Ontology

Influenced by James Bernat’s approach, the US President’s 1981 Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioural Research concluded that human death is an instant that separates the dying process from the cadaveric state. Death, as Bernat and the President’s Commission argue, cannot be a process. Because organisms cannot be both alive and dead, Bernat claims, the transition from one state to the other must be sudden and instantaneous. Since then, few have argued the opposite (...) notion that death is a process, and that the transition between living and perishing is not a discrete event. In this article we argue that human death is a process that comprises three distinct phases: dying (when the physiological responses against the shutdown of vital organs and systems are in an imminence of breaking down), decease (when events such as respiratory and cardiac arrest indicate the critical failure of vital organs or systems), and decay (the irreversible and accelerated systemic biological process of cellular death that eventually takes over the whole body). We also argue that human death differs from the ‘time of death’ indicated by death certificates, which is pointed out only to clinically and legally establish the irreversibility of the entire process. (shrink)

A model of metaphysics associated with EJ Lowe and Tuomas Tahko sees metaphysics as involving a priori knowledge of possible essences, or at least modal facts, and delimiting the actual ‘ontological categories,’ the ultimate and essential divisions of what exists, based on the results of a posteriori scientific investigation. Their approach to metaphysics has been criticized by those who argue that such metaphysics is unsuitably a priori, disconnected with empirical research in natural science, and ends up failing to provide meaningful (...) constraints on metaphysical theorization. I present different epistemological and semantic worries about these accounts to motivate an alternative perspective on which metaphysics centers on form, rather than possibility. This scholastic perspective is shown to incorporate the skeptical insights as constitutive of its approach to existence, by way of the position that ‘being’ is not a genus. Rather, ‘being’ is a determinable. The scholastic approach can thus provide responses to the skeptics, since it denies that ontological categories – in the Lowe/Tahko sense – are what metaphysicians investigate and proposes a different view of ontological categories as classes of forms. (shrink)

The study of the ontology of virtual actions is essentially an examination of the nature of actions in virtual environments directly. This article first examined traditional research on the subject and then showed that these researches ignored findings about the nature of virtual actions. Previous studies have dealt with virtual action mostly from an ethical, psychological, or legal framework and focused on the individual or social effects of virtual action. In addition, these studies discuss not the virtual action itself, but (...) its effect or consequences. Based on these findings, in this study, it was emphasized that a virtual action should be investigated through two different types at a minimum, and an alternative method was developed for studies on virtual actions. According to this method, which is called the Sophisticated Action Model, it has been argued that in virtual action research, firstly the subject performing the action and then the environment in which the action takes place should be analyzed. It is claimed that the difference of virtual subject and environment will also differentiate the ontology of virtual action. In this context, the focus of the article is on the fact that an action augmented by any virtual action has completely different ontologies. The status of augmented actions within virtual actions is considered superior to other virtual actions. The fact that augmented actions, which have such an important status among virtual actions, were ignored in previous studies makes these studies on virtual actions incomplete and flawed. The nature of augmented actions takes virtual actions to a completely different atmosphere. The article concludes by emphasizing this distinctive nature of augmented actions, the ontological separation of virtual actions, and the importance of the Sophisticated Action Model for further studies. (shrink)

Fred Polak’s futurology takes up where F. W. Schelling’s claims about the ‘modern mythology’ leaves off. Linking these, I argue Art and humanity’s joint meaning crisis originates in ‘symbolic idealism’, de-futurising both and crippling humanity’s attempts to develop a proper internal ‘narrative order of goods’ needed for our survival. Polak’s tracing of how various forms of Expressionism emerged from Impressionism in later modernism, transforming our images of reality and the future, vindicates Schelling’s earlier claims that our symbolic mode of ‘worlding’ (...) creates a materially positivistic idea of progress. And our modern repurposing of art has produced what Polak calls a disorienting ‘false and deluded realism’ partly responsible for the counter-utopian, post-humanist tendencies prevalent today in both the East and West. (shrink)

This essay offers an original interpretation and defense of the doctrine of flux, as it is presented in Plato’s Theaetetus. The methodology of the paper’s analysis is in the style of rational reconstruction, and it is highly analytic in scope, in the sense that I will focus on the text itself, and only on certain parts of it too, while ignoring the rest of Plato’s extensive corpus, and without worrying about whether, how, and to what extent the interpretation of the (...) view coheres well with the other elements of the secret doctrine view discussed in the dialogue, as well. In the first part of the essay, I’ll offer my interpretation of the doctrine. Then, in the second part of the essay, I’ll examine two potential criticisms of the doctrine, including Socrates’s infamous linguistic paradox, and show how my interpretation of Heraclitean flux metaphysics is able to circumvent both. (shrink)

The Power Structuralist View (PSV) is an account of causation in which causal relations are reduced to the powers that are activated in the subject by another subject’s power, instantly and simultaneously. PSV is based on two main assumptions: (a) holism; (b) reductionism. After justifying the choice to place PSV within the so-called ‘process accounts’ of causation (PA), I will show how, generally, every PA must solve the so-called “transference paradox” (TP) and why PSV is an innovative account. However, PSV (...) creates two main problems: (1) how to explain the instantaneous activation between correlatives; (2) how to explain which kind of “nexus” takes place between powers. I will argue that, in order to solve (1), PSV needs to adopt an intervalist position, but this leads to a form of monism that contradicts (a). Regarding (2), the reductionist approach implies the assumption that “all relations between powers are internal” and, therefore, a form of monism, again against premise (a). PSV reduces causation to a ‘primitive concept’ (the ontological dependence) but, in this way, point (2) remains unexplained. The problem of physical transference (or reciprocal influence) remains unanswered, and PSV seems to be a covert form of occasionalism. -/- [NOTE: the version on the Journal's site has problems in the footnotes. DOWNLOAD the correct version here in PhilPapers]. (shrink)

The intent of this thesis is to explore the concept of creativity as it appears in the major works of Karl Marx and to attempt to discern its role in the emancipatory political project that Marx proposes. Contemporary understandings of creativity still rely upon notions of the artist-genius, locating the "true" expression of creative freedom in the work of art. A more recent development is the commodification of creativity as a quality of a good worker, who is now expected to (...) find innovative ways of doing their job more efficiently. Both of these ideas about creativity allow for our creative energies to be diverted towards maintaining the existing relations of capitalist labor, one by putting it out of reach for most, the other by making it part of the tedium of wage labor. This thesis argues that creativity, as a fundamental human capacity, is an essential tool in changing our existing circumstances by instigating radical breaks from the status quo. Therefore, the first step in an emancipatory politics today is redefining creativity. (shrink)

Are we made entirely of matter, like sticks and stones? Or do we have a soul—a nonphysical entity—where our mental lives take place? -/- The authors Eric T. Olson and Aaron Segal begin this accessible and wide-ranging debate by looking at the often-overlooked question of whether we appear in ordinary experience to be material things. Olson then argues that the dependence of our mental lives on the condition of our brains—the fact that general anesthesia causes complete unconsciousness, for instance—is best (...) explained by saying that our mental lives are physical activities in our brains rather than nonphysical activities in the soul. Segal objects that this view is incompatible with two obvious and important facts about ourselves: that there is only one of you rather than trillions of almost identical beings now thinking your thoughts, and that we exist and remain conscious for more than an instant. These facts, he claims, are presupposed in our practical and moral judgments—but they require us to be immaterial things. Olson is forced to concede that there is no easy and uncontroversial answer to these objections but doubts whether taking us to be immaterial would be any help. The debate takes in large philosophical questions extending well beyond dualism and materialism. -/- The book features clear statements of each argument, responses to counter-arguments, in-text definitions, a glossary of key terms, and section summaries. Scholars and students alike will find it easy to follow the debate and learn the key concepts from metaphysics, philosophy of mind, and other areas necessary to understand each position. (shrink)

Reflection Theory holds that our sensations reflect physical properties, whereas Empiricism believes that sense (data), presentations, and phenomena are the ultimate existence. Lenin adhered to Reflection Theory and criticized Helmholtz’s sensory symbolism for affirming the similarity between a sensation and a physical property. By using information and color vision theories, analyzing the ostensive definition with inverted qualia, and extending the relativity principle, this paper affirms the external world’s existence independent of personal sensations. Still, it denies the similarity between a sense (...) and a physical property. Then, it improves symbolism to analog symbolism and Reflection Theory to Information Reflection Theory. (shrink)

From the time of Confucius and Aristotle up until the present day, theorists have argued that the individual self exists only as an aspect of social structures. The claim is not merely that the self is causally affected by social structures; but that the self is just social structure. The most recent iteration of this claim comes in book-length from Brian Lowery, though the argument was made more completely by Charles Taylor and Kenneth Gergen in the preceding decades. The most (...) rigorous version of the argument draws on Wittgenstein, claiming that thought itself is impossible without socially constructed meanings. Wittgenstein argued that a “private language” would be incoherent because the person using the language could not have any criteria by which to judge the correctness of the symbols used. However, this reasoning fails as an argument against individualized thought because it applies equally well to the use of public languages. So this paper argues that eliminative social constructivism has never made any sense, least of all in its latest form. (shrink)

I explore the problems of ficta ‘generation’ and ‘properties’ in light of Meinong and Ingarden. Comparing Ingarden and the historical Meinong is not a novel project idea. By contrast, comparing Ingarden and a phenomenological Meinong, to my knowledge, has not been explored yet. Here, I rely on Alberto Voltolini’s ‘phenomenological conception of außerseiende entities’. I devise Ingarden’s phenomenological ontology to account for the problems of ascription and generation crippling Meinong’s. In short, I argue for Ingarden’s account as being the better (...) suited to accommodate ficta’s generation and properties in a way that doesn’t complicate our approach to fiction. (shrink)

This is an art piece, an Ontology, and soon a accessible interactive AI running on my Ontology. It is, I like to say, the "Pudding's Proof," which will be the book title.

To solve the ship of Theseus puzzle, you need several keys. First of all, we need to fix the application condition of the physical object—it is a vehicle or an object memory; then the identification criterion—the ship was named The Ship of Theseus when he boarded it; and finally the re-application criterion—a ship (or an object memory) when it is the same ship (or object memory) as before. The degree of change from the previous and reference states must be given. (...) The identity of physical objects over time can be expressed by the uniformity of the time slices of the persisting objects. Uniformity exists from the point of view that these instances are temporal cross-sections of the same object; they may differ in other characteristics; there are no general a priori principles independent of practice. The definition of identity is decided by the community of language users. The two states of an object are the same as long as the rate of change of state remains below the threshold value relative to the reference. The two states of an object are similar as long as the change is below a threshold value with respect to each other. Similarity can be described by a tolerance relationship. The mathematical relation describing uniformity is formally an equivalence relation, just as the relation describing identity is an equivalence relation. A physical object is identical to an equivalence class when we speak of the object's identity over time and identical or not identical to an element of the equivalence class when we speak of the object having changed or ceased to exist. (shrink)

[186 pages] Just as the six branches of a snow crystal converge in regular proportions toward their common center, the six contributions to this book point toward a future philosophy of cosmic life. In this sense, this edited volume represents a multidisciplinary and transcultural polylogue of distinguished authors from three continents, which aims to establish highly innovative perspectives and open new frontiers of developing philosophical reflections and scientific foundations for the emergence of a common cosmic consciousness, for an integral ecology, (...) and for a cooperative planetary civilization of humanity. John B. Cobb, Jr. uses a process-philosophical foundation to describe life as living events expressing novelty and the cosmos as a process of self-enriching and self-evolving “Life Itself.” Chandra Wickramasinghe unfolds his scientific and philosophical perspective on cosmic life in twelve successive steps, offering a wide range of arguments and insights that support an up-to-date theory of panspermia. Attila Grandpierre presents the "Cosmic Life Principle" and the comprehensive science based upon it that is inextricably linked to the healthy and cooperative civilization, to the biological laws of nature, to the laws of logic, to the uplifting of the well-being of people and ecological communities. Chunyou Yan introduces the approach of his holographic philosophy, according to which the universe must be understood as a vast living entity, every aspect of which represents life. Bei Peng shows that the proportions of energy meridians in traditional Chinese medicine correspond to musical intervals, and on this basis she demonstrates the analogy of the human body to macrocosmic phenomena. David Bartosch offers an examination of three important systematic foundations for a poly-contextural, transcultural philosophy of cosmic life with roots in Greek, Chinese, South and West Asian, and European traditions of thought. (shrink)

This chapter provides an account of sexual ontology, grounded in and responsive to Irigaray’s philosophy, that focuses on the question of possibility. I first consider possibility in terms of the ontological negativity of sexuate beings, whereby one sex or sexuate morphology does not exhaust all that that kind of being is or can be. Second, I consider how sexual difference, as a relational structure of being, engenders possibilities for sexuate beings to develop as irreducible individuals. With particular focus on the (...) human being and the looming question of transhumanist technologies, I argue that these principles develop a sexual ontology that recognizes determinate limits between sexes while allowing for varied and creative expressions of sexuate life. (shrink)

This dissertation explores the prospects of postdeflationary substantive theorizing about truth. Postdeflationary theories define the concept of truth or the property of being a true truthbearer in a way that respects the deflationary desiderata of clarity, purity, and permissiveness with truth-aptness, without a necessary commitment to the core negative thesis of the deflationary approach. Postdeflationary substantive theories further acknowledge the complexity and explanatory utility of truth in understanding and defining other concepts and phenomena. The motivation for pursuing this study arises (...) from the so-called contemporary crisis of truth, where a substantive understanding of truth is subjected to widespread skepticism, critique, and even cynicism both inside and outside of philosophy in formal and mundane discourse. To better understand this crisis, particular attention is directed towards the deflationary critique of substantive theories of truth, which is a prevalent point of discussion in contemporary literature on western analytic philosophy. By exploring the limits and philosophical sustainability of deflationary critique of substantive accounts of truth, valuable insight is gained about the contemporary crisis of truth and the potential for substantive theorizing about truth in general. This dissertation composes of an introduction and four original research publications that address two connected themes: exploration of the philosophical sustainability of deflationary critique of substantive theories of truth, and exploration of the prospects for development of the now popular substantive pluralist theories of truth. These themes constitute both negative and positive aspects in relation to analyzing the prospects of postdeflationary substantive theorizing about truth. The first part of this dissertation focuses on arguing against the widespread deflationary readings of W.V.O. Quine’s truth, who is widely interpreted as a prominent and influential deflationist in both the secondary literature on his philosophy and contemporary truth-theoretic debates more broadly conceived. The first essay demonstrates that Quine’s immanent conception of truth involves commitments that are incompatible with general and theory-specific framings of the deflationary thesis. The second essay demonstrates conflicts between Quine’s views and what has in recent literature been argued as strong and moderate variants of the deflationary thesis. In conclusion, these essays demonstrate that the widespread deflationary readings of Quine’s truth are mistaken, thus removing a prominent thinker from the deflationists ranks while simultaneously casting suspicion towards the philosophical sustainability of the deflationary approach in general. The second part of this dissertation explores the prospects of postdeflationary substantive theorizing about truth by analyzing the limits and prospects for development of the increasingly popular substantive pluralist theories. The third essay explores different ways in which semantic ambiguity poses trouble for current pluralist models. The fourth essay argues that to achieve the theoretical desiderata that pluralists ask from discourse domains, the latter ought to be individuated on ontological rather than topical grounds. In conclusion, these essays demonstrate that while current pluralist models involve shortcomings, they encompass potential for development and provide a viable prospect for sustainable postdeflationary substantive theorizing about truth. (shrink)

There are two links that stand in the foreground of Deleuze’s treatment of Epicurus and Lucretius: the themes of immanent naturalism and of the externality of ontological relations. However, the links are problematised in Difference and Repetition, which presents an important critique of the concept of the atom. I will argue that this critique reveals the limits of the intellectual affinity between ancient atomism and Deleuzian metaphysics; in particular, that Deleuze’s notions of relationality and spatium respond to problems raised by (...) the relations between atoms and by the not-being of the atomists’ vacuum. In this sense, Deleuze’s treatment of atomism is significant because it makes clear Deleuze’s aim in shifting the mereological vocabulary from points to lines; it shows what, in Deleuze’s sense, it means to unfound and sets down the conditions for a successful Deleuzian critique of essentialist varieties of the metaphysics of structure. (shrink)

This chapter develops an argument for the ontological significance of sexual difference through Irigaray’s account of “the negative.” Reading Irigaray with Hegel’s logical analysis of finitude as a negative self-reference, or in terms of the dependence of identity on difference, I consider how this ontological negativity functions in two senses: first, in terms of a generational negativity, whereby sexuate beings rely on this difference as their own copulative condition of possibility; and second, in terms of a more general negative self-relation (...) to sexuate others as incarnated in the determinate limits of one’s own sexuate body. Against skeptical challenges to the reality of these two senses of ontological negativity, this chapter thus develops an account of sexual difference in terms of the irreducible reference to otherness in oneself, subverting the idea that there could be sexuate identity without difference. (shrink)

I. Einheit und Vielheit.--II. Sein und Werden, mit einem Epilog zum Ganzen.