Watching other people play videogames —a.k.a. ‘spectator gaming’— is a widespread practice. Yet, it is considered by some as an inadequate form of engagement with games. In this paper, I show that the strongest objection to spectator gaming relies on the claim that some properties of videogames are better, if not exclusively, accessible to the player. After that, I propose two replies to this challenge. The first is that ‘secondary players’, i.e., individuals who indirectly take part in the game, can (...) access the relevant properties. The second reply is that even paradigmatic spectators may engage in simulated play, and therefore, access these properties as well. (shrink)

This paper considers whether pictures ever implicitly represent internal spectators of the scenes they depict, and what theoretical construal to offer of their doing so. Richard Wollheim's discussion (Painting as an Art, ch.3) is taken as the most sophisticated attempt to answer these questions. I argue that Wollheim does not provide convincing argument for his claim that some pictures implicitly represent an internal spectator with whom the viewer of the picture is to imaginatively identify. instead, I defend a view (...) on which the external spectator simply imagines herself interacting, psychologically and otherwise, with the depicted scene. I explore some of the consequences of the two positions for pictorial aesthetics, arguing that the view I favour is at least as competent as Wollheim's at accommodating those phenomena we have any reason to think hold. (shrink)

Lack of consent is valorized within popular culture to the point that sexual assault has become a spectator sport and creepshot entertainment on social media. Indeed, the valorization of nonconsensual sex has reached the extreme where sex with unconscious girls, especially accompanied by photographs as trophies, has become a goal of some boys and men.

The question of judgment has become one of the central problems in recent social, political and ethical thought. This paper explores Hannah Arendt's decisive contribution to this debate by attempting to reconstruct analytically two distinctive perspectives on judgment from the corpus of her writings. By exploring her relation to Aristotelian and Kantian sources, and by uncovering debts and parallels to key thinkers such as Benjamin and Heidegger, it is argued that Arendt's work pinpoints the key antinomy within political judgment itself, (...) that between the viewpoints of the political actor and the political spectator. The paper concludes by highlighting some lacunae and difficulties in the development of Arendt's account, difficulties that set challenges for those theorists (such as Seyla Benhabib and Alessandro Ferrara) who wish to appropriate and extend Arendt's contribution into the field of contemporary critical theory. Key Words: action • aesthetics • community • freedom • history • judgment • reflection. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: Humean Moral Sentiments as Responsibility Conferring Exclusion and Humean Moral Disapproval A Spectator's Standard of Virtue Looking Forward References Further Reading.

In this paper I establish a normative limit of spectator interaction. I argue that attempts by non-participants (e.g. spectators) to affect the outcome of a contest, whether intended or merely foreseeable, are unsporting and ought to be discouraged because they undermine fairness, which is a fundamental premise of ideal competition. Because this is at odds with the participatory ethos of contemporary sports fanaticism (e.g. ?12th man? campaigns, visual distractions by spectators, etcetera) I anticipate several potential objections. I refute (...) concerns that my thesis is empirically dubious; that it is impractical; that it is subordinate to financial considerations; that it is nullified by participant acquiescence; and that it is subordinate to spectator interests. (shrink)

The most surprising conclusion of our analysis is that videogames can be most effective in generating suspense not by highlighting their unique ability to be interactive, but, to the contrary, limiting interactivity at key points, thereby turning players into helpless spectators like those that watch films. Discovering this technique in video games allows us to turn our attention back to film, where we are able to highlight a previously ignored feature of viewer film interaction, namely, helplessness.

Shipwreck with Spectator traces the evolution of the complex of metaphors related to the sea, to shipwreck, and to the role of the spectator in human culture from ancient Greece to modern times. This elegant essay exemplifies Blumenberg's ideas about the ability of the historical study of metaphor to illuminate essential aspects of being human. Originally published in the same year as his monumental Work on Myth, Shipwreck with Spectator traces the evolution of the complex of metaphors related to the (...) sea, to shipwreck, and to the role of the spectator in human culture from ancient Greece to modern times. The sea is one of humanity's oldest metaphors for life, and a sea journey, Blumenberg observes, has often stood for our journey through life. We all know the role that shipwrecks can play in this journey, and at some level we have all played witness to others' wrecks, standing in safety and knowing that there is nothing we can do to help, yet fixed comfortably or uncomfortably in our ambiguous role as spectator. Through Blumenberg's seemingly inexhaustible knowledge of letters, from ancient texts through nineteenth-century reminiscences and modern speeches, we see layer upon layer revealed in the meaning humans have given to these metaphors; and in this way we begin to understand what metaphors can do that more straightforward modes of expression cannot. This edition of Shipwreck with Spectator also includes "Prospect for a Theory of Nonconceptuality," an essay that recounts the evolution of Blumenberg's ideas about metaphorology in the years following his early manifesto "Paradigms for a Metaphorology.". (shrink)

A range of seemingly unrelated problems at the forefront of controversy about consciousness, language, and vision, among others, have a deep connection with one another that has gone unnoticed. This book suggests that this mistake arises not from what is put into a theory but rather from what is missing.

The paper argues that the act of looking, as defined between the story of Gyges, Candaules, and the offended queen and the story of Solon's visit to Lydia, functions in the first book of Herodotus, and perhaps also elsewhere throughout the Inquiry, as a metaphor for the relation of the histôr to the object of his investigation. Further, by a careful comparison of the Gyges story in Herodotus with the queen's own narration in the enigmatic "Gyges Tragedy" , we can (...) define a Herodotean psychology of spectation that bears a striking resemblance to the specifically tragic psychology manifest in the fragment. Herodotus positions his readers, the paper argues, in the place of Gyges, forcing them to look-in their imaginations-on what does not belong to them, just as the theatai in the Theater of Dionysus must look in imagination on the scene described by the queen. While the tragic audience is protected from the fate of Candaules and of Gyges' descendant Croesus by the constitutive blindness of tragedy that prevents the spectators from seeing what happens in the mukhos, Herodotus' audience must seek some other reassurance that they will not face the voyeur's penalty. This paper finally argues that Solon's theôria, with its crucial purpose of establishing the nomoi of Athens and its crucial ethic of looking not at the object of desire but at the end, installs in Herodotus' historiê the psychology of tragedy: to look desiringly is to lose, but to look inquiringly is to learn. (shrink)

Descartes's epistemology, morals, and metaphysics – each offer reason to look on real life as a spectator looks on a theater production. The meditator seeking certainty watches his body move as in a dream and employs an entirely passive faculty of knowledge. In order to act firmly and yet not risk disappointment, the moral subject confines action to the soul, refusing to count bodily activities as actions, and cultivates a desire free from passion. After the Meditations, the metaphysician abandons the (...) thesis that soul and body constitute a human being, consequently limiting human goods to goods of the soul alone and devaluing embodied life in the world. (shrink)

Can a machine think? More pointedly, if I am a machine, can I think? Beck answers these questions by analyzing two clusters of metaphors -- one of which dramatizes human beings as spontaneous agents (actors), and the other sees them as observers attempting to explain causally their own behavior and that of the actor (spectators). Using a hypothetical scene with two spectators, each explaining an action, and each representing a different way of viewing the world, Beck points up (...) the central philosophical problems raised by the varieties of ways in which we explain our own actions and those of others. (shrink)

This elegant essay exemplifies Blumenberg's ideas about the ability of the historical study of metaphor to illuminate essential aspects of being human. Originally published in the same year as his monumental Work on Myth, Shipwreck with Spectator traces the evolution of the complex of metaphors related to the sea, to shipwreck, and to the role of the spectator in human culture from ancient Greece to modern times.The sea is one of humanity's oldest metaphors for life, and a sea journey, Blumenberg (...) observes, has often stood for our journey through life. We all know the role that shipwrecks can play in this journey, and at some level we have all played witness to others' wrecks, standing in safety and knowing that there is nothing we can do to help, yet fixed comfortably or uncomfortably in our ambiguous role as spectator.Through Blumenberg's seemingly inexhaustible knowledge of letters, from ancient texts through nineteenth-century reminiscences and modern speeches, we see layer upon layer revealed in the meaning humans have given to these metaphors; and in this way we begin to understand what metaphors can do that more straightforward modes of expression cannot.This edition of Shipwreck with Spectator also includes "Prospect for a Theory of Nonconceptuality," an essay that recounts the evolution of Blumenberg's ideas about metaphorology in the years following his early manifesto "Paradigms for a Metaphorology.". (shrink)

We examined the relationship among watching soccer matches, moral functioning and aggression levels in 332 college students. Hypothesis-driven regression analyses revealed that the frequency of watching soccer matches was positively associated with low levels of moral behavior and high aggression levels. A mediation analysis also showed that moral behavior mediated the relationship between the frequency of watching soccer matches and aggression levels. Males manifested lower levels of moral functioning and higher hostility, physical and verbal aggression than females when watching a (...) soccer match. Moreover, only males reported more verbal aggression and anger when watching soccer matches as compared to their general aggression levels. (shrink)

Combining phenomenology and psychoanalysis in highly innovative ways, this book seeks to undo the binary opposition between appearance and Being that has been in place since Plato’s parable of the cave. It is, essentially, an essay on what could be called “world love,” the possibility and necessity for psychic survival of a profound and vital erotic investment by a human being in the cosmic surround. Here, the author takes her cue from Freud’s assertion that the “loss of reality” associated with (...) psychosis is a function of a disturbance not in the capacity to reason or perceive, but rather in the capacity for world love, the libidinal and semiotic circuity by means of which such love actualizes itself. In an implicit challenge to poststructuralist thought, the author claims that this love is always in response to a call issued by the world—that the world has, as it were, a vocation: its beauty ought to be seen. We must think of our own being-in-the world as a response to a primordial calling out to respond to this beauty. We are, the author suggests, at the very core of our being, summoned to what she terms world spectatorship. Drawing on Heidegger’s phenomenological elaboration of care as the being distinctive of human being and the primarily Lacanian conceptualization of the language of desire specific to each human subject, this metapsychology of love attempts to integrate issues in the fields of psychoanalysis, philosophy, visual culture, art history, and literary and film studies. (shrink)

Through a reading of Kant’s essay, “An Old Question Raised Again: Is the Human Race Constantly Progressing?”, I argue that Kant’s political philosophy fails to adequately engage with the political event in itself, and that Kant’s so-called political writings only provide a theory of the social sphere. First, I present the Kantian political subject as an antinomy between the metaphysically grounded spectator and the physically situated actor. Second, I show that Kant tries to solve the antinomy between the actor and (...) the spectator by attributing primacy to the judgement of the spectator. Third, I show that this move fails because it removes from political judgment what ultimately defines the political, i.e. plurality, spontaneity, and action. I conclude that rather than a theory of the sphere of political life, what Kant achieves is the thinking out of a theory of society (Gesellschaft). (shrink)

De la Première Guerre mondiale aux attentats du 11 septembre 2001, la manipulation des émotions par le biais des images existe et limite l'esprit critique. L'auteure révèle que les images ont un pouvoir humanisant, et la distance qu'elles créent entre l'homme et ses émotions offre à celui-ci les conditions de sa liberté, à lui de ne pas subir les images, de les refuser.

In his tractA Rationale of Judicial Evidence, Jeremy Bentham repeatedly refers to the courtroom as the ‘theatre of justice’. Bentham's description has been borne out by recent scholarship on Athenian law. As a form of civic space, the Athenian lawcourts were similar to the Theatre of Dionysos in many respects: litigants faced each other in a competitiveagon, delivering lines written for them by logographers to a mass audience which would range, ordinarily, from 200 to 1500 jurors. Moreover, modern scholars have (...) drawn on the notion of ‘social drama’ introduced by the anthropologist Victor Turner to describe the Athenian lawcourts as an arena for socially constructive feuding behaviour, as a public stage for the social élite to compete for prestige, or as a forum for ongoing communication between élite litigants and mass jurors ‘in a context which made explicit the power of the masses to judge the actions and behavior of élite individuals’. (shrink)

even a brief review of disability narratives shows that many people with disabilities, encompassing a diverse range of impairments, encounter disruptions in their everyday interactions. Individuals with disabilities report that strangers and neighbors alike fail to communicate with them.1 Instead, people defer to friends, partners, and caretakers to offer some command over the interaction. These experiences might be understood as mere annoyances, part of the experience of impairment insofar as it undermines non-disabled individuals’ modes of interaction, leaving them fumbling, seeking (...) assurance that they are handling the situation correctly. But, read less cautiously, these frustrations are emblematic of a... (shrink)

Death and the Disinterested Spectator examines the nature of philosophy in light of philosophy's claim to be a preparation for death.

Can a machine think? More pointedly, if I am a machine, can I think? Beck answers these questions by analyzing two clusters of metaphors -- one of which dramatizes human beings as spontaneous agents (actors), and the other sees them as observers attempting to explain causally their own behavior and that of the actor (spectators). Using a hypothetical scene with two spectators, each explaining an action, and each representing a different way of viewing the world, Beck points up (...) the central philosophical problems raised by the varieties of ways in which we explain our own actions and those of others. (shrink)

This article argues that the mid-1960s saw a dramatic shift in how ‘brainwashing’ was popularly imagined, reflecting Anglo-American developments in the sciences of mind as well as shifts in mass media culture. The 1965 British film The Ipcress File provides a rich case for exploring these interconnections between mind control, mind science and media, as it exemplifies the era’s innovations for depicting ‘brainwashing’ on screen: the film’s protagonist is subjected to flashing lights and electronic music, pulsating to the ‘rhythm of (...) brainwaves’. This article describes the making of The Ipcress File’s brainwashing sequence and shows how its quest for cinematic spectacle drew on developments in cybernetic science, multimedia design and modernist architecture. I argue that often interposed between the disparate endeavours of 1960s mind control, psychological science and media was a vision of the human mind as a ‘cybernetic spectator’: a subject who scrutinizes how media and other demands on her sensory perception can affect consciousness, and seeks to consciously participate in this mental conditioning and guide its effects. (shrink)

Alfred Hitchcock's Vertigo skilfully continues to stimulate different views of it – hence the volume of writing – different ways of viewing it, different ways of being a viewer of it . One purpose of the piece is to provide a little caution to those students coming to study Vertigo , and Spectatorship, for the first time: not to presume that the film, and by association any film, has one type of spectator. It is through examining various responses to it (...) – rather than presenting one view of it – that we can see perspicaciously that Vertigo has a special capacity for teaching us about the complexity of film spectatorship. This is possibly because Vertigo is so concerned to make the act of viewing an active part of viewing it. (shrink)

This article develops a novel approach to the relationship between public space and democracy. It employs the concept of the spectacle to show how public space can serve to destroy or weaken solidarity just as easily as it can foster a democratic ethos of equality. A close reading of Rousseau's Letter to M. d'Alembert on the Theatre helps illuminate the political implications of modern public life, which increasingly takes the form of passive individuals assembling in order to view a spectacle. (...) According to Rousseau, spectacles like the theater are depoliticizing because they undermine the opportunity for active participation and interaction with other citizens. By habituating the audience to theatrical modes of self-presentation, they also weaken the capacity for empathy. This article concludes by showing how contemporary theorists including Sennett, Debord and Habermas also contribute to our understanding of the concept of the spectacle. Key Words: citizenship • democracy • festival • public space • Jean-Jacques Rousseau • Richard Sennett • spectacle • theater. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on an explanation of the neglect of investigating and understanding emotional response to films. It argues that the kind of emotional experience a film offers is a proper target of ideological investigation. This chapter aims to suggest how emotions should be understood in ideological criticism. There is characterization of spectator emotion with a view toward conceptual clarification. This chapter examines two families of screen emotions: sentiment and sentimentality, and the emotions which accompany screen violence. Drawing on work (...) in both cognitive science and recent philosophy of mind, the chapter argues that a cognitive approach to the emotions offers a way of taking the role of emotions more seriously than it has been taken in most contemporary film theory. The chapter's usage of ‘cognitivism’ is distinctive by virtue of its challenge to the traditional distinction between reason and passion. (shrink)

D. D. Raphael examines the moral philosophy of Adam Smith (1723-90), best known for his famous work on economics, The Wealth of Nations, and shows that his thought still has much to offer philosophers today. Raphael gives particular attention to Smith's original theory of conscience, with its emphasis on the role of 'sympathy' (shared feelings).

Galen Strawson (2004) has championed an influential argument against the view that a life is, or ought to be, understood as a kind of story with temporal extension. The weight of his argument rests on his self-report of his experience of life as lacking the form or temporal extension necessary for narrative. And though this argument has been widely accepted, I argue that it ought to have been rejected. On one hand, the hypothetical non-diachronic life Strawson proposes would likely be (...) psychologically fragmented. On the other, it would certainly be morally diminished, for it would necessarily lack the capacity for integrity. (shrink)

Le Locataire ("The Tenant"), one of Polanski's lesser-known films, uses both an unreliable narrator and manipulates an unreliable audience to achieve its horror effect.

John Dewey's philosophical work has enjoyed a resurgence of interest of late, largely because of its iconoclastic stance toward traditional philosophy in general, and traditional epistemology in particular. In this dissertation I examine critically the anti-epistemological project which occupied Dewey throughout the first half of this century. In common with many other commentators, I understand Dewey to have held that the central, fatal flaw of traditional epistemology is its commitment to what he called the Spectator Theory of Knowledge --roughly the (...) theory that the metaphor of vision has functioned as the primary model in the characterization of knowing: that knowing is most fundamentally a passive, "beholding" relation beween the knower and the object known. After specifying precisely what Dewey takes STK to be and illustrating how traditional epistemology is, on Dewey's view, essentially committed to it, I rationally reconstruct and then explicate the main lines of criticism of STK developed by Dewey over the course of some fifty years, and examine these criticisms to ascertain whether they show that STK, hence traditional epistemology, is indefensible. The general conclusion reached is that although Dewey achieves partial success against one version of STK, he utterly fails to defeat another version of the theory; and hence, that his overall anti-epistemological project is unsuccessful. (shrink)

Panopticism is Michel Foucault’s term for the internalisation of surveillance and cultural control that is closely linked to the panopticon or surveillance architecture (associated with prisons) of Jeremy Bentham during the 18th and 19th centuries. The purpose of this article is to argue that Adam Smith’s concept of the impartial spectator provides an alternative perspective of internal surveillance that may enhance moral development and resistance to oppressive forms of control. For Smith, this is established through analogical imagination that is used (...) for self-observation to enhance prudent behaviour. The impartial spectator and its resistance to totalitarian behaviour is specifically relevant in contemporary society because of the dominant role of digital technology and scandals that have exposed digital media as participating in digital forms of surveillance, digital personae, artificial intelligence and control. It will also be highlighted that digital surveillance is closely connected to the capitalism that has infiltrated all domains of society, from socio-personal relationships to the workplace. (shrink)

It has been claimed that Adam Smith, like David Hume, has a ‘reflective endorsement’ account of the authority of morality. On such a view, our moral faculties and notions are justified insofar as they pass reflective scrutiny. But Smith's moral philosophy, unlike Hume's, is also peppered with references to God, to divine law, and to our being ‘set up’ in a specific way so as to best attain what is good and useful for us. This language suggests that there is (...) another strategy available for accounting for the authority of morality, one that would align Smith with teleological accounts of human nature and theological accounts of morality. The authority of Smith's impartial spectator would, on such an account, be derivative – it would be derived from the supreme authority of God. Such a view poses a serious challenge for contemporary interpreters of Smith who seek to read him as an empiricist, naturalist, and sentimentalist moral philosopher. This paper examines the textual evidence for this view, focusing on the role of the explicitly religious language found in a key section of Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments. I argue that this language should neither be interpreted as merely ornamental, nor as providing a theological justification of morality. Rather, it is part of Smith's illustration of the psychological influence of religious beliefs, especially the beliefs in an all-seeing judge and in a just afterlife where all human actions will be accounted for and appropriately rewarded or punished. (shrink)

[First published in Italian as: “L’irreligione e lo spettatore imparziale nel sistema morale di Adam Smith”, in Rivista di Filosofia 3 (3):375-403 (2005). -/- Translated by E. Lecaldano.] -/- A number of commentators on Smith’s philosophy have observed that the relationship between his moral theory and his theological beliefs is “exceedingly difficult to unravel.” The available evidence, as generally presented, suggests that although Smith was not entirely orthodox by contemporary standards, he has no obvious or significant irreligious commitments or orientation. (...) Contrary to this view of things, this essay argues that behind the veneer of orthodoxy that covers Smith’s discussion in The Theory of the Moral Sentiments there are significant irreligious themes present in his work. -/- . (shrink)

The philosophic spectator watches from a distance as a “disinterested” and impartial member of an audience, Lectures on Kant’s political philosophy, University of Chicago Press, 1992; Kant, On history, Prentice Hall Inc, 1957). Judicial systems use many of the elements of the spectator in the concept of an eyewitness but, with increased video technology use, the courts have taken the witness a step further by hiring forensic video analysts. The analyst’s stance is rooted in objectivity, and the process of breaking (...) a video down to its component parts to examine it, but is it based on the philosophic spectator? To better understand whether the forensic video analyst has adopted the stance of the philosophic spectator, this paper examines both the analyst and spectator, and discusses the implications for how we think and administer justice. (shrink)

We resist Schilbach et al.’s characterization of the “social perception” approach to social cognition as a “spectator theory” of other minds. We show how the social perception view acknowledges the crucial role interaction plays in enabling social understanding. We also highlight a dilemma Schilbach et al. face in attempting to distinguish their second person approach from the social perception view.

One’s philosophical points of view, which form the bases for assumptions that we bring to management theory and practice matter, and matter deeply, to management thinking and corporate behavior. In this paper I outline three related threads of philosophical conversations and explain how they are important in management theory and practice: the “linguistic turn” in philosophy, deriving from the later writings of Ludwig Wittgenstein, a social constructionist perspective: a set of theories at least implicitly derived from the linguistic turn in (...) philosophy, and the notion of the impartial spectator. I then use these three theories to analyze the idea of the corporation, corporate cultures and corporate mission statements, stakeholder theories and their differences, and the limitations of the popular notion of “corporate social responsibility.” I conclude that how one frames these management ideas makes a difference, a difference in theory and in practice. (shrink)

Growing inequality and its implications for democratic polity suggest that corporate social responsibility has not proved itself in twenty-first century business, largely as it lacks clear criteria of demarcation for businesses to follow. Today the problem is viewed by many commentators as an ethical challenge to business itself. In response to this challenge, we begin by examining Porter and Kramer’s :64–77, 2011) call for a shift from a social responsibility to a shared value framework and the need to respond to (...) the problem of the ‘separation thesis’ between business and ethics :89–118, 1996; Harris and Freeman, Bus Ethics Q 18:541–548, 2008). We identify the eighteenth century economist and philosopher Adam Smith in his book The Theory of Moral Sentiments as a source for an ethical approach to business. Building on his central concept of ‘sympathy’, we introduce the idea of the Impartial Spectator Test, which we argue builds on traditional stakeholder perspectives and which provides an objective route to ethical criteria of demarcation. We conclude by assessing how this approach adds to the existing debate around social responsibility and shared value. (shrink)

According to Adam Smith, we appeal to the imagined reactions of an ‘impartial spectator’ when justifying moral judgements of others and aspire to be impartial spectators when making judgements of ourselves. However, psychological research has shown that trying to be impartial will often have the paradoxical effect of reinforcing other-directed prejudice and self-serving bias. I argue that we can get around this problem by aspiring to be ‘partially impartial spectators’ instead.

Francesco Casetti _Inside the Gaze: The Fiction Film and its Spectator_ Translated by Nell Andrew with Charles O'Brien Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1998 ISBN: 0-253-21232-4 (pb); 0-253-33443-8 (hb) xviii + 174 pp.

Looking closely at Adam Smith’s account of the spectator perspective – along with the compatible spectator accounts in Hutcheson and Hume – is especiallyhelpful to understanding one of the main themes of the Scottish Enlightenment. The Scots in response to Hobbesian egoism described a morality that does not need to overcome a human nature that pits individuals against each other. Rather each of the three Scots describes the empirical formation of our humanity and our moral sentiments in the context of (...) relating to and observing others. The three spectator accounts of Smith, Hutcheson, and Hume clearly describe this involvement of others in the formation of morality. Adam Smith explicitly gives an accounting of the importance and, in fact, necessity of others in the formulating of not only our moral evaluations but also the very possibility of understanding one’s humanity and having an idea of morality at all. In this paper, I explain Smith’s account specifically along with its similarity to Hutcheson’s and Hume’s and argue that these empiricists ground moral sentiments in person to person relationships. For the three Scots, being human and developing a morality is begun in interactions with others. We formulate who it is we are and can be and determine acceptable ways to interact in the company of others. (shrink)