comprehensive interpretation and a qualified defense of Kant’s doctrine of freedom as a systematic conception of rational agency. -/- Although my book follows Kant in focusing on the idea of free will as a condition of moral agency, it denies that moral freedom of will is the only relevant (transcendental) type of freedom. Human beings also exercise absolute freedom of thought (intellectual autonomy) in their theoretical cognition. Moreover, our (...)
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  5. Sensibility, Understanding, and Kant’s Transcendental Deduction: From Epistemic Compositionalism to Epistemic Hylomorphism.Maximilian Tegtmeyer - 2023 - Review of Metaphysics 77 (1):57-85.
    Can sensibility, as our capacity to be sensibly presented with objects, be understood independently of the understanding, as the capacity to form judgments about those objects? It is a truism that for judgments to be empirical knowledge they must agree with what sensibility presents. Moreover, it is a familiar thought that objectivity involves absolute independence from intellectual acts. The author argues that together these thoughts motivate a common reading of Kant on which operations of sensibility are conceived as intelligible independently (...)
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  6. Kant's Proof of the Existence of the Outer World.Bianca Ancillotti - 2021 - History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 25 (1):163–189.
    In this paper I propose a novel interpretation of Kant’s proof of the existence of the outer world in the Refutation of Idealism. According to this interpretation, Kant’s proof does not provide a regressive explanation of our capacity to determine the temporal order of our experiences. Rather, it expresses a counterfactual reflection on what it takes for something to be actual in contrast to being merely imagined. On the ground of this reflection, Kant argues against the Cartesian sceptic that, even (...)
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  7. How Kant Thought He Could Reach Hume.Charles Goldhaber - 2021 - In Camilla Serck-Hanssen & Beatrix Himmelmann (eds.), The Court of Reason: Proceedings of the 13th International Kant Congress. De Gruyter. pp. 717–726.
    I argue that Kant thought his Transcendental Deduction of the Pure Concepts could reach skeptical empiricists like Hume by providing an overlooked explanation of the mind's a priori relation to the objects of experience. And he thought empiricists may be motivated to listen to this explanation because of an instability and dissatisfaction inherent to empiricism. This article is a précis of my "Kant's Offer to the Skeptical Empiricist" in Journal of the History of Philosophy.
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  8. How Kant Thought He Could Reach Hume.Charles Goldhaber - 2021 - In Camilla Serck-Hanssen & Beatrix Himmelmann (eds.), The Court of Reason: Proceedings of the 13th International Kant Congress. De Gruyter. pp. 717-726.
    I argue that Kant tries to change the mind of skeptical empiricists like Hume by offering, rather than compelling acceptance of, an alternative conception of our knowledge, and that his offer can appeal because of an instability inherent to the skeptic’s position. This article is a short précis of my "Kant's Offer to the Skeptical Empiricist" in Journal of the History of Philosophy.
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  9. (1 other version)The “Fourth Paralogism” in the 1781 Critique of Pure Reason: A (Moderately) Realist Reading.Marialena Karampatsou - 2021 - In Camilla Serck-Hanssen & Beatrix Himmelmann (eds.), The Court of Reason: Proceedings of the 13th International Kant Congress. De Gruyter. pp. 545-554.
    On the historically dominant reading of the Fourth Paralogism, Kant pursues an antiskeptical strategy of a Berkeleyan stripe, aiming to secure our belief in the existence of the external world by reducing this world to a mind-dependent, mental entity. I propose a more charitable and realist interpretation of Kant’s strategy. On the proposed reading, Kant pursues a moderate antiskeptical strategy which sets radical skeptical worries aside; Kant’s Berkeleyan-sounding remarks merely express standard Kantian doctrine (his theory of space).
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  10. Synthetic a priori judgments and Kant’s response to Hume on induction.Hsueh Qu - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):7131-7157.
    This paper will make the case that we can find in Kant’s Second Analogy a substantive response to Hume’s argument on induction. This response is substantive insofar as it does not merely consist in independently arguing for the opposite conclusion, but rather, it identifies and exploits a gap in this argument. More specifically, Hume misses the possibility of justifying the uniformity of nature as a synthetic a priori proposition, which Kant looks to establish in the Second Analogy. Note that the (...)
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  11. Some Hope for Kant's Groundwork III.Joe Saunders - 2021 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    Kant worries that if we are not free, morality will be nothing more than a phantasm for us. In the final section of the Groundwork, he attempts secure our freedom, and with it, morality. Here is a simplified version of his argument: -/- 1. A rational will is a free will 2. A free will stands under the moral law 3. Therefore, a rational will stands under the moral law -/- In this paper, I attempt to defuse two prominent objections (...)
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  12. (1 other version)The Beach of Skepticism: Kant and Hume on the Practice of Philosophy and the Proper Bounds of Skepticism.Karl Schafer - 2021 - In Peter Thiekle (ed.), Cambridge Critical Guide to Kant’s Prolegomena. Cambridge. pp. 111-132.
    The focus of this chapter will be Kant’s understanding of Hume, and its impact on Kant’s critical philosophy. Contrary to the traditional reading of this relationship, which focuses on Kant’s (admittedly real) dissatisfaction with Hume’s account of causation, my discussion will focus on broader issues of philosophical methodology. Following a number of recent interpreters, I will argue that Kant sees Hume as raising, in a particularly forceful fashion, a ‘demarcation challenge’ concerning how to distinguish the legitimate use of reason in (...)
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  13. (1 other version)Disentangling Cartesian Global Skepticism from Cartesian Problematic External-World Idealism in Kant’s Refutation.de Sá Pereira Roberto Horácio - 2020 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 102 (2): 242-260..
    Kant’s Refutation targets what he calls the problematic idealist. This is understood by the mainstream of Kantian scholarship as the global skeptic that Descartes briefly adumbrated in his first Meditation. The widespread view in the literature is that the fate of the Refutation is tied to its success as an argument against this Cartesian global skepticism. This consensus is what I want to question in this paper. I argue that Kant’s opponent – the problematic idealist – is not the Cartesian (...)
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  14. ‘For Me, In My Present State’: Kant on Judgments of Perception and Mere Subjective Validity.Janum Sethi - 2020 - Journal of Modern Philosophy 2 (9):20.
    Few of Kant’s distinctions have generated as much puzzlement and criticism as the one he draws in the Prolegomena between judgments of experience, which he describes as objectively and universally valid, and judgments of perception, which he says are merely subjectively valid. Yet the distinction between objective and subjective validity is central to Kant’s account of experience and plays a key role in his Transcendental Deduction of the categories. In this paper, I reject a standard interpretation of the distinction, according (...)
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  15. Kant’s (Non-Question-Begging) Refutation of Cartesian Scepticism.Colin Marshall - 2019 - Kantian Review 24 (1):77-101.
    Interpreters of Kant’s Refutation of Idealism face a dilemma: it seems to either beg the question against the Cartesian sceptic or else offer a disappointingly Berkeleyan conclusion. In this article I offer an interpretation of the Refutation on which it does not beg the question against the Cartesian sceptic. After defending a principle about question-begging, I identify four premises concerning our representations that there are textual reasons to think Kant might be implicitly assuming. Using those assumptions, I offer a reconstruction (...)
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  16. Epistemic Reciprocity in Schelling's Late Return to Kant.G. Anthony Bruno - 2018 - In Pablo Muchnik (ed.), Rethinking Kant. Cambridge Scholars Publishing. pp. 75-94.
    In his 1841-2 Berlin lectures, Schelling critiques German idealism’s negative method of regressing from existence to its first principle, which is supposed to be intelligible without remainder. He sees existence as precisely its remainder since there could be nothing that exists. To solve this, Schelling enlists the positive method of progressing from the fact of existence to a proof of this principle’s reality. Since this proof faces the absurdity that there is anything rather than nothing, he concludes that this fact’s (...)
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  17. The Metaphysical Deduction and the Shadow of Humean Skepticism.Markus Kohl - 2018 - Kant Studien 109 (3):367-394.
    I examine the division of labor between the Metaphysical Deduction (MD) and the Transcendental Deduction (TD). Against a common reading, I argue that the MD is insufficient to prove the a priori origin of the categories. For both Kant and his main opponent, namely Hume, the question of whether the categories have an a priori origin in the pure understanding is inseparable from the question of whether they have objective validity. Since the MD does not establish the objective validity of (...)
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  18. Kant, Epistemic Phenomenalism, and the Refutation of Idealism.Michael Oberst - 2018 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 100 (2):172-201.
    This paper takes issue with the widespread view that Kant rejects epistemic phenomenalism. According to epistemic phenomenalism, only cognition of states of one’s own mind can be certain, while cognition of outer objects is necessarily uncertain. I argue that Kant does not reject this view, but accepts a modified version of it. For, in contrast to traditional skeptics, he distinguishes between two kinds of outer objects and holds that we have direct access to outer appearances in our mind; but he (...)
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  19. A World Without a Past: New Challenges to Kant's Refutation of Idealism.Justin Remhof - 2018 - Southwest Philosophy Review 34 (1):171-180.
    In the Refutation of Idealism, Kant aims to defeat the Cartesian radical skeptical hypothesis that empirical reality might not exist and we cannot have knowledge of it. Kant intends to demonstrate that conscious experience presupposes direct experience of empirical reality. This paper presents new challenges to the conclusions Kant reaches in the Refutation. Kant’s argument turns on the claim that the past must exist, and my challenges concern the possibility that there is no past.
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  20. Can't Kant Cognize His Empirical Self? Or, a Problem for (almost) Every Interpretation of the Refutation of Idealism.Andrew Chignell - 2017 - In Andrew Stephenson & Anil Gomes (eds.), Kant and the Philosophy of Mind: Perception, Reason, and the Self. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 138-158.
    Kant seems to think of our own mental states or representations as the primary objects of inner sense. But does he think that these states also inhere in something? And, if so, is that something an empirical substance that is also cognized in inner sense? This chapter provides textual and philosophical grounds for thinking that, although Kant may agree with Hume that the self is not ‘given’ in inner sense exactly, he does think of the self as cognized through inner (...)
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  21. Intuition and Presence.Colin McLear - 2017 - In Andrew Stephenson & Anil Gomes (eds.), Kant and the Philosophy of Mind: Perception, Reason, and the Self. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 86-103.
    In this paper I explicate the notion of “presence” [Gegenwart] as it pertains to intuition. Specifically, I examine two central problems for the position that an empirical intuition is an immediate relation to an existing particular in one’s environment. The first stems from Kant’s description of the faculty of imagination, while the second stems from Kant’s discussion of hallucination. I shall suggest that Kant’s writings indicate at least one possible means of reconciling our two problems with a conception of “presence” (...)
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  22. Seeing a Flower in the Garden: Common Sense, Transcendental Idealism.Scott Stapleford - 2017 - In Elizabeth Robinson & Chris W. Surprenant (eds.), Kant and the Scottish Enlightenment. New York: Routledge. pp. 326–341.
    Stapleford (2007) identified Johann Nicolaus Tetens as the missing link between Reid’s common sense treatment of external world scepticism and Kant’s transcendental Refutation of Idealism. While that account is arguably correct, it failed to recognize the distinction between being justified in believing P and being justified in believing that my belief in P is justified. This paper corrects the oversight and explains its implications. Tetens emerges as a weak externalist regarding knowledge of external objects, situated roughly halfway between Reid’s moderate (...)
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  23. (1 other version)The Relation between Ontology and Logic in Kant.Clinton Tolley - 2016 - Internationales Jahrbuch des Deutschen Idealismus 12:75-98.
  24. Kant and the Discipline of Reason.Brian A. Chance - 2015 - European Journal of Philosophy 23 (1):87-110.
    Kant's notion of ‘discipline’ has received considerable attention from scholars of his philosophy of education, but its role in his theoretical philosophy has been largely ignored. This omission is surprising since his discussion of discipline in the first Critique is not only more extensive and expansive in scope than his other discussions but also predates them. The goal of this essay is to provide a comprehensive reading of the Discipline that emphasizes its systematic importance in the first Critique. I argue (...)
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  25. Kant’s Transcendental Idealism and his Transcendental Deduction.Justin B. Shaddock - 2015 - Kantian Review 20 (2):265-288.
    I argue for a novel, non-subjectivist interpretation of Kant’s transcendental idealism. Kant’s idealism is often interpreted as specifying how we must experience objects or how objects must appear to us. I argue to the contrary by appealing to Kant’s Transcendental Deduction. Kant’s Deduction is the proof that the categories are not merely subjectively necessary conditions we need for our cognition, but objectively valid conditions necessary for objects to be appearances. My interpretation centres on two claims. First, Kant’s method of self-knowledge (...)
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  26. Varieties of Skepticism: Essays After Kant, Wittgenstein, and Cavell.James Conant & Andrea Kern (eds.) - 2014 - Boston: De Gruyter.
    This volume brings out the varieties of forms of philosophical skepticism that have continued to preoccupy philosophers for the past couple of centuries, as well as the specific varieties of philosophical response that these have engendered above all, in the work of those who have sought to take their cue from Kant, Wittgenstein, or Cavell and to illuminate how these philosophical approaches are related to and bear upon one another.".
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  27. Skepticism after Kant.Paul Franks - 2014 - In James Conant & Andrea Kern (eds.), Varieties of Skepticism: Essays After Kant, Wittgenstein, and Cavell. Boston: De Gruyter. pp. 17-58.
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  28. Kant on Nativism, Scepticism and Necessity.John Callanan - 2013 - Kantian Review 18 (1):1-27.
    Kant criticizes the so-called ‘preformation’ hypothesis – a nativist account of the origin of the categories – at the end of the B-Deduction on the ground that it entails scepticism. I examine the historical context of Kant's criticism, and identify the targets as both Crusius and Leibniz. There are two claims argued for in this paper: first, that attending to the context of the opposition to certain forms of nativism affords a way of understanding Kant's commitment to the so-called ‘discursivity (...)
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  29. Kant and McDowell on Skepticism and Disjunctivism.Tsung-Hsing Ho - 2013 - In Stefano Bacin, Alfredo Ferrarin, Claudio La Rocca & Margit Ruffing (eds.), Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht. Akten des XI. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses. Boston: de Gruyter. pp. 761-770.
    This paper is to propose a new form of Kant’s anti-skepticism argument in light of John McDowell’s works on disjunctivism. I first discuss recent debates between McDowell and Crispin Wright on disjunctivism. I argue that Wright wrongly downplays McDowell’s disjunctivism, whose metaphysical claim that our perceptual faculties directly engage in the world has an epistemological implication that should be able to dismiss the skeptic’s imagery as fictitious. However, McDowell does not clearly offer such an argument. I will show that we (...)
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  30. (1 other version)Idealismo e refutação do idealismo na filosofia crítica de Kant.Pedro Costa Rego - 2013 - Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 54 (127):63-87.
    O presente trabalho versa sobre o tema, central no projeto filosófico de Kant, da refutação do idealismo, concentrando-se em dois momentos da Crítica da Razão Pura (CRP): a Dedução Transcendental e a Refutação do Idealismo. Adoto duas hipóteses interpretativas: a primeira, de que a seção da CRP intitulada "Refutação do Idealismo" não esgota o projeto kantiano de uma refutação do idealismo, mas lhe fornece o acabamento, apresentando-se como um desenvolvimento de argumentos aduzidos na Dedução Transcendental. A segunda, de que a (...)
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  31. Scepticism and the Development of the Transcendental Dialectic.Brian A. Chance - 2012 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 20 (2):311-331.
    Kant's response to scepticism in the Critique of Pure Reason is complex and remarkably nuanced, although it is rarely recognized as such. In this paper, I argue that recent attempts to flesh out the details of this response by Paul Guyer and Michael Forster do not go far enough. Although they are right to draw a distinction between Humean and Pyrrhonian scepticism and locate Kant's response to the latter in the Transcendental Dialectic, their accounts fail to capture two important aspects (...)
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  32. Skeptizismus und Philosophie: Kant, Fichte, Hegel.Elena Ficara (ed.) - 2012 - Editions Rodopi.
    Content: Elena Ficara: Einleitung Marco Ivaldo: Skeptizismus bei Fichte mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der Rolle des Zweifels in der »Bestimmung des Menschen« Angelica Nuzzo: A Question of Method: Transcendental Philosophy, Dialectic, and the Problem of Determination Rainer Schäfer: Kombinationen von Fundamentalismus, Kohärentismus und Skepsis bei Kant, Fichte und Hegel als Antworten auf Probleme gegenwärtiger Epistemologie Elena Ficara: Skeptizismus und die Begründung der Philosophie bei Kant und Hegel Lidia Gasperoni: Maimon und der Skeptizismus Jürgen Stahl: Skeptizismus und Kritik – zur Wandlung der (...)
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  33. The Kantian's Revenge: On Forster's Kant and Skepticism.Robert Hanna - 2012 - Kantian Review 17 (1):33-45.
  34. The Semantics of Self-Knowledge in the Refutation of Idealism.Greg Lynch - 2012 - Kant Studies Online (1).
  35. Causal refutations of idealism revisited.Andrew Chignell - 2011 - Philosophical Quarterly 61 (242):184-186.
    Causal refutations of external-world scepticism start from our ability to make justified judgements about the order of our own experiences, and end with the claim that there must be perceptible external objects, some of whose states can be causally correlated with that order. In a recent paper, I made a series of objections to this broadly Kantian anti-sceptical strategy. Georges Dicker has provided substantive replies on behalf of a version of the causal refutation of idealism. Here I offer a few (...)
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  36. Review: Forster, Michael, Kant and Skepticism[REVIEW]Robert Hanna - 2011 - Philosophical Quarterly 61 (244):635-637.
  37. La refutación del idealismo en Kant.Stefano Straulino - 2011 - Pamplona: Cuadernos de Anuario Filosófico.
  38. Scepticism, Causation and Cognition.Gary Banham - 2010 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 18 (3):507-520.
  39. Kant's Subjective Deduction.Nathan Bauer - 2010 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 18 (3):433-460.
    In the transcendental deduction, the central argument of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant seeks to secure the objective validity of our basic categories of thought. He distinguishes objective and subjective sides of this argument. The latter side, the subjective deduction, is normally understood as an investigation of our cognitive faculties. It is identified with Kant’s account of a threefold synthesis involved in our cognition of objects of experience, and it is said to precede and ground Kant’s proof of the (...)
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  40. Causal refutations of idealism.Andrew Chignell - 2010 - Philosophical Quarterly 60 (240):487-507.
    In the ‘Refutation of Idealism’ chapter of the first Critique, Kant argues that the conditions required for having certain kinds of mental episodes are sufficient to guarantee that there are ‘objects in space’ outside us. A perennially influential way of reading this compressed argument is as a kind of causal inference: in order for us to make justified judgements about the order of our inner states, those states must be caused by the successive states of objects in space outside us. (...)
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  41. Three Skeptics and the Critique: Review of Michael Forster's Kant and Skepticism.Andrew Chignell & Colin Mclear - 2010 - Philosophical Books 51 (4):228-244.
    A long critical notice of Michael Forster's recent book, "Kant and Skepticism." We argue that Forster's characterization of Kant's response to skepticism is both textually dubious and philosophically flawed. -/- .
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  42. (1 other version)Review: Forster, Kant and Skepticism.Georges Dicker - 2010 - European Journal of Philosophy 18 (4):609-615.
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  43. The refutation of idealism and the distinction between phenomena and noumena.Dina Edmundts - 2010 - In Paul Guyer (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. New York: Cambridge University Press.
  44. Knowledge, Reason and Taste: Kant's Response to Hume. [REVIEW]Andy Hamilton - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (4):737-739.
  45. Kant and the Scandal of Philosophy. [REVIEW]Katie Harrington - 2010 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 18 (1):168-171.
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  46. Review of M. Forster, Kant and Skepticism (Princeton, 2010). [REVIEW]Diego E. Machuca - 2010 - Philosophy in Review 30 (3):186-8.
  47. Kant’s (Seamless) Refutation of Idealism.Daniel Robinson - 2010 - Review of Metaphysics 64 (2):291-301.
  48. Kant, Skepticism, and the Comparison Argument.Alberto Vanzo - 2010 - In Pablo Muchnick (ed.), Rethinking Kant, vol. 2. Cambridge Scholars Publishers.
    Kant's writings on logic illustrate the comparison argument about truth, which goes as follows. A truth-bearer p is true if and only if it corresponds, or it agrees, with a portion of reality: the object(s), state(s) of affairs, or event(s) p is about. In order to know whether p agrees with that portion of reality, one must check if that portion of reality is as p states. Using the terms of the comparison argument, one must compare p with that portion (...)
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  49. Review essay.Corey W. Dyck - 2009 - Philosophy and Social Criticism 35 (5):613-619.
  50. Kant and Skepticism.Michael N. Forster (ed.) - 2009 - Princeton University Press.
    This book puts forward a much-needed reappraisal of Immanuel Kant's conception of and response to skepticism, as set forth principally in the Critique of Pure Reason. It is widely recognized that Kant's theoretical philosophy aims to answer skepticism and reform metaphysics--Michael Forster makes the controversial argument that those aims are closely linked. He distinguishes among three types of skepticism: "veil of perception" skepticism, which concerns the external world; Humean skepticism, which concerns the existence of a priori concepts and synthetic a (...)
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