Sentimental value

Journal of Value Inquiry 43 (1):55-65 (2009)
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Abstract

For many people, among the first experiences they have of things as being valuable are experiences of things as possessing sentimental value. Such is the case in childhood where treasured objects are often among the first things we experience as valuable. In everyday life, we frequently experi- ence apparent sentimental value belonging to particular garments, books, cards, and places. Philosophers, however, have seldom discussed sentimental value and have also tended to think about value generally in a way that makes it difficult for sentimental value to be a real kind of value.

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Guy Fletcher
University of Edinburgh

Citations of this work

The pen, the dress, and the coat: a confusion in goodness.Miles Tucker - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1911-1922.
How Final and Non-Final Valuing Differ.Levi Tenen - 2022 - The Journal of Ethics 26 (4):683-704.
An Expanded Conception of Sentimental Value.Rochelle DuFord - 2017 - Journal of Value Inquiry 51 (1):1-11.

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References found in this work

Two distinctions in goodness.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1983 - Philosophical Review 92 (2):169-195.
The Conception of Intrinsic Value.G. E. Moore - 1998 - In James Rachels (ed.), Philosophical Studies. Oxford University Press.
The Conception of Intrinsic Value.G. E. Moore - 1998 - In James Rachels (ed.), Ethical Theory 1: The Question of Objectivity. Oxford University Press.
On the Intrinsic Value of Pleasures.Fred Feldman - 1997 - Ethics 107 (3):448-466.
Extrinsic value.Ben Bradley - 1998 - Philosophical Studies 91 (2):109-126.

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