This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
About this topic
Summary Most philosophers believe that almost all normal human beings possess free will, but a minority are skeptics. The standard grounds for skepticism has been incompatibilism: hard determinists believe that determinism is true, and incompatible with free will. More recently, a number of philosophers have conjoined a conditional hard determinism with a belief that free will is incompatible with indeterminism, because indeterninism makes action too much a matter of chance. A very few philosophers advocate skepticism on other grounds: luck, naturalism, or the epiphenomenality of conscious thought. It is standard, though not universal, to hold that if agents lack free will they lack moral responsibility. This alleged link between free will and moral responsibility has sometimes made the debate over skepticism impassioned.
Key works Hard determinism has few defenders today, partly because most physicists doubt that determinism is true. Its classic statements date back to the time when Newtonian physics reigned; see D'Holbach unknown for a well-known example. The most influential contemporary skeptics argue that free will is incompatible with both determinism and indeterminism. Pereboom 2001 defends incompatibilism combined with skepticism about the existence of the agent-causal power that, alleged, would alone suffice for free will. Strawson argues that free will would require ultimate control, which is available only to a causa sui. Levy 2011 argues that we lack free will regardless of the causal structure of the universe, because free will is incompatible with the pervasiveness of luck. 
Introductions Pereboom 2007;Pereboom 2011; Caruso 2013
Related categories

254 found
Order:
1 — 50 / 254
  1. Moral Responsibility and the Strike Back Emotion: Comments on Bruce Waller’s The Stubborn System of Moral Responsibility.Gregg Caruso - forthcoming - Syndicate Philosophy 1 (1).
    In The Stubborn System of Moral Responsibility (2015), Bruce Waller sets out to explain why the belief in individual moral responsibility is so strong. He begins by pointing out that there is a strange disconnect between the strength of philosophical arguments in support of moral responsibility and the strength of philosophical belief in moral responsibility. While the many arguments in favor of moral responsibility are inventive, subtle, and fascinating, Waller points out that even the most ardent supporters of moral responsibility (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  2. Free Will and Moral Luck.Robert J. Hartman - forthcoming - In Joseph Campbell, Kristin M. Mickelson & V. Alan White (eds.), A Companion to Free Will.
    Philosophers often consider problems of free will and moral luck in isolation from one another, but both are about control and moral responsibility. One problem of free will concerns the difficult task of specifying the kind of control over our actions that is necessary and sufficient to act freely. One problem of moral luck refers to the puzzling task of explaining whether and how people can be morally responsible for actions permeated by factors beyond their control. This chapter explicates and (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  3. Responsibility-Foundation: Still Needed and Still Missing.Stephen Kershnar & Robert M. Kelly - forthcoming - Science, Religion and Culture.
    Responsibility is impossible because there is no responsibility-maker and there needs to be one if people are morally responsible. The two most plausible candidates, psychology and decision, fail. A person is not responsible for an unchosen psychology or a psychology that was chosen when the person is not responsible for the choice. This can be seen in intuitions about instantly-created and manipulated people. This result is further supported by the notion that, in general, the right, the good, and virtue rest (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. Why difference-making mental causation does not save free will.Alva Stråge - forthcoming - Philosophical Explorations:1-15.
    Many philosophers take mental causation to be required for free will. But it has also been argued that the most popular view of the nature of mental states, i.e. non-reductive physicalism, excludes the existence of mental causation, due to what is known as the ‘exclusion argument’. In this paper, I discuss the difference-making account of mental causation proposed by [List, C., and Menzies, P. 2017. “My Brain Made Me Do It: The Exclusion Argument Against Free Will, and What’s Wrong with (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5. Fully Caused and Flourishing? Incompatibilist Free Will Skepticism and Its Implications for Personal Well-Being.Stephan Tegtmeier - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-18.
    Previous research associates free will skepticism with adverse well-being effects. However, it is doubtful that skeptical participants in these studies disbelieved in the incompatibilist notion of what it means to have free will. This is one of the first studies to exclusively examine such skeptics. A sample of 167 participants who claimed to believe that there is no free will responded to an online survey. After examining whether participants in fact disbelieved in the incompatibilist concept, they were asked to describe (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6. Human Freedom and the Inevitability of Sin.Leigh Vicens - forthcoming - In Leigh Vicens & Peter Furlong (eds.), Theological Determinism: New Perspectives.
  7. Free Will Skepticism and Criminals as Ends in Themselves.Benjamin Vilhauer - forthcoming - In Matthew C. Altman (ed.), Palgrave Handbook on the Philosophy of Punishment. New York:
    This chapter offers non-retributive, broadly Kantian justifications of punishment and remorse which can be endorsed by free will skeptics. We lose our grip on some Kantian ideas if we become skeptical about free will, but we can preserve some important ones which can do valuable work for free will skeptics. The justification of punishment presented here has consequentialist features but is deontologically constrained by our duty to avoid using others as mere means. It draws on a modified Rawlsian original position (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8. An Asymmetrical Approach to Kant's Theory of Freedom.Benjamin Vilhauer - forthcoming - In Dai Heide and Evan Tiffany (ed.), The Idea of Freedom: New Essays on the Interpretation and Significance of Kant's Theory of Freedom.
    Asymmetry theories about free will and moral responsibility are a recent development in the long history of the free will debate. To my knowledge, Kant commentators have not yet explored the possibility of an asymmetrical reconstruction of Kant's theory of freedom, and that will be my goal here. By "free will", I mean the sort of control we would need to be morally responsible for our actions. Kant's term for it is "transcendental freedom", and he refers to the attribution of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  9. Review of Daniel Dennett and Gregg D. Caruso Just Deserts: Debating Free Will[REVIEW]Robert H. Wallace - forthcoming - Journal of Moral Philosophy.
    This is a review of Daniel Dennett and Gregg D. Caruso's Just Deserts: Debating Free Will.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  10. A Companion to Free Will.Joseph Campbell, Kristin M. Mickelson & V. Alan White (eds.) - 2022 - Hoboken, NJ, USA: Wiley-Blackwell.
    The concept of free will is fraught with controversy, as readers of this volume likely know. Philosophers disagree about what free will is, whether we have it, what mitigates or destroys it, and what it's good for. Indeed, philosophers even disagree about how to fix the referent of the term 'free will' for purposes of describing and exploring these disagreements. What one person considers a reasonably neutral working definition of 'free will' is often considered question-begging or otherwise misguided by another. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  11. Precis of Rejecting Retributivism: Free Will, Punishment, and Criminal Justice.Gregg D. Caruso - 2022 - Journal of Legal Philosophy 2 (46):120-125.
  12. Retributivism, Free Will Skepticism, and the Public Health-Quarantine Model: Replies to Kennedy, Walen, Corrado, Sifferd, Pereboom, and Shaw.Gregg D. Caruso - 2022 - Journal of Legal Philosophy 2 (46):161-216.
  13. Moral Responsibility Reconsidered.Gregg D. Caruso & Derk Pereboom - 2022 - Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
    This Element examines the concept of moral responsibility as it is used in contemporary philosophical debates and explores the justifiability of the moral practices associated with it, including moral praise/blame, retributive punishment, and the reactive attitudes of resentment and indignation. After identifying and discussing several different varieties of responsibility-including causal responsibility, take-charge responsibility, role responsibility, liability responsibility, and the kinds of responsibility associated with attributability, answerability, and accountability-it distinguishes between basic and non-basic desert conceptions of moral responsibility and considers a (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  14. Moral Responsibility in the Age of Free Will Skepticism: A Defence of Frankfurtian-Compatibilism.Owen Jeffrey Crocker - 2022 - Compos Mentis: Undergraduate Journal of Cognition and Neuroethics 10 (1):1-19.
    Free will skepticism is radical in its core claim that free will is illusory. Criminal law, however, appears to presuppose that persons are free and hence, morally responsible for their actions. So, if free will skepticism is true, our current practices that hold people to account for their wrongs appears unjustified–even immoral. This paper will challenge the free will skeptic’s core claim that free will does not exist and defend current practices of moral responsibility by offering (and defending) a Frankfurtian-compatibilist (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  15. Reforming responsibility practices without skepticism.Marcelo Fischborn - 2022 - Philosophical Psychology (NA):1-17.
    Derk Pereboom and Gregg Caruso argue that humans are never morally responsible for their actions and take that thesis as a starting point for a project whose ultimate goal is the reform of responsibility practices, which include expressions of praise, blame, and the institution of legal punishment. This paper shares the skeptical concern that current responsibility practices can be suboptimal and in need of change, but argues that a non-skeptical pursuit of those changes is viable and more promising. The main (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  16. Free will: An impossible reality or an incoherent concept?Stephen Leach - 2022 - Human Affairs 32 (4):413-419.
    The problem that Tallis attempts to address in Freedom: An Impossible Reality is that science appears to describe the entire world deterministically and that this seems to leave no room for free will. In the face of this threat, Tallis defends the existence of free will by arguing that science does not explain our intentional awareness of the world; and it is our intentional awareness that makes both science and free will possible. Against Tallis, it is here argued that his (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  17. Moral Responsibility and Existential Attitudes.Paul Russell - 2022 - In Dana K. Nelkin & Derk Pereboom (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Moral Responsibility. New York City, USA: Oxford University Press. pp. 519-543.
    We might describe the philosophical issue of human freedom and moral responsibility as an existential metaphysical problem. Problems of this kind are not just a matter of theoretical interest and curiosity: They address issues that we care about and that affect us. They are, more specifically, relevant to the significance and value that we attach to our lives and the way that we lead them. According to the orthodox view, there is a tidy connection between skepticism and pessimism. Skepticism threatens (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  18. A Puzzle Concerning Gratitude and Accountability.Robert H. Wallace - 2022 - The Journal of Ethics 26:455–480.
    P.F. Strawson’s account of moral responsibility in “Freedom and Resentment” has been widely influential. In both that paper and in the contemporary literature, much attention has been paid to Strawson’s account of blame in terms of reactive attitudes like resentment and indignation. The Strawsonian view of praise in terms of gratitude has received comparatively little attention. Some, however, have noticed something puzzling about gratitude and accountability. We typically understand accountability in terms of moral demands and expectations. Yet gratitude does not (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  19. Do We Have Free Will?Coco Zhang - 2022 - Questions 22:5-6.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  20. Do free will skeptics swallow their own medicine?: Daniel C. Dennett and Gregg D. Caruso: Just deserts. Debating free will. Cambridge: Polity, 2021, 223 pp, $15.99 PB.Maarten Boudry - 2021 - Metascience 30 (3):365-369.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  21. What Should we Believe About Free Will?Jeremy Byrd - 2021 - Erkenntnis 86 (3):505-522.
    Given the available evidence, I argue that we face considerable uncertainty about free will. In particular, I argue that the available philosophical evidence does not support being highly confident in our theories about the nature of free will, though this does not necessarily mean that we should suspend judgment about either incompatibilism or compatibilism. For those who accept incompatibilism, however, I argue that there is enough uncertainty about libertarian free will that they should suspend judgment about whether we are ever (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  22. Just Deserts: Debating Free Will.Gregg D. Caruso & Daniel C. Dennett - 2021 - 2021: Polity.
    Some thinkers argue that our best scientific theories about the world prove that free will is an illusion. Others disagree. The concept of free will is profoundly important to our self-understanding, our interpersonal relationships, and our moral and legal practices. If it turns out that no one is ever free and morally responsible, what would that mean for society, morality, meaning, and the law? Just Deserts brings together two philosophers – Daniel C. Dennett and Gregg D. Caruso – to debate (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  23. Quantum propensities in the brain cortex and free will.Danko D. Georgiev - 2021 - Biosystems 208:104474.
    Capacity of conscious agents to perform genuine choices among future alternatives is a prerequisite for moral responsibility. Determinism that pervades classical physics, however, forbids free will, undermines the foundations of ethics, and precludes meaningful quantification of personal biases. To resolve that impasse, we utilize the characteristic indeterminism of quantum physics and derive a quantitative measure for the amount of free will manifested by the brain cortical network. The interaction between the central nervous system and the surrounding environment is shown to (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  24. Free will, determinism, and the right levels of description.Leonhard Menges - 2021 - Philosophical Explorations 25 (1):1-18.
    ABSTRACT Recently, many authors have argued that claims about determinism and free will are situated on different levels of description and that determinism on one level does not rule out free will on another. This paper focuses on Christian List’s version of this basic idea. It will be argued for the negative thesis that List’s account does not rule out the most plausible version of incompatibilism about free will and determinism and, more constructively, that a level-based approach to free will (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  25. Just Deserts: Debating Free Will (Review; Invited). [REVIEW]Kristin M. Mickelson - 2021 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 29 (3):408-412.
    Plug ‘free will’ into YouTube’s search function and you will find a shocking range of people confidently sharing their untutored opinions on the topic – from recognizable physicists (Neil de Grasse...
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  26. Review of Free Will Skepticism in Law and Society: Challenging Retributive Justice, by Elizabeth Shaw, Derk Pereboom, Gregg D. Caruso (eds.), Cambridge University Press, 2019. [REVIEW]Jelena Mijić - 2021 - Filozofska Istrazivanja 41 (3):672-676.
  27. Paul Russell, The Limits of Free Will.Samuel Reis-Dennis - 2021 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 18 (5):531-533.
  28. Responsibility Skepticism and Strawson’s Naturalism: Review Essay on Pamela Hieronymi, Freedom, Resentment & The Metaphysics of Morals (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2020).Paul Russell - 2021 - Ethics 131 (4):754-776.
    There are few who would deny that P. F. Strawson’s “Freedom and Resentment” (1962) ranks among the most significant contributions to modern moral philosophy. Although any number of essays have been devoted to it, Pamela Hieronymi’s 'Freedom, Resentment, and the Metaphysics of Morals' is the first book-length study. The aim of Hieronymi’s study is to show that Strawson’s “central argument” has been “underestimated and misunderstood.” Hieronymi interprets this argument in terms of what she describes as Strawson’s “social naturalism”. Understood this (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  29. The Tension in Critical Compatibilism.Robert H. Wallace - 2021 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (1):321-332.
    (Part of a symposium on an OUP collection of Paul Russell's papers on free will and moral responsibility). Paul Russell’s The Limits of Free Will is more than the sum of its parts. Among other things, Limits offers readers a comprehensive look at Russell’s attack on the problematically idealized assumptions of the contemporary free will debate. This idealization, he argues, distorts the reality of our human predicament. Herein I pose a dilemma for Russell’s position, critical compatibilism. The dilemma illuminates the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  30. Free Will Skepticism and Its Implications: An Argument for Optimism.Gregg Caruso - 2019 - In Elizabeth Shaw (ed.), Free Will Skepticism in Law and Society. New York: pp. 43-72.
  31. Free will skepticism and its implications : the case for optimism.Gregg D. Caruso - 2019 - In Elizabeth Shaw, Derk Pereboom & Gregg D. Caruso (eds.), Free Will Skepticism in Law and Society: Challenging Retributive Justice. Cambridge University Press.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  32. Free Will Skepticism in Law and Society: An Overview.Gregg D. Caruso, Elizabeth Shaw & Derk Pereboom - 2019 - In Elizabeth Shaw, Derk Pereboom & Gregg D. Caruso (eds.), Free Will Skepticism in Law and Society: Challenging Retributive Justice. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 1-26.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  33. Hard incompatibilism and the participant attitude.D. Justin Coates - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (2):208-229.
    Following P. F. Strawson, a number of philosophers have argued that if hard incompatibilism is true, then its truth would undermine the justification or value of our relationships with other persons. In this paper, I offer a novel defense of this claim. In particular, I argue that if hard incompatibilism is true, we cannot make sense of: the possibility of promissory obligation, the significance of consent, or the pro tanto wrongness of paternalistic intervention. Because these practices and normative commitments are (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  34. Free will fallibilism and the “two-standpoints” account of freedom.Michael Louis Corrado - 2019 - Synthese 198 (3):1967-1982.
    In this paper I propose a form of free will fallibilism. Unlike the free will realist who is fully persuaded that we have sufficient evidence of freedom to justify holding individuals morally responsible for what they do and imposing punishment, and unlike the free will skeptic who is fully persuaded that we do not have enough evidence to believe that we face a future of open alternatives, the free will fallibilist will believe that we have enough evidence to justify a (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  35. Free will skepticism and criminal punishment : a preliminary ethical analysis.Farah Focquaert - 2019 - In Elizabeth Shaw, Derk Pereboom & Gregg D. Caruso (eds.), Free Will Skepticism in Law and Society: Challenging Retributive Justice. Cambridge University Press.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  36. The Conceptual Impossibility of Free Will Error Theory.Andrew H. Latham - 2019 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 15 (2):99-120.
    This paper argues for a view of free will that I will call the conceptual impossibility of the truth of free will error theory - the conceptual impossibility thesis. I will argue that given the concept of free will we in fact deploy, it is impossible for our free will judgements—judgements regarding whether some action is free or not—to be systematically false. Since we do judge many of our actions to be free, it follows from the conceptual impossibility thesis that (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  37. The Conceptual Impossibility of Free Will Error Theory.Andrew J. Latham - 2019 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 15 (2):99-120.
    This paper argues for a view of free will that I will call the conceptual impossibility of the truth of free will error theory - the conceptual impossibility thesis. I will argue that given the concept of free will we in fact deploy, it is impossible for our free will judgements - judgements regarding whether some action is free or not - to be systematically false. Since we do judge many of our actions to be free, it follows from the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  38. Paradigm Case Arguments.Kevin Lynch - 2019 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy:NA.
    From time to time philosophers and scientists have made sensational, provocative claims that certain things do not exist or never happen that, in everyday life, we unquestioningly take for granted as existing or happening. These claims have included denying the existence of matter, space, time, the self, free will, and other sturdy and basic elements of our common-sense or naïve world-view. Around the middle of the twentieth century an argument was developed that can be used to challenge many such skeptical (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  39. Free Will, Self‐Creation, and the Paradox of Moral Luck.Kristin M. Mickelson - 2019 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 43 (1):224-256.
    How is the problem of free will related to the problem of moral luck? In this essay, I answer that question and outline a new solution to the paradox of moral luck, the source-paradox solution. This solution both explains why the paradox arises and why moral luck does not exist. To make my case, I highlight a few key connections between the paradox of moral luck and two related problems, namely the problem of free will and determinism and the paradox (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  40. Free will skepticism, general deterrence, and the "use" objection.Kevin J. Murtagh - 2019 - In Elizabeth Shaw, Derk Pereboom & Gregg D. Caruso (eds.), Free Will Skepticism in Law and Society: Challenging Retributive Justice. Cambridge University Press.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  41. Free will skepticism and prevention of crime.Derk Pereboom - 2019 - In Elizabeth Shaw, Derk Pereboom & Gregg D. Caruso (eds.), Free Will Skepticism in Law and Society: Challenging Retributive Justice. Cambridge University Press.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  42. Spinoza's Dream Argument: A Response to Introspective Arguments for Freedom.J. Petrik & D. Rose - 2019 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (11-12):157-181.
    This paper critically evaluates an objection to introspective arguments for human freedom found within Spinoza's Ethics. The objection-- which we call Spinoza's dream argument -- challenges the evidentiary value of a person's experience of her own freedom by pointing out that some choices made within dreams are experienced as no less free than choices made while awake despite the fact that choices made within dreams are not free. After reconstructing Spinoza's dream argument, we critically evaluate it, concluding ultimately that it (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  43. The implications of free will skepticism for establishing criminal liability.Elizabeth Shaw - 2019 - In Elizabeth Shaw, Derk Pereboom & Gregg D. Caruso (eds.), Free Will Skepticism in Law and Society: Challenging Retributive Justice. Cambridge University Press.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  44. Just Deserts: Can we be held morally responsible for our actions? Yes, says Daniel Dennett. No, says Gregg Caruso.Gregg D. Caruso & Daniel C. Dennett - 2018 - Aeon 1 (Oct. 4):1-20.
    Can we be held morally responsible for our actions? Yes, says Daniel Dennett. No, says Gregg Caruso. Reader, you decide.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  45. A Critique of Alfred R Mele’s Work on Autonomous Agents: From Self-Control to Autonomy: Oxford University Press, New York, 1995. [REVIEW]Pujarini Das - 2018 - Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research 35 (3):603-617.
  46. Derk Pereboom, Free Will, Agency and Meaning in Life. [REVIEW]Sofia Jeppsson - 2018 - Utilitas 30 (2):241-244.
    Derk Pereboom’s Free Will, Agency and Meaning in Life (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014, pp. 219) follows quite closely in the steps of his Living Without Free Will (2001). Pereboom argues for “hard incompatibilism” in both – the thesis that regardless of whether determinism is true, the kind of free will required for desert-entailing moral responsibility is unlikely to exist. In Free Will…, however, he pays more attention to issues other than moral responsibility. This, I think, is a great strength (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  47. Hard Theological Determinism and the Illusion of Free Will: Sri Ramakrishna Meets Lord Kames, Saul Smilansky, and Derk Pereboom.Ayon Maharaj - 2018 - Journal of World Philosophies 3 (2):24-48.
    This essay reconstructs the sophisticated views on free will and determinism of the nineteenth-century Hindu mystic Sri Ramakrishna and brings them into dialogue with the views of three western philosophers—namely, the Scottish Enlightenment philosopher Lord Kames and the contemporary analytic philosophers Saul Smilansky and Derk Pereboom. Sri Ramakrishna affirms hard theological determinism, the incompatibilist view that God determines everything we do and think. At the same time, however, he claims that God, in His infinite wisdom, has endowed ordinary unenlightened people (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  48. The implications of rejecting free will: An empirical analysis.Stephen Morris - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (2):299-321.
    While skeptical arguments concerning free will have been a common element of philosophical discourse for thousands of years, one could make the case that such arguments have never been more numerous or forceful than at present. In response to these skeptical attacks, some philosophers and psychologists have expressed concern that the widespread acceptance of such skeptical attitudes could have devastating social consequences. In this paper, I set out to address whether such concerns are well-founded. I argue that there is reason (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  49. Hard-Incompatibilist Existentialism: Neuroscience, Punishment, and Meaning in Life.Derk Pereboom & Gregg D. Caruso - 2018 - In Gregg D. Caruso & Owen Flanagan (eds.), Neuroexistentialism: Meaning, Morals, and Purpose in the Age of Neuroscience. Oxford University Press.
    As philosophical and scientific arguments for free will skepticism continue to gain traction, we are likely to see a fundamental shift in the way people think about free will and moral responsibility. Such shifts raise important practical and existential concerns: What if we came to disbelieve in free will? What would this mean for our interpersonal relationships, society, morality, meaning, and the law? What would it do to our standing as human beings? Would it cause nihilism and despair as some (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  50. The Basic Argument and Modest Moral Responsibility.D. Justin Coates - 2017 - Analytic Philosophy 58 (2):156-170.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
1 — 50 / 254