Aspects of Emotion

A vast range of our everyday experiences seem to involve an immediate consciousness of value. We hear the rudeness of someone making offensive comments. In seeing someone risking her life to save another, we recognize her bravery. When we witness a person shouting at an innocent child, we feel the unfairness of this action. If, in learning of a close friend’s success, envy arises in us, we experience our own emotional response as wrong. How are these values apprehended? The three (...) most common answers provided by contemporary philosophy explain the consciousness of value in terms of judgment, emotion, or perception. An alternative view endorsed mainly by authors inspired by the phenomenological tradition argues that values are apprehended by an intentional feeling. In this model, it is by virtue of a feeling that objects are presented as being in different degrees and nuances fair or unfair, boring or funny, good or bad. This paper offers an account of this model of feeling and its basic features, and defends it over alternative models. To this end, the paper discusses different versions of the model circulating in current research which until now have developed in parallel rather than in mutual exchange. The paper also applies the proposed account to the moral domain and examines how a feeling of values is presupposed by several moral experiences. (shrink)

This book proposes and defends a new theory of emotional experience. Drawing on recent developments in the philosophy of emotion, with links to contemporary philosophy of mind, it argues that emotional experiences are sui generis states, not to be modelled after other mental states – such as perceptions, judgements, or bodily feelings – but given their own analysis and place within our mental economy. More specifically, emotional experiences are claimed to be feelings-towards-values.

This chapter examines Else Voigtländer’s place within early phenomenology. The chapter starts by disclosing her relation to Lipps and to prominent phenomenologists of the Munich Circle, such as Pfänder, Scheler, Geiger, and Daubert. It proceeds to offer an analysis of her work as it is embedded within the phenomenological tradition. In particular, the chapter focuses on her original application of the phenomenological method, her contribution to the emotivist theory of self-consciousness, her analysis of the social dimension of the self, her (...) development of a concept of affectivity as intimately linked to value, and her study of specific phenomena, such as Ressentiment and erotic love. The chapter finishes with a discussion of the mechanisms that might have led to Voigtländer’s omission from the canon of phenomenology and an argument for the necessity of rewriting the history of the phenomenological movement to include her as a fully-fledged member. (shrink)

It is a familiar feature of our affective psychology that our moods ‘crystalize’ into emotions, and that our emotions ‘diffuse’ into moods. Providing a detailed philosophical account of these affective shifts, as I will call them, is the central aim of this paper. Drawing on contemporary philosophy of emotion and mood, alongside distinctive ideas from the phenomenologically-inspired writer Robert Musil, a broadly ‘intentional’ and ‘evaluativist’ account will be defended. I argue that we do best to understand important features of these (...) affective shifts – which I document across this paper – in terms of intentional and evaluative aspects of the respective states of moods and emotion. At same the time, the account is pitched at the phenomenological level, as dealing with affective shifts primarily in terms of moods and emotions as experiential states, with respect to which it feels-like-something to be undergoing the relevant affective experience. The paper also applies the intentional-evaluative model of affective shifts to anxiety in more detail, developing the idea that certain patterns of affective shift, particularly those that allow for a kind of ‘emotional release’, can contribute to a subject’s well-being. (shrink)

Pre-theoretically, it seems obvious that there are deep and multifarious relations between memory and emotions. On the one hand, a large chunk of our affective lives concerns the good and bad events that happened to us and that we preserve in memory. This is one amongst the many ways in which memory is relevant to the nature and causation of emotions. What does recent research teach us about these relations? § 1 surveys some key issues in this regard. On the (...) other hand, which events we happen to preserve in memory very much depends on how we affectively reacted to them when they took place. Emotions are relevant to the nature and causation of memory in this and many other ways. Key issues regarding these relations are surveyed in § 2. (shrink)

Can one’s belief that one romantically loves another be false? If so, under what conditions may one come to reasonably doubt, or at least suspend belief, that one does so? To begin to answer these questions, I first outline an affective/volitional view of love similar to psychologist R. J. Sternberg’s “triangular theory”, which analyzes types of love in terms of the degrees to which they include states of passion, emotion, and commitment. I then outline two sources of potential bias that (...) may cause one to believe that one romantically loves another when one does not. Partly on the basis of those potential sources of bias and partly on the basis of more specific issues, I then argue that at least to the extent that one is aware of these issues, one may reasonably doubt that one is experiencing romantic love’s emotional feelings (even when one is experiencing them), and one may reasonably doubt that one is making romantic love’s commitments (even when one is making them). Finally, I order by relative dubitability the propositions that must be true about one’s passions, emotions, and commitments towards another in order for one to romantically love them. (shrink)

What is it like to perceive a feared object? According to a popular neo-Gibsonian theory in psychology, fear biases our perceptions of objects so as to encourage particular kinds of actions: when we are afraid, spiders may be perceived as physically closer than they are in order to promote fleeing. Firestone mounted severe criticisms against this view, arguing that these cases are better explained by non-perceptual biases that operate on accurate perceptions of the external environment. In this paper I will (...) argue that fear might indeed distort our perceptions of the world, but not in the way neo-Gibsonians suppose. In the view I favor, perceptual distortions occur as by-products of fearful attention, a special mode of attention that is part of an orchestrated defensive response that prepares the organism to deal effectively with a threat. To argue for this view I will rely on empirical evidence that fearful attention narrows down the focus of attention and favors processing of local rather than global features of stimuli, which may jointly explain why perceptual distortions might occur in fearful object seeing. This view has consequences not only for empirical investigations in fearful perceptual distortions, but also for an explanation of the intentionality of fear and the phenomenal integration of bodily and intentional elements in fear episodes. (shrink)

A view of prominence in the philosophy of emotion is that emotional experiences are not self-standing intentional experiences. Instead, they inherit the intentional content they have from their cognitive bases. One implication is that emotions whose intentional contents differ in terms of the modal and temporal properties of the relevant particular object – because the intentional contents on which they are based differ in these respects – nonetheless need not differ qua emotion-type. This leads to the same-emotional attitude, different content (...) claim: It is possible to have the same emotional attitude towards a range of (different) contents, as provided by different cognitive bases. This paper argues that this claim is mistaken. By appealing to the specific case of imagination, the same emotional-attitude, different content claim is challenged. Drawing on phenomenological observations made by Jean-Paul Sartre, supplemented with independently plausible considerations, I argue we should recognise a distinct class of emotion-types, which I call affective imaginings. Affective imaginings contrast with emotional experiences whose cognitive bases are sense-perceptual experiences (affective perceptions). The contrast turns on the way the different contents across these cases modifies the attitudinal character of the emotional experience, motivating the positing of two irreducible classes of emotional experiences. (shrink)

Shame entangles the linguistic lives of many first and second-generation Latinx Americans. On the one hand, it is easy to find videos and accounts of public acts aimed at shaming Spanish speakers in America. On the other hand, it is also common to hear first-personal accounts of the shame some members of the Latinx American community feel for living an “English-only” existence. I advance an account explaining how one’s linguistic choices can be influenced by acts intending to shame other members (...) of their culture. Further, I analyze the complexities of the shame that results in some of those who decide to live an English-Only existence as a result of the pressures to assimilate into mainstream American culture. (shrink)

Emotion theory includes attempts to reduce or assimilate emotions to states such as bodily feelings, beliefs-desire combinations, and evaluative judgements. Resistance to such approaches is motivated by the claim that emotions possess a sui generis phenomenology. Uriah Kriegel defends a new form of emotion reductivism which avoids positing irreducible emotional phenomenology by specifying emotions’ phenomenal character in terms of a combination of other phenomenologies. This article argues Kriegel’s approach, and similar proposals, are unsuccessful, since typical emotional experiences are constituted by (...) sui generis feelings towards value. (shrink)

In the last decades there has been a great controversy about the scientific status of emotion categories. This controversy stems from the idea that emotions are heterogeneous phenomena, which precludes classifying them under a common kind. In this article, I analyze this claim—which I call the Variability Thesis—and argue that as it stands, it is problematically underdefined. To show this, I examine a recent formulation of the thesis as offered by Scarantino (2015). On one hand, I raise some issues regarding (...) the logical structure of the claim. On the other hand, and most importantly, I show that the Variability Thesis requires a consensus about what counts as a relevant pattern of response in different domains, a consensus that is lacking in the current literature. This makes it difficult to assess what counts as evidence for or against this thesis. As a result, arguments based on the Variability Thesis are unwarranted. This raises serious concerns about some current empirical theories of emotions, but also sheds light on the issue of the scientific status of emotion categories. (shrink)

A very basic form of experience consists in feeling energetic, vital, alive, tired, dispirited, vigorous and so on. These feelings – which I call feelings of vitality or vital feelings – constitute the main concern of this paper. My aim is to argue that these feelings exhibit a distinctive form of affectivity which cannot be explained in terms of emotions, moods, background feelings or existential feelings and to explore different paths for their conceptualization. The paper proceeds as follows. After introducing (...) the topic (sect. 1), I show that these feelings cannot be subsumed under any of the current categories of the affective mind (sect. 2). Against this backdrop, I present and critically assess Scheler’s notion of vital feelings as an alternative model for capturing their distinctive nature (sect. 3). Next, I explore varieties of vital feelings by focusing on different levels of the bodily-felt experience (sect. 4) and analyze their specific form of self-involvement (sect. 5). Finally, I conclude by showing how the study of vital feelings might contribute to phenomenological bioethics (sect. 6). (shrink)

Review of Jean Moritz Müller, The World-Directedness of Emotional Feeling.

Given the importance of emotions in our everyday lives, it is no surprise that in recent decades the study of emotions has received tremendous attention by a number of different disciplines. Yet despite the many and great advantages that have been made in understanding the nature of emotions, there remains a class of emotional states that is understudied and that demands further elucidation. All contributions to this issue consider either emotions or aspects of emotions that deserve the label ‘neglected’. In (...) doing so, they break new theoretical ground and further our understanding of the nature of the emotions that they consider. The aim of the present paper is to introduce the special issue on neglected emotions by articulating the different ways in which emotions can be said to be neglected. (shrink)

This paper explores jealousy in Unamuno’s drama El otro. Drawing on contemporary philosophy of emotion, I will argue that for the Spanish author jealousy gives the subject a sense of self. The paper begins by embedding Unamuno’s philosophical anthropology in the context of contemporary emotion theory. It then presents the drama as an investigation into the affective dimension of self-identity. The third section offers an analysis of jealousy as an emotion of self-assessment. The final section discusses how this drama can (...) be regarded as a piece of philosophical work. (shrink)

This paper explores a currently popular view in the philosophy of emotion, according to which emotions constitute a specific form of evaluative aspect-perception (cf. esp. Roberts 2003, Döring 2004, Slaby 2008). On this view, adequate or fitting emotions play an important epistemic roe vis à vis evaluative knowledge. The paper specifically asks how to conceive of the adequacy or fittingness conditions of emotion. Considering the specific, relational nature of the evaluative properties disclosed by emotions, it is argued that a suitable (...) standard of fittingness has both a world-involving and person-involving aspect: Fitting emotions require both a fundamentum in re as well as a fundamentum in persona. (shrink)

Much contemporary philosophy of emotion has been in broad agreement about the claim that emotional experiences have evaluative content. This paper assesses a relatively neglected alternative, which I call the content-priority view, according to which emotions are responses to a form of pre-emotional value awareness, as what we are aware of in having certain non-emotional evaluative states which are temporally prior to emotion. I argue that the central motivations of the view require a personal level conscious state of pre-emotional value (...) awareness. However, consideration of extant suggestions for the relevant type of evaluative state shows them all to be problematic. As such, I conclude that at present we do not have a persuasive formulation of the content-priority view, and that to get one defenders of the view need to specify which version they are committed to and defend it against the criticisms raised. (shrink)

This book engages with what are widely recognized as the two core dimensions of emotion. When we are afraid, glad or disappointed, we feel a certain way; moreover, our emotion is intentional or directed at something: we are afraid of something, glad or disappointed about something. Connecting with a vital strand of recent philosophical thinking, I conceive of these two aspects of emotion as unified. Examining different possible ways of developing the view that the feeling dimension of emotion is itself (...) intentional, I argue against the currently popular view that it is a form of perception-like receptivity to value. I instead propose that emotional feeling is a specific type of response to value, an affective ‘position-taking’. This alternative conceives of emotional feeling as intimately related to our cares and concerns. While situating itself within the analytic-philosophical debate on emotion, the discussion crucially draws on ideas from the early phenomenological tradition in an attempt to think past the theoretical strictures of many contemporary approaches to this subject. The result is a new view of emotional feeling as a thoroughly personal form of engagement with value. (shrink)

A la manière des expériences perceptuelles qui nous présentent des formes, des couleurs, des sons, des textures, etc. les émotions nous présentent des propriétés évaluatives. Ainsi, les émotions constituent un type d’expérience perceptuelle spécifique, un type qui nous donne accès à des valeurs (plutôt qu’à des propriétés non axiologiques). Cette théorie d’origine meinongienne doit beaucoup Christine Tappolet qui y consacre un second livre Emotions, Values and Agency que tous les amoureux des choses vraiment bien faites ne pourront qu’apprécier. Cet article (...) est consacré à deux problèmes auxquels est confronté le partisan de la théorie perceptuelle des émotions, c’est-à-dire, de la théorie selon laquelle les émotions constituent un type spécifique d’expériences perceptuelles. Ce sont les problèmes de la justification et de la rationalité des émotions. Loin d’ignorer ces difficultés, Tappolet y consacre une partie de son premier chapitre (pages 31-45). Cette contribution a plus précisément deux objectifs. Le premier est de montrer pourquoi la justification ne pose pas un problème aussi sérieux que la rationalité à la théorie perceptuelle des émotions. Son second but est d’expliquer pourquoi je doute que la solution de Tappolet au problème de la rationalité fonctionne. (shrink)

This is the text of an invited talk exploring the connections between two apparently distinct notions of affect, sensory versus core affect. It is basically a progress report. It is exploratory and tentative. It starts from a mild puzzle about the apparent mismatch between the notion of affect that affective neuroscientists generally deploy and the notion of affect that emotion psychologists deploy. The notion favored by psychologists is the notion of core affect. The phenomenon studied by affective neuroscientists is usually (...) the notion of sensory affect. It's not clear how these two notions are related to each other. I'll present the main outlines of both notions, make some critical observations, and raise a few questions at the end. (shrink)

What kind of mental phenomenon is romantic love? Many philosophers, psychologists, and ordinary folk treat it as an emotion. This chapter argues the category of emotion is inadequate to account for romantic love. It examines major emotion theories in philosophy and psychology and shows that they fail to illustrate that romantic love is an emotion. It considers the categories of basic emotions and emotion complexes, and demonstrates they too come short in accounting for romantic love. It assesses the roles of (...) culture and evolution in shaping the romantic love phenomenon and evaluates the ways in which the norms of rationality that are applied to standard emotions fail to apply to love. It considers the category of sentiments and argue that despite coming close, it does not adequately capture the nature of romantic love. Finally, the chapter makes a case for love being best characterized as a syndrome. (shrink)

There are now quite a number of popular or semi-popular works urging rejection of the old opposition between rationality and emotion. They present evidence or theoretical arguments that favour a reconception of emotions as providing an indispensable basis for practical rationality. Perhaps the most influential is neuroanatomist Antonio Damasio's Descartes' Error, which argues from cases of brain lesion and other neurological causes of emotional deficit that some sort of emotional ‘marking,’ of memories of the outcomes of our choices with anxiety, (...) is needed to support learning from experience. (shrink)

Sentimentalist theories in ethics treat evaluative judgments as somehow dependent on human emotional capacities. While the precise nature of this dependence varies, the general idea is that evaluative concepts are to be understood by way of more basic emotional reactions. Part of the task of distinguishing between the concepts that sentimentalism proposes to explicate, then, is to identify a suitably wide range of associated emotions. In this paper, we attempt to deal with an important obstacle to such views, which arises (...) from the dominant tradition in the philosophy of emotion. We will be attempting to steer a middle course between the traditional view and some recent, empirically-minded criticism. (shrink)

The papers by Ronald de Sousa and Steve Davis raise very interesting issues. I think that they have the issue almost right between us, but I want to make some small amendments, which will make a big difference.First, de Sousa: with all the talk about the ‘significance feature,’ I’m not trying to make an in principle argument against the reduction of purpose/action to physical movement/change. Perhaps such an argument is possible, perhaps not. For the moment, all we have is the (...) a posteriori. But that involves our making the most dear-headed possible judgments about our actual intellectual predicament, using this term as a shorthand for a whole set of issues to do with the nature of the phenomena we face, and how they relate or don't relate to the theories on offer. Philosophy can help in this, not because philosophers wheel in bright, shiny a priori possibility arguments, but rather by clarifying what is at stake, and what is going on. (shrink)

The connections between emotion and rationality are reexamined. Historically, Plato’s doctrine of the tripartite soul has established the preconception of a strict separation of emotion/passion from cognition/rationality, encouraging the biased perception that emotions are inherently irrational. To examine whether emotions can be rational, one must first examine the various meanings of rationality as developed in philosophy, psychology and the social and economic sciences. In this article, three forms of rationality are distinguished, and it is suggested that they can act as (...) criteria to judge the rationality of emotions. Furthermore, before examining the possible relationships between emotion and rationality, the concept of emotion needs a more precise definition. A convergent definition of emotion is proposed in the form of a componential model that is based on an appraisal mechanism that produces tendencies for action to deal rapidly with important and urgent events in an individual’s life. It is demonstrated that emotions can be more or less correct or appropriate depending on the accuracy or realism of the underlying appraisal, the appropriateness of the response pattern and the efficacy of the emotion regulation. Considered in the framework of this componential model, it is suggested that emotions can be assessed as to whether, in a particular situation, they are adaptive, based on well-grounded, accurate inference from available information and considered as reasonable reactions by others. Emotions can be considered rational when they fulfill at least one of these three criteria of rationality. (shrink)

This article is an extension of the author’s previous work on this subject. Primarily it outlines the main directions of this mode of analysis and possible fields to which it could be applied. The first chapter demonstrates a specific method of understanding emotions. The second chapter examines the concept of emotions as a source of the specific modes of “internal” rationality of an agent. The third chapter isdevoted to a comparison between various emotions and the two basic intentional states - (...) belief and desire. The fourth chapter will present the instrumental typology of certain emotional concepts. The final chapter represents preliminary logical schema of the meanings of emotional concepts. (shrink)

How should we understand the emotional rationality? This first part will explore two models of cognition and analogy strategies, test their intuition about the emotional desire. I distinguish between subjective and objective desire, then presents with a feeling from the "paradigm of drama" export semantics, here our emotional repertoire is acquired all the learned, and our emotions in the form of an object is fixed. It is pretty well in line with the general principles of rationality, especially the lowest reasonable (...) principles. Turned to the second part of this side of reasonable. I will inquire how emotional beliefs, desires, and behaviors contribute to the rationality. I will present a very general biological hypothesis: emotions by controlling highlights the characteristics of perception and reasoning, so that we remove the difficulties due in particular to lead to paralysis; they are being simulated by a simplified perception of information, thus limiting our practice and cognitive choice. How are we to understand emotional or axiological rationality? I pursue analogies with both the cognitive and the strategic models, testing them against intuitions about emotional desires. We distinguish two different classes of desires, the subjective and the objective, and propose that emotions have a semantics that derives from "paradigmatic scenarios", in terms of which our emotional repertoire is learned and the formal objects of our emotions fixed. This fits in well with emerging facts about how our emotional capacities develop, and it can also be squared with the general principles of rationality, particularly minimal rationality. In the second part, I return to the perspective of rationality. I ask how emotions contribute to the rationality of beliefs, desires, and behavior. I proffer a very general biological hypothesis: Emotions spare us the paralysis potentially induced by a particular predicament by controlling the salience of features of perception and reasoning; they temporarily mimic the informational encapsulation of perception and so circumscribe our practical and cognitive options. (shrink)

This is perhaps the richest book on emotions I have read. It is also a very frustrating book. It appears to be—and Elster more or less suggests this—a series of quite different kinds of essays, connected by somewhat confusing cross references and a general concern for the nature of emotions and their transformations. The first chapter is a position paper on explanation in the social sciences, a plea for “mechanisms” as opposed to law-like principles and straightforward causal accounts. The second (...) chapter is an edifying romp through three very different periods and styles of writing about the emotions. Elster begins with Aristotle’s powerful theory of the emotions, in rich detail and with considerable sympathetic insight. The next section fast-forwards two thousand years and provides us with some of the most challenging remarks and aphorisms of the French moralists of the seventeenth century, Montaigne, Pascal, La Rochefoucault, and La Bruyére. Their wit and sometimes cynicism is delightful, particularly on the subject of hidden and hypocritical self-interest. In their often contradictory insights Elster finds apt examples of his emotional “mechanisms.” Finally, the chapter considers several of the great literary masters and their depiction of the emotions in action. Shakespeare, Jane Austen, and Stendhal are obvious choices. The discussions of Racine, De Lafayette, and George Eliot tend to be, like their work, a good bit more prosaic. (shrink)

I argue that emotions are not only rational in-themselves, strictly speaking, but they are also instrumentally rational, epistemically rational, and evaluatively rational. I begin with a discussion of what it means for emotions to be rational or irrational in-themselves, which includes the derivation of a criterion for the ontological rationality of emotions (CORe): For emotion or an emotion there exists some normative standard that is given by what emotion or an emotion is against which our emotional responses can be judged (...) or evaluated in virtue of the fact that our emotions manifest our rationality. I conclude with a brief discussion of the implications of this account. (shrink)

In this paper a connection between intentionality, intensionality, language and emotion will be drawn up through a demonstration of an intimate relationship between the intentionality of emotion and intensionality in language. What will be shown is that the intentionality of emotion can ultimately be traced to the intensionality of emotional contexts. For this purpose, emotive predicates will be categorized in terms of their intensional behavior and regularities. They will then be brought forward for an explication of why and how far (...) the intentionality of emotion is unique. The insights derived from the relevant analyses will then be employed for the implications and ramifications that might be thrown upon the fabric of emotion and language within the space of cognition. (shrink)

Do our emotions stop us being rational? For thousands of years, emotions have been thought of as obstacles to intelligent thought. This view has been challenged in recent years by both philosophers and scientists. In this groundbreaking book, the first of its kind, leading thinkers from philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience challenge this commonly held view of emotion in a series of fascinating and challenging essays.

A study in the philosophy of mind, centred on the problem of 'intentionality' the sense in which emotions can be said to have objects, their relation to these objects, and the implications of this relation for our understanding of human action and behaviour. Dr Wilson sets his enquiry against a broad historical background on what distinguishes man from inanimate objects by describing both Cartesian view of man is matter plus mind and the neo-Wittgensteinian view that there is a dynamic behavioural (...) difference – causal notions being often inapplicable to human action. Dr Wilson goes on to show the controversies and arguments that arise from the notion of intentionality cannot be analysed in causal terms. Dr Wilson believes that this notion can be shown causally and sets out to prove it. Finally, he brings this argument to a larger context mentioning that it has far-reaching effects in natural and social sciences. (shrink)

In this thesis I consider a key problem in the theory of rationality, namely that as limited knowers we must set limits on the scope of our considerations. In Chapter I, I outline the problem: the need to draw certain kinds of cognitive limits in order to be rational and the special role that emotions play in that process. In Chapter II, I outline a theory of rationality. I do this by considering a number of views on rationality and epistemology (...) and by pointing out their strengths and flaws in order to arrive at my own account of rationality. My own view emphasizes the problem of our limited capacity as "knowers" and how we can accept that and still pursue truth and knowledge. Central to this is the need to limit the search for evidence; we must accept our reasoning ability as limited and come to closure. In Chapter III I consider some prominent theories of emotion in order to understand what role they might contribute to a theory of rationality. In Chapter IV I consider de Sousa's arguments for the conclusion that emotions have an essential role in creating salience, and in so doing help us overcome cognitive binds of indecision and the need to exclude possibly relevant evidence. I argue, against de Sousa, that emotion is not required to free us from a deterministic rationality yet agree with his speculation that emotion might help to solve cognitive binds by mimicking cognitive encapsulation.Dept. of Philosophy. Paper copy at Leddy Library: Theses & Major Papers - Basement, West Bldg. / Call Number: Thesis1993.M354. Source: Masterss International, Volume: 32-02, page: 0440. Adviser: Robert C. Pinto. Thesis --University of Windsor, 1993. (shrink)

This paper pictures emotions as able to provide reasons for action in so far as the beliefs and desires which make up reasons for action are constitutive elements of emotions themselves. It claims that the states of the world which prompt emotional attitudes “justify” them in so far as they render the beliefs constitutive of those attitudes true. Finally, it addresses the question what can make the desires or valuings ingredient to emotions appropriate to their objects.

This dissertation explores the practices of emotion work in the financial services industry as they are constructed in interviews with people employed in different financial organizations. The issues of emotion work in organizations are generally investigated in terms of emotion management, impression formation and negotiation or accomplishment. The previous research has also uncovered that emotions and market moods influence how people make financial decisions under conditions of fundamental uncertainty. In this study, I adopt a critical-interpretive approach and seek to develop (...) an in-depth understanding of organizational practices through which people employed in the financial services industry maintain emotion-reason dualism. This approach allows us to shift the analysis from categorizing what counts as rational versus emotional decision making to examining discourses that constitute claims of preferred rationality and devalue the significance of emotions at work. The transcripts of 23 interviews with 17 people employed in different financial organizations constituted the data for this study. The analysis of the interview discourse shows that emotions are conceptualized as an antipode to rationality, threat, weakness and as a source of stress. On one hand, the strategies of internal emotional control reflect the participants’ desire to take control over their feelings in order to fit into the discourse of preferred rationality. The concept of emotion also shapes the tactics of impression management. The interviewees were consciously aware of which feelings they wanted to display, and how to use emotions in order to build and maintain networks of relationships with different market participants. On the other hand, the simultaneous co-existence of negation and practical utility of feelings at work in the participants’ narratives suggests that meanings associated with preferred rationality and marginalized emotionality fluctuate along the following dimensions: absence-presence, chaos-order/discipline, weakness-power and subjectivity-objectivity. These findings open up a new space to explore the concepts of emotionality and rationality as socially constructed phenomena that are reproduced in the practices of emotion work. The focus on discourse not only offers a communication centered model of rationalized emotion, but also unveils social aspects of financial management. (shrink)

I shall propose that the unlearned motives of persons are primary emotions. I am not surprised that many informed readers will wonder where I have been for the last five decades when even the conception of unlearned motives has been shown to be little more than the result of undisciplined investigation? And here I am proposing that in the nature and dynamics of some emotions that persons experience we can gain more adequate understanding of human motives at the unlearned level. (...) During the last five decades I have spent most of my time teaching the histlDry of philosophy, metaphysics, philosophy of religion, ethics and theory of value, the psychology of personali ty, and th~ philosophy of personality. Increasingly I have paid special attention to the ways in which claims about ~the nature of man I influence the theory of motives, emotions, and feelings. What kept impressing me is the way in which the viii interpretation of the "findings" about motives, feelings, and emotion reflect unargued conceptions of human nature, or that the views of fundamental motives, feelings, and emotions unduly dominate the underlying conception of the person. In focusing attention first on the essential nature of a person I shall be discussing issues that are actually basic to our more analytical interpretation of the nature and dynamics of the primary motives or primary emotions. (shrink)

In this thesis I argue that emotion can not be adequately defined in terms of sensation, normative belief , nor a combination of the two. Emotion does entail "feeling" however, and explaining the sense of feeling which is relevant to defining emotion is the central aim of this thesis. In brief, I will show that the "emotionally relevant" sense of feeling is intentional in itself--but it is not to be identified with bodily sensation as feelings "traditionally" have been treated, nor (...) is it to be reduced to normative belief, which is how "cognitive theorists" have explained the intentionality of emotion. The feeling essential to emotion is irreducibly intentional and affective in nature: It is distinctively affective and can not be analysed in terms of "component parts." ;A proper analysis of the concept of emotion requires somewhat more than an explanation of "emotionally relevant feeling" though. For as the cognitive theorists have correctly maintained, one can "have an emotion" for quite some time without having to continuously feel or experience it. So while I mainly define emotion in terms of ERF, I add to this the concept of "dispositional emotion" which accounts for emotions that are not always felt. Finally, I discuss the connection between the concept of emotion and ERF, as well as the connection between emotions and moods, and emotions and behavior. (shrink)

The subject of this thesis is the emotion-object relationship and the problem of the justification of emotions as it bears on the emotion-object relationship. We will consider three possible constituents of the concept of emotion: feelings, behavior, and belief. ;Feeling cannot be the only constituent of emotion because there are not enough distinct feelings to account for the number of emotions we seem to have. However, the Schachter-Singer study indicates that, though feelings are not the means by which we identify (...) emotions, nevertheless we will not claim to have an emotion unless we experience some feeling. ;Behaviour too fails as the sole constituent of the concept of emotion, since there are not enough consistent behavior patterns with which to identify emotions. However, again, we will want to say that sometimes behaviour does play a part in emotions. ;Finally, beliefs cannot be the only constituent of the concept of emotion, but they can allow us to account for the number of emotions we have, and do seem to be present in every emotion. These beliefs are evaluative beliefs. ;The common sense notion of an object as that of something in the world will be adopted. Beliefs are the only constituent of emotions that can take an object; unfortunately, things can go wrong with these beliefs. We can make systematic mistakes about objects, thus we must take this into consideration when constructing a picture of the emotion-object relationship. In cases of mistake, when the most crucial features of the object are present in the belief, such as spatio-temporal location and other basis physical characteristics, we will say that the emotion has an object but the emotion is unjustified. (shrink)