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  1. Reasons for actions and desires.Ulrike Heuer - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 121 (1):43–63.
    It is an assumption common to many theories of rationality that all practical reasons are based on a person's given desires. I shall call any approach to practical reasons which accepts this assumption a "Humean approach". In spite of many criticisms, the Humean approach has numerous followers who take it to be the natural and inevitable view of practical reason. I will develop an argument against the Humean view aiming to explain its appeal, as well as to expose its mistake. (...)
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  2. Reasons and impossibility.Ulrike Heuer - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 147 (2):235 - 246.
    In this paper, I argue that a person can have a reason to do what she cannot do. In a nutshell, the argument is that a person can have derivate reasons relating to an action that she has a non-derivative reason to perform. There are clear examples of derivative reasons that a person has in cases where she cannot do what she (non-derivatively) has reason to do. She couldn’t have those derivative reasons, unless she also had the non-derivative reason to (...)
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  3. Luck, Value, and Commitment: Themes from the Ethics of Bernard Williams.Ulrike Heuer & Gerald R. Lang (eds.) - 2012 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press USA.
    Luck, Value, and Commitment comprises eleven new essays which engage with, or take their point of departure from, the influential work in moral and political philosophy of Bernard Williams (1929-2003).
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  4. The Paradox of Deontology, Revisited.Ulrike Heuer - 2011 - In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Volume 1. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 236-67.
    It appears to be a feature of our ordinary understanding of morality that we ought not to act in certain ways at all. We ought not to kill, torture, deceive, break our promises (say)—exceptional circumstances apart. Many moral duties are thought of in this way. Killing another person would be wrong even if it achieved a great good, and even if it led to preventing the deaths of several others. This feature of moral thinking is at the core of deontological (...)
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  5. Intentions and the Reasons for Which We Act.Ulrike Heuer - 2014 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 114 (3pt3):291-315.
    Many of the things we do in the course of a day we don't do intentionally: blushing, sneezing, breathing, blinking, smiling—to name but a few. But we also do act intentionally, and often when we do we act for reasons. Whether we always act for reasons when we act intentionally is controversial. But at least the converse is generally accepted: when we act for reasons we always act intentionally. Necessarily, it seems. In this paper, I argue that acting intentionally is (...)
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  6.  67
    Explaining Reasons: Where Does the Buck Stop?Ulrike Heuer - 2005 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 1 (3):1-25.
    The buck-passing account of values offers an explanation of the close relation of values and reasons for action: of why it is that the question whether something that is of value provides reasons is not ”open.” Being of value simply is, its defenders claim, a property that something has in virtue of its having other reason-providing properties. The generic idea of buck-passing is that the property of being good or being of value does not provide reasons. It is other properties (...)
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  7. Beyond Wrong Reasons: The Buck-Passing Account of Value.Ulrike Heuer - 2010 - In Michael Brady (ed.), New Waves in Metaethics. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan.
    The buck-passing account of value (BPA) is very fertile ground that has given rise to a number of interpretations and controversies. It has originally been proposed by T.M. Scanlon as an analysis of value: according to it, being good ‘is not a property that itself provides a reason to respond to a thing in certain ways. Rather, to be good or valuable is to have other properties that constitute such reasons’. Buck-passing stands in a complicated relation to the fitting-attitude analysis (...)
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  8. Wrongness and reasons.Ulrike Heuer - 2010 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13 (2):137 - 152.
    Is the wrongness of an action a reason not to perform it? Of course it is, you may answer. That an action is wrong both explains and justifies not doing it. Yet, there are doubts. Thinking that wrongness is a reason is confused, so an argument by Jonathan Dancy. There can’t be such a reason if ‘ϕ-ing is wrong’ is verdictive, and an all things considered judgment about what (not) to do in a certain situation. Such judgments are based on (...)
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  9.  77
    Promising-Part 1.Ulrike Heuer - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (12):832-841.
    The explanation of promising is fraught with problems. In particular the problem that promises can be valid even when nothing good comes of keeping the promise (the problem of ‘bare wrongings’), and the bootstrapping problem with explaining how the mere intention to put oneself under an obligation can create such an obligation have been recognized since Hume’s famous discussion of the topic. There are two influential accounts of promising, and promissory obligation, which attempt to solve the problems: The expectation account (...)
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  10.  70
    Thick concepts and internal reasons.Ulrike Heuer - 2012 - In Ulrike Heuer & Gerald Lang (eds.), Luck, Value, and Commitment: Themes from the Ethics of Bernard Williams. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press USA. pp. 219.
    It has become common to distinguish between two kinds of ethical concepts: thick and thin ones. Bernard Williams, who coined the terms, explains that thick concepts such as “coward, lie, brutality, gratitude and so forth” are marked by having greater empirical content than thin ones. They are both action-guiding and world-guided: -/- If a concept of this kind applies, this often provides someone with a reason for action… At the same time, their application is guided by the world. A concept (...)
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  11.  55
    Promising - Part 2.Ulrike Heuer - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (12):842-851.
    The explanation of promising is fraught with problems. In particular the problem that promises can be valid even when nothing good comes of keeping the promise , and the bootstrapping problem with explaining how the mere intention to put oneself under an obligation can create such an obligation have been recognized since Hume’s famous discussion of the topic. In part 1, I showed that two main views of promising which attempt to solve these problems fall short of explaining the promissory (...)
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  12. The Relevance of the Wrong Kind of Reasons.Ulrike Heuer - 2018 - In C. McHugh, J. Way & D. Whiting (eds.), Normativity: Epistemic and Practical. Oxford, UK:
    There is currently a wide-ranging philosophical discussion of two kinds of reasons for attitudes which are sometimes called the right and wrong kinds of reasons for those attitudes. The question is what the distinction shows about the nature of the attitudes, and about reasons and normativity in general. The distinction is deemed to apply to reasons for different kinds of attitudes such as beliefs and intentions, as well as so-called proattitudes, e.g. admiration or desire. Wlodek Rabinowicz’s and Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen’s paper (...)
     
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  13. Introduction.Gerald Lang & Ulrike Heuer - 2012 - In Ulrike Heuer & Gerald Lang (eds.), Luck, Value, and Commitment: Themes From the Ethics of Bernard Williams. Oxford University Press. pp. 1-16.
     
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  14. Intentions, Permissibility and the Reasons for Which We Act.Ulrike Heuer - 2015 - In George Pavlakos & Veronica Rodriguez Blanco (eds.), Practical Normativity. Essays on Reasons and Intentions in Law and Practical Reason. Cambridge University Press. pp. 11-30.
    If you injure me, it matters morally whether it was an accident or you did it intentionally, and whether you did it because you thought it would be fun. I take it that any ethical theory will have to include some explanation of why this is. There are two dominant views in the current debate about the moral significance of an agent’s intentions: The one is that the intention with which someone acts at least sometimes determines whether what she does (...)
     
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  15. Reasons to Intend.Ulrike Heuer - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press. pp. 865-890.
    Donald Davidson writes that “[r]easons for intending to do something are very much like reasons for action, indeed one might hold that they are exactly the same except for time.” That the reasons for forming an intention and the reasons for acting as intended are in some way related is a widely accepted claim. But it can take different forms: (1) the reasons may mirror each other so that there is a (derivative) reason to intend whenever there is a reason (...)
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  16. Three Comments on Joseph Raz's Conception of Normativity.George Pavlakos, Niko Kolodny, Ulrike Heuer & Douglas Lavin - 2011 - Jurisprudence 2 (2):329-378.
    This section is a discussion of Joseph Raz's Conception of Normativity introduced by Georgios Pavlakos.
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  17.  68
    Raz on Values and Reasons.Ulrike Heuer - 2004 - In R. Jay Wallace (ed.), Reason and value: themes from the moral philosophy of Joseph Raz. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 129-152.
    Explaining the relation of values and reasons is a major focus of Joseph Raz’s work. I examine his account of the relation of values and reasons, focusing in particular on practical reasons. As a preliminary way of delineating two basic alternatives for mapping the relation of values and reasons, let me pose the Euthyphro-style question: (1) Is something valuable because we have reasons to behave in some way with respect to it? Or: (2) Do we have reasons to behave in (...)
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  18. Value, Luck, and Commitment.Ulrike Heuer & Gerald Lang (eds.) - 2012 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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  19.  5
    Gründe und Motive: über humesche Theorien praktischer Vernunft.Ulrike Heuer - 2001
  20. Introduction.Ulrike Heuer - 2022 - In Joseph Raz & Ulrike Heuer (eds.), The Roots of Normativity. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 1-19.
  21. Luck and Responsibility According to Bernard Williams.Ulrike Heuer - 2022 - In András Szigeti & Matthew Talbert (eds.), Morality and Agency: Themes From Bernard Williams. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, Usa.
    In his seminal paper, “Moral Luck,” Bernard Williams begins to develop an account of responsibility for unintentional aspects of our agency. It rests on a crucial distinction of success and failure, internal or external to an agent’s project. I argue that a success which results from conditions that are internal to a project is not a lucky success, nor is a failure which results from something that is internal to the project just unlucky. There is no internal luck. Responsibility-defying luck (...)
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  22. Motives and Interpretations.Ulrike Heuer - 2019 - In Dejan Makovec & Stewart Shapiro (eds.), Friedrich Waismann: The Open Texture of Analytic Philosophy. Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 279-294.
    In this paper, I comment on Waismann’s view of ‘motivational explanations’ as he develops it in his unfinished, posthumously published essay ‘Will and Motive’. According to a traditional view, when we act, the motive is an internal psychological state of which we can know through introspection, and it triggers or causes the action. Thus the motive causally explains an independent event which is the action. As Waismann sees it, everything here is false. The motive is (1) not an internal psychological (...)
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  23.  38
    Moralischer Zufall und Kontrolle durch Fertigkeiten.Ulrike Heuer - 2016 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 70 (1):5-27.
    The problem of moral luck arises from the apparent conflict of two commonly accepted claims: it seems, on the one hand, that we are responsible only for those actions that are under our control; on the other hand, we seem to be responsible for the results of our actions, even if those depend on the cooperation of factors that we do not control directly. The opponents of moral luck side with the so-called control principle. In this paper, I argue, first, (...)
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  24.  42
    Sind Wünsche Handlungsgründe?Ulrike Heuer - 1999 - Analyse & Kritik 21 (1):1-24.
    Desires are often taken to be the basis for all practical reasons. I introduce one of the most powerful arguments to sustain this view: the argument from motivation (sec. 1). In section 2, however, I develop an equally powerful objection to desire-based approaches showing that desires are not suited to accommodate the justificatory role of reasons. The objection suggests that at least one of the premises of the argument from motivation must presuppose that only desires can explain actions. This move (...)
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  25. The Reasons that Can't Be Followed.Ulrike Heuer - 2012 - Jerusalem Review of Legal Studies 8:1-14.
     
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  26. Unmoralische Moralphilosophen?Ulrike Heuer - 1994 - Ethik Und Sozialwissenschaften 5 (3):383.
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  27.  28
    Agency and Luck.Andrei Marmor, Ulrike Heuer, Rebecca Prebble & Nandi Theunissen - 2012 - In Ulrike Heuer & Gerald Lang (eds.), Luck, Value, and Commitment: Themes From the Ethics of Bernard Williams. Oxford University Press, Usa.
  28.  42
    The Roots of Normativity.Joseph Raz & Ulrike Heuer (eds.) - 2022 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Joseph Raz addresses one of the most basic philosophical questions: how to explain normativity in its many guises. His value-based account is brought to bear on many aspects of the lives of rational beings and their agency, such as their ability to maintain relationships, and to live their lives as social beings with a sense of their identity.
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    Promising-Part 1. [REVIEW]Ulrike Heuer - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (12):832-841.
    The explanation of promising is fraught with problems. In particular the problem that promises can be valid even when nothing good comes of keeping the promise (the problem of ‘bare wrongings’), and the bootstrapping problem with explaining how the mere intention to put oneself under an obligation can create such an obligation have been recognized since Hume’s famous discussion of the topic. There are two influential accounts of promising, and promissory obligation, which attempt to solve the problems: The expectation account (...)
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  30.  24
    Promising ‐ Part 2. [REVIEW]Ulrike Heuer - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (12):842-851.
    The explanation of promising is fraught with problems. In particular the problem that promises can be valid even when nothing good comes of keeping the promise (the problem of ‘bare wrongings’), and the bootstrapping problem with explaining how the mere intention to put oneself under an obligation can create such an obligation have been recognized since Hume’s famous discussion of the topic. In part 1, I showed that two main views of promising which attempt to solve these problems fall short (...)
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