- Bodiless Affect.Ron C. de Weijze - manuscriptdetails
- Justification, Normalcy and Evidential Probability.Martin Smith - manuscriptdetails
- Justification logic.Sergei Artemov - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
- Prospects for Evidentialism.Bob Beddor - forthcoming - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence. Routledge.details
- What should we believe about the future?Miloud Belkoniene - forthcoming - Synthese:1-12.details
- Inferential Seemings.Elijah Chudnoff - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind.details
- Phenomenal Explanationism and the Look of Things.Kevin McCain & Luca Moretti - forthcoming - In McCain Kevin, Stapleford Scott & Steup Matthias (eds.), Seemings: New Angles, New Arguments. New York: Routledge.details
- New frontiers in epistemic evaluation: Lackey on the epistemology of groups.Jennifer Nagel - forthcoming - Res Philosophica.details
- An Epistemic Non-individualistic Point of View on Reflection: An Essay.Waldomiro J. Silva Filho - forthcoming - Kriterion – Journal of Philosophy:731-756.details
- Self-Fulfilling Beliefs: A Defense.Paul Silva Jr - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.details
- Three Puzzles about Lotteries.Julia Staffel - forthcoming - In Igor Douven (ed.), Lotteries, Knowledge, and Rational Belief. Cambridge University Press.details
- On Mary Shepherd's Essay upon the Relation of Cause and Effect.Jessica Wilson - forthcoming - In Eric Schliesser (ed.), Neglected Classics of Philosophy, II. Oxford University Press.details
- Getting Accurate About Knowledge.Sam Carter & Simon Goldstein - 2022 - Mind:1-28.details
- Understanding and scientific progress: lessons from epistemology.Nicholas Emmerson - 2022 - Synthese 200 (1):1-18.details
- Faith, Hope, and Justification.Elizabeth Jackson - 2022 - In Luis R. G. Oliveira & Paul Silva Jr (eds.), Propositional and Doxastic Justification. New York: Routledge. pp. 201–216.details
- Disqualifying ‘Disqualifiers’.B. J. C. Madison - 2022 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 65 (2):202-214.details
- Epistemic Consent and Doxastic Justification.Luis Oliveira - 2022 - In Luis Oliveira & Paul Silva (eds.), Propositional and Doxastic Justification: New Essays on Their Nature and Significance. New York: Routledge. pp. 286-312.details
- Radical epistemology, structural explanations, and epistemic weaponry.Richard Pettigrew - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (1):289-304.details
- No Justification for Smith’s Incidentally True Beliefs.Alfred Schramm - 2022 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 99 (2):273–292.details
- Can Worsnip's strategy solve the puzzle of misleading higher-order apparent evidence?Paul Silva - 2022 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 65 (3):339-351.details
- The Hardest Paradox for Closure.Martin Smith - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (4):2003-2028.details
- Time Will Tell: Against Antirealism About the Past.Efraim Wallach - 2022 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 53 (4):539-554.details
- Reasons for Reliabilism.Bob Beddor - 2021 - In Jessica Brown & Mona Simion (eds.), Reasons, Justification, and Defeat. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 146-176.details
- Kantian Fallibilism: Knowledge, Certainty, Doubt.Andrew Chignell - 2021 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 45:99-128.details
- Robust Justification.Jonathan Matheson - 2021 - In Scott Stapleford & Kevin McCain (eds.), Epistemic Duties: New Arguments, New Angles. Routledge.details
- A Priori Justification in Nietzsche.Justin Remhof - 2021 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 38 (3):261-276.details
- No work for a theory of epistemic dispositions.Robert Weston Siscoe - 2021 - Synthese 198 (4):3477-3498.details
- Belief, Rational and Justified.Wes Siscoe - 2021 - Mind 130 (517):59-83.details
- Four arguments for denying that lottery beliefs are justified.Martin Smith - 2021 - In Douven, I. ed. Lotteries, Knowledge and Rational Belief: Essays on the Lottery Paradox (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). Cambridge:details
- More on Normic Support and the Criminal Standard of Proof.Martin Smith - 2021 - Mind 130 (519):943-960.details
- The Truth of Scepticism: on the varieties of epistemological doubt.Guido Tana - 2021 - Dissertation, University of Edinburghdetails
- Higher-Order Evidence.Daniel Whiting - 2021 - Analysis 80 (4):789-807.details
- The Range of Reasons: In Ethics and Epistemology.Daniel Whiting - 2021 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.details
- Can Infinitists Handle the Finite Mind Objection and the Distinction Objection?Bin Zhao - 2021 - Philosophia 49 (5):2275-2291.details
- Toward a general theory of knowledge.Luis M. Augusto - 2020 - Journal of Knowledge Structures and Systems 1 (1):63-97.details
- Verdad, creencias y fundacionalismo confiabilista.Miguel Cabrera Machado - 2020 - Revista de Filosofía 77:51-65.details
- Delusion, Proper Function, and Justification.Parker Crutchfield - 2020 - Neuroethics 14 (2):113-124.details
- Recent Work on Epistemic Entitlement.Peter Graham & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen - 2020 - American Philosophical Quarterly 57 (2):193-214.details
- L’objectivité scientifique à l’heure de la post-vérité.Laurent Jodoin - 2020 - Mεtascience: Discours Général Scientifique 1:199-219.details
- Two-state solution to the lottery paradox.Artūrs Logins - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (11):3465-3492.details
- Truth, fallibility, and justification: new studies in the norms of assertion.John Turri - 2020 - Synthese (9):1-12.details
- Knowledge, justification, and (a sort of) safe belief.Daniel Whiting - 2020 - Synthese 197 (8):3593-3609.details
- Non‐uniformism about the Epistemology of Modality: Strong and Weak.Ylwa Sjölin Wirling - 2020 - Analytic Philosophy 61 (2):152-173.details
- The Social Cover View: a Non-epistemic Approach to Mindreading.Manuel Almagro Holgado & Víctor Fernandez Castro - 2019 - Philosophia 48 (2):483-505.details
- The demon that makes us go mental: mentalism defended.Jonathan Egeland - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (12):3141-3158.details
- How Belief-Credence Dualism Explains Away Pragmatic Encroachment.Elizabeth Jackson - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (276):511-533.details
- Can the lottery paradox be solved by identifying epistemic justification with epistemic permissibility?Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2019 - Episteme 16 (3):241-261.details
- Small Steps and Great Leaps in Thought: The Epistemology of Basic Deductive Rules.Joshua Schechter - 2019 - In Magdalena Balcerak Jackson & Brendan Balcerak Jackson (eds.), Reasoning: New Essays on Theoretical and Practical Thinking. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
- Justified group belief is evidentially responsible group belief.Paul Silva - 2019 - Episteme 16 (3):262-281.details
- A Ética da Crença: uma Defesa Moderada da Posição Indiciária.Eros Carvalho - 2018 - Sofia 7 (1):17-40.details
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