This book takes a major step in the philosophy of education by moving back past the Enlightenment and reinstating Aristotelian Virtue at the heart of moral education.

The beliefs both that sentimental education is a vital part of moral education and that habituation is a vital part of sentimental education can be counted as being at the ‘hard core’ of the Aristotelian tradition of moral thought and action. On the basis of an explanation of the defining characteristics of Aristotelian habituation, this paper explores how and why habituation may be an effective way of cultivating the sentimental dispositions that are constitutive of the moral virtues. Taking Aristotle’s explicit (...) remarks on ethismos as a starting point, we present habituation as essentially involving (i) acting as virtue requires, (ii) both frequently and consistently, and (iii) under the supervision of a virtuous tutor. If the focus is on the first two characteristics, habituation seems to be a proper method for acquiring skills or inculcating habits, rather than an effective way of cultivating virtuous sentimental dispositions. It will be argued, however, that even if only the first two characteristics are taken into account, habituation may be an efficacious means of moderating, reducing or restricting the child’s affective dispositions where these are somehow excessive. But contrary to Aristotle’s view, the effectiveness of processes of habituation that are directed at strengthening, deepening or broadening the child’s sentimental dispositions where these are somehow deficient seems to be a function of the third characteristic, especially of the affective responses of the virtuous tutor to the child’s behaviour. At the end of the paper, this predominantly non-cognitive account of the workings of Aristotelian habituation will be compared with Nancy Sherman’s primarily cognitive view. (shrink)

With reference to the unsuccessful attempt of the Labour Government to make sex education a statutory part of the National Curriculum, this paper argues in favour of making liberal sex education compulsory at all state schools. First, the main characteristics of a liberal sex education are briefly explained. Promoting the virtue of respect for every adults right of sexual self-determination is presented as one of its central aims. Then the paper shows that state enforcement of liberal sex education is justifiable (...) to reasonable citizens in several ways and therefore meets the liberal criterion of political legitimacy. Finally, the relevant clauses of the Bill of the Labour Government are briefly evaluated. (shrink)

There is a lot of talking and writing on virtues and education nowadays. In spite of this, a clear and convincing account of the defining characteristics of the virtue approach to moral education is still lacking. This paper suggests and discusses three different definitions of such an approach. With reference to each definition it is examined whether the virtue approach can be distinguished from other main perspectives on moral education, in particular from the so-called cognitive-developmental approach (including the just community (...) approach). It is argued that only the definition that refers to an ethics of virtue will have the required differentiating capacity. (edited). (shrink)

There is a lot of talking and writing on virtues and education nowadays. In spite of this, a clear and convincing account of the defining characteristics of the virtue approach to moral education is still lacking. This paper suggests and discusses three different definitions of such an approach. With reference to each definition it is examined whether the virtue approach can be distinguished from other main perspectives on moral education, in particular from the so-called cognitive-developmental approach (including the just community (...) approach). It is argued that only the definition that refers to an ethics of virtue will have the required differentiating capacity. Consequently, only on the basis of this definition can the virtue approach be regarded as a qualitatively new development in research on moral education. (shrink)

The content and boundaries of moral education the state may require schools to offer is a matter of contention. This article investigates whether the state may obligate schools to promote the pursuit of moral ideals. Moral ideals refer to (a cluster of) characteristics of a person as well as to situations or states that are believed to be morally excellent or perfect and that are not yet realised. Having an ideal typically means that the person is dedicated to realising the (...) type of situation or person to which the ideal refers. Therefore generating student enthusiasm for moral ideals may be an effective way to realise a morally excellent society. This article defends the position that schools may be required to promote the recognition of ideals that all reasonable citizens endorse. Reasonable citizens will not, however, accept that the state obligates schools to promote the pursuit of moral ideals. (shrink)

This paper tries, from the perspective of political liberalism, to answer the question whether parents can fail in the moral upbringing of their children to the extent that the state has the right to intervene or to override their legal authority over their children. It is argued that state intervention must meet the liberal criterion of justificatory neutrality, and, on the basis of a discussion of the notion of ‘reasonable citizens’, that only serious parental failure to inculcate basic rules can (...) justify judicial intervention in the family that meets this criterion. It is concluded that political liberalism burdens the state with incompatible demands. (shrink)

This paper tries, from the perspective of political liberalism, to answer the question whether parents can fail in the moral upbringing of their children to the extent that the state has the right to intervene or to override their legal authority over their children. It is argued that state intervention must meet the liberal criterion of justificatory neutrality, and, on the basis of a discussion of the notion of ‘reasonable citizens’, that only serious parental failure to inculcate basic rules can (...) justify judicial intervention in the family that meets this criterion. It is concluded that political liberalism burdens the state with incompatible demands. (shrink)

In answering the question, “Which moral identity has to be developed in a multicultural society?” we draw a distinction between public and non-public identities of persons. On our view, a liberal democracy is characterized by a specific conception of these two central components of moral identity. In section 2, we concentrate on the public identity, while, in section 3, the nonpublic identity is the centre of interest. In explaining these main components of moral identity, we will appeal to those aspects (...) of identity as set out by Rorty & Wong which are constitutive of moral identity. (shrink)

Jan W Steutel; Forms of Reflection on Central Educational Concepts, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 22, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 163–171, https://.

Jan W Steutel; Forms of Reflection on Central Educational Concepts, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 22, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 163–171, https://.

Intellectual virtues like open-mindedness, clarity, intellectual honesty and the willingness to participate in rational discussions, are conceived as important aims of education. In this paper an attempt is made to clarify the specific nature of intellectual virtues. Firstly, the intellectual virtues are systematically compared with moral virtues. The upshot is that considering a trait of character to be an intellectual virtue implies assuming that such a trait can be derived from, or is a specification of, the cardinal virtue of concern (...) and respect for truth. Secondly, several (possible) misconceptions of intellectual virtues are avoided by making the required distinctions. For example, it is argued that our concept of an intellectual virtue should not be confused with a normative conception of intellectual virtuousness. (shrink)