Sentiment and value

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Ethics 110 (4):722-748 (2000)
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10.1086/233371

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Author Profiles

Justin D'Arms
Ohio State University
Daniel Jacobson
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor

Citations of this work

Explaining Imagination.Peter Langland-Hassan - 2020 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Stakes, withholding, and pragmatic encroachment on knowledge.Mark Schroeder - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 160 (2):265 - 285.
Fittingness First.Conor McHugh & Jonathan Way - 2016 - Ethics 126 (3):575-606.

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