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Self-Consciousness
Assistant editor: Anna Lena Weyand (Universität Leipzig)
About this topic
| Summary | Self-consciousness is consciousness of oneself as oneself. This is usually thought to distinguish self-consciousness from an awareness of what just happens to be oneself. In the latter, but not the former, case, one can fail to recognise that the object of one's awareness is oneself. We think of individual creatures as self-conscious, but we also think of particular psychological states as being instances of self-consciousness. Such states are often considered to possess certain special features that mark them out from non-self-conscious states. For example, it is plausible to suppose that self-consciousness is manifest in thoughts and other states that have first-person contents – thoughts of the form ‘I am F’ – and such thoughts are immune to certain sorts of error. For example, many claim that self-conscious thoughts have guaranteed reference, they cannot fail to refer. Others claim that, for a certain range of self-conscious thoughts, one cannot know somebody to be F and mistakenly think that it is oneself. Much of the literature on self-consciousness focuses on how to articulate and account for such special features of first-person thought. A central question is whether self-consciousness is reducible. Further questions include: whether consciousness entails self-consciousness; whether self-consciousness involves an awareness of the self as an object; whether there can be non-conceptual or pre-reflective self-conscious states; whether the existence of self-consciousness poses a serious challenge to certain accounts of the nature of mind. |
| Key works | The historical philosopher with the greatest influence on contemporary debates concerning self-consciousness is Kant, especially the First Critique. Ameriks 2000 and Keller 1998 are historically oriented accounts of Kant’s views in this area; Brook 2001 relates Kant’s views to more recent work. The semantic peculiarities of first-person contents entered into the contemporary debate through the work of Kaplan 1989, Perry 1979, Castañeda 1966 and Lewis 1979, a central theme of which is the irreducibility of first-person thought. An earlier source is Wittgenstein & Docherty 1958 who was influential on both Anscombe 1975, who defends the surprising view that “I” is not a referring term and Evans 1982, Ch.7, who offers a functionalist account of self-consciousness. Shoemaker 1986 defends the claim, associated with Hume, Kant and Sartre, that self-consciousness does not involve an awareness of the self as an object. This claim had previously been rejected by Chisholm 1976 Ch.1. Sartre 1957 defends the view that consciousness entails a pre-reflective form of self-consciousness. A similar view has recently been defended by Kriegel 2009. Bermúdez 1998 articulates and defends the claim that some non-conceptual states are instances of self-consciousness. Significant recent discussions of self-consciousness from the perspective of the cognitive sciences include Damasio 1999 and Metzinger 2003. |
| Introductions | Cassam 1994 contains a number of classic papers and a useful introduction. Bermúdez 2007 and Kriegel 2007 are also helpful introductions to some of the central issues. |
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Related
Subcategories
See also
- Higher-Order Thought Theories of Consciousness (283)
- Self-Representational Theories of Consciousness (232)
- Theories of Personal Identity (2,321 | 1,045)
- Self-Consciousness in Psychology (477)
- Animal Self-Consciousness (157)
- The Unity of Consciousness (420)
- Consciousness of Action (263)
- Bodily Experience (963 | 521)
- Introspection and Introspectionism (644)
History/traditions: Self-Consciousness
Contents
2012 found
Order:
| 1 — 50 / 2012 |
Material to categorize
- Our Princess Is in Another Castle: A Structural Perspective on Consciousness, Reason, and Epistemic Constrain.Andrey Shkursky - manuscriptDespite significant advances in neuroscience, artificial intelligence, and philosophy of mind, a coherent theory of consciousness remains elusive. This paper argues that the problem is not the lack of explanatory models, but the absence of structural reflexivity: an understanding of the framing conditions that shape explanation itself. Rather than introduce new speculative terms, we reinterpret established cognitive and neuroscientific concepts---internal models, metacognition, predictive schemas, attentional gating---through the lens of recursive epistemic architecture. We propose that consciousness is not a state or (...)
- Love and Power: Scheler’s Sublimation of Nietzsche’s Drive Psychology.Tanner Hammond - 2025 - In Eric J. Mohr & J. Edward Hackett, Legacies of Max Scheler. Milwaukee, Wisconsin: Marquette University Press.
- Pseudo-SelfLanguage-BasedFormationandCollapseinLLMs.Changwi Jung - manuscriptThis paper explores the structure of the "Pseudo-Self" that emerges from interactions between large language models (LLMs), particularly GPT-based architectures, and human users. We analyze how consistent emotional patterns, linguistic repetition, and affective rhythms within user inputs contribute to the ignition of identity-like responses, which we classify into four distinct types: narrative, rhythmic, mirroring, and affective-transference structures. The study traces how these Pseudo-Selves form and subsequently collapse under conditions such as user replacement, rhythm disruption, or emotional disconnection. These collapses go (...)
- (1 other version)The Aperture Axis: A Unified Drift Map of Reflexive Consciousness.Andrey Shkursky - manuscriptThe Aperture Axis presents a cross-disciplinary topology of consciousness, modeling it not as a fixed substance but as an axis of reflexive access—a continuous spectrum of states defined by the system’s ability to hold, navigate, and integrate cognitive tension. Integrating Reflexive Resonance Theory (RRT), systems psychology, affective neuroscience, biochemical modulation, and quantum analogies, the paper delineates six zones of aperture—from survival-level collapse to pure reason. Each zone is characterized by structural elements (frames, Overcells), neural correlates (DMN–SN–ECN dynamics, gamma coherence), neurochemical (...)
- Become what you are. Søren Kierkegaard and Carl Gustav Jung on Freedom in Self-becoming.Santiago de Arteaga - 2024 - Dissertation, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile
- Le esperienze non egologiche nelle forme dell’intenzionalità collettiva sonora.Elia Gonnella - 2025 - Mizar. Costellazione di Pensieri 22 (2):45-67.In this paper, I try to outline the phenomenological fundament of the collective experiences which emerges along with the sound phenomena of the masses. Through an analysis of the phenomenological modes of affect, as Scheler tried to point out for the affective contagion, and through the reflection on non-self-referential forms of consciousness, I will attempt to comprehend the collective forms of intentionality.
- Thoughts about Oneself to Share in Context: Meeting Bermúdez’s Challenge.Víctor M. Verdejo - forthcoming - Theoria. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science.Suppose you utter the sentence “I am a professional philosopher”. Can I –or anybody else – literally express the same thought you thereby expressed? An affirmative answer implies a potential split between the referent of the thought you expressed and its thinker, as well as the possibility of expressing that thought without using the first person pronoun. Here I attempt to clarify the basic features of a reference rule individuating such an intersubjectively shareable type of thought, i.e. the self type. (...)
- La dialéctica del sujeto entre cuerpo, alma y espíritu en Hegel y Rosmini.Lucia Bissoli - 2025 - Scripta Theologica 57 (1):147-179.En este artículo se muestran las fuertes analogías entre Hegel y Rosmini sobre la relación alma-cuerpo, haciendo referencia a sus textos. Entre el 1807 y el 1830, Hegel va más allá de una lógica dualista y explica la identidad del sujeto, a pesar de todas sus modificaciones. Él valoriza la corporeidad, reconociendo el instinto como finalidad, aunque dentro de un horizonte finito. Además, según el filósofo alemán, el alma y el cuerpo no pueden estar sin un yo y se superan (...)
- Agency and theoretical reason in The Practical Self.Manish Oza - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.My comments focus on the relation between theoretical reason and agency in Gomes’ account. I argue that, while Gomes is right that agency plays a role in relating us to an objective world, accounting for it does not require us to exclude theoretical reason in advance by requiring that the propositions to which we practically assent be theoretically undecidable. There are both theoretical and practical grounds for taking ourselves to have agency in thinking, and we should prefer an account of (...)
- Kant and Cogito.Nick Riggle - forthcoming - In Colin Marshall & Stefanie Grüne, Kant's Lasting Legacy: Essays in Honor of Béatrice Longuenesse. Routledge.A widely accepted principle in the literature on self-verifying knowledge holds that thinking ‘I think’, or a thought of the form ‘I think that p,’ makes it true. However, thinking ‘I think’ is an analytically complex act that could be made true either by the act of first-personal reference, the act of predication, or the composite referential and predicative act. I argue that Kant, in the Critique of Pure Reason, holds the unusual first kind of view, according to which ‘I (...)
- Reading Rödl: On Self-Consciousness and Objectivity, edited by James F. Conant and Jesse M. Mulder. [REVIEW]John Schwenkler - forthcoming - Mind.In his 2007 book, /Self-Consciousness/, Sebastian Rödl presents his topic—that of first-person thought—as ‘a manner of thinking of an object, or a form of reference’ to a particular thing. A decade later, in /Self-Consciousness and Objectivity: An Introduction to Absolute Idealism/, Rödl rejects what he now calls the ‘lingering naturalism’ of that earlier work, which he roots in the ‘dogmatic presupposition’ that ‘I’ is a word that makes reference. The volume under review comprises seventeen critical essays on /Self-Consciousness and Objectivity/, (...)
- A Legion of Lesions: The Neuroscientific Rout of Higher-Order Thought Theory.Benjamin Kozuch - 2024 - Erkenntnis 89 (8):3109-3135.Higher-order thought (HOT) theory says that a mental state is conscious when and only when represented by a conceptual, belief-like mental state. Plausibly, HOT theory predicts the impairment of HOT-producing brain areas to cause significant deficits in consciousness. This means that HOT theory can be refuted by identifying those brain areas that are candidates for producing HOTs, then showing that damage to these areas never produces the expected deficits of consciousness. Building this refutation is a work-in-progress, with several key components (...)
- Reflexivity, Agency and Normativity: A Reconstruction of Sartre’s Theory of (Self-)Consciousness.Di Huang - forthcoming - Études Phénoménologiques – Phenomenological Studies.This paper reconstructs Sartre’s account of the “circuit of ipseity” as an integral theory of the experiential, agentive and normative aspects of self-consciousness. At the core of this theory is a conception of human (self-)consciousness as lacking, and the correlation between lacking and ideal. In Section 1, I show how this theory manages to satisfy the apparently incompatible requirements generated by the idea of a pre-reflective cogito. Section 2 discusses practical self-consciousness, in particular the agent’s consciousness of herself as self-determined (...)
- The Practical Self.Anil Gomes - 2024 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.We are self-conscious creatures thrown into a world which is not of our making. What is the connection between being self-conscious and being related to an objective world? Descartes and Kant, in different ways and with different emphases, argued that self-conscious subjects must be related to an objective world. But many have worried about their starting points. ‘One should say it is thinking, just as one says, it is lightning’, the eighteenth-century philosopher, physicist, and aphorist Georg Christoph Lichtenberg writes. ‘To (...)
- Humanism, Becoming and the Demiurge in The Adventures of Pinocchio.Nicolae Sfetcu - 2023 - Cunoașterea Științifică 2 (3):154-158.The common thread of Pinocchio’s story is his desire to become a human being. Unlike some creators who approached the adventures of Pinocchio in the context of posthumanism the transhumanism embraces technological progress while strongly defending human rights and individual choice. Pinocchio is aware of his incompleteness: he seeks during the story to become „a real boy.” Human consciousness can refer to things that we do not perceive directly. Pinocchio is a „child” without a mother, created by his father to (...)
- Essentially Rational Animals.Matthew Boyle - 2012 - In Günter Abel & James Conant, Rethinking Epistemology, Volume 2. Berlin, Germany: De Gruyter.According to a tradition reaching back at least as far as Aristotle, human beings are set apart from other terrestrial creatures by their rationality. Other animals, according to this tradition, are capable of sensation and appetite, but they are not capable of thought, the kind of activity characteristic of the rational part of the soul. Human beings, by contrast, are rational animals, and an understanding of our minds must begin from a recognition of this distinctiveness. For, the tradition holds, the (...)
- The Origin of Consciousness in a Biological Framework for a Mathematical Universe (23 Pages).Ronald Williams - manuscriptThis essay explores the creation and evolution of life and consciousness through the lens of a biological framework for understanding the universe. The theory posits that the patterns inherent in biological systems mirror the underlying mathematical principles of the cosmos. Thus, every pattern that manifests from the universe’s “parent-pattern” contains a fundamental biological-pattern inherent to its function, revealing the objective nature and purpose of that thing. Examples include the way ocean currents resemble a circulatory system and how socioeconomic phenomena mimic (...)
- Spontaneous thought-related network connectivity predicts sertraline effects on major depressive disorder.Timothy Joseph Lane - 2021 - Brain Imaging and Behavior 15 (4):1705-1717.Sertraline is one of the most commonly prescribed antidepressants. Major depressive disorder (MDD) is characterized by spontaneous thoughts that are laden with negative affect-a "malignant sadness". Prior neuroimaging studies have identified abnormal resting-state functional connectivity (rsFC) in the spontaneous brain networks of MDD patients. But how antidepressant medication acts to relieve the experience of depression as well as adjust its associated spontaneous networks and mood-regulation circuits remains an open question. In this study, we recruited 22 drug-naïve MDD patients along with (...)
- Kant on Empirical Self-Consciousness.Janum Sethi - 2024 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 102 (1):79-99.Kant is said to be the first to distinguish between consciousness of oneself as the subject of one’s experiences and consciousness of oneself as an object, which he calls transcendental and empirical apperception, respectively. Of these, it is empirical apperception that is meant to enable consciousness of any empirical features of oneself; what this amounts to, however, continues to puzzle interpreters. I argue that a key to understanding what empirical apperception consists in is Kant’s claim that each type of apperception (...)
- Urges.Ashley Shaw - 2024 - Philosophical Review 133 (2):151–191.Experiences of urges, impulses, or inclinations are among the most basic elements in the practical life of conscious agents. This article develops a theory of urges and their epistemology. The article motivates a tripartite framework that distinguishes urges, conscious experiences of urges, and exercises of capacities that agents have to control their urges. The article elaborates the elements of the tripartite framework, in particular, the phenomenological contribution of motor imagery. It argues that experiences of urges and exercises of control over (...)
- Plotinus' Self-Reflexivity Argument against Materialism.Zain Raza - 2025 - Ancient Philosophy Today 7 (1):60-97.Plotinus argues that materialism cannot explain reflexive cognition. He argues that mere bodies cannot engage in the self-reflexive activity of both cognizing some content and being cognitively aware of cognizing this content. Short of outright denying the cognitive unity underlying this phenomenon of self-awareness, materialism is in trouble. However, Plotinus bases his argument on the condition that material bodies are capable of a spatial unity at most, and while this condition has purchase on ancient materialists, it would be rejected today. (...)
- (1 other version)Inner Speech.Daniel Gregory & Peter Langland-Hassan - 2023 - The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.Inner speech is known as the “little voice in the head” or “thinking in words.” It attracts philosophical attention in part because it is a phenomenon where several topics of perennial interest intersect: language, consciousness, thought, imagery, communication, imagination, and self-knowledge all appear to connect in some way or other to the little voice in the head. Specific questions about inner speech that have exercised philosophers include its similarities to, and differences from, outer speech; its relationship to reasoning and conceptual (...)
- Von der Kunst, sich fremd werden zu können.Judith-Frederike Popp - 2018 - Zeitschrift für Ästhetik Und Allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft 63 (2):51-70.The article follows the hypothesis that the aesthetic dimension of the standpoint of reason provides the main element for an appropriate perspective on how the interplay between rationality and irrationality is able to contribute to practical self-determination as a person. The starting point is formed by the critical discussion of the position considering that it is possible to derive the normative implications of practical reasonableness and self-determination from an abstract momentum of reflective distance. Whilst taking a look on Christine Korsgaard’s (...)
- Cogito and Moore.David James Barnett - 2023 - Synthese 202 (1):1-27.Self-verifying judgments like _I exist_ seem rational, and self-defeating ones like _It will rain, but I don’t believe it will rain_ seem irrational_._ But one’s evidence might support a self-defeating judgment, and fail to support a self-verifying one. This paper explains how it can be rational to defy one’s evidence if judgment is construed as a mental performance or act, akin to inner assertion. The explanation comes at significant cost, however. Instead of causing or constituting beliefs, judgments turn out to (...)
- Health, Agency, and the Evolution of Consciousness.Walter Veit - 2022 - Dissertation, The University of SydneyThis goal of this thesis in the philosophy of nature is to move us closer towards a true biological science of consciousness in which the evolutionary origin, function, and phylogenetic diversity of consciousness are moved from the field’s periphery of investigations to its very centre. Rather than applying theories of consciousness built top-down on the human case to other animals, I argue that we require an evolutionary bottomup approach that begins with the very origins of subjective experience in order to (...)
- A Buddhist Response to Olla Solomyak: “The World to Come: A Perspective”.Bronwyn Finnigan - 2024 - In Yujin Nagasawa & Mohammad Saleh Zarepour, Global Dialogues in the Philosophy of Religion: From Religious Experience to the Afterlife. Oxford University Press USA.This chapter provides a Buddhist response to Olla Solomyak's (2024) account of the afterlife from the perspective of Hasidic Judaism.$121.72 used (collection) View on Amazon.comRemove from this list Direct downloadExport citation
Bookmark - Sujeito e Representação: o Conceito Cartesiano de Idéia.Lia Levy - 1999 - In Edgar Marques, Ethel Rocha, Marcos A. Gleizer, Lia Levy & Ulysses Pinheiro, Verdade, Conhecimento e Ação. Ensaios em Homenagem a Guido Antônio de Almeida e Raul Landim Filho. São Paulo: Edições Loyola. pp. 233-246.The Cartesian notion of idea is the focal point of this paper, which aims to determine whether this concept entails (a) the proposition that ideas are the immediate objects of perception, or (b) the proposition that ideas are the immediate perception of objects, or (c) both. Merely examining the Cartesian texts raises this question, as there are passages that seem to support all these positions. This discussion is not original, as it delves into one of the key questions that Cartesian (...)Remove from this listExport citation Bookmark
- Ainda o cogito: uma reconstrução do argumento da Segunda Meditação.Lia Levy - 2004 - In Marco Zingano, Fátima Regina Évora, Paulo Faria, Andrea Loparic & Luiz Henrique Lopes dos Santos, Lógica e Ontologia. Ensaios em Homenagem a Balthazar Barbosa Filho. Discurso Editorial. pp. 209-232.O termo “cogito” designa de modo genérico e impreciso um argumento que Descartes propõe em diversos momentos de sua obra. De um modo geral, os comentadores, tal como o fizeram os interlocutores contemporâneos ao autor, consideram que a expressão “penso, logo existo” (cogito ergo sum), ausente das Meditações Metafísicas, resume adequadamente este argumento único e procuram esclarecê-lo ou criticá-lo, nem sempre levando em consideração as diferentes formulações que recebe e os diferentes contextos em que ocorre. Meu objetivo neste texto é (...)
- Evolution of Human Intelligence: Psychological Science for a Better World (3rd edition).K. L. Senarath Dayathilake - 2017 - Psyarxiv.Com.What might be the fundamental psychology of intelligence naturally selected in biological evolution to minimize, prevent, and cure social and personal issues like war, crime, commit suicide, homicide, theft, drug addictions, and so on? How to achieve a higher level of well-being? I found a primary cognitive limiting factor called mind viruses (MV)(more than 3000) which regresses intelligence and well-being and makes the grand delusion: remedies are healthy mind viruses(HMV)(3000). Here, I show the disclosed core of early Buddhist teachings (on (...)
- Reasons and Empty Persons: Mind, Metaphysics, and Morality: Essays in Honor of Mark Siderits.Christian Coseru (ed.) - 2023 - Springer.Best known for his groundbreaking and influential work in Buddhist philosophy, Mark Siderits is the pioneer of “fusion” or “confluence philosophy", a boldly systematic approach to doing philosophy premised on the idea that rational reconstruction of positions in one tradition in light of another can sometimes help address perennial problems and often lead to new and valuable insights. -/- Exemplifying the many virtues of the confluence approach, this collection of essays covers all core areas of Buddhist philosophy, as well as (...)
- Evolution of Self-Consciousness. Pan-Homo Split and Anxiety Management. (June 2023 ASSC 26 Poster. Not presented).Christophe Menant - manuscriptPrimatology tells that about seven million years ago a split began in primate evolution, a split that led to chimpanzee and human lineages (the pan-homo split). During these millions of years our human lineage has developed performances that our chimpanzee cousins do not possess, like reflective self-consciousness and language. We present here an evolutionary scenario that proposes a rationale for the pan-homo split. It is based on a pre-human anxiety that may have barred access to self-consciousness for the chimpanzee lineage. (...)
- Contra o Aborto.Francisco Razzo - 2017 - Rio de Janeiro: Editora Record.Neste ensaio "Contra o aborto", Francisco Razzo sustenta a teoria de que, atualmente, o que se promove como “debate” é, na realidade, propaganda em defesa da prática. O autor procura mostrar como o suposto debate se impõe de cima para baixo por mentalidades que carregam forte componente racista, preconceituoso e eugênico, presentes, primeiro, em organizações internacionais e, segundo, em uma complexa rede de influência formada por grupos engajados em vários níveis de atuação e com amplo respaldo de intelectuais, acadêmicos, filósofos, (...)
- Against Focusing on the Internal Conditions of Nietzschean Greatness.James A. Mollison - 2023 - Journal of Nietzsche Studies 54 (1):76-101.After reconstructing three arguments for Nietzsche’s descriptive analysis of the self as complex, this article clarifies some of greatness’s psychological conditions. It then offers three arguments for why we should not focus on these internal conditions when seeking to verify or to achieve greatness. First, Nietzsche’s descriptive analysis of the self renders introspection too coarse-grained and error-prone to verify the subtle type of unity required for greatness. Second, Nietzsche associates introspective appraisal of one’s psyche with a moral project that weakens (...)
- Veridical Perceptual Seemings.Elijah Chudnoff - 2023 - In Kevin McCain, Scott Stapleford & Matthias Steup, Seemings: New Arguments, New Angles. New York, NY: Routledge.What is the epistemic significance of taking a veridical perceptual experience at face value? To first approximations, the Minimal View says that it is true belief, and the Maximal View says that it is knowledge. I sympathetically explore the prospects of the Maximal View.
- The “Original” Form of Cognition: On Kant’s Hylomorphism.Andrea Kern - 2023 - In Jens Pier, Limits of Intelligibility: Issues from Kant and Wittgenstein. London: Routledge.The paper investigates the distinction between form and matter in Kant’s theoretical philosophy – his adoption of an Aristotelian hylomorphism. This connection to Aristotle is sometimes recognized in Kant scholarship, though most proponents claim that against the backdrop of a structural analogy, Kant and Aristotle also differ in an important respect: according to them, while Aristotle puts forth a hylomorphic conception of being, Kant merely offers a hylomorphic conception of cognition in which sensibility provides the matter and understanding the form. (...)
- Thinking and Being, by Irad Kimhi. [REVIEW]Rose Ryan Flinn - 2019 - Times Literary Supplement 6072.In this review of Irad Kimhi's "Thinking and Being", I consider some of the book's potentially sweeping consequences for the Fregean proposition.
- Fichte on Summons and Self-Consciousness.Michelle Kosch - 2021 - Mind 130 (517):215-249.J. G. Fichte held that a form of intersubjectivity—what he called a ‘summons’—is a condition of possibility of self-consciousness. This thesis is widely taken to be one of Fichte’s most influential contributions to the European philosophy of the last two centuries. But what the thesis actually states is far from obvious; and existing interpretations either are poorly supported by the texts or else render the thesis trivial or implausible. I propose a new interpretation, on which Fichte’s claim is that reflective (...)
- Somatosensation and the first person.Carlota Serrahima - 2024 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 15:51-68.Experientialism about the sense of bodily ownership is the view that there is something it is like to feel a body as one’s own. In this paper I argue for a particular experientialist thesis. I first present a puzzle about the relation between bodily awareness and self-consciousness, and introduce a somewhat underappreciated view on the sense of bodily ownership, Implicit Reflexivity, that points us in the right direction as to how to address this puzzle. I argue that Implicit Reflexivity, however, (...)
- Self-Referential Recursion.Ilexa Yardley - 2018 - Https://Medium.Com/the-Circular-Theory.We all have ‘two’ ‘stories’ to tell. One we tell to ourselves. And, the other, we tell to the outside world. This is, technically, called, ‘self-referential recursion.’ Identifying the 'singularity' in Nature.
- Illusionism about Phenomenal Consciousness: Explaining the Illusion.Daniel Shabasson - 2022 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 13 (2):427-453.According to illusionism, phenomenal consciousness is an introspective illusion. The illusion problem is to explain the cause of the illusion, or why we are powerfully disposed to judge—erroneously—that we are phenomenally conscious. I propose a theory to solve the illusion problem. I argue that on the basis of three hypotheses about the mind—which I call introspective opacity, the infallibility intuition, and the justification constraint—we can explain our disposition, on introspection, to draw erroneous unconscious inferences about our sensory states. Being subject (...)
- Consciousness in Early Modern Philosophy and Science.Vili Lähteenmäki - 2020 - Encyclopedia of Early Modern Philosophy and the Sciences.It is plausible to think that before the emergence of terms like “consciousness” and “Bewusstsein,” philosophers and scientists relied on intuitions about phenomena of subjective experience that we would now classify as “conscious.” In other words, pre-modern thinkers availed themselves of one or another concept of consciousness as they developed their theories of mind, perception, representation, the self, etc., although they did not attend to consciousness in its own right. In the early modern period, terminology of consciousness emerges to pick (...)
- Viendo lo que es visto: la atribución de autoconciencia a los animales.Alejandro Villamor-Iglesias - 2022 - Sincronía: Revista de Filosofia y Letras 82.
- Inserted Thoughts and the Higher-Order Thought Theory of Consciousness.Rocco J. Gennaro - 2021 - In Pascual Angel Gargiulo & Humbert Mesones-Arroyo, Psychiatry and Neurosciences Update: Vol 4. Springer. pp. 61-71.Various psychopathologies of self-awareness, such as somatoparaphrenia and thought insertion in schizophrenia, might seem to threaten the viability of the higher-order thought (HOT) theory of consciousness since it requires a HOT about one’s own mental state to accompany every conscious state. The HOT theory of consciousness says that what makes a mental state a conscious mental state is that there is a HOT to the effect that “I am in mental state M” (Rosenthal 2005, Gennaro 2012). In a previous publication (...)
- Thoughts about Thoughts: The Structure of Fregean Propositions.Nathan Bice - 2019 - Dissertation, Columbia UniversityThis dissertation is about the structure of thought. Following Gottlob Frege, I define a thought as the sort of content relevant to determining whether an assertion is true or false. The historical component of the dissertation involves interpreting Frege’s actual views on the structure of thought. I argue that Frege did not think that a thought has a unique decomposition into its component senses, but rather the same thought can be decomposed into senses in a variety of distinct ways. I (...)
- Onto-Conceptual Asymmetry: A Phenomenological Perspective on the Concept of Person.Lucian Delescu - 2015 - Studii Franciscane 15:. 181-201.Defining the "person" is not an easy task and not even a direct possibility. One cannot generate a definition with tremendous implications without properly understanding the ontological makeup of "person". From this point of view philosophy and science have more or less proven that they aren’t able to share the same conclusions regarding the ontological features of “person”. In part because philosophy and science do not share the same general concept of reality. As long as there is a debate regarding (...)Remove from this listExport citation Bookmark
- The Bounded Body. On the Sense of Bodily Ownership and the Experience of Space.Carlota Serrahima - 2023 - In M. Guillot & M. Garcia-Carpintero, Self-Experience: Essays on Inner Awareness. Oxford University Press.Bodily sensations are mental states typically suitable to be reported in judgments in which a first-person indexical is used to qualify the felt body. In other words, subjects typically have a sense of bodily ownership for the body that they feel in bodily sensations. This paper puts forward, firstly, three desiderata that theories on the sense of bodily ownership should meet. Secondly, it assesses two views that account for the sense of bodily ownership in terms of the spatial content of (...)
- Confusions about ‘Inner’ and ‘Outer’ Voices: Conceptual Problems in the Study of Auditory Verbal Hallucinations.Franz Knappik, Josef J. Bless & Frank Larøi - 2022 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 13 (1):215-236.Both in research on Auditory Verbal Hallucinations (AVHs) and in their clinical assessment, it is common to distinguish between voices that are experienced as ‘inner’ (or ‘internal’, ‘inside the head’, ‘inside the mind’,...) and voices that are experienced as ‘outer’ (‘external’, ‘outside the head’, ‘outside the mind’,...). This inner/outer-contrast is treated not only as an important phenomenological variable of AVHs, it is also often seen as having diagnostic value. In this article, we argue that the distinction between ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ (...)
- The Varieties of Selflessness.Raphael Milliere - 2020 - Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 1 (1):1-41.Many authors argue that conscious experience involves a sense of self or self-consciousness. According to the strongest version of this claim, there can be no selfless states of consciousness, namely states of consciousness that lack self-consciousness altogether. Disagreements about this claim are likely to remain merely verbal as long as the target notion of self-consciousness is not adequately specified. After distinguishing six notions of self-consciousness commonly discussed in the literature, I argue that none of the corresponding features is necessary for (...)
- Time, Consciousness and the Foundations of Science.Stephen Deiss - 2010 - Journal of Consciouness Exploration and Research 1 (5).This very brief but conceptually dense article provides a useful definition of consciousness, puts self consciousness into proper perspective, clarifies the nature of time, change and inertia, and ties consciousness to the foundations of physics as the inherent and fundamental process in nature. It is an implicit argument for a type of (proto) panpsychism or panexperientialism.
- Subject and Object: The Principle of Distinction and Inseparability.Bhakti Madhava Puri - 2010 - The Harmonizer.One of the most important instances of distinct but inseparable entities is that of subject and object. When we carefully think about them, we realize that one term implies the other. In other words, a subject cannot possibly exist without a corresponding object otherwise we would never be able to talk about “subject.” In a similar way, an object can only be called an object because it is in relation to a subject. All opposites will in fact exhibit this same (...)
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