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  1. The Epistemology of Interpersonal Relations.Matthew A. Benton - 2024 - Noûs:1-20.
    What is it to know someone? Epistemologists rarely take up this question, though recent developments make such inquiry possible and desirable. This paper advances an account of how such interpersonal knowledge goes beyond mere propositional and qualitative knowledge about someone, giving a central place to second-personal treatment. It examines what such knowledge requires, and what makes it distinctive within epistemology as well as socially. It assesses its theoretic value for several issues in moral psychology, epistemic injustice, and philosophy of mind. (...)
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  2. I Feel You: Toward a Schelerian Conception of Empathy.Jean Moritz Müller - 2023 - In Christiana Werner (ed.), Empathy's Role in Understanding Persons, Literature, and Art. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 272-295.
    In his The Nature of Sympathy, Max Scheler (2007 [1923]) offers an intriguing, if puzzling, account of empathy. According to this account, empathy is a specific kind of feeling through which we are immediately aware of others’ emotions but which is not itself an emotion and doesn’t require us to have those emotions ourselves. Moreover, qua immediate awareness of others’ emotions empathy is supposed to afford understanding why they feel those emotions. Although having echoes with ordinary discourse and experience, Scheler's (...)
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  3. An Alternative Model for Direct Cognition of Third-Party Elementary Mental States.de Sá Pereira Roberto Horácio - 2021 - Revista de Filosofia Moderna E Contemporânea 9 (1):15-28.
    I aim to develop an alternative theoretical model for the direct cognition of the elementary states of others called the theory of interaction (henceforth TI), also known as the “second person” approach. The model I propose emerges from a critical reformulation of the displaced perception model proposed by FRED DRETSKE (1995) for the introspective knowledge of our own mental states. Moreover, against Dretske, I argue that no meta-representation (second-order representation of a first-order representation as a representation) is involved in the (...)
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  4. Young Schoolchildren’s Epistemic Development: A Longitudinal Qualitative Study.Michael Weinstock, Vardit Israel, Hadas Fisher Cohen, Iris Tabak & Yifat Harari - 2020 - Frontiers in Psychology 11.
    How children seek knowledge and evaluate claims may depend on their understanding of the source of knowledge. What shifts in their understandings about why scientists might disagree and how claims about the state of the world are justified? Until about the age of 41/2, knowledge is seen as self-evident. Children believe that knowledge of reality comes directly through our senses and what others tell us. They appeal to these external sources in order to know. The attainment of Theory of Mind (...)
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  5. Three problems of other minds.Chad Engelland - 2019 - Think 18 (51):63-75.
    The traditional problem of other minds is epistemological. What justification can be given for thinking that the world is populated with other minds? More recently, some philosophers have argued for a second problem of other minds that is conceptual. How can we conceive of the point of view of another mind in relation to our own? This article retraces the logic of the epistemological and conceptual problems, and it argues for a third problem of other minds. This is the phenomenological (...)
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  6. Perception, Evidence, and our Expressive Knowledge of Others' Minds.Anil Gomes - 2019 - In Anita Avramides & Matthew Parrott (eds.), Knowing Other Minds. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
    ‘How, then, she had asked herself, did one know one thing or another thing about people, sealed as they were?’ So asks Lily Briscoe in To the Lighthouse. It is this question, rather than any concern about pretence or deception, which forms the basis for the philosophical problem of other minds. Responses to this problem have tended to cluster around two solutions: either we know others’ minds through perception; or we know others’ minds through a form of inference. In the (...)
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  7. Enactivism, other minds, and mental disorders.Joel Krueger - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 1):365-389.
    Although enactive approaches to cognition vary in terms of their character and scope, all endorse several core claims. The first is that cognition is tied to action. The second is that cognition is composed of more than just in-the-head processes; cognitive activities are externalized via features of our embodiment and in our ecological dealings with the people and things around us. I appeal to these two enactive claims to consider a view called “direct social perception” : the idea that we (...)
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  8. Direct Social Perception.Joel Krueger - 2018 - In Albert Newen, Leon De Bruin & Shaun Gallagher (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of 4E Cognition. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  9. Remarks on Perception and Other Minds.Edmund Dain - 2017 - Nordic Wittgenstein Review 6 (2):31-45.
    It is a simple truth about the English language that we can see or hear or feel what others are thinking or feeling. But it is tempting to think that there is a deeper sense in which we cannot really see or hear or feel these things at all. Rather, what is involved must be a matter of inference or interpretation, for instance. In these remarks, I argue against a variety of ways in which that thought, the thought that we (...)
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  10. The Look of Another Mind.Matthew Parrott - 2017 - Mind 126 (504):1023-1061.
    According to the perceptual model, our knowledge of others' minds is a form of perceptual knowledge. We know, for example, that Jones is angry because we can literally see that he is. In this essay, I argue that mental states do not have the kind of distinctive looks that could sufficiently justify perceptual knowledge of others’ mentality. I present a puzzle that can arise with respect to mental states that I claim does not arise for non-mental properties like being an (...)
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  11. Seeing the Invisible: How to Perceive, Imagine, and Infer the Minds of Others.Luke Roelofs - 2017 - Erkenntnis 83 (2):205-229.
    The psychology and phenomenology of our knowledge of other minds is not well captured either by describing it simply as perception, nor by describing it simply as inference. A better description, I argue, is that our knowledge of other minds involves both through ‘perceptual co-presentation’, in which we experience objects as having aspects that are not revealed. This allows us to say that we perceive other minds, but perceive them as private, i.e. imperceptible, just as we routinely perceive aspects of (...)
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  12. The Perceptibility of Emotion.Joel Smith - 2017 - In Hichem Naar & Fabrice Teroni (eds.), The Ontology of Emotions. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 130-148.
    I offer an account of the ontology of emotions and their expressions, drawing some morals for the view that we can perceive others' emotions in virtue of seeing their expressions.
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  13. On Whether we Can See Intentions.Shannon Spaulding - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (2):150-170.
    Direct Perception is the view that we can see others' mental states, i.e. that we perceive others' mental states with the same immediacy and directness that we perceive ordinary objects in the world. I evaluate Direct Perception by considering whether we can see intentions, a particularly promising candidate for Direct Perception. I argue that the view equivocates on the notion of intention. Disambiguating the Direct Perception claim reveals a troubling dilemma for the view: either it is banal or highly implausible.
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  14. Overthinking and Other Minds: The Analysis Paralysis.Bonnie Talbert - 2017 - Social Epistemology 31 (6):545-556.
    Although many cases of knowledge require careful, conscious deliberation, knowledge of other minds is different, for it requires in some sense that we not think too much about it. The primary way that we come to know what others are thinking is by interacting with them, and the interactive context requires real-time engagement such that conscious intellectual deliberation is disruptive in that it disturbs the flow of the interaction. Understanding that part of what we know when we know others comes (...)
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  15. Perceptual Recognition, Emotion, and Value.Joel Smith - 2016 - In Julian Dodd (ed.), Art, Mind, and Narrative: Themes From the Work of Peter Goldie. New York, NY: Oxford University Press UK.
    I outline an account of perceptual knowledge and assess the extent to which it can be employed in a defence of perceptual accounts of emotion and value recognition. I argue that considerations ruling out lucky knowledge give us some reason to doubt its prospects in the case of value recognition. I also discuss recent empirical work on cultural and contextual influences on emotional expression, arguing that a perceptual account of value recognition is consistent with current evidence.
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  16. Perceiving expressions of emotion: What evidence could bear on questions about perceptual experience of mental states?Stephen A. Butterfill - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 36:438-451.
  17. Perceiving mental states.Peter Carruthers - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 36:498-507.
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  18. A Bayesian approach to person perception.C. W. G. Clifford, I. Mareschal, Y. Otsuka & T. L. Watson - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 36:406-413.
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  19. Testimony and Other Minds.Anil Gomes - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (1):173-183.
    In this paper I defend the claim that testimony can serve as a basic source of knowledge of other people’s mental lives against the objection that testimonial knowledge presupposes knowledge of other people’s mental lives and therefore can’t be used to explain it.
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  20. Direct social perception and dual process theories of mindreading.Mitchell Herschbach - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 36:483-497.
    The direct social perception thesis claims that we can directly perceive some mental states of other people. The direct perception of mental states has been formulated phenomenologically and psychologically, and typically restricted to the mental state types of intentions and emotions. I will compare DSP to another account of mindreading: dual process accounts that posit a fast, automatic “Type 1” form of mindreading and a slow, effortful “Type 2” form. I will here analyze whether dual process accounts’ Type 1 mindreading (...)
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  21. Is a modular cognitive architecture compatible with the direct perception of mental states?Jane Suilin Lavelle - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 36:508-518.
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  22. Seeing What You Want.William E. S. McNeill - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 36:554-564.
    There has been recent interest in the hypothesis that we can directly perceive some of each other’s mental features. One popular strategy for defending that hypothesis is to claim that some mental features are embodied in a way that makes them available to perception. Here I argue that this view would imply a particular limit on the kinds of mental feature that would be perceptible (§2). I sketch reasons for thinking that the view is not yet well-motivated (§3). And I (...)
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  23. Inferentialism and our knowledge of others’ minds.William E. S. McNeill - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (6):1435-1454.
    Our knowledge of each others’ mental features is sometimes epistemically basic or non-inferential. The alternative to this claim is Inferentialism, the view that such knowledge is always epistemically inferential. Here, I argue that Inferentialism is not plausible. My argument takes the form of an inference to the best explanation. Given the nature of the task involved in recognizing what mental features others have on particular occasions, and our capacity to perform that task, we should not expect always to find good (...)
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  24. The felt presence of other minds: Predictive processing, counterfactual predictions, and mentalising in autism.Colin J. Palmer, Anil K. Seth & Jakob Hohwy - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 36:376-389.
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  25. The Phenomenology of Face‐to‐Face Mindreading.Joel Smith - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (2):274-293.
    I defend a perceptual account of face-to-face mindreading. I begin by proposing a phenomenological constraint on our visual awareness of others' emotional expressions. I argue that to meet this constraint we require a distinction between the basic and non-basic ways people, and other things, look. I offer and defend just such an account.
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  26. On Direct Social Perception.Shannon Spaulding - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 36:472-482.
    Direct Social Perception (DSP) is the idea that we can non-inferentially perceive others’ mental states. In this paper, I argue that the standard way of framing DSP leaves the debate at an impasse. I suggest two alternative interpretations of the idea that we see others’ mental states: others’ mental states are represented in the content of our perception, and we have basic perceptual beliefs about others’ mental states. I argue that the latter interpretation of DSP is more promising and examine (...)
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  27. Emotions and Other Minds.Joel Krueger - 2014 - In Rudiger Campe & Julia Weber (eds.), Interiority/Exteriority: Rethinking Emotion. Walter de Gruyter. pp. 324-350.
  28. The Phenomenology of Person Perception.Joel Krueger - 2014 - In Mark Bruhn & Donald Wehrs (eds.), Neuroscience, Literature, and History. Routledge. pp. 153-173.
  29. Phenomenology and the visibility of the mental.Joel Krueger - 2013 - Annual Review of the Phenomenological Association of Japan 29:13-25.
  30. Empathy.Joel Krueger - 2013 - In Byron Kaldis (ed.), Encyclopedia of Philosophy and the Social Sciences. Los Angeles: Sage Publications.
  31. Watsuji's Phenomenology of Embodiment and Social Space.Joel Krueger - 2013 - Philosophy East and West 63 (2):127-152.
    The aim of this essay is to situate the thought of Tetsurō Watsuji within contemporary approaches to social cognition. I argue for Watsuji’s current relevance, suggesting that his analysis of embodiment and social space puts him in step with some of the concerns driving ongoing treatments of social cognition in philosophy of mind and cognitive science. Yet, as I will show, Watsuji can potentially offer a fruitful contribution to this discussion by lending a phenomenologically informed critical perspective. This is because (...)
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  32. The space between us: embodiment and intersubjectivity in Watsuji and Levinas.Joel Krueger - 2013 - In Leah Kalmanson, Frank Garrett & Sarah Mattice (eds.), Levinas and Asian Thought. Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: Duquesne University Press. pp. 53-78.
    This essay brings Emmanuel Levinas and Watsuji Tetsurō into constructive philosophical engagement. Rather than focusing primarily on interpretation — admittedly an important dimension of comparative philosophical inquiry — my intention is to put their respective views to work, in tandem, and address the problem of the embodied social self.1 Both Watsuji and Levinas share important commonalities with respect to the embodied nature of intersubjectivity —commonalities that, moreover, put both thinkers in step with some of the concerns driving current treatments of (...)
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  33. Social perception and “spectator theories” of other minds.Søren Overgaard & Joel Krueger - 2013 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (4):434 - 435.
    We resist Schilbach et al.’s characterization of the “social perception” approach to social cognition as a “spectator theory” of other minds. We show how the social perception view acknowledges the crucial role interaction plays in enabling social understanding. We also highlight a dilemma Schilbach et al. face in attempting to distinguish their second person approach from the social perception view.
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  34. Current Disciplinary and Interdisciplinary Debates on Empathy.Eva-Maria Engelen & Birgitt Röttger-Rössler - 2012 - Emotion Review 4 (1):3-8.
    Empathy as “Feelingly Grasping” Perhaps the central question concerning empathy is if and if so how it combines aspects of thinking and feeling. Indeed, the intellectual tradition of the past centuries has been marked by a dualism. Roughly speaking, there have been two pathways when it comes to understanding each other: 1) thinking or mind reading and 2) feeling or empathy. Nonetheless, one of the ongoing debates in psychology and philosophy concerns the question whether these two abilities, namely, understanding what (...)
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  35. Seeing mind in action.Joel Krueger - 2012 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (2):149-173.
    Much recent work on empathy in philosophy of mind and cognitive science has been guided by the assumption that minds are composed of intracranial phenomena, perceptually inaccessible and thus unobservable to everyone but their owners. I challenge this claim. I defend the view that at least some mental states and processes—or at least some parts of some mental states and processes—are at times visible, capable of being directly perceived by others. I further argue that, despite its initial implausibility, this view (...)
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  36. (1 other version)Seeing subjectivity: defending a perceptual account of other minds.Joel Krueger & Søren Overgaard - 2012 - ProtoSociology (47):239-262.
    The problem of other minds has a distinguished philosophical history stretching back more than two hundred years. Taken at face value, it is an epistemological question: it concerns how we can have knowledge of, or at least justified belief in, the existence of minds other than our own. In recent decades, philosophers, psychologists, neuroscientists, anthropologists and primatologists have debated a related question: how we actually go about attributing mental states to others (regardless of whether we ever achieve knowledge or rational (...)
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  37. (1 other version)Embodiment and the Perceptual Hypothesis.William E. S. McNeill - 2012 - Philosophical Quarterly 62 (247):569 - 591.
    The Perceptual Hypothesis is that we sometimes see, and thereby have non-inferential knowledge of, others' mental features. The Perceptual Hypothesis opposes Inferentialism, which is the view that our knowledge of others' mental features is always inferential. The claim that some mental features are embodied is the claim that some mental features are realised by states or processes that extend beyond the brain. The view I discuss here is that the Perceptual Hypothesis is plausible if, but only if, the mental features (...)
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  38. XII—Is There a Problem of Other Minds?Anil Gomes - 2011 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (3pt3):353-373.
    Scepticism is sometimes expressed about whether there is any interesting problem of other minds. In this paper I set out a version of the conceptual problem of other minds which turns on the way in which mental occurrences are presented to the subject and situate it in relation to debates about our knowledge of other people's mental lives. The result is a distinctive problem in the philosophy of mind concerning our relation to other people.
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  39. Dynamic Existence.Claus Janew - 2011 - Journal of Consciousness Exploration and Research 2 (6):877-884.
    Everything is in motion. "Inertness" arises from (approximative) repetition, that is, through rotation or an alternation that delineates a focus of consciousness. This focus of consciousness, in turn, must also move/alternate (the two differ only in continuity). If its alternation seems to go too far - physically, psychically or intellectually - it reaches into the subconscious. In this way, interconnection is established by the alternation of the focus of consciousness. Therefore, in a world in which everything is interconnected, all focuses (...)
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  40. Extended cognition and the space of social interaction.Joel Krueger - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (3):643-657.
    The extended mind thesis (EM) asserts that some cognitive processes are (partially) composed of actions consisting of the manipulation and exploitation of environmental structures. Might some processes at the root of social cognition have a similarly extended structure? In this paper, I argue that social cognition is fundamentally an interactive form of space management—the negotiation and management of ‘‘we-space”—and that some of the expressive actions involved in the negotiation and management of we-space (gesture, touch, facial and whole-body expressions) drive basic (...)
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  41. Believing what the Man Says about His Own Feelings.Benjamin McMyler - 2011 - In Martin Gustafsson Richard Sorli (ed.), The Philosophy of J. L. Austin. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
  42. A Theory of Affect Perception.Edoardo Zamuner - 2011 - Mind and Language 26 (4):436-451.
    What do we see when we look at someone's expression of fear? I argue that one of the things that we see is fear itself. I support this view by developing a theory of affect perception. The theory involves two claims. One is that expressions are patterns of facial changes that carry information about affects. The other is that the visual system extracts and processes such information. In particular, I argue that the visual system functions to detect the affects of (...)
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  43. Seeing Other Minds.Steven M. Duncan - 2010 - Seattle Critical Review (on Line) 1 (1):1-30.
    In this paper, I offer an account of our knowledge of other minds based on V. C. Aldrich's account of aesthetic perception, according to which there is a sense in which we literally see other minds.
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  44. (1 other version)Perceiving Emotions.Mitchell Green - 2010 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 84 (1):45-61.
    I argue that it is possible literally to perceive the emotions of others. This account depends upon the possibility of perceiving a whole by perceiving one or more of its parts, and upon the view that emotions are complexes. After developing this account, I expound and reply to Rowland Stout's challenge to it. Stout is nevertheless sympathetic with the perceivability-of-emotions view. I thus scrutinize Stout's suggestion for a better defence of that view than I have provided, and offer a refinement (...)
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  45. On Seeing That Someone is Angry.William McNeill - 2010 - European Journal of Philosophy 20 (4):575-597.
    Abstract: Some propose that the question of how you know that James is angry can be adequately answered with the claim that you see that James is angry. Call this the Perceptual Hypothesis. Here, I examine that hypothesis. I argue that there are two different ways in which the Perceptual Hypothesis could be made true. You might see that James is angry by seeing his bodily features. Alternatively, you might see that James is angry by seeing his anger. If you (...)
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  46. Seeing Other People.Joel Smith - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):731-748.
    I present a perceptual account of other minds that combines a Husserlian insight about perceptual experience with a functionalist account of mental properties.
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  47. “Perception of Other People’s Emotions”.Edoardo Zamuner - 2010 - ASCS09.
    In this paper I argue that one of the functions of the perceptual system is to detect other people’s emotions when they are expressed in the face. I support this view by developing two separate but interdependent accounts. The first says that facial expressions of emotions carry information about the emotions that produced them, and about some of their properties. The second says that the visual system functions to extract the information that expressions carry about emotions.
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  48. Other minds and perceived identity.Anil Gomes - 2009 - Dialectica 63 (2):219-230.
    Quassim Cassam has recently defended a perceptual model of knowledge of other minds: one on which we can see and thereby know that another thinks and feels. In the course of defending this model, he addresses issues about our ability to think about other minds. I argue that his solution to this 'conceptual problem' does not work. A solution to the conceptual problem is necessary if we wish to explain knowledge of other minds.
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  49. Empathy and the extended mind.Joel W. Krueger - 2009 - Zygon 44 (3):675-698.
    I draw upon the conceptual resources of the extended mind thesis to analyze empathy and interpersonal understanding. Against the dominant mentalistic paradigm, I argue that empathy is fundamentally an extended bodily activity and that much of our social understanding happens outside of the head. First, I look at how the two dominant models of interpersonal understanding, theory theory and simulation theory, portray the cognitive link between folk psychology and empathy. Next, I challenge their internalist orthodoxy and offer an alternative "extended" (...)
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  50. A privileged access to other minds.Guido Melchior - 2009 - In Volker A. Munz, Klaus Puhl & Joseph Wang (eds.), Language and World – Papers of the XXXII International Wittgenstein Symposium. Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society. pp. 274-276.
    It is widely hold view that persons have privileged access to their own minds, although there are numerous different views, how it exactly looks like. One possible interpretation of this privilege of first-person-perspective is to regard reference to own mental states as privileged in comparison to reference to mental states of others. I will argue for the existence of an additional privilege of third-person-perspective: Other persons can refer to all mental states of a person in way the person herself cannot. (...)
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