Sentimental Rules is an ambitious and highly interdisciplinary work, which proposes and defends a new theory about the nature and evolution of moral judgment. In it, philosopher Shaun Nichols develops the theory that emotions play a critical role in both the psychological and the cultural underpinnings of basic moral judgment. Nichols argues that our norms prohibiting the harming of others are fundamentally associated with our emotional responses to those harms, and that such 'sentimental rules' enjoy an advantage in (...) cultural evolution, which partly explains the success of certain moral norms. This has sweeping and exciting implications for philosophical ethics. Nichols builds on an explosion of recent intriguing experimental work in psychology on our capacity for moral judgment and shows how this empirical work has broad import for enduring philosophical problems. The result is an account that illuminates fundamental questions about the character of moral emotions and the role of sentiment and reason in how we make our moral judgments. This work should appeal widely across philosophy and the other disciplines that comprise cognitive science. (shrink)

According to a historically popular view, emotions are normative experiences that ground moral knowledge much as perceptual experiences ground empirical knowledge. Given the analogy it draws between emotion and perception, sentimental perceptualism constitutes a promising, naturalist-friendly alternative to classical rationalist accounts of moral knowledge. In this paper, we consider an important but underappreciated objection to the view, namely that in contrast with perception, emotions depend for their occurrence on prior representational states, with the result that emotions cannot give perceptual-like (...) access to normative properties. We argue that underlying this objection are several specific problems, rooted in the different types of mental states to which emotions may respond, that the sentimental perceptualist must tackle for her view to be successful. We argue, moreover, that the problems can be answered by filling out the theory with several independently motivated yet highly controversial commitments, which we carefully catalogue. The plausibility of sentimental perceptualism, as a result, hinges on further claims sentimental perceptualists should not ignore. (shrink)

I discuss the intuitive distinction between emotions and sentiments, and argue that sentiments cannot be reduced to emotions (and hence constitute their own category of affective state). ​.

A large amount of data is maintained in every Social networking sites.The total data constantly gathered on these sites make it difficult for methods like use of field agents, clipping services and ad-hoc research to maintain social media data. This paper discusses the previous research on sentiment analysis.

In this paper, I provide some evidence for the view that a common charge against those who adopt vegetarianism is that they would be sentimental. I argue that this charge is pressed frequently by those who adopt moral absolutism, a position that I reject, before exploring the question if vegetarianism might make sense. I discuss three concerns that might motivate those who adopt vegetarian diets, including a concern with the human health and environmental costs of some alternative diets, a (...) concern about inflicting pain on animals, and a concern with the killing of animals. While I argue that vegetarianism does not make sense in some situations, I hope that this paper shows that there are many good reasons why the adoption of vegetarian, and—even more so—vegan diets might be appropriate in some situations. In carving out this position, I focus primarily on the question whether a morally relevant distinction between the killing of plants and the killing of animals should be made. I engage primarily with the views of two of the most prominent authors on this issue, arguing that neither Peter Singer nor Tom Regan provide a satisfactory account on the ethics of killing nonhuman organisms. Two views are challenged in particular, the view that relatively simple animals such as molluscs, as well as plants, lack awareness, and the view that animals without a preference to continue living stand to lose little or nothing by being killed. I provide some evidence to support the claim that many share my view that it is more problematic to kill animals than to kill plants, before analyzing why some suppress the negative feelings they associate with killing animals. By exploring these issues I hope to shed some light on the issue of whether the feelings of those who adopt vegetarianism are sentimental or make sense, and to stimulate reflection amongst those with an interest in food ethics. (shrink)

Much recent discussion of love concerns ‘the reasons for love’: whether we love for reasons and, if so, what sorts of things those reasons are. This chapter seeks to call into question some of the assumptions that have shaped this debate, in particular the assumption that love might be ‘responsive’ to reasons in something like the way that actions, beliefs, intentions and ordinary emotions are. I begin by drawing out some tensions in the existing literature on reasons for love, suggesting (...) that these arise in part because different interests expressed in the language of ‘reasons’ – the interests of explanation, justification and interpersonal understanding – pull us towards different kinds of account of reasons for love. This seems to count in favor of treating these interests separately, with different conceptions of the reasons that answer to them. This suggestion, as I explain, runs up against a certain conception of ‘responsiveness to reasons’, which I argue is implicitly assumed in many discussions of reasons for love. However, I argue that we should be skeptical about the application of this conception to love in light of the ontological differences between love and paradigm ‘reasons-responsive’ phenomena, potentially making room for the suggested methodological separation. (shrink)

This book challenges the conventional wisdom that improving democratic politics requires keeping emotion out of it. Marcus advances the provocative claim that the tradition in democratic theory of treating emotion and reason as hostile opposites is misguided and leads contemporary theorists to misdiagnose the current state of American democracy. Instead of viewing the presence of emotion in politics as a failure of rationality and therefore as a failure of citizenship, Marcus argues, democratic theorists need to understand that emotions are in (...) fact a prerequisite for the exercise of reason and thus essential for rational democratic deliberation and political judgment. Attempts to purge emotion from public life not only are destined to fail, but ultimately would rob democracies of a key source of revitalization and change. Drawing on recent research in neuroscience, Marcus shows how emotion functions generally and what role it plays in politics. In contrast to the traditional view of emotion as a form of agitation associated with belief, neuroscience reveals it to be generated by brain systems that operate largely outside of awareness. Two of these systems, "disposition" and "surveillance," are especially important in enabling emotions to produce habits, which often serve a positive function in democratic societies. But anxiety, also a preconscious emotion, is crucial to democratic politics as well because it can inhibit or disable habits and thus clear a space for the conscious use of reason and deliberation. If we acknowledge how emotion facilitates reason and is "cooperatively entangled" with it, Marcus concludes, then we should recognize sentimental citizens as the only citizens really capable of exercising political judgment and of putting their decisions into action. (shrink)

The beliefs both that sentimental education is a vital part of moral education and that habituation is a vital part of sentimental education can be counted as being at the ‘hard core’ of the Aristotelian tradition of moral thought and action. On the basis of an explanation of the defining characteristics of Aristotelian habituation, this paper explores how and why habituation may be an effective way of cultivating the sentimental dispositions that are constitutive of the moral virtues. (...) Taking Aristotle’s explicit remarks on ethismos as a starting point, we present habituation as essentially involving (i) acting as virtue requires, (ii) both frequently and consistently, and (iii) under the supervision of a virtuous tutor. If the focus is on the first two characteristics, habituation seems to be a proper method for acquiring skills or inculcating habits, rather than an effective way of cultivating virtuous sentimental dispositions. It will be argued, however, that even if only the first two characteristics are taken into account, habituation may be an efficacious means of moderating, reducing or restricting the child’s affective dispositions where these are somehow excessive. But contrary to Aristotle’s view, the effectiveness of processes of habituation that are directed at strengthening, deepening or broadening the child’s sentimental dispositions where these are somehow deficient seems to be a function of the third characteristic, especially of the affective responses of the virtuous tutor to the child’s behaviour. At the end of the paper, this predominantly non-cognitive account of the workings of Aristotelian habituation will be compared with Nancy Sherman’s primarily cognitive view. (shrink)

« L'expression la plus adéquate que j'ai trouvée pour désigner les trois expériences hors du commun qu'il m'a été donné de vivre est celle utilisée par Romain Rolland dans sa correspondance avec Freud : le sentiment océanique. Romain Rolland aurait emprunté le magnifique et mystérieux terme « océanique » à la mystique indienne, notamment à Ramakrishna. Ce dernier parlait de son extase comme d'un « océan de joie ineffable ». Alors, qu'est-ce donc que ce sentiment océanique? Ce serait l'expérience rare, (...) fulgurante et généralement brève d'être Un avec le Tout. Comme si les frontières entre le Moi et le monde s'évanouissaient au profit d'un sentiment d'unité, de compréhension et de conscience élargie. » (Yves Vaillancourt) Rassemblant les morceaux épars de la littérature, de la psychanalyse et de la musique, l'auteur retrouve les pierres d'un chemin à la fois singulier et universel. (shrink)

Annette Baier's aim is to make sense of David Hume's Treatise as a whole. Hume's family motto, which appears on his bookplate, was True to the End. Baier argues that it is not until the end of the Treatise that we get his full story about truth and falsehood, reason and folly. By the end, we can see the cause to which Hume has been true throughout the work. Baier finds Hume's Treatise of Human Nature to be a carefully crafted (...) literary and philosophical work which itself displays a philosophical progress of sentiments. His starting place is an overly abstract intellectualism that deliberately thrusts passions and social concerns into the background. In the three interrelated books of the Treatise, his self-understander proceeds through partial successes and dramatic failures to emerge with new-found optimism, expecting that the exact knowledge the morally self-conscious anatomist of human nature can acquire will itself improve and correct our vision of morality. Baier describes how, by turning philosophy toward human nature instead of toward God and the universe, Hume initiated a new philosophy, a broader discipline of reflection that can embrace Charles Darwin and Michel Foucault as well as William James and Sigmund Freud. Hume belongs both to our present and to our past. (shrink)

What does it mean for emotion to be well-constituted? What distinguishes good feeling from (just) feeling good? Is there such a distinction at all? The answer to these questions becomes clearer if we realize that for an emotion to be all it seems, it must be responsible as well as responsive to what it is about. It may be that good feeling depends on feeling truly if we are to be really moved, moved in the way that avoids the need (...) for constant, fretful replenishment and reinforcement. To be sound, emotions may need to be capable of genuineness, depth, and other kinds of integrity. And that, in turn, may require certain virtues of mind, such as truthfulness, temperateness, and even courage, that are more familiar at the level of action. The governing aim of this book is to demonstrate that there can be problems of a structural kind with the adequacy of emotions and the emotional life. (shrink)

The provision of services by companies in specific domains requires continuous commitment and a constructive approach to meet customer requirements, however, it is often challenging to determine the level of customer satisfaction without their feedback. Therefore, this paper attempts to provide a solution to this problem by using comments from social networks and evaluating their sentiment using the VADER model. In order to accomplish the aim of our research, a lexicon has been built with more than 9500 adjectives and verbs (...) from the Albanian language based on VADER which is just in the initial form and the sentiments are evaluated as positive, neutral, or negative. The lexicon was constructed for the Albanian language and two companies of the Republic of Kosovo were researched as case studies. Furthermore, the sentiment estimation, using the VADER model, in case of our datasets, we obtained a high accuracy, approximately between 89% and 95%. This level of accuracy has been primarily attributed to the application of all preprocessing steps within the dataset, which significantly enhances the model’s performance. (shrink)

Identifying what is wrong with the demise of wildlife requires prior identification of the human sentiment which is offended by that demise. Attempts to understand this in terms of animal rights (individual or species) and the benefits of wildlife to human beings or the wider environment are rejected. A diagnosis of this sentiment is attempted in terms of our increasing admiration, in the conditions of modernity and postmodernity, for the 'harmony' or 'at homeness' of wild animals with their environments. The (...) diagnosis is defended against certain misunderstandings, and implications are tentatively drawn from it for environmental education and the management of wildlife. (shrink)

The Sentimental Life of International Law is about our age-old longing for a decent international society and the ways of seeing, being, and speaking that might help us achieve that aim. This book asks how international lawyers might engage in a professional practice that has become, to adapt a title of Janet Malcolm's, both difficult and impossible. It suggests that international lawyers are disabled by the governing idioms of international lawyering, and proposes that they may be re-enabled by speaking (...) different sorts of international law, or by speaking international law in different sorts of ways. In this methodologically diverse and unusually personal account, Gerry Simpson brings to the surface international law's hidden literary prose and offers a critical and redemptive account of the field. He does so in a series of chapters on international law's bathetic underpinnings, its friendly relations, the neurotic foundations of its underlying social order, its screened-off comic dispositions, its anti-method, and the life-worlds of its practitioners. Finally, the book closes with a chapter in which international law is re-envisioned through the practice of gardening. All of this is put forward as a contribution to the project of making international law, again, a compelling language for our times. (shrink)

For many people, among the first experiences they have of things as being valuable are experiences of things as possessing sentimental value. Such is the case in childhood where treasured objects are often among the first things we experience as valuable. In everyday life, we frequently experi- ence apparent sentimental value belonging to particular garments, books, cards, and places. Philosophers, however, have seldom discussed sentimental value and have also tended to think about value generally in a way (...) that makes it difficult for sentimental value to be a real kind of value. (shrink)

In a reply to Mizrahi (2019), Bryant (2020) raises several methodological concerns regarding my attempt to test hypotheses about the observation that academic philosophers tend to find “scientism” threatening empirically using quantitative, corpus based methods. Chief among her methodological concerns is that numbers of philosophical publications that mention “scientism” are a “poor proxy for scholarly sentiment” (Bryant 2020, 31). In reply, I conduct a sentiment analysis that is designed to find out whether academic philosophers have negative, positive, or neutral sentiments (...) toward “scientism.” The results of this analysis suggest that, for the most part, articles on “scientism” written by academic philosophers tend to contain mostly negative rather than positive (or neutral) sentiments about “scientism.”. (shrink)

R. Jay Wallace argues in this book that moral accountability hinges on questions of fairness: When is it fair to hold people morally responsible for what they do? Would it be fair to do so even in a deterministic world? To answer these questions, we need to understand what we are doing when we hold people morally responsible, a stance that Wallace connects with a central class of moral sentiments, those of resentment, indignation, and guilt. To hold someone responsible, he (...) argues, is to be subject to these reactive emotions in one's dealings with that person. Developing this theme with unusual sophistication, he offers a new interpretation of the reactive emotions and traces their role in our practices of blame and moral sanction. With this account in place, Wallace advances a powerful and sustained argument against the common view that accountability requires freedom of will. Instead, he maintains, the fairness of holding people responsible depends on their rational competence: the power to grasp moral reasons and to control their behavior accordingly. He shows how these forms of rational competence are compatible with determinism. At the same time, giving serious consideration to incompatibilist concerns, Wallace develops a compelling diagnosis of the common assumption that freedom is necessary for responsibility. Rigorously argued, eminently readable, this book touches on issues of broad concern to philosophers, legal theorists, political scientists, and anyone with an interest in the nature and limits of responsibility. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Confucian Sentimental Representation: A New Approach to Confucian Democracy by Kyung Rok KwonStephen C. AngleKWON, Kyung Rok. Confucian Sentimental Representation: A New Approach to Confucian Democracy. New York: Routledge, 2022. vi + 128 pp. Cloth, $128.00; eBook, $39.16Two facts have driven much of the recent theorizing about Confucian democracy. First, even in robust democracies like South Korea and Taiwan, East Asian citizens hold distinctive views about (...) the relation between leaders and led. Two-thirds of South Korean respondents and a third of those from Taiwan agreed with the statement "If we have political leaders who are morally upright, we can let them decide everything." Second, it is uncontroversial to say that traditional Confucianism advocated for rule by the virtuous. Most observers believe these two facts are linked but disagree about their normative upshot. Some regret the lingering authoritarianism polluting East Asian democracies, while others—primarily based in less democratic [End Page 146] countries—call for an embrace of "meritocracy" instead of democracy. A third group, to which Kwon Kyung Rok and I both belong, believe that properly understood "rule by virtue" can be better realized in a democracy. This means that modern Confucians should be democrats, and it suggests a distinctive way of conceptualizing democracy that both may be more apt for East Asia and may even offer lessons applicable worldwide. For Kwon, the key to all this is rethinking how we understand political representation.Kwon argues that we should look to representation rather than directly at democracy because representation is both central to modern conceptions of democracy and yet makes a more constructive dialogue partner for Confucian virtue-based politics. Democracy, says Kwon, is at its core concerned with the equal distribution of political power, whereas representation concerns "a special relationship and psychology" between the representer and the represented that he understands in terms of "authorization," the making of "sound judgments," and "accountability." Chapters 1 and 2 of the book explore the primarily "rationalist" notion of representation found in the Western tradition and the more "sentimentalist" version of representation that can be constructed out of Confucian virtue politics. The latter chapter is the creative core of the book. Kwon argues that for one to count as a representative in a modern Confucian context, one needs to make sound judgments of the true interests of society and share emotions with the people—in the process of transforming them into more morally cultivated people. This sense of "representing" the people builds on what it is to be a virtuous exemplar. Along the way Kwon makes a detailed case that direct caring rather than empathy is core to the idea of humaneness (or benevolence; ren) that is so central to Confucianism; this is a good example of how he engages with interpretive literature to clarify aspects of his picture.The final two chapters engage with alternative accounts of modern Confucian political theory. Chapter 3 provides a negative defense of democratic sentimental representation by demonstrating that various "meritocratic" alternative arguments fail. One of the key points here is that Daniel Bell and Tongdong Bai are overly concerned with the instrumental value of a ruler's competence, missing the intrinsic value of a ruler's virtue and its contribution to the ethically good life of the community; as a result, their views fail to be distinctively Confucian. Chapter 4 takes Sungmoon Kim's influential idea of "public reason Confucianism" as its point of departure. Kwon is quite sympathetic to Kim's framework and defends Kim against certain misunderstandings, but perceptively argues that there is a gap in Kim's account between citizens, understood primarily in affective terms, and the state, which in Kim's account is exemplified by the high court and is understood primarily in rationalist terms. What is missing is the bridging role of leaders. Kwon writes that mediating between formal and informal decision-making processes, leaders should "make ordinary citizens feel respected and make them focus on public issues in appropriate ways." He believes that a caring and competent [End Page 147] leader can "broaden the horizon of mutual understanding by exhorting [citizens] to think of all as belonging to an extended family." In short... (shrink)

RESUMEN Se aborda el pensamiento de E.M. Cioran desde la perspectiva de un sinsabor vital denominado sentimiento de muerte. El término, aunque aparece solo en su primer escrito, es transversal a toda su obra, puesto que para el autor los seres humanos nos intuimos como posesos de la muerte en cada momento de nuestra existencia. Esto cambia el tono normal de la vida, al poner frente a la persona una realidad carente de sentido y dominada por circunstancias radicales y limitantes (...) como el dolor y la agonía, que culmina en una atmósfera gobernada por la intuición trágica de la vida. ABSTRACT The article addresses the thought of E.M. Cioran from the perspective of that vital uneasiness known as the sentiment of death. Although the term appears only in his first book, the idea cuts across his entire work given that, for Cioran, human beings intuit themselves as possessed by death at every moment of their lives. When persons are faced with a meaningless reality, dominated by radical and limiting circumstances such as pain and agony, the whole tenor of life changes until it becomes a tragic intuition of life. (shrink)

The Covid-19 pandemic is forcing organizations to innovate and change their strategies for a new reality. This study collects online learning related tweets in Arabic language to perform a comprehensive emotion mining and sentiment analysis (SA) during the pandemic. The present study exploits Natural Language Processing (NLP) and Machine Learning (ML) algorithms to extract subjective information, determine polarity and detect the feeling. We begin with pulling out the tweets using Twitter APIs and then preparing for intensive preprocessing. Second, the National (...) Research Council Canada (NRC) Word-Emotion Lexicon was examined to calculate the presence of the eight emotions at their emotional weight. Third, Information Gain (IG) is used as a filtering technique. Fourth, the latent reasons behind the negative sentiments were recognized and analyzed. Finally, different classification algorithms including Naïve Bayes (NB), Multinomial Naïve Bayes (MNB), K Nearest Neighbor (KNN), Logistic Regression (LR), and Support Vector Machine (SVM) were examined. The experiments reveal that the proposed model performs well in analyzing the perception of people about coronavirus with a maximum accuracy of about 89.6% using SVM classifier. From a practical perspective, the method could be generalized to other topical domains, such as public health monitoring and crisis management. It would help public health officials identify the progression and peaks of concerns for a disease in space and time, which enables the implementation of appropriate preventive actions to mitigate these diseases. (shrink)

Duties to address global poverty face a motivation gap. We have good reasons for acting yet we do not, at least consistently. A ‘sentimental education’, featuring literature and journalism detailing the lives of distant others has been suggested as a promising means by which to close this gap. Although sympathetic to this project, I argue that it is too heavily wed to a charitable model of our duties to address global poverty—understood as requiring we sacrifice a certain portion of (...) our income. However, political action, aimed at altering institutions at both a global and a local level is likely to be necessary in order to provide effective long-term solutions to poverty globally. To rectify this, the article develops an alternative dialogical account of sentimental education, suitable for motivating support for political action to address global poverty. (shrink)

If the words of natural human language possess a universal positivity bias, as assumed by Boucher and Osgood’s (1969) famous Pollyanna hypothesis and computationally confirmed for large text corpora in several languages (Dodds et al., 2015), then children and youth literature (CYL) should also show a Pollyanna effect. Here we tested this prediction applying a vector space model- based sentiment analysis tool called SentiArt (Jacobs, 2019) to two CYL corpora, one in English (372 books) and one in German (500 books). (...) Pitching our analysis at the sentence level, and assessing semantic as well as lexico-grammatical information, bBoth corpora show the Pollyanna effect and thus add further evidence to the universality hypothesis. The results of our multivariate sentiment analyses provide interesting testable predictions for future scientific studies of literature. (shrink)

The initial problem to be faced by naturalist investigations into morals is how to conceptualize it in a way that explains what ordinarily occurs in nature. In this sense, a vertical explication where actions are catalogued according to abstract theoretical constructions says little about the world. Therefore, the investigation presented in this article will be guided by an inverse methodology. It will refer to analysis of ordinary social behaviours which I will advance through the understanding of morality according to its (...) functionality. The concept of morals presented by Tugendhat, for whom morality is a combination of reciprocal demands expressed through sentences of duty based on sentiments, is of major importance to the way in which I will address the question. Moreover, I will carry out an accurate study of humean moral thought, with the objective of determining to what extent sentiment and reason influence the motivation to approve or censor socially relevant actions. Once we have investigated the natural aspects of the moral phenomenon, I will conclude the article presenting a possible compatibility between theoretical marks of humean empiricism and Darwin’s evolutionism. (shrink)

Michael Tanner; IX*—Sentimentality, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 77, Issue 1, 1 June 1977, Pages 127–148, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristotelia.

Incorporating the complete, corrected text of The Corded Shell, Kivy brings his earlier arguments up to date in light of recent work in the field, and discusses ...

I analyse the concept of sentimental value, with a view to identifying its relations with the notions of intrinsic, final, extrinsic and instrumental value. The analysis explores issues arising in the understanding of an object as sentimentally valuable, and reveals a serious tension in the common sense extrinsic conception of sentimental value.

Die „family sentiments“ sind nichts Ursprüngliches, sondern entfalten sich erst beim Vorhandensein bestimmter ökonomischer Tatbestände. Sie können deshalb auch nicht als Erklärung für den Ursprung der Familie dienen. Die jeweils herrschenden Auffassungen über die Grundlagen der Verwandtschaft sind ganz verschieden ; jedenfalls bildet diese nicht etwa selbst die Grundlage der gesellschaftlichen Organisation, sondern das umgekehrte Verhältnis trifft zu. Die juristische Verwandtschaft beruht häufig nicht auf Blutszusammengehörigkeit, und die Nomenklatur der Unterscheidung der Grade der Verwandtschaft gewinnt erst in der patriarchalischen Familie (...) ihre volle Bedeutung. Die Gefühle zwischen den Familienmitgliedern können nicht als naturgegeben gelten, denn sonst müssten sie auch bei den Tieren Vorkommen. Der Zusammenhalt zwischen den Mitgliedern einer Gruppe, der bei Tieren beobachtet wird, beruht nicht auf gefühlsmässiger Bindung, sondern auf ökonomischen Faktoren. Die Bindung der Mutter an die Kinder findet sich gewiss auch bei vielen Tieren, aber was wir Mutterliebe nennen, ist etwas anderes, denn jene Bindung bezieht sich bei dem Muttertier unterschiedslos auch auf fremde Junge. Besonders wichtig für die Beurteilung des Charakters der „family sentiments“ ist die Differenzierung der Gefühle zwischen den Mitgliedern einer Gruppe, wenn die ökonomische Grundlage sich ändert, sowie die Anpassung der Gefühle an neue Funktionen. Weitere Beispiele für die Abhängigkeit der „family sentiments“ von ökonomischen Tatbeständen bieten die Erklärung ihrer Verschiedenheit in der englischen und französischen Familie oder die Folgen der industriellen Revolution. Mit dem Sieg der liberalistischen Wirtschaft ändert sich die ganze psychologische Basis für die „family sentiments“, alle gefühlsmässigen Beziehungen werden individualistisch. Die schwere Krise, in die das kapitalistische System geraten ist, greift auch tief in die Familienbeziehungen ein. Jedoch werden die bisher in der Familie aufbewahrten menschlichen Gefühle sich in einer besser organisierten Gesellschaft besser entfalten können.Les „family sentiments“ ne se développèrent qu’en rapport à certains faits économiques. Ils ne sauraient donc servir à expliquer l’origine de la famille. Les conceptions quant à la base de la parenté (en particulier sur la naissance des enfants) qui dominent dans les différentes phases du développement de l’humanité sont très distinctes l’une de l’autre. La base de l’organisation sociale est formée par d’autres éléments que les „family sentiments“. La parenté reconnue ne repose souvent pas sur la parenté du sang. Les noms désignant les degrés de la parenté gagnent leur signification actuelle avec l’apparition dans l’histoire de la famille patriarcale. — Les sentiments entre les différents membres de la famille ne sauraient être considérés comme des données naturelles, car si tel était le cas, on trouverait ces mêmes sentiments également chez les animaux. Les liens entre membres d'un groupe, observés aussi bien chez les animaux que chez les hommes ont pour base des facteurs d'ordre matériel. Le sentiment qui lie la mère à sa progéniture se trouve, il est vrai, chez de nombreux animaux, mais ce n'est point ce que nous appelons aujourd'hui l'amour maternel. Ce lien de la femelle se rencontre aussi bien à l'égard de la progéniture des autres animaux que pour la sienne. Pour être à même de bien juger le caractère des „family sentiments“, il importe surtout d'observer l’adaptation de ces sentiments à de nouvelles exigences, c’est-à-dire comment les sentiments entre membres d'un groupe subissent un changement quand la base économique se trouve modifiée. B. donne d'autres exemples pour la dépendance des „family sentiments“ de facteurs économiques, dans son exposé sur la différence des sentiments dans la famille française et anglaise, tout en décrivant les suites de la révolution industrielle. Avec la victoire du libéralisme économique, la base psychologique pour les „family sentiments“ se transforme entièrement : tous les sentiments revêtent un caractère individualiste. La grande crise dans laquelle le système actuel de l’économie est entré, influence sensiblement les relations psychiques. Les sentiments qui, jusqu'à présent, étaient restreints dans le cadre de la famille, se développeront dans une société mieux organisée que celle de notre époque. (shrink)

Michael Tanner; IX*—Sentimentality, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 77, Issue 1, 1 June 1977, Pages 127–148, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristotelia.

Purpose Misinformation surrounding the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) has contributed to the formation of misbeliefs among the public. The purpose of this paper is to investigate public sentiment and misbeliefs about the SDGs on the YouTube platform. Design/methodology/approach The authors extracted 8,016 comments from YouTube videos associated with SDGs. The authors used a pre-trained Python library NRC lexicon for sentiment and emotion analysis, and to extract latent topics, the authors used BERTopic for topic modeling. Findings The authors found eight emotions, (...) with negativity outweighing positivity, in the comment section. In addition, the authors identified the top 20 topics discussing various SDGs and SDG-related misbeliefs. Practical implications The authors reported topics related to public misbeliefs about SDGs and associated keywords. These keywords can be used to formulate social media content moderation strategies to screen out content that creates these misbeliefs. The result of hierarchical clustering can be used to devise and optimize response strategies by governments and policymakers to counter public misbeliefs. Originality/value This study represents an initial endeavor to gain a deeper understanding of the public’s misbeliefs regarding SDGs. The authors identified novel misbeliefs about SDGs that previous literature has not studied. Furthermore, the authors introduce an algorithm BERTopic for topic modeling that leverages transformer architecture for context-aware topic modeling. (shrink)

From the perspective of art education, the worst-case philosophical scenario is the hedonist-subjectivist account of art. If we measure art by the pleasure we gain from it, it may seem senseless to attempt teaching the reception of art. David Hume's ‘Of the Standard of Taste’ provides an argument for the art-education enthusiast, explaining that—even on a subjectivist account—art education crystallises our own preferences. While I refer to a historical debate and provide a close reading of an 18th-century essay, my goal (...) is to offer a philosophical solution to an ongoing dilemma; I use Hume's essay to ground the justification of art education. (shrink)

Pascal founds his interpretation of the Augustinian doctrine of the corruption of human nature on a philosophy of faith inherited from Montaigne: « we are Christians in just the same way as we are Périgordians or Germans » (Essais, II, 12) : this conception of « human faith » is analysed, in turn, by means of concepts drawn from Descartes (passion) and Gassendi (imagination). He thus leads us to a very modern conception of « human faith » – without grace (...) – as being the product of education and habit, a « sentiment » like so many others. (shrink)

This thesis defends a naturalistic interpretation, and offers a critical analysis, of the views of David Hume on the subject of free will and moral responsibility. A central theme is that Hume's views should be understood and assessed in relation to P.F. Strawson's influential paper "Freedom and Resentment" (1962). -/- The work in this thesis lays the foundation for "Freedom and Moral Sentiment: Hume's Way of Naturalizing Responsibility" (Oxford University Press: 1995).

The foundation for a system of morals, this 1749 work is a landmark of moral and political thought. Its highly original theories of conscience, moral judgment, and virtue offer a reconstruction of the Enlightenment concept of social science, embracing both political economy and theories of law and government.

In this book, Russell examines Hume's notion of free will and moral responsibility. It is widely held that Hume presents us with a classic statement of a compatibilist position--that freedom and responsibility can be reconciled with causation and, indeed, actually require it. Russell argues that this is a distortion of Hume's view, because it overlooks the crucial role of moral sentiment in Hume's picture of human nature. Hume was concerned to describe the regular mechanisms which generate moral sentiments such as (...) responsibility, and Russell argues that his conception of free will must be interprted within this naturalistic framework. He goes on to discuss Hume's views about the nature and character of moral sentiment; the extent to which we have control over our moral character; and the justification of punishment. Throughout, Russell argues that the naturalistic avenue of interpretation of Hume's thought, far from draining it of its contemporary interest and significance, reveals it to be of great relevance to the ongoing contemporary debate - particuarly in relation to the views of P.F. Strawson and his influential paper "Freedom and Resentment". (shrink)

Les auteurs analysent l'absence du sentiment d'injustice dans la musique populaire, que ce soit dans les chansons traditionnelles, les chansons d'amour, le rap ou encore les chansons politiquement engagées. Electre 2018.

Si l’on accorde que les affects ou émotions résultent de processus d’artialisation, l’absence surprenante d’artialisation du « sentiment d’injustice » dans la chanson populaire, constatée à l’issue d’une enquête minutieuse et complète, ne doit-elle pas conduire à mettre en question ce sentiment lui-même? Il s’agira à la fois de tester la cohérence de la position artialiste et de mesurer le domaine de validité du « sentiment d’injustice », voire des notions du « juste » et de l’« injuste ».

This article considers the ongoing difficulties for mainstream political theory of actualizing human rights, with particular reference to Rorty’s attempt to transcend their liberal foundations. It argues that there is a problematic disjuncture between his articulation of exclusion and his hope for inclusion via the expansion of the liberal human rights culture. More specifically, it shows that Rorty’s description of victimhood is based on premises unavailable to him, with the consequence that stateless persons are rendered inhuman, and, further, that his (...) accounts of sentimentality and solidarity have limited potential for the inclusion of such victims within the liberal ‘community of justification’. In the final analysis, the article argues that there is a substantial mismatch between Rorty’s dependence on both liberal norms and international political practice, and his hopes for the human rights culture to include those stripped of human dignity. (shrink)

Sentimentality is usually thought of as a mild vice. Unlike such vices as cruelty, dishonesty, or contemptuousness, sentimentality appears to affect only the individuals who have it, and then, not very adversely. So what if we indulge our taste for prematurely dying heroines or stoic, sweet-natured children? Shedding a tear or feeling a diffuse affection does not seem to hurt anyone, not even ourselves. But because of its impact on the self, sentimentality is a more serious vice than might be (...) suspected.Regardless of the immediate object of our sentimental gaze, the self is also sentimentalized. The self is not only the subject engaged in sentimentalizing activity, but also its mediated object. A sentimentalized sense of self discourages activity and keeps us from dealing with the world directly. The distortion of and absorption in the self is dangerous for sentimental individuals and those with whom they interact. To see why, we must examine the structuring of perception, thought, and emotion which makes up sentimentality. Our inquiry will be sharpened by reference to literary depictions which reflect or encourage sentimental response. Versing us in the ways of sentimentality, some literature may generate our everyday patterns of sentimentalized thought and feeling. (shrink)

"Sympathetic Sentiments develops an innovative interdisciplinary framework to explore the implications of living in a 'culture of feeling' that seems ill at ease with itself, one in which 'sentiments' are frequently denounced for being 'sentimental' and self-indulgent. This is traced back to the inheritance of the eighteenth century, enabling us to identify a distinctive 'spectacle of sympathy' in which sympathy seems inherently to entail public forms of expression whereby being 'on show' is both a condition of the authenticity of (...) such affects and of their capacity to be masked and simulated -- hence stimulating controversy, but also the exploration of the vicarious dimensions of modern experience so central to modern literature, art and culture. The implications of all this are further explored in the context of current debates over the display of trauma as the language of sympathetic engagement, and the alleged prevalence of 'compassion fatigue' in the era of media sensationalism. Overall, the book uncovers the patterns that both reproduce our capacity for 'sympathetic sentiments' while revealing the inherent underlying tensions."--. (shrink)