Emotion as Feeling Towards Value: A Theory of Emotional Experience

Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press (2021)
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This book proposes and defends a new theory of emotional experience. Drawing on recent developments in the philosophy of emotion, with links to contemporary philosophy of mind, it argues that emotional experiences are sui generis states, not to be modelled after other mental states – such as perceptions, judgements, or bodily feelings – but given their own analysis and place within our mental economy. More specifically, emotional experiences are claimed to be feelings-towards-values.



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Jonathan Mitchell
Cardiff University

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