In this article I demonstrate how Hannah Arendt both appropriates and transforms Aristotle’s view of political friendship. I argue that the brief discussion of Aristotelian political friendship in The Human Condition relies on an earlier de-materialization of Aristotle’s work on friendship. This de-materialization of Aristotle’s view of friendship allows Arendt to discuss Aristotelian friendship as a kind of ‘respect’, where ‘respect’ is a philosophical notion unavailable to Aristotle. Ultimately, for Arendt, the experience of friendship opens up a space for human (...) beings to begin to practice a distinct way of seeing one another – a ‘respect’ – that can in turn be practiced in public, making the experience of friendship an important precursor to action. (shrink)

Through a reading of Kant’s essay, “An Old Question Raised Again: Is the Human Race Constantly Progressing?”, I argue that Kant’s political philosophy fails to adequately engage with the political event in itself, and that Kant’s so-called political writings only provide a theory of the social sphere. First, I present the Kantian political subject as an antinomy between the metaphysically grounded spectator and the physically situated actor. Second, I show that Kant tries to solve the antinomy between the actor and (...) the spectator by attributing primacy to the judgement of the spectator. Third, I show that this move fails because it removes from political judgment what ultimately defines the political, i.e. plurality, spontaneity, and action. I conclude that rather than a theory of the sphere of political life, what Kant achieves is the thinking out of a theory of society (Gesellschaft). (shrink)

Commentators often note that there are contradictions, or at least inconsistencies, in Arendt’s work. On the one hand, Arendt is accused of theoretical inconsistencies, insofar as she makes claims in her later work that seem incompatible with claims she made earlier. On the other hand, Arendt has been accused of contradicting herself morally, with some commentators claiming that Arendt should not have written Eichmann in Jerusalem the way she wrote it. Both views place the treatment of the 1961 Eichmann trial (...) at the center of Arendt’s thought, and cast it as representing a radical shift from Arendt’s earlier work. This article shows that both views fail to acknowledge the importance of what I call the “archetype of non-contradiction” in Arendt’s work. I argue that, viewed in perspective, her treatment of the Eichmann trial is simply another instance of Arendt attempting to follow the archetype of non-contradiction, practicing tentative and fluid thinking, and maintaining her friendship with herself. (shrink)