Why are the fundamentals of education apparently so little changed in our era of digital technology? Is their obstinate persistence evidence of resilience or obsolescence? Such questions can best be answered not by imagining an uncertain high-tech future, but by examining a well-documented past--a history of instruction and media that extends from Gilgamesh to Google. Norm Friesen looks to the combination and reconfiguration of oral, textual, and more recent media forms to understand the longevity of so many educational arrangements and (...) practices. Friesen examines the interrelationship of reading, writing, and pedagogy in the case of the lecture and the textbook--from their premodern to their postmodern incarnations. Over hundreds of years, these two forms have integrated textual, oral, and (more recently) digital media and connected them with changing pedagogical and cultural priorities. The Textbook and the Lecture opens new possibilities for understanding not only mediated pedagogical practices and their reform but also gradual changes in our conceptions of the knowing subject and of knowledge itself. Drawing on wide-ranging scholarship in fields as diverse as media ecology and German-language media studies, Foucauldian historiography, and even archaeological research, The Textbook and the Lecture is a fascinating investigation of educational media. (shrink)

A culturally influential sub-discipline within literary studies, literary theory has developed in parallel form in other arts and social science disciplines, so that one might refer to "cultural theory" or "social theory" as well, or even just to "theory." It's as familiar as the word "postmodern" and as tricky as "deconstruction." What is it about? What is at stake? Theory is about rationality. This book's title invites two different interpretations of what it might mean to say so. For many, the (...) essence of literary theory is the unmasking and redescription of rationality in other terms. Put ironically, rationality is male; rationality is white; rationality is repression.... The book's title, however, can also be read in a second way. On this reading, rationality itself is the essence of literary theory and central to literature, art, and society. Certain conceptions of what it entails can be problematic; the critique in the first way of reading the title remains relevant. Yet one can affirm rationality as integral to human flourishing, including the processes of producing, analyzing, and enjoying literature, art, and culture. This book provides readers with a clear overview of theory's development and the abiding presence of its concern with the status of rationality across its forms. (shrink)

This handbook presents a comprehensive introduction to the core areas of philosophy of education combined with an up-to-date selection of the central themes. It includes 95 newly commissioned articles that focus on and advance key arguments; each essay incorporates essential background material serving to clarify the history and logic of the relevant topic, examining the status quo of the discipline with respect to the topic, and discussing the possible futures of the field. The book provides a state-of-the-art overview of philosophy (...) of education, covering a range of topics: Voices from the present and the past deals with 36 major figures that philosophers of education rely on; Schools of thought addresses 14 stances including Eastern, Indigenous, and African philosophies of education as well as religiously inspired philosophies of education such as Jewish and Islamic; Revisiting enduring educational debates scrutinizes 25 issues heavily debated in the past and the present, for example care and justice, democracy, and the curriculum; New areas and developments addresses 17 emerging issues that have garnered considerable attention like neuroscience, videogames, and radicalization. The collection is relevant for lecturers teaching undergraduate and graduate courses in philosophy of education as well as for colleagues in teacher training. Moreover, it helps junior researchers in philosophy of education to situate the problems they are addressing within the wider field of philosophy of education and offers a valuable update for experienced scholars dealing with issues in the sub-discipline. Combined with different conceptions of the purpose of philosophy, it discusses various aspects, using diverse perspectives to do so. Contributing Editors: Section 1: Voices from the Present and the Past: Nuraan Davids Section 2: Schools of Thought: Christiane Thompson and Joris Vlieghe Section 3: Revisiting Enduring Debates: Ann Chinnery, Naomi Hodgson, and Viktor Johansson Section 4: New Areas and Developments: Kai Horsthemke, Dirk Willem Postma, and Claudia Ruitenberg. (shrink)

In this introductory paper, I try to give an overview of the concept of normativity in its philosophical history and its contemporary interpretations and uses in different fields. From philosophy of logic and mathematics to philosophy of language and mind, and to philosophy of medicine and care, normativity is found as a key concept pointing at the possibility of scientific and technical progress and improvement of human life in the interaction between the individual and his environment.

Both Kant’s and Hegel’s conceptions of normativity have shown to be extremely thorough and influential until today. Against the background of the much-disputed issue of ‘formalism’, _Concepts of Normativity: Kant or Hegel?_ explores limits and perspectives of their deliberations.

Even if we know all relevant descriptive facts about an act, we can still be uncertain about its moral acceptability. Most literature on how to act under such normative uncertainty operates on moral realism, the metaethical view that there are objective moral facts. Lay people largely report anti-realist intuitions, which poses the question of how these intuitions affect their interpretation and handling of normative uncertainty. Results from two quasi-experimental studies (total N = 365) revealed that most people did not interpret (...) normative uncertainty as referring to objective moral facts but rather as uncertainty regarding one’s own view, uncertainty regarding the culturally accepted view or as the result of ambivalence. Especially the anti-realist majority of participants interpreted normative uncertainty different to how it is described in the literature on choice under normative uncertainty. Metaethical views were also associated with lay peoples’ choice of uncertainty reduction strategies and with assumptions about the intended aim of such strategies. The current findings suggest that empirical investigations of normative uncertainty might benefit from considering folk metaethical pluralism, as the lay public largely disagrees with the metaethical assumptions underlying the current discourse on choice under normative uncertainty. (shrink)

This article compares and contrasts Hans Kelsen's concept of normative imputation, in the Lecture Course of 1926, with the concepts of peripheral and central imputation, in The Pure Theory of Law of 1934. In this process, a wider and more significant distinction is revealed within the development of Hans Kelsen's theory of positive law. This distinction represents a shift in Kelsen's philosophical allegiance from the Neo-Kantianism of Windelband to that of Cohen. This, in turn, reflects a broader disengagement of (...) The Pure Theory of Law from the more direct connection with a political project of a civitas maxima envisaged by the Lecture Course. (shrink)

The essay addresses the debates about the ontology of norms considering the case of accounting for customary norms. It undertakes and defends a stance in favor of a semantic ontology by developing a framework for the explanation of norms as abstract objects and their linking with social facts to be identified in categories like “customary”, “enacted”, “legal”, “grammatical”, and so on. Furthermore, the work addresses the rival conceptions (pragmatic and eclectic) by showing the specific impossibility that these face for giving (...) a satisfactory account on customary norms. The inquiry concludes by exploring some possible insights from the philosophy of mind to explain the conceptual nature of norms as mental representations. (shrink)

The programmatic statement put forward in von Wright's last works on deontic logic introduces the perspective of logical pragmatics, which has been formally explicated here and extended so to include the role of norm-recipient as well as the role of norm-giver. Using the translation function from the language of deontic logic to the language of set-theoretical approach, the connection has been established between the deontic postulates, on one side, and the perfection properties of the norm-set and the counter-set, on the (...) other side. In the study of conditions of rational norm-related activities it has been shown that diverse dynamic second-order norms related to the concept of the consistency norm-system hold: -- the norm-giver ought to restore ``classical'' consistency by revising an inconsistent system, -- the norm-recipient ought to preserve an inconsistent system by revision of its logic so that inconsistency does not imply destruction of the system. Dialetheic deontic logic of Priest is a suitable logic for the purpose since it preserves other perfection properties of the system. (shrink)

In his discussion of normative concepts in the first part of On What Matters (2011), Parfit holds that apart from the ‘ought’ of decisive reason, there are other senses of ‘ought’ which do not imply any reasons. This claim poses a dilemma for his ‘reason-involving conception’ of normativity: either Parfit has to conclude that non-reason-implying ‘oughts’ are not normative. Or else he is forced to accept that normativity needs only to involve ‘apparent reasons’ – a certain kind (...) of hypothetical truths about reasons. I argue that both of these options are inacceptable. In the course of the discussion, I present a general objection to ‘apparent reason accounts’ of the normativity of rationality as advocated not only by Parfit, but also by Schroeder (2009) and Way (2009). (shrink)

New Breeding Techniques such as CRISPR-Cas9 are revolutionizing plant breeding and food production. Experts believe that the social debate about these technologies could be similar to those on green genetic engineering: emotional and highly controversial. Future debate about Genome Editing could benefit from a better understanding of the GMO (genetically modified organism) controversy. Against this background, this paper (a) presents results of a content analysis of position papers criticizing green genetic engineering in Germany. In particular, (b) it focuses on the (...) controversy as a place where normative concepts of nature are debated and become visible. Hence, the study complements existing interpretations by showing that the emerging concepts are more diverse than the familiar reductionist breakdown of the debate into anthropocentric vs. non-anthropocentric conceptions suggests. (shrink)

The paper discusses the sense in which the changes undergone by normative economics in the twentieth century can be said to be progressive. A simple criterion is proposed to decide whether a sequence of normative theories is progressive. This criterion is put to use on the historical transition from the new welfare economics to social choice theory. The paper reconstructs this classic case, and eventually concludes that the latter theory was progressive compared with the former. It also briefly comments on (...) the recent developments in normative economics and their connection with the previous two stages. (Published Online April 18 2006) Footnotes1 This paper suspersedes an earlier one entitled “Is There Progress in Normative Economics?” (Mongin 2002). I thank the organizers of the Fourth ESHET Conference (Graz 2000) for the opportunity they gave me to lecture on this topic. Thanks are also due to J. Alexander, K. Arrow, A. Bird, R. Bradley, M. Dascal, W. Gaertner, N. Gravel, D. Hausman, B. Hill, C. Howson, N. McClennen, A. Trannoy, J. Weymark, J. Worrall, two annonymous referees of this journal, and especially the editor M. Fleurbaey, for helpful comments. The editor's suggestions contributed to determine the final orientation of the paper. The author is grateful to the LSE and the Lachmann Foundation for their support at the time when he was writing the initial version. (shrink)

Hart's and Kelsen's respective outlooks on the concept of normativity not only differ by the way they explain this concept but also, more importantly, in what they seek to achieve when endeavouring to account for the normative dimension of law. By examining Hart's and Kelsen's models in the light of Korsgaard's understanding of the “normativity problem,” my aim is to emphasise not only their contrasted perspectives, but also the common limit they impose on their theories by dismissing as (...) inappropriate any question regarding the emergence of legal normativity. On the basis of my previous arguments, I shall explain why I deem Raz's analysis of the contrast between Hart's and Kelsen's conceptions of normativity to be misleading. (shrink)

This section is a discussion of Joseph Raz's Conception of Normativity introduced by Georgios Pavlakos.

The goal of the text is to reconstruct the concept of cultural normativity found in the phenomenological philosophy of law. The starting point of the text is the distinction between cultural normativity and normativity in culture. This distinction is based on reference to an extra-cultural, but not non-human instance – transcendent to the creations of humanity and its world, but in relations with the human equipment, with the characteristics of a specific human being and its existence. The (...) specific relations between cultural and legal normativity can be found in phenomenological concepts of law, which draw on the Husserlian transcendentalism and essentialism. The phenomenology of law attempts to answer the question of the sources, and the ontological and epistemological status of normativity as such. Normativity as a written and unwritten set of norms is characterized by phenomenologists with reference to value and axiology. The values are assumed by them as certain fixed reference points (“horizon of values” given to be recognized), because norms make it possible to establish rules for various individual and collective practices within a particular community and culture on the basis of values. (shrink)

Despite facing almost immediate criticism from Hegel, Kant’s view of normativity has greatly influenced contemporary value theory. This volume is the fruit of a 2017 conference at Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam by the same name that sought to bring the two conflicting accounts into dialogue (1). There are three general points worth making before addressing the articles themselves. This book review considers each chapter and its contribution to Hegel's account of normativity.

In this paper we focus on some new normativist positions and compare them with traditional ones. In so doing, we claim that if normative judgments are involved in determining whether a condition is a disease only in the sense identified by new normativisms, then disease is normative only in a weak sense, which must be distinguished from the strong sense advocated by traditional normativisms. Specifically, we argue that weak and strong normativity are different to the point that one ‘normativist’ (...) label ceases to be appropriate for the whole range of positions. If values and norms are not explicit components of the concept of disease, but only intervene in other explanatory roles, then the concept of disease is no more value-laden than many other scientific concepts, or even any other scientific concept. We call the newly identified position “value-conscious naturalism” about disease, and point to some of its theoretical and practical advantages. (shrink)

For a long time, the concept of moral integrity in politics has been highly controversial. While many look at it from a moralist perspective demanding absolute observance of moral values and principles, some scholars, chiefly Niccolò Machiavelli and his many followers, believe that politics is typically devoid of moral considerations. Others, such as Demetris Tillyris, consider politics to be a distinct way of life with a moral yardstick distinct from ordinary moral standards. All these viewpoints are grounded on divergent understandings (...) of the purpose of political power and how politicians ought to behave. This paper attempts to provide an exposition and critical analysis of the various contestations on integrity in politics. Through a normative ethical approach, it explores diverse theoretical perspectives with the aim of arriving at a comprehensive understanding of moral integrity in politics. The discussion and analysis in this paper are based on the theoretical lenses of the Aristotelian virtue ethics and the morality of power games. (shrink)

The article discusses the concept of progressive and degressive proportionality of the distribution of parliamentary seats. In the first part are presented axiological sources of the principles of proportionality and progressive and degressive proportionality and the history of degressively proportional apportionments of seats in the European Parliament. The main part of the article is devoted to the formulation of proposals for strict formal definition of degressive and progressive proportionality, and a description of the method of apportionment of seats in the (...) European Parliament based on the strict definition of degressive proportionality and maintaining maximum compatibility with former apportionments adopted in multilateral negotiations. The last part of the article consists of a discussion of the possibilities of adopting the concept of progressive proportionality in the analysis of the functioning of parliamentary electoral systems. (shrink)

The European project was aimed from the outset, alongside reconciliation (peace) and economic reconstruction (prosperity), at a degree of political integration too. Political integration has progressed modestly. Not everybody is convinced of its benefits. Besides, the notion of a European polity opens the question about its sources of cohesion. Those sources are more or less evident in the member states – language, history, legal, political and religious traditions, for instance. They give, say, Latvia, Italy or Hungary a certain degree of (...) unity – a national identity. But what ought to be that source of cohesion – or identity – for the European Union (EU) considered as a whole? This paper analyses five normative conceptions about such ‘European identity’ (EI) – cultural, legal, economic, international and cosmopolitan – and suggests that they are not mutually exclusive, but can be combined in a synthetic notion that promises to reflect in a more comprehensive and accurate way the sources of the minimal unity required to hold the EU polity together. (shrink)

In this article I argue that there are grounds for considering agonistic democracy and participatory democracy complementarity in order to institutionalize agonism which has thus far lacked an elaborate articulation of its institutional dimension. The two democratic theories share a commitment toward widening the scope of the political as a way of inclusion of citizens and their subsequent political subjectivation and empowerment. Furthermore, there are authors on both sides who think democracy does not need foundations. Agonistic participation and contestation, on (...) the one hand, and the broadening and strengthening of various sectors of political participation, on the other, both open up new possibilities for critique and change, but also create new risks. Building on a redefinition of agonisitic participation, I aim to attenuate an objection that agonism is normatively weak in terms of lacking resources to motivate citizens and justify their critique of practices of domination and oppression. The article concludes that we need to embrace agonistic participation as a means towards the development of democratic political judgement, as there are no other guarantees, i.e. secure foundations, for our ability to distinguish between democratic and non-democratic agon. (shrink)

Legal theory usually distinguishes only two kinds of legal realism: the American and the Scandinavian. Another school of this theoretical perspective is German legal realism, which refers to scholars like Ihering, Weber, and Schelsky. According to German legal realism, the author outlines what legal theory can do to persuade modern jurisprudence to face the social reality of law, conceived as institutionalized normative communication. The latter always occurs with reference to already valid and effectively operative legal norms which are used in (...) an established, normatively binding legal practice in a given regional society. (shrink)

This paper challenges the philosophical assumption that bodily sensations are free from normative constraints. It examines the normative status of bodily sensations through two studies: a corpus-linguistic analysis and an experimental investigation. The corpus analysis shows that while emotions are frequently subject to normative judgments concerning their appropriateness, similar attitudes are less evident towards bodily sensations like feelings of pain, hunger and cold. In contrast, however, the experimental study reveals notable differences in conceptions of bodily sensations. It finds that sensations (...) of hunger and cold are occasionally subject to normative assessment, with about half of the participants considering it reasonable to assess these sensations normatively. (shrink)

The author introduces a normative conception of coherence, derived from a pragmatic interpretation of the application of norms to concrete cases. A distinction is made between the justification of a norm and its application. In the case of moral norms, justification and application can be analysed as two different discursive procedures which give rise to different aspects of the principle of impartiality. Impartial justification requires a procedure by which all interests concerned are taken into account whereas impartial application requires a (...) procedure where all features of a situation are considered. The complete description of a concrete case makes necessary a coherent interpretation of all the valid norms which are prima facie applicable. This requirement of an ideal coherent system of norms is restricted to interpretive “paradigms” in the case of legal norms, because it is necessary to produce singular judgments under the restrictive conditions of scarce time and incomplete knowledge. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: I The Nature of Philosophy of Education and Conceptual Analysis II Peters' Conception of Education and some of its Normative Implications III Peters' Indeterminacy of Educational Aims and the Need for Sustained Dialogue References.

This article aims to highlight why R. S. Peters' conceptual analysis of ‘education’ was such an important contribution to the normative field of philosophy of education. In the article, I do the following: 1) explicate Peters' conception of philosophy of education as a field of philosophy and explain his approach to the philosophical analysis of concepts; 2) emphasize several (normative) features of Peters' conception of education, while pointing to a couple of oversights; and 3) suggest how Peters' analysis might (...) be used to reinvigorate a conversation on one central educational aim—that of how we might educate citizens for the 21st century. (shrink)

This article aims to highlight why R. S. Peters' conceptual analysis of ‘education’ was such an important contribution to the normative field of philosophy of education. In the article, I do the following: 1) explicate Peters' conception of philosophy of education as a field of philosophy and explain his approach to the philosophical analysis of concepts; 2) emphasize several (normative) features of Peters' conception of education, while pointing to a couple of oversights; and 3) suggest how Peters' analysis might (...) be used to reinvigorate a conversation on one central educational aim—that of how we might educate citizens for the 21st century. (shrink)

I defend a theory of philosophy, suggested explicitly by Allan Gibbard (and inspired by Kant), in which the main branches may be considered as fundamental inquiry into norms of different kinds. Special attention is given to how even metaphysics fits the description. The theory is defended by explaining a variety of ‘known facts’ about philosophy, understood as facts commonly recognized in academic philosophy. These include: that philosophy spans a diversity of areas, including logic, metaphysics, epistemology, ethics and aesthetics; that philosophy (...) has seemed, at least, to be different in kind from other areas of inquiry; that philosophy lacks experts and official procedures of justification; that philosophy appears important to some but not to others. (shrink)

In her 2007 paper, “Argument Has No Function” Jean Goodwin takes exception with what she calls the “explicit function claims”, arguing that not only are function-based accounts of argumentation insufficiently motivated, but they fail to ground claims to normativity. In this paper I stake out the beginnings of a functionalist answer to Goodwin.

This paper compares and contrasts two recent approaches to the theory of normative concepts with each other and with more traditional theories in metaethics, in order to highlight several different projects one could be engaged in when developing a theory of normative concepts. The two accounts derive from Millgram, The Great Endarkenment and Chrisman The Meaning of ‘Ought’. These accounts share in rejecting traditional attempts to explain what ‘ought’ is about or expresses. Instead these accounts treat ‘ought’ as (...) a quantificational word. However, the nature and range of the quantification are importantly different in the two accounts, which impacts on the ways in which the accounts integrate with the various projects one could be engaged in when developing a theory of normative concepts. (shrink)