Introspection and Introspectionism
Summary | Introspection is the process through which people (and possibly some animals) become aware of their own current mental states like thoughts and sensory experiences. Statements like ‘I have a red afterimage’, ‘I am thinking about which route to take’, ‘I feel a pain in my toe’, are taken to be introspective reports that are the products of introspection. Disagreement still looms large about whether introspective awareness is a quasi-perceptual process or merely a conceptual affair, i.e. can we attend to or even sense our mental states, or merely think about them. Given that introspection often leads to knowledge about one’s mental states, many scholars are also interested in the epistemic properties, e.g. incorrigibility, certainty, reliability, of introspective reports. This category also hosts articles on introspectionism, a doctrine which was popular in the late 19th and early 20th century, and which considers introspection to be the primary scientific method for investigating mental states and processes. |
Key works | The topic of introspection has a long tradition in philosophy: Locke 1689 and Kant 1781/1998 are considered important forerunners of the inner-sense account of introspection which has been argued for in greater detail by Armstrong 1968 and Lycan 1996. Shoemaker 1994 has criticized the inner-sense account in a series of articles, whereas Dretske 1995 and Tye 2000 have proposed influential transparency-based accounts of introspection of sensory states, highlighting the importance of drawing an appearance-reality distinction in introspective reports. Other important views include self-monitoring accounts by I. Goldman 2006 and Nichols & Stich 2003, and self-fulfillment theories, e.g. Burge 1988. |
Introductions | Schwitzgebel 2010 and Gertler 2015 provide highly accessible introductions to the topic. Gertler 2003 and Smithies & Stoljar 2012 are useful collections of articles on introspection and self-knowledge. |
- Verbal Reports and Heterophenomenology (56)
- Phenomenology and Consciousness (365)
- Eastern Approaches to Consciousness (64)
- First-Person Approaches in the Science of Consciousness, Misc (107)
- Self-Consciousness (1,901 | 186)
- Knowledge of Consciousness (180)
- The Given (199)
- Self-Knowledge (1,623 | 551)
- Infallibility and Incorrigibility In Self-Knowledge (142)
- Metacognition and Consciousness (130)
- Verbal Reports and Heterophenomenology (56)
- Phenomenology and Consciousness (365)
- Eastern Approaches to Consciousness (64)
- First-Person Approaches in the Science of Consciousness, Misc (107)
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