Cham, Schweiz: Palgrave Macmillan (2019)

Authors
Jean Moritz Müller
University Of Bonn
Abstract
This book engages with what are widely recognized as the two core dimensions of emotion. When we are afraid, glad or disappointed, we feel a certain way; moreover, our emotion is intentional or directed at something: we are afraid of something, glad or disappointed about something. Connecting with a vital strand of recent philosophical thinking, I conceive of these two aspects of emotion as unified. Examining different possible ways of developing the view that the feeling dimension of emotion is itself intentional, I argue against the currently popular view that it is a form of perception-like receptivity to value. I instead propose that emotional feeling is a specific type of response to value, an affective ‘position-taking’. This alternative conceives of emotional feeling as intimately related to our cares and concerns. While situating itself within the analytic-philosophical debate on emotion, the discussion crucially draws on ideas from the early phenomenological tradition in an attempt to think past the theoretical strictures of many contemporary approaches to this subject. The result is a new view of emotional feeling as a thoroughly personal form of engagement with value.
Keywords Emotion  Feeling  Intentionality  Value  Position-taking  Phenomenology
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Reprint years 2019
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ISBN(s) 978-3-030-23819-3   978-3-030-23820-9   3030238199   9783030238193
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Chapters BETA
Conclusion

This chapter provides a concise summary of the main arguments and conclusions of this book. The upshot of my critique of the dominant intentionalist view and my positive contribution towards a more adequate alternative are laid out.

The Evaluative Foundation of emotional feeling

I expand on the position-taking view by offering an account of the axiological awareness on which emotional feelings are based as responses to value. In doing so, my aim is to elaborate on a central aspect of PT which can seem controversial in light of a common concern about the possibility of value... see more

Emotional Feeling as Position-Taking

Based on my remarks on feeling towards in the foregoing chapter, I offer the position-taking view as more adequate intentionalist alternative to the axiological receptivity view . On this view, emotional feelings constitute a favourable position taken towards something in response to its value. Afte... see more

Emotional Feeling as Receptivity to Value

The axiological receptivity view is critically assessed in some detail. I start by laying out the phenomenological motivation for the view. As proponents of the view tend to suppose, ordinary experience supports AR in that emotional feelings are commonly experienced as a type of impression or presen... see more

emotional feeling and Formal Objects

This aim of this chapter is to prepare the ground for the main argument of the book. In the first part, I elaborate on the nature of emotional feeling by examining the common characterization of emotions as affective or, alternatively, as stirrings of the sensitive mind . I reject the popular view t... see more

Introduction

Emotions are significant to us in part in virtue of involving feeling. Moreover, on a currently widely held view, their significance derives from the fact that the feeling involved in emotions is inseparable from their world-directed aspect or intentionality. On this view—which I call intentionalism... see more

The Evaluative Foundation of Emotional Feelingemotional feeling

I expand on the position-taking view by offering an account of the axiological awareness on which emotional feelings are based as responses to value. In doing so, my aim is to elaborate on a central aspect of PT which can seem controversial in light of a common concern about the possibility of value... see more

Feelingsemotional feeling and Formal Objects

This aim of this chapter is to prepare the ground for the main argument of the book. In the first part, I elaborate on the nature of emotional feeling by examining the common characterization of emotions as affective or, alternatively, as stirrings of the sensitive mind . I reject the popular view t... see more

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The Fittingness of Emotions.Hichem Naar - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):13601-13619.

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