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Reasons and Emotions.Christine Tappolet - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.details
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The Wrong Kind of Reasons.Nye Howard - 2017 - In Tristram Colin McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. New York: Routledge. pp. 340-354.details
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Can Emotion be Modelled on Perception?Mikko Salmela - 2011 - Dialectica 65 (1):1-29.details
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Sentimentalism (International Encyclopedia of Ethics).Antti Kauppinen - 2022 - In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Wiley.details
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The strike of the demon: On fitting pro‐attitudes and value.Wlodek Rabinowicz & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - 2004 - Ethics 114 (3):391-423.details
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The subtleties of fit: reassessing the fit-value biconditionals.Rachel Achs & Oded Na’Aman - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (9):2523-2546.details
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XII. Narrative and Perspective; Values and Appropriate Emotions.Peter Goldie - 2003 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 52:201-220.details
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Response-Dependence and Aesthetic Theory.Alex King - 2023 - In Chris Howard & R. A. Rowland (eds.), Fittingness. OUP. pp. 309-326.details
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What Is Evaluable for Fit?Oded Na'aman - 2023 - In Chris Howard & R. A. Rowland (eds.), Fittingness. OUP.details
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Justice and Retaliation.Stephen Darwall - 2010 - Philosophical Papers 39 (3):315-341.details
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Artificial Moral Responsibility: How We Can and Cannot Hold Machines Responsible.Daniel W. Tigard - 2021 - Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 30 (3):435-447.details
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Attitudes and the Normativity of Fittingness.Conor McHugh - 2023 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 97 (1):273-293.details
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What Roles Do Emotions Play in Morality?Antti Kauppinen - 2024 - In Andrea Scarantino (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Emotion Theory. Routledge.details
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Creativity.Peter Langland-Hassan - 2020 - In Explaining Imagination. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 262-296.details
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There are no i-beliefs or i-desires at work in fiction consumption and this is why.Peter Langland-Hassan - 2020 - In Explaining Imagination. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 210-233.details
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Value, Fitting‐Attitude Account of.Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2013 - In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Hoboken, NJ: Blackwell.details
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Psychopathy, autism, and basic moral emotions: Evidence for sentimentalist constructivism.Erick Jose Ramirez - 2019 - In Bluhm Robyn & Tekin Serife (eds.), The Bloomsbury Companion to the Philosophy of Psychiatry. Bloomsbury.details
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Love for a Reason.Peter Goldie - 2010 - Emotion Review 2 (1):61-67.details
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Correct Responses and the Priority of the Normative.Jennie Louise - 2009 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (4):345-364.details
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Moral Realism and the Existence of God: Improving Parfit’s Metaethics.Martin Jakobsen - 2020 - Leuven, Belgia: Peeters.details
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Explaining Imagination.Peter Langland-Hassan - 2020 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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On the fittingness of agential evaluations.Roberto Keller - 2022 - Philosophical Explorations 25 (2):251–268.details
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The appropriateness of moral emotion and Humean sentimentalism.Sunny Yang - 2009 - Journal of Value Inquiry 43 (1):67-81.details
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Higher-Order Evidence in Aesthetics.Daniel Whiting - 2023 - British Journal of Aesthetics 63 (2):143-155.details
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Defending the wide-scope approach to instrumental reason.Jonathan Way - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 147 (2):213 - 233.details
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A new moral sentimentalism.Eric Vogelstein - 2016 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (3):346-368.details
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Losing the light at the end of the tunnel: Depression, future thinking, and hope.Juliette Vazard - 2024 - Mind and Language 39 (1):39-51.details
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Affect, motivational states, and evaluative concepts.Daniel Vanello - 2020 - Synthese 197 (10):4617-4636.details
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Desire's Own Reasons.Uku Tooming - 2022 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 8 (2):259-277.details
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The rationality of collective guilt.Deborah Tollefsen - 2006 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 30 (1):222–239.details
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Fitting Attitudes And Essentially Contestable Concepts.Cain Todd - 2012 - Filosofia Unisinos 13 (2 - suppl.).details
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Moral Distress as a Symptom of Dirty Hands.Daniel W. Tigard - 2019 - Res Publica 25 (3):353-371.details
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There Is No Techno-Responsibility Gap.Daniel W. Tigard - 2020 - Philosophy and Technology 34 (3):589-607.details
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Accepting Moral Luck and Taking Responsibility in Public Health Crises.Daniel Tigard - 2023 - Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 32 (1):34-40.details
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The Virtues of Reactive Attitudes.Lisa Tessman - 2020 - Journal of Value Inquiry 55 (3):437-456.details
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Moral distress in health care: when is it fitting?Lisa Tessman - 2020 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 23 (2):165-177.details
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The Receptive Theory: A New Theory of Emotions.Christine Tappolet - 2023 - Philosophies 8 (6):117.details
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Valeurs et émotions, les perspectives du néo-sentimentalisme.Christine Tappolet - 2012 - Dialogue 51 (1):7-30.details
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Réponses à mes critiques.Christine Tappolet - 2018 - Philosophiques 45 (2):513-526.details
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Les émotions et leurs conditions d’adéquation.Christine Tappolet - 2002 - Philosophiques 29 (2):378-382.details
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La normativité des concepts évaluatifs.Christine Tappolet - 2011 - Philosophiques 38 (1):157-176.details
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Emotions as indeterminate justifiers.András Szigeti - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):1-23.details
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No Need to Get Emotional? Emotions and Heuristics.András Szigeti - 2013 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (4):845-862.details
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Sentimentalism and Moral Dilemmas.András Szigeti - 2015 - Dialectica 69 (1):1-22.details
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Reasons: Wrong, Right, Normative, Fundamental.Kurt Sylvan & Errol Lord - 2019 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 15 (1).details
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