Meditation and Consciousness

The term mindfulness has become increasingly popular in the West due, in no small part, to contemporary studies of mindfulness-based therapies in psychology. According to the Pali Nik?yas, mindfulness practice is the heart of Buddhism, for it alone can lead one to enlightenment. However, are contemporary and traditional accounts of the practice of mindfulness referring to the same technique? In this paper I will argue that modern accounts of mindfulness in the field of psychology omit important features of the classical (...) Buddhist accounts of the term: specifically, the sense of mindfulness (sati) as recollection, and the context of mindfulness practice, which includes significant ethical and cognitive implications. I will argue that the exclusion of these aspects of sati leads to confusion and to the neglect of constitutive features of the Buddhist practice of mindfulness that could prove beneficial to modern contemplative practitioners as well as to both psychology and cognitive science. While the Western psychological tradition emphasizes the nonjudgmental and present-centered nature of mindfulness -bare attention- (Kabat-Zinn, 2003), the classical accounts given in traditional Buddhist texts, both Theravada and Mahayana, emphasize the relation of sati to memory and the cognitive and evaluative aspects of the practice, as well as its ability to distinguish and select between wholesome and unwholesome tendencies. Classical sources also emphasize the need for mindfulness practice to be embedded in the Noble Eightfold Path. While contemporary mindfulness is practiced as a way to better enjoy the present moment, the traditional notion of sati is actually supposed to induce “disenchantment” with our present circumstances so as to be motivated to free oneself from samsara (Wallace, 2006). Thus, close analysis reveals that, although the notion of bare attention is not completely foreign to traditional views, it by no means exhausts the complete meaning of sati. As long as the recollecting, cognitive, and ethical features of sati are ignored, mindfulness will continue to be regarded merely as a therapeutical tool for reducing mental symptoms, rather than for irreversibly eliminating mental afflictions (klesha) from their root, which is the fundamental goal of Buddhist practice.. (shrink)

PLoS ONE 3(3): e1897. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.

Anders, Rudi When I see a colourful sunset, my mind goes to a spectacular purple sunset I saw near the Mexican border many years ago. That memory stops me from being fully aware of the scene in front of me. No two sunsets are the same and my memory is stopping me from fully appreciating the spectacle before my eyes. Famous and spectacular places don't work for me because expectations and memories get in the way, but when I walk alone (...) in nature I find my mind stops chattering and I begin to effortlessly notice the shades of green in the foliage, the patterns in the bark on the trees and the sounds and fragrances. It sometimes feels as if am absorbed by the surroundings. When this happens I don't bother with the names of birds or flowers because even that distracts from direct experience. (shrink)

This paper pursues two lines of inquiry. First, drawing on evidence from clinical literature on borderline states of consciousness, I propose a new categorical framework for liminal states of consciousness associated with certain forms of meditative attainment; second, I argue for dissociating phenomenal character from phenomenal content in accounting for the etiology of nonconceptual states of awareness. My central argument is that while the idea of nonconceptual awareness remains problematic for Buddhist philosophy of mind, our linguistic and categorizing practices cannot (...) be adequately explained without considering the ways in which the first-person phenomenology grounds a more basic level of cognitive and affective sensing. (shrink)

Monográfico titulado: "Yoga: Historia, filosofía y prácticas", núm. 94, 2022. Aposta.Revista de Ciencias Sociales. ISSN: 1696-7348.

El yoga supramental nunca será un yoga mainstream, ni está diseñado para serlo. No puede subsumirse en una clase de hora y media, ni se presta a ser encerrado en una sala de yoga. Se trata de un compromiso existencial que requiere de toda una vida de dedicación. En estas páginas indago en la vida de su fundador, el yogui, poeta y filósofo Sri Aurobindo (1872-1950). Educado en Cambridge, activista político en pos de la independencia de India y nominado al (...) Premio Nobel de literatura y de la paz, Sri Aurobindo fue sobre todo un experimentador de las profundidades de la conciencia, cuyo yoga se inspira en la enseñanza de Sri Ramakrishna, tal y como algunos investigadores contemporáneos están reivindicando en nuestros días. En este texto enfatizo esa influencia de Sri Ramakrishna, bosquejo la sādhanā que propone el yoga supramental tal y como se refleja en la correspondencia que Sri Aurobindo mantuvo con sus discípulos, e indago en el papel que cumplen la emoción y el fuego anímico en un yoga que tiene como finalidad la espiritualización de la materia. (shrink)

In che cosa crede chi pratica la meditazione buddhista? Dare una risposta univoca e coerente è assai difficile; il Buddhismo infatti si concretizza in una molteplicità di scuole e dottrine caratterizzate da complesse logiche e metafisiche. Ci sono tuttavia delle indicazioni minimali che fungono da denominator comune per chi si accosta alla meditazione. Esse riguardano soprattutto l’assenza di punti di vista determinati, l’esperienza del tempo e la relazione di dipendenza reciproca di ogni cosa con ogni altra. Utilizzando gli strumenti della (...) filosofia analitica, questo libro propone una interpretazione dei princìpi basilari che guidano la meditazione buddhista, facendo leva sulle potenzialità del senso comune, inteso non semplicemente come l’opinione generica della maggioranza – troppo spesso già infarcita di presupposti metafisici discutibili - bensì come insieme di credenze che tutti noi possediamo, ma di cui non sempre siamo consapevoli. (shrink)

A philosopher and a cognitive neuroscientist conversed with Buddhist lama Tilmann Lhündrup Borghardt about the unresolved phenomenological concerns and logical questions surrounding “pure” consciousness or minimal phenomenal experience, a quasi-contentless, non-dual state whose phenomenology of “emptiness” is often described in terms of the phenomenal quality of luminosity that experienced meditators have reported occurs in deep meditative states. Here, we present the excerpts of the conversation that relate to the question of how it is possible to first have and later retrieve (...) such non-dual states of selflessness and timelessness that are unrelated to sensory input. According to TLB, a “pure” experience of consciousness contains the phenomenal quality of luminous clarity, which is experienced solely in the transitional phase from the non-dual state of absolute emptiness to the state of minimal emptiness, when the person gradually returns to duality. However, this quality of luminous clarity can also be experienced in non-minimal states as in the experiential mode of being awakened. TLB describes this transition as a kind of ephemeral afterglow in the form of a maximally abstract phenomenal quality, i.e., luminosity, which justifies the conclusion of having been in a state of “pure” consciousness. (shrink)

Recently, a three-dimensional construct model for complex experiential Selfhood has been proposed (Fingelkurts et al., 2016b,c). According to this model, three specific subnets (or modules) of the brain self-referential network (SRN) are responsible for the manifestation of three aspects/features of the subjective sense of Selfhood. Follow up multiple studies established a tight relation between alterations in the functional integrity of the triad of SRN modules and related to them three aspects/features of the sense of self; however, the causality of this (...) relation is yet to be shown. In this article we approached the question of causality by exploring functional integrity within the three SRN modules that are thought to underlie the three phenomenal components of Selfhood while these components were manipulated mentally by experienced meditators in a controlled and independent manner. Participants were requested, in a block-randomised manner, to mentally induce states representing either increased (up-regulation) or decreased (down-regulation) sense of (a) witnessing agency (“Self”), or (b) body representational-emotional agency (“Me”), or (c) reflective/narrative agency (“I”), while their brain activity was recorded by an electroencephalogram (EEG). This EEG-data was complemented by first-person phenomenological reports and standardised questionnaires which focused on subjective contents of three aspects of Selfhood. The results of the study strengthen the case for a direct causative relationship between three phenomenological aspects of Selfhood and related to them three modules of the brain SRN. Furthermore, the putative integrative model of the dynamic interrelations among three modules of the SRN has been proposed. (shrink)

In Buddhism, Meditation and Free Will: A Theory of Mental Freedom , Rick Repetti explains how the dynamics of Buddhist meditation can result in a kind of metacognition and metavolitional control that exceeds what is required for free will and defeats the most powerful forms of free will skepticism. This article argues that although the Buddhist path requires and enhances the kind of mental and volitional control Repetti describes, the central dynamic of the path and meditation is better understood as (...) a process of habituation. This not only involves the dis‐identification from mental and emotional content that Repetti discusses—and is commonly emphasized in modern presentations of mindfulness or insight (vipassanā ) meditation—but also a transformation of the heart that is effected through the complementary psychological and somatic qualities associated with calm abiding (samatha ) and concentration (samādhi ) and emphasized in the Pali Nikāyas and commentaries. (shrink)

This is my response to the criticisms of Gregg Caruso, David Cummiskey, and Karin Meyers, in their roles as members of the “Author Meets Critics” panel devoted to my book, Buddhism, Meditation, and Free Will: A Theory of Mental Freedom at the 2019 annual meeting of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association, organized by Christian Coseru. Caruso's main objection is that I am not sufficiently attentive to details of opposing arguments in Western philosophy, and Cummiskey's and Meyers’ objections, (...) similarly, are that I am insufficiently attentive to details of Buddhism. I argue that all such objections, however putatively correct, do not rise to the level of objections that actually undermine my account of mental freedom. (shrink)

이 책의 p 135 또는 326에 대한 간략한 요약을 얻을 수 있습니다. 당신이 진화 심리학에 속도를하지 않는경우, 당신은 먼저 제목에이 용어와 수많은 최근 텍스트 중 하나를 읽어야한다. 최고 중 하나는 버스에 의해 2 nd "진화 심리학의 핸드북"입니다. 2nd 약 15 년 전까지, 행동의 설명은 정말 전혀 정신 과정에 대한 설명이 아니었다, 하지만 오히려 모호하고 크게 사람들이 무슨 짓을하고 그들이 말한 에 대한 설명, 이유에 대한 통찰력없이. 우리는 사람들이 행사를 기념하고, 하나님을 찬양하고, 그 (또는 그) 축복을 받기 위해 모인다고 말할 수 (...) 있습니다.. 그러나 이 중 어느 것도 관련 정신 적 과정을 설명하지, 않으므로 사과가 왜 땅에 떨어지는지 설명하는 것과 거의 같은 방식으로 설명이라고 말할 수, 있습니다. 이 책은 학계, 종교, 정치 및 대중에 의해 거의 보편적으로 무시되고 거부 된 인간의 행동의 유전 적 기초의 해명 (핑커의 우수한 책 ''빈 Slatè'참조)을 계속합니다. 그의 진술 (p3)은 종교가 유전적인지 묻는 것은 의미가 없으며 유전자와 환경으로 인한 모든 행동의 변이 율이 다른 모든 행동 (예 : 핑커 참조)과 마찬가지로 연구 될 수 있습니다. 제목은 "원시 종교의 일부 측면을 설명하는 예비 시도"해야한다,, 그는 전혀 높은 의식을 취급하지 않기 때문에 (예를 들어, 사토리, 깨달음 등) 이는 지금까지 가장 흥미로운 현상과 지적, 교육된 사람들에게 개인 관심의 종교의 유일한 부분입니다 21 세기에. 이 책 전체를 읽으면 그런 것들이 존재한다고 생각하지 않을 것입니다. 마찬가지로,, 마약과 종교의 거대한 분야에 대한. 그것은 합리성에 대한 프레임 워크가 부족하고 지금 너무 생산적 인 생각보기의 이중 시스템을 언급하지 않습니다. th에 대한 내 자신의 최근 논문을 제안 합니다. 그럼에도 불구하고, 이 책은 많은 관심을 가지고있으며, 날짜가 되었음에도 불구하고 여전히 읽을 가치가 있습니다. 현대 의 두 시스템 보기에서인간의 행동에 대한 포괄적 인 최신 프레임 워크를 원하는 사람들은 내 책을 참조 할 수 있습니다'철학의 논리적 구조, 심리학, 민d와 루드비히 비트겐슈타인과 존 Searle의언어' 2nd ed (2019). 내 글의 더 많은 관심있는 사람들은 '이야기 원숭이를 볼 수 있습니다-철학, 심리학, 과학, 종교와 운명 행성에 정치 - 기사 및 리뷰 2006-2019 3 rd 에드 (2019) 및 21st 세기 4번째 에드 (2019) 및 기타에서 자살 유토피아 망상. (shrink)

Вы можете получить краткое резюме этой книги на р 135 или 326. Если вы не до скорости, на эволюционной психологии, вы должны сначала прочитать один из многочисленных последних текстов с этим термином в названии. Один из лучших является "Справочник эволюционной психологии" 22-й ed Buss. Примерно 15 лет назад, «объяснение» поведения на самом деле не были объясненияпсихических процессов на всех, но довольно расплывчатые и в значительной степени бесполезные описания того, что люди сделали и что они сказали, без понимания, почему. Мы могли (...) бы сказать, что люди собираются, чтобы отметить событие, хвалить бога, получить его (или ее или их) благословения, и т.д.. , но все это описывает соответствующие психические процессы,, поэтому мы могли бы сказать, что они являются объяснениявоем во многом таким же образом, что это объясняет, почему яблоко падает на землю, если мы говорим его, потому что мы выпустили его,, и это тяжелый-нет никакого механизма и не пояснительную или прогностической власти. Эта книга продолжает разъяснение генетической основы человеческого поведения, которое было почти повсеместно проигнорировано и отвергнуто научными кругами, религией, политикой и общественностью (см. отличную книгу Пинкера «Пустой Слате»). Его заявление (p3) о том, что бессмысленно спрашивать, является ли религия генетической, ошибочно, так как процент изменения любого поведения из-за генов и окружающей среды может быть изучен, так же, как и для всех других моделей поведения (см., например, Пинкер). Название должно быть "Предварительные попытки объяснить некоторые аспекты примитивной религии",, так как он не относится к высшему сознанию на всех (например, сатори, просветление и т.д.), которые на сегодняшний день являются наиболее интересными явлениями и единственной частью религии личного интереса к умным, образованным людям в 21 веке. Читая всю эту книгу, вы никогда не догадаетесь, такие вещи существуют. Аналогичным образом,, для огромной области наркотиков и религии. В нем отсутствуют рамки для рациональности и не упоминается о двойных системах мышления, которые в настоящее время столь продуктивны. Для йis я предлагаю мои собственные последние документы. Тем не менее, книга имеет большой интерес, и, несмотря на то, от все еще стоит прочитать. Те, кто желает всеобъемлющего до современных рамок для человеческого поведения из современных двух systEms зрения могут проконсультироваться с моей книгой"Логическая структура философии, психологии, Минd иязык в Людвиг Витгенштейн и Джон Сирл" второй ред (2019). Те, кто заинтересован в более моих сочинений могут увидеть "Говоря обезьян - Философия, психология, наука, религия и политика на обреченной планете - Статьи и обзоры 2006-2019 3-й ed (2019) и suicidal утопических заблуждений в 21-мst веке 4-й ed (2019) th и другие. (shrink)

Краткий обзор жизни и духовной автобиографии уникального американского мистика Ади Да (Франклин Джонс). Наклейка на обложке некоторых изданий говорит: "Самая глубокая духовная автобиография всех времен", и это вполне может быть правдой. Я нахожусь в моих 70 и прочитал много книг духовных учителей и на духовность, и это один из величайших. Конечно,, это byдалеко самый полный и ясный отчет о процессе просветления я когда-либо видел. Даже если у вас нет никакого интереса вообще в самых увлекательных из всех человеческих психологических процессов, это (...) удивительный документ, который раскрывает многое о религии, йоге и человеческой психологии и зондирует глубины и пределы человеческих возможностей. Я описываю его в некоторых деталях и сравнить его учение с современной индийской мистик Ошо. Те, кто желает всеобъемлющего до современных рамок для человеческого поведения из современных двух systEms зрения могут проконсультироваться с моей книгой"Логическая структура философии, психологии, Минd иязык в Людвиг Витгенштейн и Джон Сирл" второй ред (2019). Те, кто заинтересован в более моих сочинений могут увидеть "Говоря обезьян - Философия, психология, наука, религия и политика на обреченной планете - Статьи и обзоры 2006-2019 3-й ed (2019) и suicidal утопических заблуждений в 21-мst веке 4-й ed (2019) th и другие. (shrink)

Una breve rassegna della vita e dell'autobiografia spirituale dell'unico mistico americano Adi Da (Franklin Jones). L'adesivo sulla copertina di alcune edizioni dice 'L'autobiografia spirituale più profonda di tutti i tempi' e questo potrebbe essere vero. Ho 70 anni e ho letto molti libri di insegnanti spirituali e sulla spiritualità, e questo è uno dei più grandi. Certamente, è by lontano il resoconto più completo e piùchiaro del processo di illuminazione che abbia mai visto. Anche se non hai alcun interesse nel (...) più affascinante di tutti i processi psicologici umani, è un documento incredibile che rivela molto sulla religione, lo yoga e la psicologia umana e sonda le profondità e i limiti delle possibilità umane. Lo descrivo in dettaglio e paragono il suo insegnamento a quello del mistico indiano contemporaneo Osho. Coloro che desiderano un quadro aggiornato completo per il comportamento umano dalla moderna vista a due systems possono consultare il mio libro 'La struttura logica dellafilosofia, psicologia, Mind e il linguaggio in Ludwig Wittgenstein e John Searle' 2nd ed (2019). Coloro che sono interessati a più dei miei scritti possono vedere 'TalkingMonkeys--Filosofia, Psicologia, Scienza, Religione e Politica su un Pianeta Condannato--Articoli e Recensioni 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) e Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019) . (shrink)

While philosophers of mind have devoted abundant time and attention to questions of content and consciousness, philosophical questions about the nature and scope of mental action have been relatively neglected. Galen Strawson’s account of mental action, arguably the most well-known extant account, holds that cognitive mental action consists in triggering the delivery of content to one’s field of consciousness. However, Strawson fails to recognize several distinct types of mental action that might not reduce to triggering content delivery. In this paper, (...) we argue that meditation provides a useful model for understanding a wider range of types of mental action than heretofore recognized. Conclusions yielded by two distinct bodies of current psychological research on meditation and cognition, and meditation and introspection, buttress meditation’s suitability for this role. (shrink)

In this article I examine an important episode in the growth of ‘mindfulness’ as a biomedical modality in Britain: the formation and establishment of Mindfulness-Based Cognitive Therapy by John Teasdale and his colleagues Mark Williams and Zindel Segal. My study, focusing on Teasdale’s contribution, combines ethnographic, oral historical and archival research to understand how mindfulness was disseminated or, to use a term sometimes used by mindfulness practitioners themselves, ‘transmitted’. Drawing on theoretical support from Max Weber, Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze, (...) I argue that transmission had a very specific form within the Buddhistic milieu that Teasdale occupied and within which he developed MBCT. To ‘transmit’ mindfulness was to transmit an experiential essence; a type of subjectivity that was seen as perennial, universal and radically distinct from its historical context. In tracing the recurring metaphysical, metaphorical and visual tropes of mindfulness and its transmission, I attempt to understand how Teasdale was embedded in both local and global networks of discourse and practice, and how his life and work contributed and depended upon an assemblage whose elements straddled empiricist psychology and religious mysticism. I also examine how authority, experience and knowledge were closely interwoven in the birth of British mindfulness, coming together to form an affectively compelling ‘diagram’ that shaped the way mindfulness was practiced and disseminated. In doing so, I aim to open up the possibility of studying the history of the human sciences from a new perspective: one which places an emphasis on the emotional impetus generated by metaphysical assumptions. (shrink)

The acclaim accorded Jiddu ‘Krishnamurti’ (1895-1986) – as an apparently major figure in our modern understanding of all things spiritual – shows just how shallow western popular culture is when it tries to extend its reach beyond science, materialism and celebrity. Krishnamurti liked to portray himself as a wholly independent thinker, and as someone who encouraged similar independence of thought in others, yet he milked the role of an oriental guru tirelessly, discoursing from on high in an autocratic and commanding (...) manner. At best his vast body of transcribed teachings is diverting nonsense; at worst he’s wasting our time. -/- keywords: criticism critical analysis critique Jiddu Krishnamurti assessment evaluation appraisal. (shrink)

The above problem is discussed with the use of the example of selected canonical Upanishads. The analysis starts with a fragment from the Mundaka Upanishad : “When he [ brahman ] that is both high [ para ] and low [ apara ] is seen”. In my opinion, this very conjoining of the absolute and relative reality, which is considerably rare in the canonical texts, requires in-depth analysis. In the discussed texts, the para / apara dimensions of reality are strictly (...) correlated with the states of consciousness in which they are experienced. Thus, in my discussion, I also consider whether all yoga adepts have always been talking about experiencing the four states of consciousness. I discuss the terms which denote the para and apara dimensions as well as the question whether the text indicates their hierarchy and, if this is the case, in what contexts and in what respect. I refer to the canonical Upanishads which belong to the Atharvaveda lineage, i.e. to Prashna, Mundaka, and Mandukya. (shrink)

The relation of the meditative state of jhāna to the development of insight and liberating knowledge is one of the most controversial issues in studies on early Buddhism. In the Suttapitaka and later Buddhist meditative texts, one can find discrepancies which are difficult to reconcile. In this paper, I propose a new model of meditative insight using an interdisciplinary approach based both on critical philological studies of the Suttapitaka and the results of the dynamically developing cognitive science. I also highlight (...) and examine the difficulties related to the traditional Buddhist model of insight. In order to propose a plausible model of insight as an element organically linked to jhāna, I refer to several new developments in the field of cognitive science. (shrink)

In addition to the familiar moral theories of Virtue Ethics, Consequentialism and Deontology, India presents us with one unique moral theory: it may be called “Yoga” (discipline, meditation) but also “Bhakti,” which is typically translated as “Devotion” but is also translated as “Love.” In this chapter, I focus on Bhakti, in its formal and informal manifestations in Indian philosophy. In order to understand how it is a distinct and basic option of moral theory, I will identify four basic options of (...) moral theory by being explicit about my methodology in the study of philosophy. This allows us to appreciate how the Indian disagreements on moral theory contribute to a philosophical exploration of love. It will also help us appreciate how Yoga/Bhakti (Love) is a unique, basic theoretical option that treats love as the basic conception of morality. In providing such an account, Yoga/Bhakti elucidates the moral unity of a diverse range of concerns that we talk about with the English term “love,” including strong evaluation of things (“I love that song”), relationships of friendship, familial bonds, and the intimacy of sexual partners. (shrink)

Prominent figures in the philosophical literature on attention hold that the connection between attention and selection is essential (Mole, 2011), necessary (Wu, 2011; 2014), or conceptual (Smithies, 2011). I argue that selection is neither essentially, necessarily, nor conceptually tied to attention. I first isolate the target conception of selection that I deny is so tightly coupled with attention: graded intramodal selection within consciousness. I analyse two visual cases: analysis of the first case shows that there can be attention without a (...) connection to tasks or action; analysis of the second case shows that there can be attention without a phenomenal foreground/background structure. Finally, I extend the argument into the domain of the body by considering a form of meditative absorption in body sensations to recapitulate the conclusions drawn from the two visual cases. (shrink)

Theories of meditation predict systematic changes or alterations of consciousness that go along with increased practice. This paper first summarizes the predictions of three representative theoretical approaches: the early Buddhist theory of meditation, the Samkhya/Yoga theory, and a theoretical approach based on contemporary Western mindfulness meditation. The two traditional theories predict the existence of an ultimate altered state of consciousness often termed enlightenment or liberation, and the occurrence of other advanced and intermediate ASCs such as psi-like phenomena, states of deep (...) absorption, and states of bliss, but also highly negative states, as well as a variety of anomalous sensory experiences. Both the theoretical frameworks of contemporary mindfulness meditation and traditional theories predict profound meditation- induced changes that might be summarized as 'less selfishness and more happiness'; these are termed 'mundane ASCs'. There is some empirical support for the existence of the ultimate ASC, as well as for psi-like phenomena, but the systematic evidence available is far from conclusive. Predictions for other intermediate ASCs are better supported, and the evidence for mundane ASCs is quite solid. It seems worthwhile to put more effort into examining the predictions for advanced ASCs by collaborating with very experienced meditators, relying on sophisticated single-case studies, and employing sensitive qualitative methods. (shrink)

The picture of moral development defended by followers of Aristotle takes moral cultivation to be like playing a harp; one gets to be good by actually spending time playing a real instrument. On this view, we cultivate a virtue by doing the actions associated with that virtue. I argue that this picture is inadequate and must be supplemented by imaginative techniques. One can, and sometimes must, cultivate virtue without actually performing the associated actions. Drawing on strands in Buddhist philosophy, I (...) explain several methods of moral development that rely on imagination and visualization rather than overt action. These techniques are essential in cases where cultivating virtue the way one practices the harp is impossible. In particular, I focus on single-event virtues, first-time virtuous acts, and morally dangerous situations. (shrink)

In our society, where interest in Buddhist meditation is expanding enormously, numerous scientific studies are now conducted on the neurophysiological effects of meditation practices and on the neural correlates of meditative states. However, very few studies have been conducted on the experience associated with contemplative practice: what it is like to meditate -- from moment to moment, at different stages of practice -- remains almost invisible in contemporary contemplative science. Recently, 'micro-phenomenological' interview methods have been developed to help us become (...) aware of lived experience and describe it with rigour and precision. The present article presents the results of a pilot project1 aimed at applying these methods to the description of meditative experience. The first part of the article describes these methods and their adjustment for the investigation of meditative experience. The second part provides micro- phenomenological descriptions of two processes of which meditation practice enables the practitioner to become aware: the process of losing contact with the current situation and generation of virtual ones in 'mind-wandering' episodes, and the process of emergence of a thought. The third part of the article highlights the interest such descriptions may have for practitioners and for teachers of meditation, defines the status of these results, and outlines directions for further research. (shrink)

Yoga is a nonspeciesist liberalism, founded in a moral non-naturalism, which identifies the essence of personhood as the Lord, defined by unconservative self-governance—an abstraction from each of us that is non-proprietary. According to Yoga, the right is defined as the approximation of the regulative ideal (the Lord) and the good is the perfection of this practice, which delivers us from a life of coercion into a personal world of freedom. It is an alternative to Deontology, Consequentialism, and Virtue Ethics, which (...) provides a unitary account of moral well-being and worldly well-being. The seeming antinomy of freedom and determinism is resolved in the ethical life. I argue that Yoga provides a critical and instructive response to alternative ethical theories and the problem of collective harm. (shrink)

In conveying experiences of meditation, the question of what exceeds or should resist description has been a recurrent topic of commentary in a wide array of literature -- including religious doctrine, meditation guides, and contextual accounts written by historians and social scientists. Yet, to date, this question has not significantly informed neuroscientific studies on the effects of meditation on brain and behaviour, in large part -- but not wholly -- because of the disregard for first-person accounts of experience that still (...) characterizes neuroscience in general. By juxtaposing perspectives from non-neuroscientific accounts on the tensions and questions raised by what is and is not expressed or expressible in words, this article paves the way for a new set of possibilities in experimental contemplative neuroscience. (shrink)

On the basis of many years of personal experience the paper describes Buddhist meditation as a mystical practice. After a short discussion of the role of some central concepts in Buddhism, William James’ concept of religious experience is used to explain the goal of meditators as the achievement of a special kind of an experience of this kind. Systematically, its main point is to explain the difference between a craving for pleasant ‘mental events’ in the sense of short-term moods, and (...) the long-term project of achieving a deep change in one’s attitude to life as a whole, a change that allows the acceptance of suffering and death. The last part argues that there is no reason to call the discussed practice irrational in a negative sense. Changes of attitude of the discussed kind cannot be brought about by argument alone. Therefore, a considered use of age-old practices like meditation should be seen as an addition, not as an undermining of reason. (shrink)

Based on recent findings, we propose a framework for a relationship among attention, effort and optimal performance. Optimal performance often refers to an effortless and automatic, flow-like state of performance. Mindfulness regulates the focus of attention to optimal focus on the core component of the action, avoiding too much attention that could be detrimental for elite performance. Balanced attention is a trained state that can optimize any particular attentional activity on the dual-process spectrum.

In this paper I will use the phenomenology of Zen meditation to look at the role of attention within the predictive processing framework. Section 1 introduces PP, according to which the brain is a dynamical, hierarchical, hypothesis-testing mechanism. Section 2 discusses the current proposal that attention is the process of precision optimization and presents some of the challenges for this theory. Section 3 introduces zazen and uses some of the emerging patterns of its phenomenology to clarify the workings of attention, (...) with a special emphasis on the difficulty of maintaining a relaxed and homogeneous state of attention. I claim that this difficulty corresponds to a hyperprior that leads to the expectation of a given level of uncertainty in the world, which in turn pulls attention towards distracting input. Section 4 looks at research about cognitive control and meditation, and concludes that the agent can attempt to impose a global strategy that can affect the assignment of precision expectations, but that this assignment ultimately depends on a complex interplay of different factors. Section 5 discusses some possible challenges for the claims of this paper and Section 6 is a conclusion followed by possible future directions. (shrink)

Saṃvega is a morally motivating state of shock that -- according to Buddhaghosa -- should be evoked by meditating on death. What kind of mental state it is exactly, and how it is morally motivating is unclear, however. This article presents a theory of saṃvega -- what it is and how it works -- based on recent insights in psychology. According to dual process theories there are two kinds of mental processes organized in two" systems" : the experiential, automatic system (...) 1, and the rational, controlled system 2. In normal circumstances, system 1 does not believe in its own mortality. Saṃvega occurs when system 1 suddenly realizes that the "subjective self" will inevitably die (while system 2 is already disposed to affirm the subject's mortality). This results in a state of shock that is morally motivating under certain conditions. Saṃvega increases mortality salience and produces insight in suffering, and in combination with a strengthened sense of loving-kindness or empathic concern both mortality salience and insight in suffering produce moral motivation. (shrink)

In the Dunhuang manuscript IOL Tib J 709, which is a collection of writings concerning meditation, we come across a short text attributed to a Tibetan master called Byaṅ-cub-klu-dbaṅ (allegedly eighth-ninth centuries CE). In his work, Byaṅ-cub-klu-dbaṅ exposes a method of meditation that seems to be strongly indebted to Indian Mahāyāna scriptural sources. Besides, also a Chinese Chan influence is here detectable. Therefore, the method of meditation taught by Byaṅ-cub-klu-dbaṅ seems to represent a commingling of different elements from different contexts. (...) After a general introduction to the manuscript IOL Tib J 709, this study focuses on Byaṅ-cub-klu-dbaṅ’s text, discussing and analysing the following topics: its author and date, the Indian Mahāyāna possible sources, Chinese Chan elements, the meditational path described. An annotated translation of the text, along with its transliteration and the reproduction of the fac-simile of the corresponding portion of the manuscript, concludes the study. (shrink)

Using theoretical analysis of self-consciousness concept and experimental evidence on the brain default mode network (DMN) that constitutes the neural signature of self-referential processes, we hypothesized that the anterior and posterior subnets comprising the DMN should show differences in their integrity as a function of meditation training. Functional connectivity within DMN and its subnets (measured by operational synchrony) has been measured in ten novice meditators using an electroencephalogram (EEG) recording in a pre-/post-meditation intervention design. We have found that while the (...) whole DMN was clearly suppressed, different subnets of DMN responded differently after 4 months of meditation training: The strength of EEG operational synchrony in the right and left posterior modules of the DMN decreased in resting post-meditation condition compared to a pre-meditation condition, whereas the frontal DMN module on the contrary exhibited an increase in the strength of EEG operational synchrony. These findings combined with published data on functional–anatomic heterogeneity within the DMN and on trait subjective experiences commonly found following meditation allow us to propose that the first-person perspective and the sense of agency (the witnessing observer) are presented by the frontal DMN module, while the posterior modules of the DMN are generally responsible for the experience of the continuity of ‘I’ as embodied and localized within bodily space. Significance of these findings is discussed. (shrink)

Based on the finding in novices that four months of meditation training significantly increases frontal default mode network (DMN) module/subnet synchrony while decreasing left and right posterior DMN modules synchrony, the current study tested the prediction whether experienced meditators (those who are practising meditation intensively for several years) had a change in the DMN “trinity” of modules as a baseline trait characteristic and whether this change is in a similar direction as in the novice trainees who practised meditation for only (...) four months. Comparison of functional connectivity within DMN subnets (measured by electroencephalogram operational synchrony in the three separate DMN modules) between five experienced meditators and 10 naïve participants (who were about to start the meditation training) fully support the prediction. Interpretation that links such DMN subnets changes to the three-dimensional components of the experiential selfhood was proposed. (shrink)

In this commentary, we engage with Almaas’s contribution from the perspective of phenomenology and its idea of a ‘minimal self’. We attempt to clarify Almaas’s claims about ‘phenomenological givens’ and ‘non-dual’, ‘pure consciousness’, and then show how they might be reconciled with phenomenological approaches to consciousness and self. We conclude by briefly indicating some of the ways a comparative analysis of this sort is mutually beneficial.