Elisabetta Lalumera
University of Bologna
M. Cristina Amoretti
Università degli Studi di Genova
In this paper we focus on some new normativist positions and compare them with traditional ones. In so doing, we claim that if normative judgments are involved in determining whether a condition is a disease only in the sense identified by new normativisms, then disease is normative only in a weak sense, which must be distinguished from the strong sense advocated by traditional normativisms. Specifically, we argue that weak and strong normativity are different to the point that one ‘normativist’ label ceases to be appropriate for the whole range of positions. If values and norms are not explicit components of the concept of disease, but only intervene in other explanatory roles, then the concept of disease is no more value-laden than many other scientific concepts, or even any other scientific concept. We call the newly identified position “value-conscious naturalism” about disease, and point to some of its theoretical and practical advantages.
Keywords Disease, Normativity, health, Cooper, Kingma, Naturalism, Boorse, Values
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Reprint years 2021, 2022
DOI 10.1007/s11019-021-10048-x
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References found in this work BETA

Science, Policy, and the Value-Free Ideal.Heather Douglas - 2009 - University of Pittsburgh Press.
Health as a Theoretical Concept.Christopher Boorse - 1977 - Philosophy of Science 44 (4):542-573.
The Philosophy of Evidence-Based Medicine.Jeremy Howick - 2011 - Wiley-Blackwell, Bmj Books.
A Philosophy for the Science of Well-Being.Anna Alexandrova - 2017 - New York: Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Quantitative Problem for Theories of Dysfunction and Disease.Thomas Schramme - 2021 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 17 (2):(SI7)5-30.

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