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  1. The impossibility of non-manipulable probability aggregation.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2023
    A probability aggregation rule assigns to each profile of probability functions across a group of individuals (representing their individual probability assignments to some propositions) a collective probability function (representing the group's probability assignment). The rule is “non-manipulable” if no group member can manipulate the collective probability for any proposition in the direction of his or her own probability by misrepresenting his or her probability function (“strategic voting”). We show that, except in trivial cases, no probability aggregation rule satisfying two mild (...)
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  2. Psychological Mechanism of Corruption: A Comprehensive Review. [REVIEW]Juneman Abraham, Julia Suleeman & Bagus Takwin - forthcoming - Asian Journal of Scientific Research.
    Corruption prevention can be more effective if it does not rely merely on legal enforcement. This theoretical review aimed to propose a hypothetical psychological model capable of explaining the behavior of corruption. Moral disengagement is a variable that is considered ontologically closest in “distance” to the variable of corruption behavior. Counterfeit self, implicit self-theory, ethical mindset and moral emotion are taken into account as the pivotal factors of the corruption behavior and its mechanism of moral disengagement. Counterfeit self along with (...)
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  3. The Impossibility of a Bayesian Liberal?William Bosworth & Brad Taylor - forthcoming - Journal of Politics.
    Aumann’s theorem states that no individual should agree to disagree under a range of assumptions. Political liberalism appears to presuppose these assumptions with the idealized conditions of public reason. We argue Aumann’s theorem demonstrates they nevertheless cannot be simultaneously held with what is arguably political liberalism’s most central tenet. That is, the tenet of reasonable pluralism, which implies we can rationally agree to disagree over conceptions of the good. We finish by elaborating a way of relaxing one of the theorem’s (...)
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  4. Social Choice Should Guide AI Alignment in Dealing with Diverse Human Feedback.Vincent Conitzer, Rachel Freedman, Jobst Heitzig, Wesley H. Holliday, Bob M. Jacobs, Nathan Lambert, Milan Mosse, Eric Pacuit, Stuart Russell, Hailey Schoelkopf, Emanuel Tewolde & William S. Zwicker - forthcoming - Proceedings of the Forty-First International Conference on Machine Learning.
    Foundation models such as GPT-4 are fine-tuned to avoid unsafe or otherwise problematic behavior, such as helping to commit crimes or producing racist text. One approach to fine-tuning, called reinforcement learning from human feedback, learns from humans' expressed preferences over multiple outputs. Another approach is constitutional AI, in which the input from humans is a list of high-level principles. But how do we deal with potentially diverging input from humans? How can we aggregate the input into consistent data about "collective" (...)
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  5. Million Dollar Questions: Why Deliberation is More Than Information Pooling.Daniel Hoek & Richard Bradley - forthcoming - Social Choice and Welfare.
    Models of collective deliberation often assume that the chief aim of a deliberative exchange is the sharing of information. In this paper, we argue that an equally important role of deliberation is to draw participants’ attention to pertinent questions, which can aid the assembly and processing of distributed information by drawing deliberators’ attention to new issues. The assumption of logical omniscience renders classical models of agents’ informational states unsuitable for modelling this role of deliberation. Building on recent insights from psychology, (...)
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  6. Stable Voting.Wesley H. Holliday & Eric Pacuit - forthcoming - Constitutional Political Economy.
    We propose a new single-winner voting system using ranked ballots: Stable Voting. The motivating principle of Stable Voting is that if a candidate A would win without another candidate B in the election, and A beats B in a head-to-head majority comparison, then A should still win in the election with B included (unless there is another candidate A' who has the same kind of claim to winning, in which case a tiebreaker may choose between such candidates). We call this (...)
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  7. O Futuro do Tribunal: como a tecnologia permitiria descentralizar a unificação da jurisprudência.Ramiro Peres - forthcoming - In Democracia presente para gerações futuras (working title). Lisbon: Humus.
    O Judiciário moderno constitui um sistema hierarquizado e centralizado, em que cortes superiores, com um número pequeno de membros, têm a função de “dar a última palavra” para resolver desacordos doutrinários entre instâncias inferiores – e inclusive rever decisões das demais autoridades. Essa estrutura hierárquica implica uma fonte peculiar de instabilidade: o tribunal superior se torna como que um “ponto único de falha” suscetível à captura, à pressão indevida, à sobrecarga, e até a súbitas mudanças doutrinárias – pondo em risco (...)
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  8. Multidimensional Concepts and Disparate Scale Types.Brian Hedden & Jacob M. Nebel - 2024 - Philosophical Review 133 (3):265-308.
    Multidimensional concepts are everywhere, and they are important. Examples include moral value, welfare, scientific confirmation, democracy, and biodiversity. How, if at all, can we aggregate the underlying dimensions of a multidimensional concept F to yield verdicts about which things are Fer than which overall? Social choice theory can be used to model and investigate this aggregation problem. Here, we focus on a particularly thorny problem made salient by this social choice-theoretic framework: the underlying dimensions of a given concept might be (...)
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  9. An impossibility theorem concerning positive involvement in voting.Wesley H. Holliday - 2024 - Economics Letters 236:111589.
    In social choice theory with ordinal preferences, a voting method satisfies the axiom of positive involvement if adding to a preference profile a voter who ranks an alternative uniquely first cannot cause that alternative to go from winning to losing. In this note, we prove a new impossibility theorem concerning this axiom: there is no ordinal voting method satisfying positive involvement that also satisfies the Condorcet winner and loser criteria, resolvability, and a common invariance property for Condorcet methods, namely that (...)
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  10. Extensive Measurement in Social Choice.Jacob M. Nebel - 2024 - Theoretical Economics 19 (4):1581-1618.
    Extensive measurement is the standard measurement-theoretic approach for constructing a ratio scale. It involves the comparison of objects that can be concatenated in an additively representable way. This paper studies the implications of extensively measurable welfare for social choice theory. We do this in two frameworks: an Arrovian framework with a fixed population and no interpersonal comparisons, and a generalized framework with variable populations and full interpersonal comparability. In each framework we use extensive measurement to introduce novel domain restrictions, independence (...)
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  11. Betting on Conspiracy: A Decision Theoretic Account of the Rationality of Conspiracy Theory Belief.Melina Tsapos - 2024 - Erkenntnis 89 (2):1-19.
    The question of the rationality of conspiratorial belief ¬divides philosophers into mainly two camps. The particularists believe that each conspiracy theory ought to be examined on its own merits. The generalist, by contrast, argues that there is something inherently suspect about conspiracy theories that makes belief in them irrational. Recent empirical findings indicate that conspiratorial thinking is commonplace among ordinary people, which has naturally shifted attention to the particularists. Yet, even the particularist must agree that not all conspiracy belief is (...)
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  12. Two impossibility results for social choice under individual indifference intransitivity.Gustav Alexandrie - 2023 - Social Choice and Welfare 61:919–936.
    Due to the imperfect ability of individuals to discriminate between sufficiently similar alternatives, individual indifferences may fail to be transitive. I prove two impossibility theorems for social choice under indifference intransitivity, using axioms that are strictly weaker than Strong Pareto and that have been endorsed (sometimes jointly) in prior work on social choice under indifference intransitivity. The key axiom is Consistency, which states that if bundles are held constant for all but one individual, then society’s preferences must align with those (...)
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  13. Split Cycle: a new Condorcet-consistent voting method independent of clones and immune to spoilers.Wesley Holliday & Eric Pacuit - 2023 - Public Choice 197:1-62.
    We propose a Condorcet-consistent voting method that we call Split Cycle. Split Cycle belongs to the small family of known voting methods satisfying the anti-vote-splitting criterion of independence of clones. In this family, only Split Cycle satisfies a new criterion we call immunity to spoilers, which concerns adding candidates to elections, as well as the known criteria of positive involvement and negative involvement, which concern adding voters to elections. Thus, in contrast to other clone-independent methods, Split Cycle mitigates both “spoiler (...)
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  14. Strong dictatorship via ratio-scale measurable utilities: a simpler proof.Jacob M. Nebel - 2023 - Economic Theory Bulletin 11 (1):101-106.
    Tsui and Weymark (Economic Theory, 1997) have shown that the only continuous social welfare orderings on the whole Euclidean space which satisfy the weak Pareto principle and are invariant to individual-specific similarity transformations of utilities are strongly dictatorial. Their proof relies on functional equation arguments which are quite complex. This note provides a simpler proof of their theorem.
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  15. The Democratic Imperative to Make Margins Matter.Daniel Wodak - 2023 - Maryland Law Review 86 (2):365-442.
    Many commentators lament that American democracy is in crisis. It is becoming a system of minority rule, wherein a party with a minority of the nationwide vote can control the national government. Partisan gerrymandering in the House of Representatives fuels this crisis, as does the equal representation of small and large states in the Senate. But altering these features of the legislature would not end minority rule. Indeed, it has long been held that majority rule cannot be guaranteed within any (...)
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  16. Fully Bayesian Aggregation.Franz Dietrich - 2021 - Journal of Economic Theory 194:105255.
    Can a group be an orthodox rational agent? This requires the group's aggregate preferences to follow expected utility (static rationality) and to evolve by Bayesian updating (dynamic rationality). Group rationality is possible, but the only preference aggregation rules which achieve it (and are minimally Paretian and continuous) are the linear-geometric rules, which combine individual values linearly and combine individual beliefs geometrically. Linear-geometric preference aggregation contrasts with classic linear-linear preference aggregation, which combines both values and beliefs linearly, but achieves only static (...)
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  17. Voting Theory in the Lean Theorem Prover.Wesley H. Holliday, Chase Norman & Eric Pacuit - 2021 - In Sujata Ghosh & Thomas Icard (eds.), Logic, Rationality, and Interaction: 8th International Workshop, Lori 2021, Xi’an, China, October 16–18, 2021, Proceedings. Springer Verlag. pp. 111-127.
    There is a long tradition of fruitful interaction between logic and social choice theory. In recent years, much of this interaction has focused on computer-aided methods such as SAT solving and interactive theorem proving. In this paper, we report on the development of a framework for formalizing voting theory in the Lean theorem prover, which we have applied to verify properties of a recently studied voting method. While previous applications of interactive theorem proving to social choice have focused on the (...)
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  18. Axioms for Defeat in Democratic Elections.Wesley H. Holliday & Eric Pacuit - 2021 - Journal of Theoretical Politics 33 (4):475 - 524.
    We propose six axioms concerning when one candidate should defeat another in a democratic election involving two or more candidates. Five of the axioms are widely satisfied by known voting procedures. The sixth axiom is a weakening of Kenneth Arrow's famous condition of the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA). We call this weakening Coherent IIA. We prove that the five axioms plus Coherent IIA single out a method of determining defeats studied in our recent work: Split Cycle. In particular, Split (...)
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  19. Uncertainty, equality, fraternity.Rush T. Stewart - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):9603-9619.
    Epistemic states of uncertainty play important roles in ethical and political theorizing. Theories that appeal to a “veil of ignorance,” for example, analyze fairness or impartiality in terms of certain states of ignorance. It is important, then, to scrutinize proposed conceptions of ignorance and explore promising alternatives in such contexts. Here, I study Lerner’s probabilistic egalitarian theorem in the setting of imprecise probabilities. Lerner’s theorem assumes that a social planner tasked with distributing income to individuals in a population is “completely (...)
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  20. A note on Murakami’s theorems and incomplete social choice without the Pareto principle.Wesley H. Holliday & Mikayla Kelley - 2020 - Social Choice and Welfare 55:243-253.
    In Arrovian social choice theory assuming the independence of irrelevant alternatives, Murakami (1968) proved two theorems about complete and transitive collective choice rules that satisfy strict non-imposition (citizens’ sovereignty), one being a dichotomy theorem about Paretian or anti-Paretian rules and the other a dictator-or-inverse-dictator impossibility theorem without the Pareto principle. It has been claimed in the later literature that a theorem of Malawski and Zhou (1994) is a generalization of Murakami’s dichotomy theorem and that Wilson’s (1972) impossibility theorem is stronger (...)
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  21. Arrow's Decisive Coalitions.Wesley H. Holliday & Eric Pacuit - 2020 - Social Choice and Welfare 54:463–505.
    In his classic monograph, Social Choice and Individual Values, Arrow introduced the notion of a decisive coalition of voters as part of his mathematical framework for social choice theory. The subsequent literature on Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem has shown the importance for social choice theory of reasoning about coalitions of voters with different grades of decisiveness. The goal of this paper is a fine-grained analysis of reasoning about decisive coalitions, formalizing how the concept of a decisive coalition gives rise to a (...)
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  22. Social Choice or Collective Decision-making: What Is Politics All About?Thomas Mulligan - 2020 - In Volker Kaul & Ingrid Salvatore (eds.), What Is Pluralism? London: Routledge. pp. 48-61.
    Sometimes citizens disagree about political matters, but a decision must be made. We have two theoretical frameworks for resolving political disagreement. The first is the framework of social choice. In it, our goal is to treat parties to the dispute fairly, and there is no sense in which some are right and the others wrong. The second framework is that of collective decision-making. Here, we do believe that preferences are truth apt, and our moral consideration is owed not to those (...)
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  23. Reclamation: Taking Back Control of Words.Mihaela Popa-Wyatt - 2020 - Grazer Philosophische Studien (1):159-176.
    Reclamation is the phenomenon of an oppressed group repurposing language to its own ends. A case study is reclamation of slur words. Popa-Wyatt and Wyatt (2018) argued that a slurring utterance is a speech act which performs a discourse role assignment. It assigns a subordinate role to the target, while the speaker assumes a dominant role. This pair of role assignments is used to oppress the target. Here I focus on how reclamation works and under what conditions its benefits can (...)
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  24. Weak Pseudo-Rationalizability.Rush T. Stewart - 2020 - Mathematical Social Sciences 104:23-28.
    This paper generalizes rationalizability of a choice function by a single acyclic binary relation to rationalizability by a set of such relations. Rather than selecting those options in a menu that are maximal with respect to a single binary relation, a weakly pseudo-rationalizable choice function selects those options that are maximal with respect to at least one binary relation in a given set. I characterize the class of weakly pseudo-rationalizable choice functions in terms of simple functional properties. This result also (...)
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  25. Are Referendums and Parliamentary Elections Reconcilable? The Implications of Three Voting Paradoxes.Suzanne Andrea Bloks - 2019 - Moral Philosophy and Politics 6 (2):281-311.
    In representative democracies, referendum voting and parliamentary elections provide two fundamentally different methods for determining the majority opinion. We use three mathematical paradoxes – so-called majority voting paradoxes – to show that referendum voting can reverse the outcome of a parliamentary election, even if the same group of voters have expressed the same preferences on the issues considered in the referendums and the parliamentary election. This insight about the systemic contrarieties between referendum voting and parliamentary elections sheds a new light (...)
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  26. Strategic Voting Under Uncertainty About the Voting Method.Wesley H. Holliday & Eric Pacuit - 2019 - Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science 297:252–272.
    Much of the theoretical work on strategic voting makes strong assumptions about what voters know about the voting situation. A strategizing voter is typically assumed to know how other voters will vote and to know the rules of the voting method. A growing body of literature explores strategic voting when there is uncertainty about how others will vote. In this paper, we study strategic voting when there is uncertainty about the voting method. We introduce three notions of manipulability for a (...)
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  27. Markets in votes: Alienability, strict secrecy, and political clientelism.Nicolás Maloberti - 2019 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 18 (2):193-215.
    Standard rationales for the illegality of markets in votes are based on concerns over the undue influence of wealth and the erosion of civic responsibility that would result from the commodification of votes. I present an alternative rationale based on how the mere alienability of votes alters the strategic setting faced by political actors. The inalienability of votes ensure the strict secrecy of voting, that is, the inability of voters to communicate credibly to others the content of their votes. In (...)
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  28. Towards a Logic of Epistemic Theory of Measurement.Daniele Porello & Claudio Macolo - 2019 - In Gabor Bella & Paolo Bouquet (eds.), Modeling and Using Context - 11th International and Interdisciplinary Conference, {CONTEXT} 2019, Trento, Italy, November 20-22, 2019, Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science 11939. pp. 175-188.
    We propose a logic to reason about data collected by a num- ber of measurement systems. The semantic of this logic is grounded on the epistemic theory of measurement that gives a central role to measure- ment devices and calibration. In this perspective, the lack of evidences (in the available data) for the truth or falsehood of a proposition requires the introduction of a third truth-value (the undetermined). Moreover, the data collected by a given source are here represented by means (...)
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  29. The Expressive Case against Plurality Rule.Daniel Wodak - 2019 - Journal of Political Philosophy 27 (3):363-387.
    The U.S. election in November 2016 raised and amplified doubts about first-past-the-post (“plurality rule”) electoral systems. Arguments against plurality rule and for alternatives like preferential voting tend to be consequentialist: it is argued that systems like preferential voting produce different, better outcomes. After briefly noting why the consequentialist case against plurality rule is more complex and contentious than it first appears, I offer an expressive alternative: plurality rule produces actual or apparent dilemmas for voters in ways that are morally objectionable, (...)
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  30. Choice functions and weak Nash axioms.Susumu Cato - 2018 - Review of Economic Design 22:159–176.
    The Nash axiom is a basic property of consistency in choice. This paper proposes weaker versions of the axiom and examines their logical implications. In particular, we demonstrate that weak Nash axioms are useful to understand the relationship between the Nash axiom and the path independence axiom. We provide an application of weak Nash axioms to the no-envy approach. We present a possibility result and an impossibility result.
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  31. Rule by Multiple Majorities: A New Theory of Popular Control.Sean Ingham - 2018 - Cambridge University Press.
    In a democracy, citizens should have some control over how they are governed. If they do not participate directly in making policy, they ought to maintain control over the public officials who design policy on their behalf. Rule by Multiple Majorities develops a novel theory of popular control: an account of what it is, why democracy's promise of popular control is compatible with what we know about actual democracies, and why it matters. While social choice theory suggests there is no (...)
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  32. Democratic Deliberation and Social Choice: A Review.Christian List - 2018 - In André Bächtiger, Jane Mansbridge, John Dryzek & Mark Warren (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Deliberative Democracy. Oxford University Press.
    In normative political theory, it is widely accepted that democracy cannot be reduced to voting alone, but that it requires deliberation. In formal social choice theory, by contrast, the study of democracy has focused primarily on the aggregation of individual opinions into collective decisions, typically through voting. While the literature on deliberation has an optimistic flavour, the literature on social choice is more mixed. It is centred around several paradoxes and impossibility results identifying conflicts between different intuitively plausible desiderata. In (...)
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  33. Logics for modelling collective attitudes.Daniele Porello - 2018 - Fundamenta Informaticae 158 (1-3):239-27.
    We introduce a number of logics to reason about collective propositional attitudes that are defined by means of the majority rule. It is well known that majoritarian aggregation is subject to irrationality, as the results in social choice theory and judgment aggregation show. The proposed logics for modelling collective attitudes are based on a substructural propositional logic that allows for circumventing inconsistent outcomes. Individual and collective propositional attitudes, such as beliefs, desires, obligations, are then modelled by means of minimal modalities (...)
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  34. A Theory of Bayesian Groups.Franz Dietrich - 2017 - Noûs 53 (3):708-736.
    A group is often construed as one agent with its own probabilistic beliefs (credences), which are obtained by aggregating those of the individuals, for instance through averaging. In their celebrated “Groupthink”, Russell et al. (2015) require group credences to undergo Bayesian revision whenever new information is learnt, i.e., whenever individual credences undergo Bayesian revision based on this information. To obtain a fully Bayesian group, one should often extend this requirement to non-public or even private information (learnt by not all or (...)
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  35. Probabilistic Opinion Pooling Generalized. Part One: General Agendas.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2017 - Social Choice and Welfare 48 (4):747–786.
    How can different individuals' probability assignments to some events be aggregated into a collective probability assignment? Classic results on this problem assume that the set of relevant events -- the agenda -- is a sigma-algebra and is thus closed under disjunction (union) and conjunction (intersection). We drop this demanding assumption and explore probabilistic opinion pooling on general agendas. One might be interested in the probability of rain and that of an interest-rate increase, but not in the probability of rain or (...)
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  36. Review of Iwao Hirose, Moral Aggregation. [REVIEW]Johan E. Gustafsson - 2017 - Mind 126 (503):964-967.
  37. Judgement aggregation in non-classical logics.Daniele Porello - 2017 - Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 27 (1-2):106-139.
    This work contributes to the theory of judgement aggregation by discussing a number of significant non-classical logics. After adapting the standard framework of judgement aggregation to cope with non-classical logics, we discuss in particular results for the case of Intuitionistic Logic, the Lambek calculus, Linear Logic and Relevant Logics. The motivation for studying judgement aggregation in non-classical logics is that they offer a number of modelling choices to represent agents’ reasoning in aggregation problems. By studying judgement aggregation in logics that (...)
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  38. Probabilistic Opinion Pooling.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2016 - In Alan Hájek & Christopher Hitchcock (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Probability and Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Suppose several individuals (e.g., experts on a panel) each assign probabilities to some events. How can these individual probability assignments be aggregated into a single collective probability assignment? This article reviews several proposed solutions to this problem. We focus on three salient proposals: linear pooling (the weighted or unweighted linear averaging of probabilities), geometric pooling (the weighted or unweighted geometric averaging of probabilities), and multiplicative pooling (where probabilities are multiplied rather than averaged). We present axiomatic characterisations of each class of (...)
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  39. Voting, deliberation and truth.Stephan Hartmann & Soroush Rafiee Rad - 2016 - Synthese 195 (3):1-21.
    There are various ways to reach a group decision on a factual yes–no question. One way is to vote and decide what the majority votes for. This procedure receives some epistemological support from the Condorcet Jury Theorem. Alternatively, the group members may prefer to deliberate and will eventually reach a decision that everybody endorses—a consensus. While the latter procedure has the advantage that it makes everybody happy, it has the disadvantage that it is difficult to implement, especially for larger groups. (...)
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  40. Vindicating methodological triangulation.Remco Heesen, Liam Kofi Bright & Andrew Zucker - 2016 - Synthese 196 (8):3067-3081.
    Social scientists use many different methods, and there are often substantial disagreements about which method is appropriate for a given research question. In response to this uncertainty about the relative merits of different methods, W. E. B. Du Bois advocated for and applied “methodological triangulation”. This is to use multiple methods simultaneously in the belief that, where one is uncertain about the reliability of any given method, if multiple methods yield the same answer that answer is confirmed more strongly than (...)
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  41. Spurious Unanimity and the Pareto Principle.Philippe Mongin - 2016 - Economics and Philosophy 32 (3):511-532.
    The Pareto principle states that if the members of society express the same preference judgment between two options, this judgment is compelling for society. A building block of normative economics and social choice theory, and often borrowed by contemporary political philosophy, the principle has rarely been subjected to philosophical criticism. The paper objects to it on the ground that it indifferently applies to those cases in which the individuals agree on both their expressed preferences and their reasons for entertaining them, (...)
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  42. Measurement scales and welfarist social choice.Michael Morreau & John A. Weymark - 2016 - Journal of Mathematical Psychology 75:127-136.
    The social welfare functional approach to social choice theory fails to distinguish a genuine change in individual well-beings from a merely representational change due to the use of different measurement scales. A generalization of the concept of a social welfare functional is introduced that explicitly takes account of the scales that are used to measure well-beings so as to distinguish between these two kinds of changes. This generalization of the standard theoretical framework results in a more satisfactory formulation of welfarism, (...)
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  43. Changing Our Mind.Glen Pettigrove - 2016 - In Michael Brady & Miranda Fricker (eds.), The Epistemic Life of Groups: Essays in the Epistemology of Collectives. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 111-129.
    A complete analysis of group knowledge would include an account of the acquisition and revision of group beliefs. This paper explores what an account of group belief revision would require. Focusing on moral communities and moral beliefs, I identify a number of ways in which such communities might revise their beliefs. And I develop an account of group belief revision that can accommodate modifications of a) propositional content, b) non-propositional content, c) understanding and d) conception.
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  44. Psikologi Kebangsaan Sebagai Payung Studi Baru di Indonesia.Juneman Abraham (ed.) - 2015 - Jakarta: ReneBook.
    Title in English: Psychology of Nationality as A New Studies Umbrella in Indonesia. Abstract: The role of psychology in dealing with issues of and improving the welfare of the nation has often been raised into topics of psychology seminars and conferences, both in subdisciplines of social psychology, clinical-macro psychology, and other subdisciplines. Psychology, as a science that deals with human dimensions, tries to contribute from formulating the definition of "nation" to doing research and social intervention on the nation's problems. This (...)
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  45. Theorems and Models in Political Theory: An Application to Pettit on Popular Control.Sean Ingham - 2015 - The Good Society 24 (1):98-117.
    Pettit (2012) presents a model of popular control over government, according to which it consists in the government being subject to those policy-making norms that everyone accepts. In this paper, I provide a formal statement of this interpretation of popular control, which illuminates its relationship to other interpretations of the idea with which it is easily conflated, and which gives rise to a theorem, similar to the famous Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem. The theorem states that if government policy is subject to popular (...)
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  46. Aggregating Causal Judgments.Richard Bradley, Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2014 - Philosophy of Science 81 (4):491-515.
    Decision-making typically requires judgments about causal relations: we need to know the causal effects of our actions and the causal relevance of various environmental factors. We investigate how several individuals' causal judgments can be aggregated into collective causal judgments. First, we consider the aggregation of causal judgments via the aggregation of probabilistic judgments, and identify the limitations of this approach. We then explore the possibility of aggregating causal judgments independently of probabilistic ones. Formally, we introduce the problem of causal-network aggregation. (...)
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  47. On a Fallacy in the Kaldor-Hicks Efficiency-Equity Analysis.David Ellerman - 2014 - Constitutional Political Economy 25 (2):125-136.
    This paper shows that implicit assumptions about the numeraire good in the Kaldor-Hicks efficiency-equity analysis involve a "same-yardstick" fallacy (a fallacy pointed out by Paul Samuelson in another context). These results have negative implications for cost-benefit analysis, the wealth-maximization approach to law and economics, and other parts of applied welfare economics--as well as for the whole vision of economics based on the "production and distribution of social wealth.".
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  48. When to defer to supermajority testimony — and when not.Christian List - 2014 - In Jennifer Lackey (ed.), Essays in Collective Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 240-249.
    Pettit (2006) argues that deferring to majority testimony is not generally rational: it may lead to inconsistent beliefs. He suggests that “another ... approach will do better”: deferring to supermajority testimony. But this approach may also lead to inconsistencies. In this paper, I describe conditions under which deference to supermajority testimony ensures consistency, and conditions under which it does not. I also introduce the concept of “consistency of degree k”, which is weaker than full consistency by ruling out only “blatant” (...)
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  49. Independence and Interdependence: Lessons from the Hive.Christian List & Adrian Vermeule - 2014 - Rationality and Society 26 (2):170-207.
    There is a substantial class of collective decision problems whose successful solution requires interdependence among decision makers at the agenda-setting stage and independence at the stage of choice. We define this class of problems and describe and apply a search-and-decision mechanism theoretically modeled in the context of honeybees and identified in earlier empirical work in biology. The honeybees’ mechanism has useful implications for mechanism design in human institutions, including courts, legislatures, executive appointments, research and development in firms, and basic research (...)
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  50. Arrow's Theorem.Michael Morreau - 2014 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: N/A.
    Kenneth Arrow’s “impossibility” theorem—or “general possibility” theorem, as he called it—answers a very basic question in the theory of collective decision-making. Say there are some alternatives to choose among. They could be policies, public projects, candidates in an election, distributions of income and labour requirements among the members of a society, or just about anything else. There are some people whose preferences will inform this choice, and the question is: which procedures are there for deriving, from what is known or (...)
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