Three Comments on Joseph Raz's Conception of Normativity

Jurisprudence 2 (2):329-378 (2011)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This section is a discussion of Joseph Raz's Conception of Normativity introduced by Georgios Pavlakos

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,219

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Review Article: Legal Theory, Law, and Normativity.Leonard Kahn - 2012 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 9 (1):115-126.
From Normativity to Responsibility.Joseph Raz - 2011 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Reason, Reasons and Normativity.Joseph Raz - 2010 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 5. Oxford University Press.
Respecting value.Mark Eli Kalderon - 2008 - European Journal of Philosophy 16 (3):341-365.
The active and the passive: Joseph Raz.Joseph Raz - 1997 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 71 (1):211–228.
But is it liberalism?Loren E. Lomasky - 1990 - Critical Review: A Journal of Politics and Society 4 (1-2):86-105.
Raz on the Right to Autonomy.Nicole Hassoun - 2011 - European Journal of Philosophy 22 (1):96-109.

Analytics

Added to PP
2011-12-19

Downloads
135 (#131,838)

6 months
11 (#196,102)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author Profiles

Douglas Lavin
University College London
George Pavlakos
University of Glasgow
Ulrike Heuer
University College London
1 more

Citations of this work

Inferring as a way of knowing.Nicholas Koziolek - 2017 - Synthese (Suppl 7):1563-1582.
A New Defense of the Motive of Duty Thesis.Benjamin Wald - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (5):1163-1179.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Internal and External Reasons.Bernard Williams - 1979 - In Ross Harrison (ed.), Rational action: studies in philosophy and social science. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 101-113.
Persons, Character, and Morality.Bernard Williams - 1976 - In James Rachels (ed.), Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973–1980. Cambridge University Press.
A Sensible Subjectivism.David Wiggins - 1987 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Two notions of necessity.Martin Davies & Lloyd Humberstone - 1980 - Philosophical Studies 38 (1):1-31.

View all 11 references / Add more references