43 found
Order:
Disambiguations
Jonathan Mitchell [44]Jonathan F. Mitchell [1]Jonathan Paul Mitchell [1]
See also
Jonathan Mitchell
Cardiff University
Jonathan Paul Mitchell
University College Dublin
  1. The Epistemology of Emotional Experience.Jonathan Mitchell - 2017 - Dialectica 71 (1):57-84.
    This article responds to two arguments against ‘Epistemic Perceptualism’, the view that emotional experiences, as involving a perception of value, can constitute reasons for evaluative belief. It first provides a basic account of emotional experience, and then introduces concepts relevant to the epistemology of emotional experience, such as the nature of a reason for belief, non-inferentiality, and prima facie vs. conclusive reasons, which allow for the clarification of Epistemic Perceptualism in terms of the Perceptual Justificatory View. It then challenges two (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   29 citations  
  2. The intentionality and intelligibility of moods.Jonathan Mitchell - 2019 - European Journal of Philosophy 27 (1):118-135.
    This article offers an account of moods as distinctive kinds of personal level affective-evaluative states, which are both intentional and rationally intelligible in specific ways. The account contrasts with those who claim moods are non-intentional, and so also arational. Section 1 provides a conception of intentionality and distinguishes moods, as occurrent experiential states, from other states in the affective domain. Section 2 argues moods target the subject’s total environment presented in a specific evaluative light through felt valenced attitudes (the Mood-Intentionality (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  3.  69
    Emotion as Feeling Towards Value: A Theory of Emotional Experience.Jonathan Mitchell - 2021 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
    This book proposes and defends a new theory of emotional experience. Drawing on recent developments in the philosophy of emotion, with links to contemporary philosophy of mind, it argues that emotional experiences are sui generis states, not to be modelled after other mental states – such as perceptions, judgements, or bodily feelings – but given their own analysis and place within our mental economy. More specifically, emotional experiences are claimed to be feelings-towards-values.
  4. The Irreducibility of Emotional Phenomenology.Jonathan Mitchell - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85.
    Emotion theory includes attempts to reduce or assimilate emotions to states such as bodily feelings, beliefs-desire combinations, and evaluative judgements. Resistance to such approaches is motivated by the claim that emotions possess a sui generis phenomenology. Uriah Kriegel defends a new form of emotion reductivism which avoids positing irreducible emotional phenomenology by specifying emotions’ phenomenal character in terms of a combination of other phenomenologies. This article argues Kriegel’s approach, and similar proposals, are unsuccessful, since typical emotional experiences are constituted by (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  5.  73
    Pre-emotional Awareness and the Content-Priority View.Jonathan Mitchell - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (277):771-794.
    Much contemporary philosophy of emotion has been in broad agreement about the claim that emotional experiences have evaluative content. This paper assesses a relatively neglected alternative, which I call the content-priority view, according to which emotions are responses to a form of pre-emotional value awareness, as what we are aware of in having certain non-emotional evaluative states which are temporally prior to emotion. I argue that the central motivations of the view require a personal level conscious state of pre-emotional value (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  6. Emotion and Attention.Jonathan Mitchell - 2022 - Philosophical Studies (1):1-27.
    This paper first demonstrates that recognition of the diversity of ways that emotional responses modulate ongoing attention generates what I call the puzzle of emotional attention, which turns on recognising that distinct emotions (e.g., fear, happiness, disgust, admiration etc.) have different attentional profiles. The puzzle concerns why this is the case, such that a solution consists in explaining why distinct emotions have the distinct attentional profiles they do. It then provides an account of the functional roles of different emotions, as (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  7. The bodily-attitudinal theory of emotion.Jonathan Mitchell - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (8):2635-2663.
    This paper provides an assessment of the bodily-attitudinal theory of emotions, according to which emotions are felt bodily attitudes of action readiness. After providing a reconstruction of the view and clarifying its central commitments two objections are considered. An alternative object side interpretation of felt action readiness is then provided, which undermines the motivation for the bodily-attitudinal theory and creates problems for its claims concerning the content of emotional experience. The conclusion is that while the bodily-attitudinal theory marks out a (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  8. Affective Representation and Affective Attitudes.Jonathan Mitchell - 2019 - Synthese (4):1-28.
    Many philosophers have understood the representational dimension of affective states along the model of sense-perceptual experiences, even claiming the relevant affective experiences are perceptual experiences. This paper argues affective experiences involve a kind of personal level affective representation disanalogous from the representational character of perceptual experiences. The positive thesis is that affective representation is a non-transparent, non-sensory form of evaluative representation, whereby a felt valenced attitude represents the object of the experience as minimally good or bad, and one experiences that (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  9. The Mind’s Presence to Itself: In Search of Non‐intentional Awareness.Jonathan Mitchell - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (3):659-675.
    According to some philosophers, the mind enjoys a form of presence to itself. That is to say, in addition to being aware of whatever objects it is aware of, it is also (co-presently) aware of itself. This paper explores the proposal that we should think about this kind of experiential-presence in terms of a form of non-intentional awareness. Various candidates for the relevant form of awareness, as constituting supposed non-intentional experiential-presence, are considered and are shown to encounter significant problems. The (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  10. The Attitudinal Opacity of Emotional Experience.Jonathan Mitchell - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (280):524-546.
    According to some philosophers, when introspectively attending to experience, we seem to see right through it to the objects outside, including their properties. This is called the transparency of experience. This paper examines whether, and in what sense, emotions are transparent. It argues that emotional experiences are opaque in a distinctive way: introspective attention to them does not principally reveal non-intentional somatic qualia but rather felt valenced intentional attitudes. As such, emotional experience is attitudinally opaque.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  11. Emotional Intentionality and the Attitude‐Content Distinction.Jonathan Mitchell - 2019 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (2):359-386.
    Typical emotions share important features with paradigmatic intentional states, and therefore might admit of distinctions made in theory of intentionality. One such distinction is between attitude and content, where we can specify the content of an intentional state separately from its attitude, and therefore the same content can be taken up by different intentional attitudes. According to some philosophers, emotions do not admit of this distinction, although there has been no sustained argument for this claim. In this article, I argue (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  12. Emotional Experience and Propositional Content.Jonathan Mitchell - 2019 - Dialectica 73 (4):535-561.
    Those arguing for the existence of non-propositional content appeal to emotions for support, although there has been little engagement in those debates with developments in contemporary theory of emotion, specifically in connection with the kind of mental states that emotional experiences are. Relatedly, within emotion theory, one finds claims that emotional experiences per se have non-propositional content without detailed argument. This paper argues that the content of emotional experience is propositional in a weak sense, associated with aspectual experience and correctness (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  13. Can Evaluativism about Unpleasant Pains meet the Normative Condition?Jonathan Mitchell - 2019 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 62 (7).
    This paper assesses whether Evaluativism, as a view about the nature of unpleasant pains, can meet a specific normative condition. The normative condition says whatever candidate state is offered as an analysis of unpleasant pain should be intrinsically phenomenally bad for its subject to be in. I first articulate a method reflecting this condition, called the normative contrast method, and then frame Evaluativism in detail. The view is then tested through this method. I show that Evaluativism can explain why cases (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  14.  46
    On the non-conceptual content of affective-evaluative experience.Jonathan Mitchell - 2018 - Synthese 197 (7):3087-3111.
    Arguments for attributing non-conceptual content to experience have predominantly been motivated by aspects of the visual perception of empirical properties. In this article, I pursue a different strategy, arguing that a specific class of affective-evaluative experiences have non-conceptual content. The examples drawn on are affective-evaluative experiences of first exposure, in which the subject has a felt valenced intentional attitude towards evaluative properties of the object of their experience, but lacks any powers of conceptual discrimination regarding those evaluative properties. I also (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  15. On the non-conceptual content of affective-evaluative experience.Jonathan Mitchell - 2018 - Synthese:1-25.
    Arguments for attributing non-conceptual content to experience have predominantly been motivated by aspects of the visual perception of empirical properties. In this article, I pursue a different strategy, arguing that a specific class of affective-evaluative experiences have non-conceptual content. The examples drawn on are affective-evaluative experiences of first exposure, in which the subject has a felt valenced intentional attitude towards evaluative properties of the object of their experience, but lacks any powers of conceptual discrimination regarding those evaluative properties. I also (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  16. Affective Shifts: Mood, Emotion and Well-Being.Jonathan Mitchell - 2021 - Synthese (5-6):1-28.
    It is a familiar feature of our affective psychology that our moods ‘crystalize’ into emotions, and that our emotions ‘diffuse’ into moods. Providing a detailed philosophical account of these affective shifts, as I will call them, is the central aim of this paper. Drawing on contemporary philosophy of emotion and mood, alongside distinctive ideas from the phenomenologically-inspired writer Robert Musil, a broadly ‘intentional’ and ‘evaluativist’ account will be defended. I argue that we do best to understand important features of these (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  17.  51
    Towards Affective-Evaluativism: the Intentional Structure of Unpleasant Pain Experience.Jonathan Mitchell - 2024 - Philosophical Quarterly.
    Evaluativism about unpleasant pains offers one way to think about unpleasant pain experience. However, extant Evaluativist views do not pay enough attention to the affective dimension of pain experience and the complex relations between the affective, evaluative and sensory dimensions. This paper clarifies these relations and provides a view which more closely reflects the phenomenology of unpleasant pains. It argues that the intentional structure of paradigmatic unpleasant pain is as follows: unpleasant pains essentially involve a proprietary intentional mode—what I call (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  18. Self-Locating Content in Visual Experience and the "Here-Replacement" Account.Jonathan Mitchell - 2021 - Journal of Philosophy 118 (4):188-213.
    According to the Self-Location Thesis, certain types of visual experiences have self-locating and so first-person, spatial contents. Such self-locating contents are typically specified in relational egocentric terms. So understood, visual experiences provide support for the claim that there is a kind of self-consciousness found in experiential states. This paper critically examines the Self-Location Thesis with respect to dynamic-reflexive visual experiences, which involve the movement of an object toward the location of the perceiving subject. The main aim of this paper is (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  19. Two irreducible classes of emotional experiences: Affective imaginings and affective perceptions.Jonathan Mitchell - 2021 - European Journal of Philosophy 30 (1):307-325.
  20.  52
    Can Evaluativism about unpleasant pains meet the normative condition?Jonathan Mitchell - 2019 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 62 (7):779-802.
    ABSTRACTThis paper assesses whether Evaluativism, as a view about the nature of unpleasant pains, can meet a specific normative condition. The normative condition says whatever candidate state is offered as an analysis of unpleasant pain should be intrinsically phenomenally bad for its subject to be in. I first articulate a method reflecting this condition, called the normative contrast method, and then frame Evaluativism in detail. The view is then tested through this method. I show that Evaluativism can explain why cases (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  21.  98
    The Horizonality of Visual Experience.Jonathan Mitchell - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
    Abstract: How is it that we can visually experience complete three-dimensional objects despite being limited, in any given perceptual moment, to perceiving the sides facing us from a specific spatial perspective? To make sense of this, such visual experiences must refer to occluded or presently unseen back-sides which are not sense-perceptually given, and which cannot be sense- perceptually given while the subject is occupying the spatial perspective on the object that they currently are – I call this the horizonality of (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  22. The Phenomenal Contribution of Attention.Jonathan Mitchell - 2022 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    Strong or Pure Intentionalism is the view that the phenomenal character of a conscious experience is exhaustively determined by its intentional content. Contrastingly, impure intentionalism holds that there are also non content-based aspects or features which contribute to phenomenal character. Conscious attention is one such feature: arguably its contribution to the phenomenal character of a given conscious experience are not exhaustively captured in terms of what that experience represents, that is in terms of properties of its intentional object. This paper (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  23.  14
    Affective representation and affective attitudes.Jonathan Mitchell - 2021 - Synthese 198 (4):3519-3546.
    Many philosophers have understood the representational dimension of affective states along the model of perceptual experiences. This paper argues affective experiences involve a kind of personal level affective representation disanalogous from the representational character of perceptual experiences. The positive thesis is that affective representation is a non-transparent, non-sensory form of evaluative representation, whereby a felt valenced attitude represents the object of the experience as minimally good or bad, and one experiences that evaluative standing as having the power to causally motivate (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  24. Understanding Meta-Emotions: Prospects for a Perceptualist Account.Jonathan Mitchell - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (4):505-523.
    This article clarifies the nature of meta-emotions, and it surveys the prospects of applying a version of the perceptualist model of emotions to them. It first considers central aspects of their intentionality and phenomenal character. It then applies the perceptualist model to meta-emotions, addressing issues of evaluative content and the normative dimension of meta-emotional experience. Finally, in considering challenges and objections, it assesses the perceptualist model, concluding that its application to meta-emotions is an attractive extension of the theory, insofar as (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  25. Nietzschean Self-Overcoming.Jonathan Mitchell - 2016 - Journal of Nietzsche Studies 47 (3):323-350.
    Nietzsche often writes in praise of self-overcoming. He tells us that his humanity consists in “constant self-overcoming” 1 and that if someone wanted to give a name to his lifelong self-discipline against “Wagnerianism,” Schopenhauer, and “the whole modern ‘humaneness,’” then one might call it self-overcoming. He says that his writings “speak only” of his overcomings, later claiming that “the development of states that are increasingly high, rare, distant, tautly drawn and comprehensive … are dependent on the constant ‘self-overcoming of man’”,2 (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  26. A Nietzschean Theory of Emotional Experience: Affect as Feeling Towards Value.Jonathan Mitchell - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    This paper offers a Nietzschean theory of emotion as expressed by following thesis: paradigmatic emotional experiences exhibit a distinctive kind of affective intentionality, specified in terms of felt valenced attitudes towards the (apparent) evaluative properties of their objects. Emotional experiences, on this Nietzschean view, are therefore fundamentally feelings towards value. This interpretation explains how Nietzschean affects can have evaluative intentional content without being constituted by cognitive states, as these feelings towards value are neither reducible to, nor to be thought along (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  27. Nietzsche on taste: epistemic privilege and anti-realism.Jonathan Mitchell - 2017 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 60 (1-2):31-65.
    The central aim of this article is to argue that Nietzsche takes his own taste, and those in the relevant sense similar to it, to enjoy a kind of epistemic privilege over their rivals. Section 2 will examine the textual evidence for an anti-realist reading of Nietzsche on taste. Section 3 will then provide an account of taste as an ‘affective evaluative sensibility’, asking whether taste so understood supports an anti-realist reading. I will argue that it does not and that (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  28. Affective Persistence and the Normative Phenomenology of Emotion.Jonathan Mitchell - 2022 - In J. Deonna, C. Tappolet & F. Teroni (eds.), A Tribute to Ronald de Sousa.
    This paper presents a detailed analysis of affective persistence and its significance – that is the persistence of affect in the face of countervailing or contradictory evaluative information. More specifically, it appeals to the phenomena of affective persistence to support the claim that a significant portion of the emotional experiences of adult humans involve a kind of normative phenomenology. Its central claim is that by appealing to a distinctive kind of normative phenomenology that emotions exhibit, we get a neat personal (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  29.  9
    The Horizonal Structure of Visual Experience.Jonathan Mitchell - 2023 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
    How is it that we can visually experience complete three-dimensional objects despite being limited, in any given perceptual moment, to perceiving the sides facing us from a specific spatial perspective? To make sense of this, such visual experiences must refer to occluded or presently unseen back-sides which are not sense-perceptually given, and which cannot be sense-perceptually given while the subject is occupying the spatial perspective on the object that they currently are—I call this the horizonality of visual experience. Existing accounts (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  30.  12
    On the temporality of the emotions: An essay on grief, anger, and love, by Berislav Marušić [Book Review].Jonathan Mitchell - unknown
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  31. Another Look at Mode Intentionalism.Jonathan Mitchell - 2020 - Erkenntnis 87 (6):2519-2546.
    A central claim in contemporary philosophy of mind is that the phenomenal character of experience is entirely determined by its content. This paper considers an alternative called Mode Intentionalism. According to this view, phenomenal character outruns content because the intentional mode contributes to the phenomenal character of the experience. I assess a phenomenal contrast argument in support of this view, arguing that the cases appealed to allow for interpretations which do not require positing intentional modes as phenomenologically manifest aspects of (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  32. A Nietzschean Critique of Metaphysical Philosophy.Jonathan Mitchell - 2017 - Journal of Nietzsche Studies 48 (3):347-374.
    This article provides a new account of Nietzsche’s critique of metaphysical philosophy. After framing Nietzsche’s anti-metaphysical project (Section 1), I suggest that to understand the logic of his critique we should reconstruct a taxonomy which distinguishes between ‘rich metaphysics’ and ‘thin metaphysics’ (Section 2). I then consider Nietzsche’s methodological critique of ‘rich metaphysics’, arguing that his position, which alleges motivational bias against ‘rich metaphysics’, is not compelling, since even granting that previous ‘rich metaphysicians’ exemplified such bias there is no necessity (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  33.  6
    Exploring affective evaluative horizons.Jonathan Mitchell - unknown
    A key claim of classical phenomenology is that intentional experiences involve a distinctive kind of implicit intentionality, which accompanies the relevant explicit intentionality. This implicit intentionality is purportedly co-constitutive of the object-presenting phenomenology of those intentional experiences. This implicit intentionality is often framed by Husserl and other classical phenomenologists in terms of horizonal intentionality or intentional horizons. Its most interesting form is labelled the 'inner horizon'. My aim in this paper is to consider whether a case can be made for (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  34.  29
    Liking That It Hurts: The Case of the Masochist and Second-Order Desire Accounts of Pain’s Unpleasantness.Jonathan Mitchell - 2022 - American Philosophical Quarterly (2):181-189.
    Recent work on pain focuses on the question ‘what makes pains unpleasant’. Second-order desire views claim that the unpleasantness of pain consists in a second-order intrinsic desire that the pain experience itself cease or stop. This paper considers a significant objection to second-order desire views by considering the case of the masochist. It is argued that various ways in which the second-order desire view might try to account for the case of the masochist encounter problems. The conclusion is that until (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  35.  8
    The Cambridge Atlas of the Middle East and North Africa.John R. Clark, Gerald Blake, John Dewdney & Jonathan Mitchell - 1990 - Journal of the American Oriental Society 110 (1):142.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  36.  10
    Experiencing mandates: Towards a hybrid account.Jonathan Mitchell - unknown
    In this paper I focus on a subset of experiences in which action-properties are presented—namely, those in which objects in our perceptual surroundings or environment ‘demand’ that certain actions be carried out, as experienced mandates (EMs). The critical part of the paper argues that a complex contents view, which builds all of the distinctiveness of such experiences into their perceptual content, is unsatisfactory. As an alternative, I argue that EMs involve bodily potentiation, which is best understood in terms of felt (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  37.  11
    Legislating clear-statement regimes in national-security law.Jonathan F. Mitchell & GMU Law School Submitter - unknown
    Congress's national-security legislation will often require clear and specific congressional authorization before the executive can undertake certain actions. The War Powers Resolution, for example, prohibits any law from authorizing military hostilities unless it "specifically authorizes" them. And the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 required laws to amend FISA or repeal its "exclusive means" provision before they could authorize warrantless electronic surveillance. But efforts to legislate clear-statement regimes in national-security law have failed to induce compliance. The Clinton Administration inferred congressional (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  38. Katsafanas, Paul. The Nietzschean Self: Moral Psychology, Agency and the Unconscious.Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016. Pp. 272. $74.00. [REVIEW]Jonathan Mitchell - 2017 - Ethics 127 (3):777-783.
  39.  31
    On the temporality of the emotions: An essay on grief, anger, and love, by BerislavMarušić. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022. ISBN: 0198851162, £55.00 (Hardcover). [REVIEW]Jonathan Mitchell - 2023 - European Journal of Philosophy 31 (2):534-538.
    European Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  40.  31
    Review of the World-Directedness of Emotional Feeling. [REVIEW]Jonathan Mitchell - 2021 - Philosophical Quarterly 71 (1):218-221.
    Review of the World-Directedness of Emotional Feeling. by müller jean moritz.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  41.  18
    Nietzsche on Ethics and Politics by Maudemarie Clark. [REVIEW]Jonathan Mitchell - 2016 - Journal of Nietzsche Studies 47 (3):492-497.
    Maudemarie Clark is best known among Nietzsche scholars for two monographs, Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy and The Soul of Nietzsche’s Beyond Good and Evil, the second coauthored with David Dudrick. The focus of these works was metaphysical-cum-epistemological, in the first instance distinguishing Nietzsche’s views on truth from the popular association with postmodernism, in the second providing an “esoteric” rereading of book 1 of BGE in an attempt to rebuff central aspects of naturalistic readings like that of Brian Leiter. The (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  42. Review of Thomas Stern (ed.), The New Cambridge Companion to Nietzsche, Cambridge. [REVIEW]Jonathan Mitchell - forthcoming - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
  43. Review of Jean Moritz Müller, The World-Directedness of Emotional Feeling. [REVIEW]Jonathan Mitchell - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.