Civil Society

The relations between the majority and minorities in a democracy have been standardly viewed as the main subject matter of toleration: the majority should refrain from using its dominant position to interfere with some minorities’ practices or beliefs despite its dislike or disapproval of such practices or beliefs. Can the idea of toleration provide us with the necessary resources to understand and respond to the problems arising out of majority/minorities relations in a democracy? We reply in the negative and make (...) two main claims: first, that resorting to toleration is not enough to make sense of the problems deriving from the unequal participation of minorities in society, and, second, that it risks sanctioning the asymmetric relation between the majority and minorities informed by the negative judgement of the former towards some belief or practice of the latter. We suggest resorting instead to the idea of equal opacity respect for persons: all persons should be treated equally as moral agents, in accordance with their equally possessing the capacity for self-legislation, and as if they were opaque to our judgement for all those properties of theirs which exceed moral agency. Looking at the majority/minorities relations through such a lens enables us to understand (and appropriately respond to) what is problematic in such relations: the majority often fails to treat minorities as moral agents by failing to take their voices into account on an equal footing, by seeing them merely as recipients of certain provisions affecting them rather than their authors, and by considering them as legitimately exposed to the majority’s (negative) judgment. The purchase of our argument is illustrated by reference to two minorities whose treatment is paradigmatic of the problematic nature of majority/minorities relations across Europe: Muslims and Roma. (shrink)

In this article, I claim that at least some young people have the requisite capacity for political participation, and that the exclusion of these young people is in breach of the reasonable expectation that all capable citizens are included in democratic processes. I suggest implementing a capacity test for those under the current age of majority. I outline a system of capacity testing for the youth, distinguish this proposal from prior attempts to justify capacity testing and argue that a suitably (...) constrained capacity testing regime is not simply defensible, but superior to the current system, which arbitrarily excludes some capable members of society from participation. Finally, I explain why only this limited capacity testing regime is acceptable. (shrink)

Polarization often happens asymmetrically. One political actor radicalizes, and the results reverberate through the political system. This is how the deep divisions in contemporary American politics arose: the Republican Party radicalized. Republican officeholders began to use extreme legislative tactics. Republican voters became animated by contempt for their political rivals and by the defense of their own social superiority. The party as a whole launched a wide-ranging campaign of voter suppression and its members endorsed violence in the face of electoral defeat. (...) This paper is about how such asymmetric polarization affects everyone else’s obligations. My core claim is that two kinds of relationship – civic friendship and non-subordination – underpin critical democratic norms. Republican misbehavior has severed cross-partisan civic friendships. Their authoritarianism forfeits their claim to non-subordination. The former means that non-Republicans need not justify policy on public grounds. The latter undercuts Republicans’ claim to enjoy minority vetoes when out of power and it gives their rivals reason to disobey the laws that Republicans make when they are in power. More generally, when one political actor contravenes the proper norms of democratic politics, their opposition is not bound by those norms. (shrink)

In the postmodern era, European political philosophy has introduced several concepts. These concepts have ideologically prepared Western countries for decentralization reform. Being still “in process”, reflection on the proper structure of postmodern society is marked by ambiguous and often contradictory ideas. The very view on the state as a de-hierarchical, rhizomorphic and horizontal phenomenon presupposes numerous ways of reforming it. Throughout their histories, European countries have shifted from confrontations, hostilities and rivalries towards new mechanisms of fruitful relationships between civil society (...) and state institutions. Nowadays, many aspects are influencing the elaboration and implementation of strategies on civil society development in different countries. These aspects include the following: different starting conditions; the presence or absence of basic principles of public space development; the possibility of fulfilling civic practices’ potential; the level of political participation. West European countries have managed to create a viable structure to support the development of civil society, as well as maintain a stable dialogue between it and the state. However, the process is still on: effective practices of interaction between them are being developed; conditions for more effective cooperation are being improved; new financial instruments are being created and implemented. All Central and East European countries have a common understanding of civil society as one of the most important actors in developing cooperation with the government. At the same time, they should be able to solve existing essential problems, such as low awareness about global development problems and the population’s unreadiness to meet the immediate objectives of civil society development. (shrink)

It is frequently argued that to address structural injustice, individuals should participate in collective actions organized by civil society organizations (CSOs), but the role and the normative status of CSOs are rarely discussed. In this paper, we argue that CSOs semi-perfect our shared obligation to address structural injustice by defining shared goals as well as taking actions to further them. This assigns a special moral status to CSOs, which in turn gives rise to our duty to support them. Thus, we (...) do not have full discretion when deciding whether to join collective actions or not. Under certain conditions, we can even be forced by others to do our share. (shrink)

The Covid-19 pandemic has affected not only health systems worldwide, but also global civil society, it has posed a global threat to humanity with significant implications and indicated weak points of postmodern civil society such as the lack of global solidarity and global cooperation, the lack of global health equity, the increase in poverty, social insecurity and deep inequality, the lack of support for the liberal international order, the lack of coordination mechanism for responding to the pandemic. Three main crises (...) of postmodern society are identified and analysed: relations of cooperation between nations and states, protests in different countries, the inadequacy of scientific and technological achievements of civilization. The analysis of these crises led to the conclusion that, along with the negative impact of the Covid-19 pandemic for humanity, it should be seen as a crucial moment for human civilization that identified gaps and directions for the development of global civil society. The transformation of society today must take place in terms of rethinking the consequences and results of globalization, and taking into account the processes of socio-political and socio-cultural transformation. Today, humanity needs to transform global society by reconsidering the role of WHO as a leading intergovernmental organization in the global health system, strengthening the role of global governance, creating a new paradigm of global health, developing global cooperation, solidarity and coordination towards global health equity. (shrink)

The Catholic Church never officially endorses political candidates but rather respects the freedom of its faithful to vote according to the dictates of their conscience. However, in the last presidential elections, some Catholic bishops and priests in the Philippines publicly and openly supported the presidential candidacy of Vice President Leni Robredo while urging the rest of the faithful to do the same. These bishops and priests anchored their position on their shared belief that voting for Robredo was the only rightful (...) and moral option because of her clean track record, non-involvement in any act of corruption, and principled approach in governance. In contrast, her political archnemesis Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos, Jr. had long been embroiled in several allegations of corruption, non-payment of taxes, and fakery of educational attainments. Hence, for these bishops and priests, voting for Marcos Jr. was both wrong and immoral. And yet, the election results hit them with a big “slap in the face,” as more than 31 million Filipinos (majority of whom are Catholics) cast their votes for Marcos Jr., while only 15 million voted for Robredo. This outcome, no doubt, raises the question: Why did the repeated calls of these bishops and priests go unheeded? In this paper, I will attempt to answer this question by subjecting the political moralism of these Catholic leaders to some objective postmodern evaluation. To do this, I will employ the postmodern thoughts of Nietzsche, Lyotard, and Rorty as a lens to examine why many Filipino Catholics today no longer buy the political moralism of their religious leaders. (shrink)

In this chapter I articulate philosophical and pedagogical motivations for introducing Ethics Bowl to adults, followed by practical strategies for implementation. Ethics Bowl is an opportunity for individuals to engage in ethical reflection for themselves, and to thereby have greater ownership over their habits, beliefs, values, and life projects. As a deliberative pedagogy, it is also an opportunity for individuals to cultivate democratic skills and dispositions that will in turn permeate the civic sphere, the workplace, and other domains of shared (...) life. Ethics Bowl remains one of the most impactful forms of public philosophy in our engagement toolkit. It fosters mutual respect and a spirit of cooperation in the face of ethical and political disagreement, and bridges our many divisions—age included. (shrink)

Philosophy for Children (P4C) practice and its distinctive method of cultivating communities of philosophical inquiry model two main functions of democratic civil society. Civil society makes explicit the implicit agreement of communal membership and common belonging and mediates the diverse interests and values of community members. An essential principle of civil society that underlies these two functions is that its members possess intrinsic and political equality, fostering a unique space for civic engagement and democratic will-formation. P4C programs enact these functions (...) of civil society: as children encounter philosophical questions, speak their minds, listen to one another, disagree, and puzzle out the reasons for their disagreements, the main aim is that they engage in collaborative inquiry. I argue that free and open-access P4C programs at public libraries are microcosms of civil society in the serendipitous accidental coming together of strangers. These programs enact civil society insofar as they motivate and exercise civic virtues of collaboration and critical reflection by practicing community of inquiry through self-correcting dialogue. (shrink)

With the events in Hong Kong in 2019 to 2020, it is clear that the “one-country-two-system” is no longer working as it should. Under the sovereignty of the largest remaining totalitarian state, this chapter will first argue that, apart from the undermining of freedom, rule of law and basic human right, the biggest danger of totalitarianism to Hong Kong is the jeopardizing or even destruction of the mutual trust in the civil society. It then moves on to show that totalitarianism, (...) communism in particular, is a form of nihilism in the Nietzschean sense that “the highest value devalues itself, the question ‘why?’ finds no answer”, and will go through texts from Karl Marx and Sergey Nechaev to Hannah Arendt to illustrate this point. It will then analyse how this process of destruction is happening in Hong Kong in the form of what we may call, in Harvel’s term, “post-totalitarianism”. Finally, using Hegel’s theory, it will argue that the civil society can act as a bulwark against totalitarian state by championing arete as the common good. (shrink)

The word “populism” commonly elicits images of hordes of angry townspeople with pitchforks and torches. That is the classic picture of “the mob,” bolstered by countless movie and television productions, and it is clearly based on such historical events as the English civil wars, the sans-culottes’ terror, the Bolshevik revolution, and the recent genocides in Rwanda and Burundi. Many of the leaders involved in fostering such horrors are seen as radical democrats whose successors today should also be feared. In this (...) paper, I argue that any mob takeovers of the feared sort are actually antithetical to radical democracy. This is because an authentically democratic regime, even of the most extreme type, is necessarily inconsistent with “mobocracy” or any sort of “tyranny of the majority” given its essential procedural aspects. It is argued, in fact, that leaders of legitimately democratic movements have generally been quite vapid because of the fallibilistic, plebiscitary proceduralism inherent in any authentic attempt to require government policy to reflect the “general will.” And this vapidity is argued to inhere regardless of the extent of rhetorical powers of the advocate or advocacy. (shrink)

The modern world space, which is affected by the post-pandemic consequences, is noted by the globalization of society, the increasing role of citizenship in making important state and international decisions has become possible in the context of the information revolution and has its own characteristics of communication in information and communication networks. The importance and need for a thorough study of the chosen topic is that the widespread use of various forms and methods of civil communication, free access of citizens (...) to information at all stages of decision-making and the functioning of central and local governments, the participation of civil society institutions in the work of expert, consultative, and advisory public councils on the expression and protection of the rights and freedoms of citizens, public control, direct electronic receipt of public services, etc. are important factors in the democratization of government in post-pandemic modern times. After all, we are talking about a deliberate orientation to new values - the person and the collective, their direct participation in the democratic organization of life of the state and society. The main thing in this context is that the rational consensus of civil society and the state is a factor in universal social discourse and a strategic resource for democratic development in the context of post-pandemic modernity. The aim of the article is to consider the epistemological and sociocultural aspects of the functioning of the communication capabilities of civil society institutions in the context of revealing the possibility and significance of their involvement in the processes of implementing state security policy. (shrink)

Calls for civility have been on the rise recently, as have presumptions that civility is both an academic virtue and a prerequisite for rational engagement and discussion among those who disagree. One imperative of epistemic decolonization is to unmask the ways that familiar conceptual resources are produced within and function to uphold a settler colonial epistemological framework. I argue that rhetorical deployments of ‘civility’ uphold settler colonialism by obscuring the systematic production of state violence against marginalized populations and Indigenous peoples, (...) relying on the colonial conceptual framework of ‘civilized’ vs ‘savage’, and excusing death-promoting rhetoric under the guise of liberal disagreement. (shrink)

Through a reading of Kant’s essay, “An Old Question Raised Again: Is the Human Race Constantly Progressing?”, I argue that Kant’s political philosophy fails to adequately engage with the political event in itself, and that Kant’s so-called political writings only provide a theory of the social sphere. First, I present the Kantian political subject as an antinomy between the metaphysically grounded spectator and the physically situated actor. Second, I show that Kant tries to solve the antinomy between the actor and (...) the spectator by attributing primacy to the judgement of the spectator. Third, I show that this move fails because it removes from political judgment what ultimately defines the political, i.e. plurality, spontaneity, and action. I conclude that rather than a theory of the sphere of political life, what Kant achieves is the thinking out of a theory of society (Gesellschaft). (shrink)

Although successive generations of digital technology have become increasingly powerful in the past 20 years, digital democracy has yet to realize its potential for deliberative transformation. The undemocratic exploitation of massive social media systems continued this trend, but it only worsened an existing problem of modern democracies, which were already struggling to develop deliberative infrastructure independent of digital technologies. There have been many creative conceptions of civic tech, but implementation has lagged behind innovation. This article argues for implementing one such (...) vision of digital democracy through the establishment of a public corporation. Modeled on the Corporation for Public Broadcasting in the United States, this entity would foster the creation of new digital technology by providing a stable source of funding to nonprofit technologists, interest groups, civic organizations, government, researchers, private companies, and the public. Funded entities would produce and maintain software infrastructure for public benefit. The concluding sections identify what circumstances might create and sustain such an entity. (shrink)

Fukuyama's 'The End of History' has referred to Kojeve's 'homogenous state' as some sort of conceptual container for the evolving idea of liberal democracy. This paper critically re-assess the homogeneity of state as final stage of liberal idea and defends civil society in terms of democratic governance. It also invites to discuss the role of scholars as public intellectuals and repels the ideological abuse of the scientific method.

In this contribution, I investigate Hegel’s idea that ethical life is to be understood in terms of a “second nature”. For spirit to actualize itself as second nature does not mean for it to somehow regain the immediacy and simplicity of nature, but to find itself in a nature it has yet to exceed, and to produce a nature of a different sort. While this general characterization pertains to all three spheres of ethical life – the family, civil society, and (...) the state –, it is the “second nature” of civil society which brings out the radically modern character of Hegel’s conception most clearly: it is post-Kantian, not neo-Aristotelian. In order to bring this into view, the first section reconstructs the way in which Kant characterizes cultivation and civilization as the production of a second nature which is necessary to prepare us for, but not yet sufficient for a free and moral appropriation of our natural capacities. In the second section, I delineate how Hegel develops Kant’s conception of culture and civil society further. On Hegel’s account, civil society is not the last stage of our natural development, but a strategic regression of ethical life in its attempt to deepen the appropriation of our nature. Civil society presents itself as a spiritual animal kingdom in which ethical life realizes itself in the state of its own dissolution. In the third and final section, I suggest that to supersede the limitations and to develop the liberating potential of this type of second nature we can’t take recourse to moralization, as Kant had suggested, but are in need of a politics of second nature. (shrink)

The standard view of academic freedom and free speech is that they play complementary roles in universities. Academic freedom protects academic discourse, while other public discourse in universities is protected by free speech. Here I challenge this view, broadly, on the grounds that free speech in universities sometimes undermines academic practices. One defense of the standard view, in the face of this worry, says that campus free speech actually furthers the university’s academic aims. Another says that universities have a secondary (...) democratic function, which cannot be fulfilled without free speech on campus. I identify shortcomings in both types of arguments. (shrink)

A link between populism and social media is often suspected. This paper spells out a set of possible mechanisms underpinning this link: that social media changes the communication structure of the public sphere, making it harder for citizens to obtain evidence that refutes populist assumptions. By developing a model of the public sphere, four core functions of the public sphere are identified: exposing citizens to diverse information, promoting equality of deliberative opportunity, creating deliberative transparency, and producing common knowledge. A wellworking (...) public sphere allows citizens to learn that there are genuine disagreements among citizens that are held in good faith. Social media makes it harder to gain this insight, opening the door for populist ideology. (shrink)

This chapter is a call to philosophers to philosophize for their cities and not merely in them. As business-model approaches to higher education increasingly dominate, the place for philosophy within the Academy is likely to continue shrinking. It is the argument of this chapter that demonstrating the importance of philosophy demands a that we shift our focus from the problems and concerns of our colleagues to those of our neighbors. The chapter concludes with some examples of what a more urban-oriented (...) philosophy might involve. (shrink)

L’idéal démocratique est accusé d’être irréaliste. Le gouvernement du peuple par le peuple et pour le peuple serait une chimère dans les sociétés contemporaines. Il faudrait lui préférer les visées plus modestes associées à l’élection : un droit de vote égal et la satisfaction du plus grand nombre. La démocratie ne se laisse pourtant pas réduire à la compétition électorale. Les acteurs et les institutions politiques qui s’en réclament invoquent non seulement un marché, où rivalisent des intérêts privés, mais un (...) forum, où s’affrontent des visions adverses de la justice. Ils attendent de la délibération collective qu’elle serve l’autonomie politique et le bien commun, mais savent aussi qu’elle peut les menacer, lorsque la liberté, l’égalité ou la publicité lui font défaut. Cette enquête philosophique interroge la pertinence de l’idéal démocratique pour des sociétés complexes, dotées d’institutions représentatives et soumises à la communication de masse. Elle montre à quelles conditions cet idéal peut aujourd’hui orienter la critique et l’action. Les citoyens peuvent encore aspirer à se gouverner eux-mêmes, donc à délibérer en égaux. -/- The democratic ideal is accused of being unrealistic. Government of the people by the people and for the people would be a chimera in contemporary societies. The more modest aims associated with election should be preferred: equal suffrage and the satisfaction of the greatest number. But democracy cannot be reduced to electoral competition. The political actors and institutions that claim it invoke not only a market, where private interests compete, but also a forum, where opposing visions of justice confront each other. They expect collective deliberation to serve political autonomy and the common good, but they also know that it can threaten them when it lacks freedom, equality or publicity. This philosophical inquiry questions the relevance of the democratic ideal for complex societies with representative institutions and subject to mass communication. It shows under what conditions a deliberative understanding of this ideal can today orient criticism and action. Citizens can still aspire to govern themselves, hence to deliberate as equals. (shrink)

This introduction presents the articles contained in this special issue of Philosophy and Social Criticism on the topic of populism. It does so by placing them in the field of discussions that the standard conception of populism as ‘illliberal democracy’ has stimulated in many areas of the populism-research that was produced in response to the recent increase in populist governments in established constitutional democracies world-wide. Following the methodological canon of studies in the field, it presents the individual contributions roughly in (...) three segments according to leading questions they focus on. In each segment, the introduction attempts to indicate the degree to which the articles depart and provide reasons for departing from the initial standard conception and thereby point to new relevant directions for further work. The first segment consists of essays that take on the definitional and empirical question of what and where populism is, and which varieties of it there are. The second segment presents new work focusing on the diagnostic question of what conditions and institutional conditions enable contemporary populism in established liberal constitutional representative democracies. They thus also aim at explaining or at least providing insight into the structures on the supply side that make populism popular as an `outsider option'. The third and largest segment comprises essays that present various approaches to answering the therapeutic question what democratic political systems and societies can do to confront, absorb or internalize the lessons from populist challenges. (shrink)

This essay presents a novel approach to specifying the meaning of the concept of populism, on the political position it occupies and on the nature of populism. Employing analytic techniques of concept clarification and recent analytic ideology critique, it develops populism as a political kind in three steps. First, it descriptively specifies the stereotype of populist platforms as identified in extant research and thereby delimits the peculiar political position populism occupies in representative democracies as neither inclusionary nor fascist. Second, it (...) specifies on this basis analytically–normatively the particular stance towards liberal representative democracy (in particular towards popular sovereignty and democratic legitimacy) that unifies populism’s political position and explains how populist politics can be compelling for democratic citizens. The normative core (populist ideology) turns out to require no more than two general principles of legitimizing political authority by elections. Surprisingly, it does not need a separate anti-pluralist or exclusionary commitment: it entails it. Third, this normative model allows a response to a contested question in the theoretical discussion, namely, whether populism (properly specified) can be democracy-enhancing. The article defends the negative answer in virtue of the normative core alone and does so as much vis-à-vis a minimal (purely electoral) as vis-à-vis a normatively ambitious (liberal) conception of democracy. The reconstruction of the normative core of populist ideology enables a novel argument to show that populism is incompatible with the continued democratic legitimation of political authority even in the normatively most austere conception of ‘electoral democracy’, not just with ‘liberal democracy’. Assuming a normatively more ambitious concept of democratic legitimation in terms of political autonomy, the model also produces an extremely direct argument showing that populists cannot fulfil their promise of ‘taking back control’ over political decision-making to the population. (shrink)

The paper advances a new comprehensive complex approach to the investigation of the civilizational aspects in the development of regional associations of countries. The research starts with the overview of historical dimensions of the civilizational approach and the contribution of the founding scholars to its development. It continues with the analysis of the scientific and methodological input of the followers and the critics of this approach. The authors suggest their theoretical approach to the identification of the modern local civilizations according (...) to six parameters: natural, biological, technical, economic, social, and governing. The civilizational affiliation of countries and the civilizational structure of major 17 regional associations of countries are identified. The results demonstrate that some regional groups have been more homogeneous in terms of civilizational composition, others – less homogeneous, which does not interfere with their dynamic development. However, the logic of the historical dynamics of human development indicates the inevitability of changing the current situation through prolonged civilizational conflicts resulting in significant changes in the global social dynamics and the civilizational structure of the world and of regional associations of countries. The identification of the civilization structure of countries and regional associations contributes to the rational decision-making in the areas of international economic relations and to the formation of the integration/disintegration policies on the national and regional levels. It is predicted that from 2030 global social dynamics will undergo a fundamental breakthrough that will radically change the civilizational structure of the world and regional unions of countries. Methods. The research is based on the application of the systemic and historical approach, combined with the methods of analysis, synthesis, analogy, abstraction, generalization and method of individual expert assessment. Novelty of the research. The authors have identified the civilizational structure of countries using statistically available criteria for the six groups of factors, which allows to determine the homogeneity level of the major regional groups of countries. Practical significance. Identification of civilization structure of countries and regional associations creates the opportunity for adjusting national and subregional integration and disintegration policies. The aim of the study is to determine the civilizational structure of the regional associations of countries. To achieve this goal the following tasks are set and solved: –to analyze and optimize the existing approaches to the identification of local civilizations; –to identify the current state of the countries’ belonging to this or that civilization, their civilizational structure; –to reveal the civilizational structure of the major regional blocs. (shrink)

미국과 세계는 지난 세기 동안 과도 한 인구 증가에서 붕괴의 과정에, 그리고 지금 그것의 모든, 3 세계 사람들 로 인해. 자원 의 소비와 30 억 더 ca. 2100의 추가는 산업 문명을 붕괴하고 엄청난 규모의 기아, 질병, 폭력과 전쟁을 초래할 것입니다. 지구는 매년 표토의 적어도 1 %를 잃고, 그래서 그것은 2100 에 가까워지면, 그것의 음식 성장 능력의 대부분은 사라질 것입니다. 수십억 달러가 죽을 것이고 핵전쟁은 확실합니다. 미국에서, 이것은 거 대 한 이민 및 이민자 재생산에 의해 크게 가속화 되 고, 민주주의에 의해 (...) 가능 하 게 학대와 함께. 타락한 인간의 본성은 민주주의와 다양성의 꿈을 범죄와 빈곤의 악몽으로 바꾸어 놓습니다. 중국은 이기심을 제한하는 독재를 유지하는 한 미국과 세계를 계속 압도할 것입니다. 붕괴의 근본 원인은 우리의 타고난 심리학이 현대 세계에 적응할 수 없다는 것입니다. 인권의 개념은 제3세계 모성에 의한 무자비한 파괴로부터 주의를 끌기 위해 좌파들이 추진하는 사악한 환상이다. 이것은 기본적인 생물학과 심리학에 대한 무지와 더불어 민주사회를 통제하는 부분적으로 교육받은 사람들의 사회 공학적 망상으로 이어집니다. 당신이 한 사람을 도와주면 다른 사람에게 해를 끼칠 수 있다는 것을 이해하는 사람은 거의 없습니다- 무료 점심식사가 없고, 사람이 소비하는 모든 물건은 수리를 넘어 지구를 파괴합니다. 따라서 모든 곳의 사회 정책은 지속 가능하지 않으며 이기심에 대한 엄격한 통제없이 모든 사회가 무정부 상태 또는 독재로 붕괴될 것입니다. 거의 언급되지 않은 가장 기본적인 사실은 미국이나 세계에 빈곤층의 상당 부분을 들어 올리고 거기에 보관할 자원이 충분하지 않다는 것입니다. 이 것을 시도하는 것은 미국을 파산시키고 세계를 파괴하는 것입니다. 우리의 유전적 품질과 마찬가지로 지구의 식량 생산 능력은 매일 감소합니다. 그리고 지금, 언제나처럼, 지금까지 가난한 자의 가장 큰 적은 다른 가난한 부자가 아닙니다. 극적이고 즉각적인 변화가 없다면 미국이나 민주주의 체제를 따르는 어떤 나라도 막을 희망이 없다. (shrink)

Standard accounts of civil disobedience include nonviolence as a necessary condition. Here I argue that such accounts are mistaken and that civil disobedience can include violence in many aspects, primarily excepting violence directed at other persons. I base this argument on a novel understanding of civil disobedience: the special character of the practice comes from its combination of condemnation of a political practice with an expressed commitment to the political. The commitment to the political is a commitment to engaging with (...) others as co-members in the on-going political project of living together. I show how such an understanding of civil disobedience is superior to the Rawlsian strain of thought, which focuses on fidelity to law. Rawls was concerned with civil disobedience solely in the context of overriding political obligation. The project of characterizing a contestatory political practice that can be distinguished and used in a wider variety of contexts than Rawls is concerned with, including under illegitimate regimes, beyond the nation-state, or on behalf of anarchism, requires a different understanding of civil disobedience. (shrink)

This paper criticizes the separation between public-political versus private and unpolitical performed by liberal political theories, which constructs a very unclear and depoliticized sphere, subjects, values and practices that cannot be accessed neither by political-juridical institutions nor by social movements, citizen initiatives and political-cultural minorities, undermining a direct, participative and inclusive democratic political praxis as the basis of social criticism, cultural resistance and political emancipation by the very emphasis on the unpoliticity and privatization of civil society, its subjects, practices, values (...) and clashes; the political fundamentalism of institutionalized and universalist religions, which imposes the unpolitical private on the social, political, cultural and institutional sphere, from the delegitimation, silencing and marginalization of the differences, of the political praxis as a social struggle between opposed and different voices. We will propose that the possible way and strategy for a critical social theory and an emancipatory and inclusive democratic political praxis in face of this consolidated depoliticization of the praxis, civil society and institutions is to deconstruct such a separation between public-political and private by the politicization of civil society, its subjects, struggles, values and practices, which means that the foundation and application of a political theory into the social depends on the affirmation of the centrality of civil society’s political subjects and social clashes. Here, the praxis as politicity, carnality and permanent-pungent struggle and, as a consequence, the centrality of nowadays social-political subjects become the core of the theoretical-practical grounding and in terms of its link with the social sphere, subjects and clashes. (shrink)

This book explores Hobbes's ideas about the internal pacification of states, the prospect of a peaceful international order, and the connections between civil and international peace. It questions the notion of a negative Hobbesian peace, which is based on the mere suppression of violence, and emphasises his positive vision of everlasting peace in a well-governed commonwealth. The book also highlights Hobbes's ideas about international coexistence and cooperation, which he considers integral to good government. In examining Hobbes's conception of peace, it (...) provides a fresh perspective on his international political thought. The findings also have wider implications for the ways in which we think about Hobbes's relationship to the realist and liberal traditions of international thought, and will appeal to students and scholars of political theory and international relations. (shrink)

From Cairo to Occupy Wall Street, from Istanbul Gezi Park to DANS protests in Sofia, in recent public sphere movements we have witnessed the emergence of a new wave of creative protest. The surge of creative forms of political action brings to the fore the question of democratic potential of creative political protest. This paper explores in what ways creative protest could deepen democracy. I argue that creative political protest nurtures democracy by generating a peaceful culture of resistance and by (...) providing a peaceful way of responding to politics of intolerance and polarization. (shrink)