In the third and fourth parts of the book, Günther shows--in debate with Hare, Dworkin, and others--how argumentation on the appropriate application of norms and principles in morality and law is possible.

The author introduces a normative conception of coherence, derived from a pragmatic interpretation of the application of norms to concrete cases. A distinction is made between the justification of a norm and its application. In the case of moral norms, justification and application can be analysed as two different discursive procedures which give rise to different aspects of the principle of impartiality. Impartial justification requires a procedure by which all interests concerned are taken into account whereas impartial application requires a (...) procedure where all features of a situation are considered. The complete description of a concrete case makes necessary a coherent interpretation of all the valid norms which are prima facie applicable. This requirement of an ideal coherent system of norms is restricted to interpretive “paradigms” in the case of legal norms, because it is necessary to produce singular judgments under the restrictive conditions of scarce time and incomplete knowledge. (shrink)

Wie kommt es, dass sich Menschen an normative Ordnungen halten, und aus welchen Normen bestehen diese? Die Frage nach deren bindender Kraft beleuchten die philosophischen Beiträge dieses Bandes. Ergänzend wird aus historischer Sicht untersucht, wie sich unterschiedliche Rechtfertigungsweisen von Ordnungen entwickelt haben. Der Konstruktion neuer internationaler Rechtsordnungen gehen die rechtswissenschaftlichen Beiträge nach. Aus politikwissenschaftlicher Perspektive wird schließlich gezeigt, auf welchen Prinzipien die institutionelle Gestaltung unserer politischen Welt beruht beziehungsweise beruhen sollte.

In this paper the author criticizes the way Robert Alexy reconstructs the relationship between legal and practical reasoning. The core of Alexy's argumentation (Alexy 1978) is considered the claim that legal argumentation is a “special case” of general practical discourse. In order to question this claim, the author analyzes three different types of argument: (1) that legal reasoning is needed by general practical discourse itself, (2) that there are similarities between legal argumentation and general practical discourse, (3) that there is (...) a correspondence between certain types of argument in general practical discourse and in legal argumentation.**. (shrink)

In a constitutional democracy, the imputation of a legal violation to an individual must be related to the fact that democratic approval of a norm - under limiting conditions - is coupled with the obligation to follow that norm. The neutrality of modern law toward the quality of motives for following a norm, however, challenges the assumption of such a connection. This challenge is overlooked by those who take the position that individual imputation should be based on the morally autonomous (...) individual's self-contradiction. In contrast, deterrence theories fail to see the other relevant aspect, namely that individual imputation cannot be completely divorced from the perspective of the individual as a citizen, who could indeed follow the norm because of his insight into the reasons for its validity. Individual imputation takes account of this double classification of a person subject to law as citizen and as private autonomous legal subject only if the actor is addressed as citizen in the reasoning given to support the determination of culpability without simultaneously requiring him to actually adopt the perspective of a citizen. Die individuelle Zurechnung einer Rechtsverletzung muß in einem demokratischen Verfassungsstaat etwas damit zu tun haben, daß mit der demokratischen Zustimmung zu einer Norm unter einschränkenden Bedingungen - auch die Verpflichtung zur Normbefolgung verbunden ist. Gegen die Vermutung eines solchen Zusammenhangs spricht jedoch die Neutralität des modernen Rechts gegenüber der Qualität der Motive seiner Befolgung. Dies wird von denjenigen Positionen übersehen, die eine individuelle Zurechnung auf den Selbstwiderspruch der sittlich autonomen Person gründen wollen. Dagegen übersehen präventive Schuldtheorien den anderen Aspekt, daß sich individuelle Zurechnung nicht gänzlich von der Perspektive des Staatsbürgers lösen darf, der eine legitime Norm aus Einsicht in die Gründe ihrer Geltung auch befolgen könnte. Der doppelten Codierung der Rechtsperson als Staatsbürger und als privatautonomes Rechtssubjekt entspricht die individuelle Zurechnung nur dann, wenn der Täter durch die Begründung des Schuldurteils als Staatsbürger angesprochen wird, ohne daß ihm ein Wechsel in die Perspektive eines Staatsbürgers auch zugemutet würde. (shrink)

La théorie de l'argumentation montre que le raisonnement pratique s'exerce selon deux modalités : la justification de la validité d'une norme générale et la justification de la pertinence de l'application d'une norme générale au cas d'espèce. Le jugement d'application est le produit d'une argumentation commandée par une exigence d'impartialité. Cette exigence se traduit dans le principe procédural selon lequel on ne peut établir qu'une norme peut légitimement s'appliquer dans une situation que si ont été prises en considération toutes les caractéristiques (...) de la situation qui sont relevantes en regard d'une interprétation cohérente de toutes les normes applicables. Un tel critère de validité s'impose tant au jugement moral en situation qu'au jugement juridique. (shrink)

The article first sketches a panorama of contrasting crisis-like processes that currently characterize the general understanding of freedom, such as the increase in restrictions on freedom against the background of man-made environmental changes, the strengthening of the freedom to dispose of one’s own life in the discussion on assisted suicide, the development of more complex views of the biological nature of human beings and their freedom, the disavowal of the connection between freedom and responsibility, and the increasing use of new (...) communication media and algorithmic technologies of observation, analysis, and modification of human behavior. Under this impression, new contours of a complex and conflictual order of freedom are drawn. They become apparent in at least three determinations of the relationship of freedom: in the relationship of freedom to human nature, in the relationship to others and to society, and in the relationship to extra-human nature. In all three relationships, the semantics of disposal and domination seem to have a highly destructive effect on a crisis-like moment and carry the risk of contributing to a long-term loss of freedom. (shrink)

Jurgen Habermas is widely regarded as one of the outstanding intellectuals. This title focuses on the theory of law which can be distilled from his vast compendium of work. It places this theory in the context of Habermas' overall contribution to the theory of society, political theory and social philosophy.