Neural devices have the capacity to enable users to regain abilities lost due to disease or injury – for instance, a deep brain stimulator (DBS) that allows a person with Parkinson’s disease to regain the ability to fluently perform movements or a Brain Computer Interface (BCI) that enables a person with spinal cord injury to control a robotic arm. While users recognize and appreciate the technologies’ capacity to maintain or restore their capabilities, the neuroethics literature is replete with examples of (...) concerns expressed about agentive capacities: A perceived lack of control over the movement of a robotic arm might result in an altered sense of feeling responsible for that movement. Clinicians or researchers being able to record and access detailed information of a person’s brain might raise privacy concerns. A disconnect between previous, current, and future understandings of the self might result in a sense of alienation. The ability to receive and interpret sensory feedback might change whether someone trusts the implanted device or themselves. Inquiries into the nature of these concerns and how to mitigate them has produced scholarship that often emphasizes one issue – responsibility, privacy, authenticity, or trust – selectively. However, we believe that examining these ethical dimensions separately fails to capture a key aspect of the experience of living with a neural device. In exploring their interrelations, we argue that their mutual significance for neuroethical research can be adequately captured if they are described under a unified heading of agency. On these grounds, we propose an “Agency Map” which brings together the diverse neuroethical dimensions and their interrelations into a comprehensive framework. With this, we offer a theoretically-grounded approach to understanding how these various dimensions are interwoven in an individual’s experience of agency. (shrink)

Zygmunt Bauman has devoted considerable amount of attention to the discussion of the educational challenges in liquid modernity. While a good deal of professional attention has been given to Bauman’s concept in various fields and disciplines, his views on education have received relatively little response by educational theorists and practitioners. The aim of this article is to assess Bauman’s prognosis and diagnosis for education in liquid modernity and argue that even if one generally accepts Bauman’s portrayal of current society, his (...) educational view must presuppose ‘solid’ elements if it is to remain consistent. The article offers some critical reflections with regard to these themes by appealing in particular to the notion of self-critical appropriation, as it is employed in the work of Jurgen Habermas. It is with this notion that it is possible to overcome inconsistencies in Bauman’s educational views and form the basis for understanding how to account for the development of authentic personhood in the social climate of liquid modernity. (shrink)

The aim of this article is twofold: first, to identify and address three central divisions in the field of authentic education that introduce ambiguity and at times inconsistencies within the field of authentic education. These divisions concern a) the relationship between autonomy and authenticity; b) the division between the two basic attitudes towards ‘care’ in the authenticity literature, and; c) the well-worn division between objective and subjective realms of knowledge and identity construction. Addressing these divisions through Charles Taylor's distinction between (...) active and passive aspects of authenticity, I believe, will lead to a better understanding of the main issues involved in conceptualising and applying authenticity-based education. Second, to present what I call The Postconventional Authentic Relation-to-Self as a basis for overcoming and reconciling the above divisions. I shall conclude by providing some examples of the way the perspective envisioned by PARTS can be applied to educational practices. (shrink)

Hospize verstehen sich als Orte einer ganzheitlichen Sterbebegleitung, welche nicht allein die Behandlung körperlicher und psychischer Symptome, sondern auch die soziale und spirituelle Betreuung der Sterbenden beinhaltet. Eine zentrale Bedeutung innerhalb dieser umfassenden Begleitung am Lebensende hat die Idee der Selbstbestimmung. Dem Hospizgast soll ermöglicht werden, im Sinne einer größtmöglichen Autonomie über die eigenen Belange bis zuletzt selbst entscheiden zu können. Diese zentrale Zielsetzung der Hospizarbeit wurde in der Literatur bisher überwiegend in theoretisch-programmatischer Weise thematisiert, es liegen jedoch kaum Untersuchungen (...) zu der Frage vor, wie die Idee der „Selbstbestimmung bis zuletzt“ im Alltag der Hospize praktisch umgesetzt wird. Über die besonderen Umstände der Pflege in stationären Hospizen hinaus ist der hier zugrunde gelegte Begriff von Autonomie auch von grundsätzlichem medizinethischen Interesse. Das ganzheitlich-palliative Konzept von Behandlung und Pflege, welches bereits im Hospiz als Institution fest verankert ist, legt nahe, dass die Idee der Selbstbestimmung in diesem Umfeld anders konzeptualisiert wird als im Bereich der „klassischen“, zumeist kurativ orientierten Medizin. Die qualitative Interviewstudie mit haupt- und ehrenamtlichen Mitarbeiterinnen und Mitarbeitern konnte zeigen, dass in stationären Hospizen ein Konzept von Selbstbestimmung vertreten wird, welches über rein medizinische Entscheidungen weit hinausgeht. Zugleich konnte aber auch herausgearbeitet werden, wo nach Ansicht der Mitarbeiterinnen und Mitarbeiter mögliche Grenzen der Selbstbestimmung des Gastes im Hospiz liegen. (shrink)

Hospize verstehen sich als Orte einer ganzheitlichen Sterbebegleitung, welche nicht allein die Behandlung körperlicher und psychischer Symptome, sondern auch die soziale und spirituelle Betreuung der Sterbenden beinhaltet. Eine zentrale Bedeutung innerhalb dieser umfassenden Begleitung am Lebensende hat die Idee der Selbstbestimmung. Dem Hospizgast soll ermöglicht werden, im Sinne einer größtmöglichen Autonomie über die eigenen Belange bis zuletzt selbst entscheiden zu können. Diese zentrale Zielsetzung der Hospizarbeit wurde in der Literatur bisher überwiegend in theoretisch-programmatischer Weise thematisiert, es liegen jedoch kaum Untersuchungen (...) zu der Frage vor, wie die Idee der „Selbstbestimmung bis zuletzt“ im Alltag der Hospize praktisch umgesetzt wird. Über die besonderen Umstände der Pflege in stationären Hospizen hinaus ist der hier zugrunde gelegte Begriff von Autonomie auch von grundsätzlichem medizinethischen Interesse. Das ganzheitlich-palliative Konzept von Behandlung und Pflege, welches bereits im Hospiz als Institution fest verankert ist, legt nahe, dass die Idee der Selbstbestimmung in diesem Umfeld anders konzeptualisiert wird als im Bereich der „klassischen“, zumeist kurativ orientierten Medizin. Die qualitative Interviewstudie mit haupt- und ehrenamtlichen Mitarbeiterinnen und Mitarbeitern konnte zeigen, dass in stationären Hospizen ein Konzept von Selbstbestimmung vertreten wird, welches über rein medizinische Entscheidungen weit hinausgeht. Zugleich konnte aber auch herausgearbeitet werden, wo nach Ansicht der Mitarbeiterinnen und Mitarbeiter mögliche Grenzen der Selbstbestimmung des Gastes im Hospiz liegen. (shrink)

In the practice of education and educational reforms today ‘meritocracy’ is a prevalent mode of thinking and discourse. Behind political and economic debates over the just distribution of education benefits, other kinds of philosophical issues, concerning the question of democracy, await to be addressed. As a means of evoking a language more subtle than what is offered by political and economic solutions, I shall discuss Ralph Waldo Emerson's idea of perfectionism, particularly his ideas of the ‘gleam of light’ and ‘genius’, (...) as an alternative mode of thinking of human power. Through this Emersonian lens, a provocative shift will be made from meritocracy and ‘mediocracy’ to aristocracy. Emersonian aristocracy destabilizes balanced measures and prevailing discourse about fairness and justice, and makes us reconsider how to achieve a just society in democracy. As an educational implication, I shall propose the idea of citizenship without inclusion—a vision of education for a democratic society in which we learn to live as and with the Great Man. (shrink)

Tucked into Wolfgang Streeck’s influential crisis theory of contemporary capitalism are various attempts at causally linking processes of neoliberalisation to generalised depoliticisation, while depoliticisation is in its turn attributed to the emergence of a diffuse ‘consumerist’ ethos in the 1970s. Streeck argues that rising consumerism led to a generalised demotic embrace of marketised forms of need satisfaction and in so doing evacuated the political will to resist neoliberal reforms. If, however, we take neoliberalisation to entail both the depoliticisation of the (...) demos and the marketisation of the polity, then Streeck’s attempt to connect these processes to consumption is weakened by significant historical oversights on both ends. Streeck’s attribution of depoliticisation to a new consumerist ethos is beset by a reductive economism. At the same time, Streeck overlooks just how pivotal legitimatory ideals of consumer-side social order developed by specific networked elites have been for the marketisation of the polity. (shrink)

Various kinds of contemplative practices have been a part of the western philosophical tradition since the Age of Antiquity. Today, however, philosophy as a way of life has ceased to be an integral part of academic practice. The capability to gain knowledge or understanding is believed to come out of pure intellectual endeavor, without exercising the mind and body holistically. This has created a blind spot for philosophy, where no profound pedagogical and moral transformation of subjectivity can be articulated. Furthermore, (...) meditation practices have often been understood as egoistic, apolitical activity. Our purpose is to suggest that this understanding is due to the liberalist and Cartesian tradition of subjectivity today widely proliferated in education. However, through an analysis of a meditation exercise in breathing, it is possible to deconstruct these notions and open novel vistas for thinking about the relationship between truth and subjectivity in education. A simple breathing exercise can dissolve the dualisms ingrained in occidental philosophy and culture - which has many socio-political implications for educational theory and praxis. (shrink)

The Dutch education system relies upon a large number of publicly-subsidized, denominational schools. The authors defend the importance of schools that educate children within a specific — including denominational — conception of the good by arguing for the importance of such a conception for the development of the child's identity. An essential component of this developmental process is critical reflection, conceived as crucial to the formation of moral autonomy.

Through the examination of the lives of several immortal beings, this paper defends a version of Moritz Schlick’s claim that the meaning of life is play. More precisely: a person’s life has meaning to the extent it there are things in it that the person values intrinsically rather than merely instrumentally and above a certain threshold of intensity. This is a subjectivist account of meaning in life. I defend subjectivism about meaning in life from common objections by understanding statements about (...) life’s meaning in quasi-realist terms. (shrink)

Questo contributo teorico propone una prospettiva innovativa nel dibattito sul concetto di “bullshit”. L’ipotesi principale è che la vaghezza sia un elemento fondamentale delle bullshit, che si focalizza sull’attività. In questo modo si supera il dibattito in letteratura che mette al centro o l’intenzionalità dell’enunciatore o la struttura e il contenuto degli enunciati. Si sostiene inoltre che la vaghezza non debba essere considerata come un limite, ma come un’opportunità per comprendere situazioni comunicative complesse. Questo differente approccio, basato sulla tradizione pragmatista, (...) supera alcuni limiti evidenziati in letteratura, aprendo la strada a una comprensione più approfondita del fenomeno delle bullshit. Offre inoltre una risposta esaustiva ad alcuni quesiti di Frankfurt e riconosce il lato “produttivo” delle bullshit, adattandosi meglio a molteplici circostanze quotidiane. Un approccio pragmatista al fenomeno-bullshit basato sulla vaghezza offre una maggiore comprensione di fenomeni complessi di comunicazione senza cadere nel “paradigma della sincerità” evidenziato da Frankfurt. (shrink)

The unprecedented growth and demand for Applied Ethics since the last quarter of the previous century, has opened up a range of new opportunities for the discipline of Philosophy. While these new opportunities have been enthusiastically seized upon by some philosophers, others have frowned upon them or rejected them outright. In order to make sense of this demand for Applied Ethics training, I will first explore in general why this demand for Applied Ethics developed. I will then use the example (...) of Business Ethics to demonstrate and discuss some of the suspicions contemplated by philosophers who regard Applied Ethics as a dangerous and deceitful temptation that potentially can corrupt Philosophy, and that philosophers should at best avoid or at least be very careful of. I will assess the legitimacy and seriousness of these concerns and objections with regard to Business Ethics and then outline an Aristotelian approach to Business Ethics that I believe can be practised with philosophical integrity. (shrink)

The unprecedented growth and demand for Applied Ethics (Business Ethics, Medical Ethics, Information Ethics, Engineering Ethics, etc.) since the last quarter of the previous century, has opened up a range of new opportunities for the discipline of Philosophy. While these new opportunities have been enthusiastically seized upon by some philosophers, others have frowned upon them or rejected them outright. In order to make sense of this demand for Applied Ethics training, I will first explore in general why this demand for (...) Applied Ethics developed. I will then use the example of Business Ethics to demonstrate and discuss some of the suspicions contemplated by philosophers who regard Applied Ethics as a dangerous and deceitful temptation that potentially can corrupt Philosophy, and that philosophers should at best avoid or at least be very careful of. I will assess the legitimacy and seriousness of these concerns and objections with regard to Business Ethics and then outline an Aristotelian approach to Business Ethics that I believe can be practised with philosophical integrity. (shrink)

We are all ambivalent at every turn. “Should I skip class on this gorgeous spring day?” “Do I really want to marry Eric?” Despite being uncomfortable and unsettling, there are some forms of ambivalence that are appropriate and responsible. Even when they seem trivial and superficial, they reveal some of our deepest values, the self-images we would like to project. In this paper, I analyze collaborative ambivalence, the kind of ambivalence that arises from our identity-forming close relationships. The sources and (...) resolutions of collaborative ambivalence reveal how much of our thinking—and so also of our motivational structure—emerges from the details of our collaborative and dialogical engagements. The imaginative skills and strategies exercised in remaining justifiably of two minds—of preserving appropriate ambivalence—are central to practical reasoning. Because these skills provide models for addressing conflicts in the public sphere, because they prompt shared deliberation, they are among the civic virtues. (shrink)

It is not uncommon for patients with advanced disease to express a wish to hasten death. Qualitative studies of the WTHD have found that such a wish may have different meanings, none of which can be understood outside of the patient’s personal and sociocultural background, or which necessarily imply taking concrete steps to ending one’s life. The starting point for the present study was a previous systematic review of qualitative studies of the WTHD in advanced patients. Here we analyse in (...) greater detail the statements made by patients included in that review in order to examine their moral understandings and representations of illness, the dying process and death. We identify and discuss four classes of assumptions: assumptions related to patients’ moral understandings in terms of dignity, autonomy and authenticity; assumptions related to social interactions; assumptions related to the value of life; and assumptions related to medicalisation as an overarching context within which the WTHD is expressed. Our analysis shows how a philosophical perspective can add to an understanding of the WTHD by taking into account cultural and anthropological aspects of the phenomenon. We conclude that the knowledge gained through exploring patients’ experience and moral understandings in the end-of-life context may serve as the basis for care plans and interventions that can help them experience their final days as a meaningful period of life, restoring some sense of personal dignity in those patients who feel this has been lost. (shrink)

The current article offers a short critique of some of the pre-suppositions of the positive psychology approach. It takes the seminal book 'Character Strengths and Virtues' by Peterson and Seligman as the key text, and then explores an alternative programme of enquiry offered by virtue ethics as articulated by MacIntyre. The MacIntyrean approach developed here is consciously focused on traditions of virtue ethics, engaging in empirical enquiry from within a particular tradition, and enquiring into the practical ethics of others who (...) may themselves be members of that same tradition, or who may be adherents of some alternative tradition. The purpose of this article is to explore some of the fundamental differences between this kind of virtue ethics approach and that offered by positive psychology. It is suggested that philosophy is much better placed to undertake empirical work than Peterson and Seligman assume, and that their claims to possess superior data should be treated with caution, particularly in respect of their championing of measurement over philosophy. (shrink)

Abstract.Eastern religions, such as Hinduism and Buddhism, have traditionally held to the view that in order for an individual to fully benefit from their practice it was important to lessen or eliminate one's individual desires. Such practice was sometimes referred to as the “death of the ego” in order to emphasize its importance. However, the relatively recent popularity of East‐meets‐West spirituality in Western consumer cultures tends to emphasize the acceptance and transformation of one's ego rather than its death. This essay (...) discusses sociological changes that have shaped and contributed to the popularity of East‐meets‐West spirituality in Western culture that in turn have brought about a modification of the principle of ego death. The views of six Western authors and practitioners of East‐meets‐West spirituality on the importance of the principle of ego death are compared and contrasted. Theories related to the management of self‐identity in consumer society can partly explain the modification of traditional Eastern religious practices, such as ego death, in order that they become relevant and appealing to a society that increasingly reifies the concept of the self. The implication is that the excision of the concept of ego death from the practice of East‐meets‐West spirituality may affect its efficacy. (shrink)

Large language models and other generative artificial intelligence systems are achieving increasingly impressive results, though the quality of those results still seems dull and uninspired. This paper argues that this poor quality can be linked to the philosophical notion of inauthenticity as presented by Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and Heidegger, and that this inauthenticity is fundamentally grounded in the design and structure of such systems by virtue of the way they statistically level down the materials on which they are trained. Although it (...) seems possible to create the conditions for authenticity in these systems, the resulting authenticity would be grounded in machine intelligence, not human intelligence. The argument extends the criticisms of artificial intelligence articulated by Hubert Dreyfus, updated to account for recent developments in machine learning and artificial neural networks. While more optimistic concerning the prospects for successfully creating artificial intelligence than Dreyfus had been, this paper argues that the resulting intelligence may not align well with human intelligence and may not be desirable for humans, if it is fully authentic. (shrink)

The writings of Weber and Taylor have some strong affinities. Both start from the anthropological idea that man evaluates his position in the world and constitutes the social world by values. Their analyses of values aim at an understanding of those intersubjective meanings that have constituted western modernity. But, at the same time, their anthropological starting point leads to different interpretations of modernity. Historically, both argue that rationalization (as instrumental rationality) is one of the most influential Kulturbedeutung of modernity. Weber's (...) thesis of rationalization is, however, entangled in a paradox. Overemphasizing the rationalized elements of modernity, he fails scientifically to grasp certain counter-movements in modernity, such as individuation, subjectivity and new life forms. Taylor, investigating the moral sources of expressivism, shows that these life forms are an inherent part of modernity. Yet his method of articulating the sources of modernity is insufficient to transform it towards a causal explanation of behaviour in everyday life. (shrink)

While many commentators have held that the concept ‘alienation’ is of crucial importance when attempting to understand human existence, others have held that it is an inherently empty concept that we should abandon. In this article, I refute the latters’ charge by showing that each conception of ‘alienation’ is underpinned by a normative ontological conception of the preferable, or authentic, self and show that the concept ‘alienation’ has ethical, existential and socio-political uses. From this I conclude that, when properly understood, (...) the concept ‘alienation’ can provide us with vital insights into human existence. (shrink)

The boundaries of honesty are the focal point of this exploration of the individualistic origins of modernist ethics and the consequent need for a more pragmatic approach to business ethics. The tendency of modernist ethics to see honesty as an individual responsibility is described as a contextually naive approach, one that fails to account for the interactive effects between individual choices and corporate norms. By reviewing the empirical accounts of managerial struggles with ethical dilemmas, the article arrives at the contextual (...) preconditions for encouraging the development of reflective moral agents in modern corporations. (shrink)

While discussing critical individuality as oneof the main goals of liberal education, theemphasis has usually been on direct educationalmeasures. Much less attention has been given tothe social preconditions for its development.This paper discusses the societal aspect of thequestion by employing the notion of spherepluralism. The attempt is to point out someways in which the diversified nature of societycan be employed in its full potential for thedevelopment of critical individuality. Thearticle aims to outline a form of spherepluralism, which is based on (...) structuraldifferentiation, cultural diversity, communalvitality, confessional pluralism andcross-communal criticism. The suggestion isthat the critical potential of sphere pluralismpresupposes a proper balance between sphereautonomy and inter-sphere criticism as well asthat between social construction of meaning andobjective-structural constraints. (shrink)

Emotion is always someone's. An emotion is also, at least typically, about something and witnesses the value, or lack of value, in it. Some emotions, such as shame and pride, are actually about the self that has them. But self-concern can insinuate itself into every corner of the emotional life. This occurs when the centre of concern in emotion drifts from the ostensible objects of focus (I was sorry to hear your bad news) to the emotion itself, to the drama (...) of it, to its feel, to the fact that one is having it. In an unobvious way, the world becomes backdrop, the self the omnipresent protagonist. The apparent ordering, the natural ordering of subject and object in emotion, is inverted. Emotion undergoes a kind of commodification. Yet this is paradoxical. For it isolates the self and subverts the communication and uptake of emotion by others. Narcissism is inimical to the social character of emotion. (shrink)

Abstract:The article draws upon the work of two people, Lawrence Stenhouse and Derek Morrell, who in the 1960s offered a vision of education based upon, first, the moral conviction that a liberal and humane education was essential for all and for society, second, the belief in a curriculum agenda in which such moral conviction might be reconciled with moral uncertainty, and, third, the recognition of the indispensability of a democratic approach to making that reconciliation possible. The article shows how that (...) vision has been dimmed by a prevailing social philosophy and political practice, sadly abetted by some in universities who should know better. (shrink)

Recent work in ethics and epistemology argues that physical surroundings have normative force. The ideas of 'grounding knowledge' and 'real ethics' provide an important way to understand sense of place. This paper uses this work to argue that there is a moral structure to material culture, and that the existence of this moral structure makes it necessary for us to pay attention to the epistemic import of the physical environments we create and live in. Since environments are thick with moral (...) norms, it is incumbent upon us to figure out what kinds of environments are most conducive to our shared visions of the good life. (shrink)

This article provides a conceptual and normative framework through which we may understand the potentially ethically significant roles that information generated by neurotechnologies about our brains and minds may play in our construction of our identities. Neuroethics debates currently focus disproportionately on the ways that third parties may (ab)use these kinds of information. These debates occlude interests we may have in whether and how we ourselves encounter information about our own brains and minds. This gap is not yet adequately addressed (...) by most allusions in the literature to potential identity impacts. These lack the requisite conceptual or normative foundations to explain why we should be concerned about such effects or how they might be addressed. This article seeks to fill this gap by presenting a normative account of identity as constituted by embodied self-narratives. It proposes that information generated by neurotechnologies can play significant content-supplying and interpretive roles in our construction of our self-narratives. It argues, to the extent that these roles support and detract from the coherence and inhabitability of these narratives, access to information about our brains and minds engages non-trivial identity-related interests. These claims are illustrated using examples drawn from empirical literature reporting reactions to information generated by implantable predictive BCIs and psychiatric neuroimaging. The article concludes by highlighting ways in which information generated by neurotechnologies might be governed so as to protect information subjects’ interests in developing and inhabiting their own identities. (shrink)

In recent years there has been much debate over whether recognition has displaced, or should displace, redistribution as the pre‐eminent concern of contemporary politics. That debate is not about whether we should continue to pursue an egalitarian ideal, since equality is as much a goal for the politics of recognition as it is for the politics of redistribution. In this essay, I address only issues of recognition and ask what kind of equal recognition we can reasonably demand or pursue. I (...) argue that we can expect to secure equal recognition of difference or particularity only if that recognition is mediated by more general forms of recognition. Certainly that approach is implied if we hold that difference should be recognised because that difference matters to the recognised rather than to the recogniser. Thus, I challenge the prevailing view that the politics of difference should replace the politics of universalism; rather, the politics of difference presupposes a form of universalism. I also use a distinction between status and merit recognition to indicate the difficulties that confront the goal of equal recognition if we insist that particularity or difference should be the object of unmediated recognition. I use cultural and religious identities as the main foci for my argument, but I also consider how far that argument translates to issues of sexuality and gender. (shrink)

Integrity is generally considered to be an important military virtue. The first part of this article tries to make sense of integrity’s many, often contradicting, meanings. Both in the military and elsewhere, its most common understanding seems to be that integrity requires us to live according to one’s personal principal values and principles we have a moral obligation to do so, and it is a prerequisite to be able to ‘look ourselves in the mirror.’ This notion of integrity as upholding (...) personal values and principles is a very problematic one in itself, especially to those working in the military. For several reasons, perhaps the role that the virtue of integrity has in a military organization could in fact be better played by other virtues. (shrink)

Modern honor appears to be distinguished by two contradictory impulses, a neglect or even disdain of honor, and an ambition to elevate and promote it as dignity, self-esteem, and recognition. The article argues that these tensions can be traced to a foundational difference regarding the political importance of the passion of honor, evident in the seminal and contending formulations by Machiavelli and Hobbes. In recovering and articulating the bases of these competing modern conceptions of honor and tracing the influence of (...) their divergent trajectories, the article seeks to show the importance of honor for understanding contemporary politics. (shrink)

At least since 2003, when the US President’s Council on Bioethics published Beyond Therapy: Biotechnology and the Pursuit of Happiness , there has been heated debate about the ethics of using pharmacology to reduce the intensity of emotions associated with painful memories. That debate has sometimes been conducted in language that obfuscates as much as it illuminates. I argue that the two sides of the debate actually agree that, in general, it is good to reduce the emotional intensity of memories (...) associated with traumatic events, when (as in the case of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder) the intensity of those memories is dis proportionate to the precipitating traumatic event. Both sides also agree that, in general—not as an ironclad rule—it is bad to reduce the emotional intensity of memories associated with difficult but normal human problems of living, when the intensity of the emotions is proportionate to those problems. Between those two areas of agreement, there is a zone of ambiguity, in which reasonable people, who proceed from different but equally ethical frameworks, may indeed reach different conclusions about the same set of facts. But I will argue that even in the zone of ambiguity, there is more agreement than the language favored by the different frameworks sometimes suggests. Ultimately, I suggest that if we see the extent to which the substantive differences between the two frameworks are smaller than their articulators’ language sometimes suggests, we can engage in a more productive conversation about whether a particular intervention will facilitate or diminish human flourishing. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is a critical reflection on the field of educational administration and its varied and often conflicting epistemologies. It is argued that the field of educational administration is a community of diverse epistemologies. Although epistemological heterogeneity has been persistently vilified by both theorists and pragmatists with their own discursive agendas, it is this precise environment of critical dialogue and diversity that is conducive to new frontiers in the field. A phenomenology of recognition is thus presented as (...) a showcase for the possibility of approaching and expanding the field topically rather than treatise-like generalizations at the macro level, which are mostly dated discussions on philosophy of science. The principal value of the article is showing alternative pathways—not limited to the discussions about theory of recognition—to new frontiers in educational administration by demonstrating the possibility of thematic theory developments in the field and defending the diversity of existing epistemologies in the field as an asset rather than a liability for further development in the field. (shrink)

Students today are habitual users of digital technology. However, they do not examine the nature of their relationship with technology. Even though we are all enduring severe environmental crises including the COVID-19 pandemic, our students do not appear to see the interrelated connections between the environmental crisis and themselves. A case in point is that they have difficulty drawing a connection between environmental crises and their participation in industrial civilization. This is why it is necessary to consider technological literacy seriously (...) for our environmental education. This study seeks to investigate an alternative way to set up the relation of technology for the current environmental education by comparing the views of Heidegger and Latour on technology. Even though the question of the two thinkers starts from the same critics of the instrumentality of technology, their strategies to overcome it are quite different. While Heidegger suggests a human-centered relationship between humans and technology, Latour criticizes the limitation of this approach and maintains that more symmetrical relations with technology are needed as a form of a network between human and nonhuman actors. In this paper, I argue for the urgency of cultivating a sense of connection for our students’ technological literacy in this environmental crisis. For that purpose, I insist Latour’s advice for teachers and researchers to be considered more seriously to encourage students to take symmetrical relationship with technology in these aggravating environmental crises. (shrink)

In this paper, we reconceptualize CSR in the media industries by combining empirical data with theoretical perspectives emerging from the communication studies and business ethics literature. We develop a new conception of what corporate responsibility in media organizations may mean in real terms by bringing Bardoel and d’Haenens’ discussion of the different dimensions of media accountability into conversation with the empirical results from three international focus group studies, conducted in France, the USA and South Africa. To enable a critical perspective (...) on our findings, we perform a philosophical analysis of its implications for professional, public, market, and political accountability in the media, drawing on the insights of Paul Virilio. We come to the conclusion that though some serious challenges to media accountability exist, the battle for responsible media industries is not lost. In fact, the speed characterizing the contemporary media environment may hold some promise for fostering the kind of relational accountability that could underpin a new understanding of CSR in the media. (shrink)

The belief that human rights are culturally relative has been reinforced by recent attempts to develop more plausible conceptions of human rights whose philosophical foundations are closely aligned with culture-specific ideas about human nature and/or dignity. This paper contests specifically the position that a conception of human rights is culturally relative by way of contesting the claim that there is an African case in point. That is, it contests the claim that there is a unique theory of rights. It analyses (...) three examples of what often passes as African conception of human rights arguing that they have little or nothing to do with human rights, are simply inadequate or are not African in the sense at issue in a cultural relativism. Along the way, it distinguishes between two meanings of the term African contending that to the extent that the practice of prizing the ‘community’ higher than any other value is definitive of African, the idea of African human rights remains suspect. (shrink)

The dominant model for bioethical inquiry taught in medical schools is that of principlism. The heritage of this methodology can be traced to the Enlightenment project of generating a universalizable justification for normative morality arising from within the individual, rational agent. This project has been criticized by Alasdair MacIntyre who suggests that its failure has resulted in a fragmented and incoherent contemporary ethical framework characterized by fundamental intractability in moral debate. This incoherence implicates principlist conceptions of bioethics. Medical ethics as (...) practiced, though, is partially in keeping with teleological alternatives to principlism. Nonetheless, the hegemony of principlism threatens to harm the practice of good medicine whenever it is used to provide justification for the sanction or prohibition of practices, despite not being equipped to grant moral authority to such justifications. An example of this failure and its resulting harm is expressed in the growing obsolescence of living donor liver transplantation. (shrink)

According to Stephen Holland, the challenges I mention in my original paper can be met, so that, in a way, the problem of paternalism in public health care—which I intended to put into perspective by drawing out some possible justifications for it—returns in all its might and glory. But of course, as Holland observes, I never suggested that my challenges could never be met. I only wanted to point out that for each and every particular public health policy that should (...) come to our attention we should reflect upon these challenges and see whether they could provide reasons for justification. I believe that the discussion is often stalled because these measures—in the absence of individual consent and in their aim to benefit the public's ‘best interests’—seem to be paternalist by default. In my paper, I wanted to call this assumption into question, but never intended to prove that there is no such thing as unjustified paternalism in public health care. Nevertheless, Holland's criticism is very insightful and he has done a lot to clarify my position. However, he also puts me on the spot by urging me to argue to what extent I can meet his rebuttal, and I am very grateful for that opportunity. (shrink)

The long-running discourse on respect for human dignity and autonomy in the physician-patient relationship pertaining to persons with dementia (PwDs) is explored deeply in this paper through the use of a real-life case, to highlight the complex interplay between autonomy and best interest when it comes to a PwD's experiential and critical interests. Many scenarios and perspectives are described and applies to the case. However, there are a few perspectives, which are touched upon that could do with further scrutiny. Firstly, (...) it has been argued that rigid adherence to the advance directives of PwDs means that PwDs will be the only people who are not allowed to ever change their minds. This withdrawal of a fundamental freedom hardly accords with respect for human dignity, or for any residual autonomy that these individuals may still enjoy. Secondly, viewing this case through the lens of care ethics, and incorporating the recently proposed conceptual framework of anthropological vulnerability, may reveal valuable insights regarding care provision and caring physician-patient relationships. These perspectives would analyse the role of relational ontology, particularly in relation to significant others, significant communities, and caregivers. (shrink)

: This project draws on scholarship of feminist and womanist scholars, and on results of interviews with scientists currently involved in molecular genetics. With reference to Margaret Urban Walker's "practices of moral responsibility," the social practices of molecular geneticists are explored, and strategies identified through which scientists negotiate their moral responsibilities. The implications of this work for scientists and for feminists are discussed.

This project draws on scholarship of feminist and womanist scholars, and on results of interviews with scientists currently involved in molecular genetics. With reference to Margaret Urban Walker's “practices of moral responsibility,” the social practices of molecular geneticists are exphred, and strategies identified through which scientists negotiate their moral responsibilities. The implications of this work for scientists and for feminists are discussed.

Hastings Center Report, Volume 52, Issue 1, Page 42-50, January/February 2022.

Abstract Nancy Fraser raises serious doubts about the critical potential of identity theories of recognition on the ground that they encourage the reduction of personal identity to cultural identity. Based on a comparative analysis of Charles Taylor's and Axel Honneth's theories of recognition, this paper argues that Fraser's critique is justified with respect to some aspects of Taylor's theory of identity, but not with respect to his conception of recognition, or to Honneth's conception of both identity and recognition. Taylor's theory (...) of identity recognition is vulnerable to Fraser's critique because under certain conditions of pathological socialization it cannot prevent the normative subordination of strong evaluation to whatever dominant goods are acquired through acculturation. Honneth's theory of identity recognition overcomes this normative weakness in three ways. First, Honneth differentiates between three types of self-relation that cannot be reduced to cultural identity. Second, he operates with a mixed, attributive?responsive model of recognition that normatively underwrites all these types of self-relation. Third, he makes the condition of reciprocity in recognition the criterion for successful self-realization that enables one to distinguish between misrecognition and non-normative experiences of human suffering. (shrink)

Practitioners of education in South Africa (SA) struggle painfully between the extremes of its authoritarian and deeply religious roots that prescribe blind obedience to people in authority and their elders, and the demands of open-mindedness, critical thinking and also solidarity required for democratic citizenship. A particular pedagogy was used with some 400 student teachers to investigate philosophically the rights and wrongs of corporal punishment in schools. This article justifies the use of this particular approach to moral education ? despite its (...) ?Western? liberal roots ? in post-apartheid SA as it opens up a non-judgemental space to explore philosophically what students actually believe. Without moralising or slipping into moral relativism, such philosophical teaching increases student participation, autonomy and self-discipline, and at the same time develops moral reasoning and moral knowledge. Hence, it needs to be introduced as a pedagogy in institutions that educate future teachers. (shrink)

Purpose. The article deals with the consideration of certain types of value models of human creation from the standpoint of philosophical anthropology and social philosophy. It is about certain models that fulfill the worldview-semantic modes of a person. Theoretical basis. The authors cover peculiarities of such models in the process of creation of "the new types of a person". The process of reformatting these types and its means are studied. The process of valuing metamorphoses of Ukrainians is taken as an (...) example. The research is limited to the Soviet period and the period of independence, which is reflected respectively in Thesis I – The Phenomenon of Homo Sovieticus and Thesis II – A Person in the Situation of Post-Homo Sovieticus. The emphasis is on the peculiarities of the value matrix of these types and their ideological potential. Originality is in the disclosure of anthropological models that correspond to the value functionality, that is, the determination and expression of the essence of a person. It is shown that certain projects, under the conditions of forced reformatting, by their value reduction are classified as inhuman. They are based on the narrative of ideological myth and deprived of the projection of the complete development of a personality. The proposed approach allows to revise the current trends of such projections and, most importantly, to predict their value potentials in the dynamics of the transformational progress of the essence of the modern Ukrainian. Conclusions. The essay reflects the process of transformation of the worldview-semantic modes, which are represented by two situations-products – the Soviet person and the contemporary. The first type is formed by the mythology of political ideology. This person is deprived of himself or herself. Their collective identity is brought up by the anthropological effect of violence and fear. The second type is very similar. This person finds himself or herself in the situation of value disorientation, nostalgic impulses and instrumental thinking. Their task is to move towards the "monad personality". This is possible by means of formation of the "own philosophy", "inherent teleology of a breakthrough", as well as by taking into account the problem of consolidation and radicalism of external factor. (shrink)