Perception

In this paper we argue that object perception may be affected by what we call “perceptual frames.” Perceptual frames are adaptations of the perceptual system that guide how perceptual objects are singled out from a sensory environment. These adaptations are caused by perceptual learning and realized through bottom-up functional processes such that sensory information is organized in a subject-dependent way leading to idiosyncratic perceptual object representations. Through domain-specific training, perceptual learning, and the acquisition of object-knowledge, it is possible to modulate (...) the adaptive perceptual system such that its ability to represent becomes bespoke. Different perceivers with different perceptual frames may, therefore, receive the same sensory information and perceive different perceptual objects due to the effects of framing. Consequently, we demonstrate the plausibility of this account by surveying empirical data concerning the functions of (1) multisensory integration, (2) amodal completion, and (3) predictive anticipation. Regarding (1), we argue that the perceptual system’s optimization processes employ perceptual frames to facilitate multisensory feature binding. Regarding (2), we argue that amodal completion can occur with or without the help of mental imagery, yet either instance of amodal completion requires perceptual frames. Regarding (3), we demonstrate that perceptually anticipating an object’s motion involves the implementation of perceptual frames. We conclude that framing effects are a matter of perceptual diversity and highlight the need to accommodate unique perspectives in the philosophy and science of perception. (shrink)

Dustin Stokes book _Thinking and Perceiving_ is a substantial achievement. In this comment, I discuss issues related to cognitive penetration. While I agree with Stokes’ criticisms of Fodor and Pylyshyn’s discussion of cognitive penetration with respect to the role of attention, I provide a supporting, but different argument against how they understand attention. I also emphasize that the common appeal to behavioural data in arguing for cognitive penetration is less effective than an argument that supplements behavioural data with computational models. (...) I sketch how drawing on computational models strengthens the case for the cognitive penetration of attention by intention. This suggests that cognitive penetration is as common as intentional action. (shrink)

We argue that the core social being system is unlike other core systems in that it participates in frequent, widespread learning. As a result, the social being system is less constant throughout the lifespan and less informationally encapsulated than other core systems. This learning supports the development of the precursors of bias, but also provides avenues for preempting it.

By religious experiences I mean those human experiences characterised by a kind of intuitional seeming to the effect that a transcendent or all‐encompassing being—God—exists. After explaining two significant similarities between religious and perceptual experiences, I will argue that the doctrine of phenomenal dogmatism about perceptual experiences can be applied to religious experiences as well. In the following two sections, the challenge arising from the objection from cognitive penetration is extended to the case of religious experiences. I show that the importance (...) of this challenge may be dependent on a debate over the proper content of experience—namely the debate over low‐level vs. high‐level content. In the subsequent section, I argue that even if the religious experience is deemed an experience with low‐level content, then the charge of cognitive penetration may not be avoided. Drawing upon the doctrine of divine simplicity, in the penultimate section, I argue that the experience of God has a specific characteristic which, in companion with its thin content, enables it to escape the charge of cognitive penetration. Alternatively put, the experience of God possesses an important epistemological advantage owing to its distinctive object, which makes it significantly reliable. In the final section, three possible objections are briefly addressed. (shrink)

Written for a general popular audience, this is a discussion of the current state of research into the influence of belief on perception. It suggests that sense perception and thought do seep into one other, but that this doesn’t mean that perception is always biased in favour of our prior convictions: on the contrary, the influence of belief on perception can help us better navigate the world. I believe that following the link given above enables you to bypass the paywall (...) that might stop you getting to the article by other means. (shrink)