Civil Society

The relations between the majority and minorities in a democracy have been standardly viewed as the main subject matter of toleration: the majority should refrain from using its dominant position to interfere with some minorities’ practices or beliefs despite its dislike or disapproval of such practices or beliefs. Can the idea of toleration provide us with the necessary resources to understand and respond to the problems arising out of majority/minorities relations in a democracy? We reply in the negative and make (...) two main claims: first, that resorting to toleration is not enough to make sense of the problems deriving from the unequal participation of minorities in society, and, second, that it risks sanctioning the asymmetric relation between the majority and minorities informed by the negative judgement of the former towards some belief or practice of the latter. We suggest resorting instead to the idea of equal opacity respect for persons: all persons should be treated equally as moral agents, in accordance with their equally possessing the capacity for self-legislation, and as if they were opaque to our judgement for all those properties of theirs which exceed moral agency. Looking at the majority/minorities relations through such a lens enables us to understand (and appropriately respond to) what is problematic in such relations: the majority often fails to treat minorities as moral agents by failing to take their voices into account on an equal footing, by seeing them merely as recipients of certain provisions affecting them rather than their authors, and by considering them as legitimately exposed to the majority’s (negative) judgment. The purchase of our argument is illustrated by reference to two minorities whose treatment is paradigmatic of the problematic nature of majority/minorities relations across Europe: Muslims and Roma. (shrink)

In this article, I claim that at least some young people have the requisite capacity for political participation, and that the exclusion of these young people is in breach of the reasonable expectation that all capable citizens are included in democratic processes. I suggest implementing a capacity test for those under the current age of majority. I outline a system of capacity testing for the youth, distinguish this proposal from prior attempts to justify capacity testing and argue that a suitably (...) constrained capacity testing regime is not simply defensible, but superior to the current system, which arbitrarily excludes some capable members of society from participation. Finally, I explain why only this limited capacity testing regime is acceptable. (shrink)

In this first installment of a three-part series, I focus on the critique of civility. In so doing, I do not defend incivility. In fact, part of my critique of civility extends equally to incivility. My position is that we must move our normative discourse beyond both the thesis of civility and the antithesis of incivility to a synthesis that reframes the discussion in terms of nonviolence.

In parts one and two of this three-part series, I developed a framework for ahimsic (nonviolent) communication (AC) as an alternative to the standard communicative norm of civility. The framework presented for AC offers various categories of resistance to violence, including nonviolent forms of negotiation, compromise, protest, verbal force, verbal distraction, argumentation, and communicative satyagraha (Gandhian nonviolence applied to communication). I also provided a range of real-life examples of successful AC resistance, including the stories of Derek Black, Daryl Davis, James (...) Lawson, and Antoinette Tuff. These examples demonstrate that AC “works” even against neo-Nazis, KKK grand wizards, angry punch-throwing bikers, and active school shooters. In this third and final installment, I will explain why AC works—better than any form of violent communication (VC). My main claim is that AC derives strategic power from its moral power. As various components of my argument are drawn from the nonviolence tradition more generally, what follows will double as a primer on the morality of nonviolence. However, we will also see significant differences in how we must adapt nonviolent strategy and morality to the case of communication. (shrink)

When it comes to contentious conversations, the call for civility is commonplace. Rarely do we hear a call for nonviolence in communication. This is unfortunate, since nonviolence is a better standard than civility (a standard I critiqued in part one of this three-part series). Part of the problem is that a framework for communicative nonviolence has not (to my knowledge) been fully developed. Mohandas (“Mahatma”) Gandhi, the “father of nonviolence,” is widely known for nonviolence, but primarily in the realm of (...) noncommunicative action. However, there is a natural line of development in that direction from elements in his thought: Gandhi derives his commitment to nonviolence ("ahimsa" in Sanskrit) from his "law of Truth," which directs us to follow “Truth in thought, Truth in speech, and Truth in action." Inspired by Gandhi among others, Marshall B. Rosenberg developed what he termed "Nonviolent Communication" (NVC). Valuable though NVC is, it is most applicable to particular conversational contexts. It is but one part of a broader nonviolent framework, which I’ll call "ahimsic communication" (AC) to distinguish it from NVC. In this second installment of the series, I develop a framework for AC. (shrink)

The current section of issues 12/2021-13/2022 of History of Communism in Europe deals with East-East and East-South relations among socialist countries and countries of the Global South. Exploring local specificities and global ambitions, the papers bring to light the beginnings of the socialist developmental projects, and bilateral relations that overcome the strict framework of the monolithic socialist bloc.

Andrew Arato and Jean Cohen's Populism and Civil Society: The Challenge to Democratic Constitutionalism is probably the most important contribution to the academic debate on populism in recent years. I will discuss two of the book's core contribution to the delete: (un-)civil society and constitutionalism.

Realist thinkers in political philosophy often criticize ideal theorists for neglecting or eliminating the fact of politics in their work. This is supposed to be problematic because we should never expect to overcome politics. Any theory that attempts to do so is said to be unrealistic, naïve, and impractical. Although much has been said in the dispute between realists and ideal theorists in recent years, this particular line of criticism, which should be distinguished from other criticisms of ideal theory, has (...) not been clearly or explicitly addressed by ideal theorists in the literature. I deal with this issue by examining the ideal theory of John Rawls, which has been a prominent target of realist criticisms. My aim is to see where politics exists, or might exist, in Rawls’s theory, and whether this politics satisfactorily answers to the various aspects of the realist’s critique. My analysis suggests that there may be no inherent or necessary conflict between ideal theory and real politics, after all. (shrink)

Over the past 70 years, the United States has undergone major moral shifts surrounding gender, sexual orientation, and race. These changes have been highly problematic and incomplete. But they appear as stunning improvements–progress–in the human condition nonetheless. Democracy plausibly has something to do with this. On its face, democratic governance embodies the promise of protest, voice, foment, and therefore social change. And yet, as a new crop of skeptics has pointed out, democratic citizens tend to be ignorant, irrational, and easily (...) manipulated. Such anxieties have only grown with the recent surge of populism. From the standpoint of democratic theory, these observations present a critical challenge. What exactly is the role of democracy in social progress? What can this teach us about democracy’s definitive principles and ideals? And how can we reconcile democracy’s characteristic aspirations with the disappointing facts of real-world politics? -/- This book offers a sustained answer to these questions, presenting a fresh philosophical account of social progress that focuses on democracy, and delivering an innovative rebuttal to skeptics inspired by the recent populist wave. Following in the tradition of John Dewey, the book argues that democracy enables progress through “experiments in living”: trying out new moral ideas and learning from the experience of acting on them. Drawing on research in social psychology and several detailed historical case studies–same-sex marriage, women’s integration into the workforce, and school desegregation–it illuminates the critical role of novel experience in building community: linkages of emotion and identity across a democratic public. And it shows how these linkages enable diverse citizens to flourish together. Technocratic skeptics suggest that the problems with democracy derive from citizens’ ignorance and incompetence. But, as the book argues, the remedy for democracy’s contemporary malaise must target failures of community more than failures of knowledge or skill. And that requires a new round of experimental innovations in social life. -/- . (shrink)

The article examines potential scenarios of how cyborg technologies might influence social relations and the structure of future society. The authors forecast several scenarios for social development in the context of cyborgization - the mass implementation of technological modifications to human physicality and cognitive systems. They analyze possible ways new social hierarchies might emerge in the context of human technological enhancement. The work pays special attention to the problem of social fragmentation and potential conflicts resulting from uneven distribution of technologies. (...) Addressing "future shock" - the possible social reaction to radical technological transformations - the authors propose developing ethical principles and technological empathy as strategic directions for helping society adapt to new conditions and maintain consensus in the future. (shrink)

In this commentary published, I explore the difficult but urgent question: has civil society in Bangladesh failed to uphold its responsibility as a check on government power? Over the years, civil society’s silence has allowed concerning issues like electoral manipulation, human rights abuses, and corruption to go unchecked. From the forced resignation of Chief Justice Sinha to the tragic murder of Abrar Fahad, the lack of strong, collective action has left many crucial injustices unchallenged. Civil society has a fundamental duty (...) to defend democratic principles, demand transparency, and hold power accountable. But too often, our intellectuals, academics, journalists, and human rights defenders avoided direct engagement, especially during moments that called for bold stances. This silence has enabled a climate of impunity and fear that damages the very foundations of democracy. I argue that civil society owes an apology for its inaction—this isn’t merely symbolic. Admitting these past failures is the first step toward rebuilding trust and credibility. Civil society must recommit to its role as the people's voice and stand firmly against abuses of power while protecting the rights and freedoms that all Bangladeshis deserve. (shrink)

Universities have always been part of political and public discourse in one way or another. The EU has assigned universities a new model role as ultimate integrators for the designated European Education Area and European Research Area. In this sense, Homo Academicus must reflect on new arrangements, as the previously occupied position of an omniscient detached observer is no longer valid. It is doomed to remain an unaccomplished and misleading idealization. The European Council has introduced the idea of the European (...) University as a bottom-up network of universities across the EU. It presents education as everyone’s favorite muse, but it is not a silver bullet. The education system is entangled in national and supranational interests, constantly shifting between the public and private sectors. The academic community is experiencing one of the biggest existential conflicts in choosing between two options: 1) scholastic supra-civic detachment, ivory tower escapism, and elitist stance, or 2) intellectual social engagement and civic education. Unless this conflict is resolved, future universities will not be able to foster transversal skills and prepare accountable citizens. (shrink)

In this contribution, Andrew Arato and Jean Cohen’s Populism and Civil Society is confronted with current gender studies research on populism. This research mainly focuses on right-wing populism and highlights strong links between right-wing populists and the religious right, which are to a large degree organized by “anti-gender,” a stance both against social constructivist notions of gender and against basic gender rights, especially in the fields of reproduction and of LGBTIQ concerns. Against the backdrop of this literature, I argue that (...) in Populism and Civil Society, right-wing populist anti-gender politics are not addressed in a way that takes account of their full complexity; and that these politics furthermore suggest to treat right-wing populism and left-wing populism as phenomena that do not only differ in content, but also in form. (shrink)

Populism and Civil Society: The Challenge to Democratic Constitutionalism (2022) by Andrew Arato and Jean Cohen is an important book that addresses a widespread and ominous phenomenon around the world: The challenge of populism. This book forms a symposium by renowned authors which gathers commentaries on Arato and Cohen’s book. From different points of view, comments, suggestions and queries are put forward, to which the authors respond. The authors’ illuminating rejoinders not only present some of their arguments in a new (...) light but also arrive at a clarifying interpretation of their approach. (shrink)

I will critically explore Arato and Cohen’s work on populism acknowledging areas of agreement while noting gaps in their reasoning particularly regarding the complex relations between capitalism and democracy and the recent erosion of democracy replacing it with authoritarian regimes that are better suited for neoliberal policies.

With what modes of mentality can we build a visceral, subjective sense of being in some specific mass-political society? Theorists and political cultivators standardly call upon the imagination – the kind prompted by symbols and rituals, for example. Could perception ever play such a role? I argue that it can, but that perceptions of mass-political publics come with costs of cruelty and illusion that neither democratic theorists nor participants should be willing to pay. The clearest examples of such perceptions are (...) found in fascist political culture. My discussion aims to illuminate what it is about publics, perception, and democracy that makes this so. -/- . (shrink)

“Populism and Civil Society” is a rich book full of insights. I see three crucial overarching points the book drives home: one about the character of current populism, one about the causes, and one about the consequences. First, they define populism in a way that goes beyond the prevailing juxtaposition of the people and the elite. Instead, the definition involves elements of the ideas about a good order, including the central role of popular sovereignty, the symbolic representation and embodiment of (...) the whole of the people, the strict borders between in and out, and a focus on electoral competition. Second, Arato and Cohen provide an explanation of populism that focuses on politics and democratic tensions. Third, the book points to “strong authoritarian tendencies that are almost always fully evident when populism achieves political power.” These propositions are right on target and very convincingly developed. In fact, they are very much in line with an attempt to account for “authoritarian populism” that Armin Schäfer and I have provided. Against this backdrop, I want to comment on the core messages by raising some questions about the details of these issues. It will become evident that this commentary is a case of sympathizing criticism. (shrink)

Are corporations ever morally obligated to engage in counterspeech—that is, in speech that aims to counter hate speech and misinformation? While existing arguments in moral and political philosophy show that individuals and states have such obligations, it is an open question whether those arguments apply to corporations as well. In this essay, I show how two such arguments—one based on avoiding complicity, and one based on duties of rescue—can plausibly be extended to corporations. I also respond to several objections to (...) corporate counterspeech. (shrink)

While Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is often seen to involve voluntary and deliberative approaches such as certification, governments have recently stepped into the picture through national legislation. France’s Law on Duty of Vigilance adopted in 2017 is a landmark case of such legislation. Years of voluntary CSR certification schemes led by Civil Society were replaced by a new philosophy of fighting for mandatory CSR controlled by a judge. We depict the change of mindset and the related change of roles inside (...) the coalition of Civil Society actors represents a Machiavellian Moment. The combination of collective civil society actors’ roles (namely nongovernmental organizations and labor unions) as Machiavellian _Virtue_ with disruptive events as Machiavellian _Fortuna_ made the law’s adoption possible. Based on this case study, we provide an analysis of civil society roles in the development of CSR-related legislation. (shrink)

Recent literature on Christian nationalism by sociologists of religion in the United States identifies a perceived novel phenomenon: the fusion of authoritarian governmental forms with Christianity. However, the socio-historical origin of this international trend has been left relatively unexplored. Therefore, the goal of this chapter is to create a single international account that lends itself to future comparative theoretical frameworks and analyses through the term "Christofascism." -/- The chapter can also be accessed on google books at the link included in (...) the description. Finally, order the book on Routledge's website, also linked in the description. (shrink)

Scholarly curiosity about political friendship (the relationship of mutual care among political fellows) is increasing as liberal democracies around the world face radical polarization. Yet one worry persists: can political friendship really exist in contemporary democracies? The objective of this paper is to answer this question in the affirmative. To this end, I investigate whether members of modern polities have reasons to form friendly bonds with one another. The paper has four parts. The first establishes a fundamental desideratum that any (...) consideration must satisfy to count as a reason for political fellows to partake in political friendship. The second evaluates and rejects a line of argument that presents bonds of mutual identification and belonging among political fellows as reasons for political friendship. The third evaluates and rejects a line of argument due to Paul Ludwig that presents the shared utility of political community as a reason for political fellows to engage in friendly practices with one another. Finally, I introduce my own novel argument—the “argument from membership”—for why political fellows have a reason to care for one another. I argue that membership in a functioning political community is indispensably valuable for any individual in virtue of playing a constitutive role in the individual’s attainment of their final ends. I hold that, as constituent parts of the same political community, political fellows have a reason to value one another and, accordingly, to care for one another’s well-being. (shrink)

This paper aims to reframe the debate over the intelligence of democracy by revisiting the classic Dewey/Lippmann debate. I argue that Dewey’s way of addressing this problem is better than both dominant approaches today (as exemplified by Jason Brennan and Hélène Landemore), since it acknowledges the intellectual obstacles democracy faces while keeping faith with democracy as an ethical ideal. I also illustrate how Dewey’s ideas in The Public and its Problems can serve as the foundation for building a response to (...) the challenge thinkers like Lippmann and Brennan pose for democracy. Dewey’s pragmatist orientation toward this challenge, along with his idea of the “Great Community”, offer us a promising path to building an intelligent and empowering democratic society. (shrink)

This book investigates Duterte’s brand of authoritarianism from a multidisciplinary approach. It brings together views from scholars and activists from diverse disciplines and areas of work to investigate the core of Duterte’s disastrous authoritarianism and how it takes specific forms in various contexts (e.g., the church, peace process, discourse, Lumad schools, state). The book and its contributors do not in any way hide behind the language of academic neutrality. What is at work here is an engaged scholarship that does not (...) investigate the problem of authoritarianism from a neutral ground supposedly devoid of all values, beliefs, and interpretations. Rather, the book recognizes scholarship to be a political practice which aims to elucidate a theoretical position that intends not only to understand authoritarianism but also to imagine the prospects for a democratic future. (shrink)

This article explores the role of deliberative democracy in political modernization and the dynamic relationship between civil society and the state. It aims to elucidate the essence of deliberative democracy as a mechanism for civil society’s influence on the state, and systematically analyze the conceptual studies of deliberative democracy in the context of civil society’s power potential, both in Ukraine and globally. The study reflects on the evolution of civil society, highlighting its transformation from a state-dominated concept to one of (...) parity with government institutions. The research emphasizes the significance of public discourse in legitimizing government decisions and examines the roles of various scholars in developing the concept of deliberative democracy.Deliberative democracy, a post-classical theory, is contrasted with electoral democracy, focusing on public discourse as a key legitimacy source for legislative acts. The paper delves into the historical origins of deliberation and deliberative democracy, crediting political scientist J.Bessette with coining the term. It discusses the critical elements of deliberative democracy, including public dialogue, rational discourse, and institutionalized exchange of opinions for decision-making. The model incorporates elements of representative, direct, and participatory democracy, highlighting its basis in public consultation and discourse.The article also examines various forms of the deliberative process, including open public discussions and behind-closed-doors exchanges, underscoring the importance of information, argumentation, and persuasion. It critiques the liberal interpretation of democracy and stresses the need for citizen involvement in governance, spotlighting the role of political civil society organizations in fostering democratic deliberation. (shrink)

This paper serves three purposes. First, it examines the theme of jus post bellum (“postwar justice”) as it emerges within a just peacemaking (JP) framework. Second, it defines just political participation as civil society peacebuilding reflected in Catholic social thought (CST). Third, it envisions a place for just political participation within the jus post bellum praxis specifically endorsed by the World Bank report of 2007, titled Civil Society and Peacebuilding: Potential, Limitations and Critical Factors. The paper then attends to the (...) Church and faith-based organizations and their roles in civil society peacebuilding postbellum. In doing so, it clarifies the characteristics of jus post bellum within a JP scheme by (a) distinguishing them from the just war approach, (b) identifying JP-oriented jus post bellum thinkers such as Daniel Philpott and Larry May, and (c) incorporating civil society peacebuilding endorsed by both the World Bank report and CST. (shrink)

Intergenerational transfers are a core feature of the practice of private philanthropy. A substantial portion of the resources committed to charitable causes comes from transfers (either during life or at death) that continue to pay out after death. Indeed, much of the power of the charitable foundation lies in its ability to extend the life of an enterprise beyond the mortal existence of its initiating agents. Despite their prevalence, whether and in what way the instruments of intergenerational philanthropy can be (...) justified is controversial. Many have argued that these instruments unfairly privilege the interests of the dead at the expense of the living and unborn. More recently, others have argued that intergenerational charitable transfers comport with the demands of distributive justice and are therefore legitimate. This paper contends that both of these perspectives fail to see the problem for what it is. Intergenerational charitable transfers may indeed promote justice in certain respects, but they do so at the cost of imposing the judgments of the dead onto the living. Respecting the wishes of the past conflicts with an interest in “generational sovereignty.” The paper concludes that properly accounting for this interest in generational sovereignty doesn’t require the abolition of intergenerational philanthropy. But it does tell in favor of a different regulatory orientation than most legal systems currently adopt. (shrink)

Polarization often happens asymmetrically. One political actor radicalizes, and the results reverberate through the political system. This is how the deep divisions in contemporary American politics arose: the Republican Party radicalized. Republican officeholders began to use extreme legislative tactics. Republican voters became animated by contempt for their political rivals and by the defense of their own social superiority. The party as a whole launched a wide-ranging campaign of voter suppression and its members endorsed violence in the face of electoral defeat. (...) This paper is about how such asymmetric polarization affects everyone else’s obligations. My core claim is that two kinds of relationship – civic friendship and non-subordination – underpin critical democratic norms. Republican misbehavior has severed cross-partisan civic friendships. Their authoritarianism forfeits their claim to non-subordination. The former means that non-Republicans need not justify policy on public grounds. The latter undercuts Republicans’ claim to enjoy minority vetoes when out of power and it gives their rivals reason to disobey the laws that Republicans make when they are in power. More generally, when one political actor contravenes the proper norms of democratic politics, their opposition is not bound by those norms. (shrink)

Scholarship on Chinese civil society suffers from a weak theorization of the concept, in which civil society is generally defined as NGOs (non-governmental organizations) that exists in the third sector. This article examines the dimension between state and society known as ‘civil sphere’, a concept that is broader and more mysterious than the conventional notion of ‘civil society’. Civil sphere can be understood as a discursive structure that defines what is civil and what is uncivil in a society. Taking the (...) Chinese intellectual debate between the New Lefts and the Liberals as an example, this article shows that in a society that is rapidly changing, the existence of such a public sphere represents a vital source of individual freedom. Even though the civil sphere in China has been contracting lately, there are still intellectual debates on fundamental ideological issues that merit academic attention. (shrink)

El objetivo de este capítulo es ofrecer una lectura alternativa que centre la mirada en el protagonismo ciudadano tras su letargo antipolítico por décadas en la democracia venezolana. ¿Qué respuestas han surgido desde la ciudadanía para contrarrestar la desinformación? Las respuestas no están en un humanismo digital, ni en la ética cívica ni una epistemología por la verdad. Este êthos ciudadano se ha orientado, más bien, hacia una infoética, una praxis ciudadana con raíces en la ética periodística y se ha (...) fortalecido gracias a la creciente alfabetización mediática y lucha contra los bulos. Este êthos ciudadano no está, sin embargo, desprovisto de valores. La defensa de la democracia y de derechos fundamentales han renovado el compromiso por la ciudadanía y por la información para hacer frente a la polarización, la relativización de la tragedia y la posverdad. (shrink)

In the postmodern era, European political philosophy has introduced several concepts. These concepts have ideologically prepared Western countries for decentralization reform. Being still “in process”, reflection on the proper structure of postmodern society is marked by ambiguous and often contradictory ideas. The very view on the state as a de-hierarchical, rhizomorphic and horizontal phenomenon presupposes numerous ways of reforming it. Throughout their histories, European countries have shifted from confrontations, hostilities and rivalries towards new mechanisms of fruitful relationships between civil society (...) and state institutions. Nowadays, many aspects are influencing the elaboration and implementation of strategies on civil society development in different countries. These aspects include the following: different starting conditions; the presence or absence of basic principles of public space development; the possibility of fulfilling civic practices’ potential; the level of political participation. West European countries have managed to create a viable structure to support the development of civil society, as well as maintain a stable dialogue between it and the state. However, the process is still on: effective practices of interaction between them are being developed; conditions for more effective cooperation are being improved; new financial instruments are being created and implemented. All Central and East European countries have a common understanding of civil society as one of the most important actors in developing cooperation with the government. At the same time, they should be able to solve existing essential problems, such as low awareness about global development problems and the population’s unreadiness to meet the immediate objectives of civil society development. (shrink)

It is frequently argued that to address structural injustice, individuals should participate in collective actions organized by civil society organizations (CSOs), but the role and the normative status of CSOs are rarely discussed. In this paper, we argue that CSOs semi-perfect our shared obligation to address structural injustice by defining shared goals as well as taking actions to further them. This assigns a special moral status to CSOs, which in turn gives rise to our duty to support them. Thus, we (...) do not have full discretion when deciding whether to join collective actions or not. Under certain conditions, we can even be forced by others to do our share. (shrink)

Politics never became a central intellectual interest of Murdoch’s, but she produced one important and visionary political essay in the ‘50’s, several popular writings on political matters, and a significant chapter in Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals that echoes throughout that book. In the 1958 “House of Theory,” she sees the welfare state as having almost entirely failed to address the deeper problems of capitalist society, including a failure to create the conditions for values she saw as central to (...) the socialist tradition—equality, absence of exploitation, meaningful work, and a sense of community. In Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals, Murdoch abandons the idea that moral ideals provide a guide to constructing a good society. She retains from her earlier work that the individual-moral domain is governed by perfectionism, but society cannot be. ‘Society must be thought of as a bad job to be made the best of’, for example, through the liberal idea of rights. Murdoch had a lifelong engagement with Marxism as a philosophy, introduced to her as a member of the Communist Party in the late ‘30’s and ‘40’s, and continuing through her subsequent long Labour period, and even when she moved to the Right in the Thatcher era. Marx and Marxism were always part of her mental universe, and she continued to work out what she agreed and disagreed with in it. (shrink)

The Covid-19 pandemic has affected not only health systems worldwide, but also global civil society, it has posed a global threat to humanity with significant implications and indicated weak points of postmodern civil society such as the lack of global solidarity and global cooperation, the lack of global health equity, the increase in poverty, social insecurity and deep inequality, the lack of support for the liberal international order, the lack of coordination mechanism for responding to the pandemic. Three main crises (...) of postmodern society are identified and analysed: relations of cooperation between nations and states, protests in different countries, the inadequacy of scientific and technological achievements of civilization. The analysis of these crises led to the conclusion that, along with the negative impact of the Covid-19 pandemic for humanity, it should be seen as a crucial moment for human civilization that identified gaps and directions for the development of global civil society. The transformation of society today must take place in terms of rethinking the consequences and results of globalization, and taking into account the processes of socio-political and socio-cultural transformation. Today, humanity needs to transform global society by reconsidering the role of WHO as a leading intergovernmental organization in the global health system, strengthening the role of global governance, creating a new paradigm of global health, developing global cooperation, solidarity and coordination towards global health equity. (shrink)

This paper argues that the current scholarship of radical politics primarily bannered by Christopher Ryan Maboloc is a misappropriation of the postMarxist political project of Mouffe and Laclau. Drawing primarily both on Mouffe’s and Laclau’s work Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics and an interview with Chantal Mouffe herself, the paper argues how the post-Marxist radical political project of Mouffe and Laclau fails to theoretically fit to the style of governance and regime of Duterte. Fundamental to the (...) idea of radical democratic politics is the task of radicalizing liberal democracy. However, as discussed in the paper, liberal democracy is a project whose very institutions and processes Duterte and his regime have undermined and attacked. Under Duterte’s regime, radical democracy lost the conditions for its flourishing, rendering its own impossibility. (shrink)

The Catholic Church never officially endorses political candidates but rather respects the freedom of its faithful to vote according to the dictates of their conscience. However, in the last presidential elections, some Catholic bishops and priests in the Philippines publicly and openly supported the presidential candidacy of Vice President Leni Robredo while urging the rest of the faithful to do the same. These bishops and priests anchored their position on their shared belief that voting for Robredo was the only rightful (...) and moral option because of her clean track record, non-involvement in any act of corruption, and principled approach in governance. In contrast, her political archnemesis Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos, Jr. had long been embroiled in several allegations of corruption, non-payment of taxes, and fakery of educational attainments. Hence, for these bishops and priests, voting for Marcos Jr. was both wrong and immoral. And yet, the election results hit them with a big “slap in the face,” as more than 31 million Filipinos (majority of whom are Catholics) cast their votes for Marcos Jr., while only 15 million voted for Robredo. This outcome, no doubt, raises the question: Why did the repeated calls of these bishops and priests go unheeded? In this paper, I will attempt to answer this question by subjecting the political moralism of these Catholic leaders to some objective postmodern evaluation. To do this, I will employ the postmodern thoughts of Nietzsche, Lyotard, and Rorty as a lens to examine why many Filipino Catholics today no longer buy the political moralism of their religious leaders. (shrink)

The paper examines how values lose their sacred or protected significance and turn into values as a hobby. Using an excerpt from Arundhati Roy's novel “The God of Small Things”, a trend of transformation of values is outlined, raising questions about the importance of different values – both sacred and secular – for the representatives of these values. In short, the question is related to the value of values: is their practice (affirmation) meaningful in the basic sense of these values, (...) or is this practice mere imitation as a hobby? The article gives several examples that show the versatility of this topic. The case of Qutb’s Islamism highlights the importance of the distinction between private and public: the exclusion of the Islamic religion from the public sphere would result in the religion and its values losing their prominent role. A contrasting direction of change is evident in the woke movement, in which secular ideas transform into quasi-religious beliefs (resacralization of values). Finally, an explanation of this contemporary cultural picture of values becoming a hobby (in the dynamics of private-public relations) is sought in Andreas Reckwitz’s observation that the “general” is being replaced by a “singular” logic. Since the sacred and general meaning of values is abolished, this is where the shift in the understanding of values is most apparent. Because there is no longer a foundation of a sacred myth, individual values become a private matter and have no public meaning. (shrink)

In this chapter I articulate philosophical and pedagogical motivations for introducing Ethics Bowl to adults, followed by practical strategies for implementation. Ethics Bowl is an opportunity for individuals to engage in ethical reflection for themselves, and to thereby have greater ownership over their habits, beliefs, values, and life projects. As a deliberative pedagogy, it is also an opportunity for individuals to cultivate democratic skills and dispositions that will in turn permeate the civic sphere, the workplace, and other domains of shared (...) life. Ethics Bowl remains one of the most impactful forms of public philosophy in our engagement toolkit. It fosters mutual respect and a spirit of cooperation in the face of ethical and political disagreement, and bridges our many divisions—age included. (shrink)