Karl Marx

My aim in this paper is fairly modest. I obviously do not claim that there has never been or could never be an instance of irrational or fallacious appeals to quotations from canonical sources in the marxist tradition. Instead, I claim that the practice of using quotations from canonical sources is not, as such, irrational. If we understand the epistemological infrastructure of the practice -- the rational underpinnings of it -- we can grasp how these citations appeal to the presumptive (...) authoritativeness of formulations that condense or concisely convey the core of insights that emerged from learning processes that the intellectual tradition of marxism has already traversed. The rational underpinnings of the practice include, first, the neo-Hegelian idea that we can justify a view we now hold by rationally reconstructing the insight-motivated learning process from which it emerged, and second, the convention that these rational reconstructions do not have to be elaborated in each insistence, but can be invoked in a short-form way, such as by citing the name of a decision or a concise statement of it (like a short quotation), as is common in the epistemologically similar practice of precedential reasoning in common law juridical justification. No claim is true just because of who made it; but a claim might be presumptively authoritative in cases where it was made at the end of a learning process, which has not been overtaken by a change in the circumstances or further learning. (shrink)

Parece consenso entre as diversas correntes e movimentos marxistas na América Latina a afirmativa de que Marx foi ateu. Contudo, pouco se discute sobre qual o ateísmo de Marx e sua concepção sobre a religião de forma geral e do cristianismo em particular. A importância de tal discussão parece-me eminente em um continente que notadamente tem como uma de suas constituições as culturas latina e judaica cristã.

Nietzsche’s psychological theory of the drives calls into question two common assumptions of ideology critique: 1) that ideology is fetishistic, substituting false satisfactions for true ones, and 2) that ideology is falsification; it conceals exploitation. In contrast, a Nietzschean approach begins from the truth of ideology: that capitalism produces an authentic contentment that makes the concealment of exploitation unnecessary. And it critiques ideology from the same standpoint: capitalism produces pleasures too efficiently, an overproduction of desire that is impossible to sustain (...) indefinitely. Nietzsche’s concept of the drives (Trieben) is grounded in his theory of the will to power. In contrast to Freud’s view that drives aim at satiation, pleasure through stimulus reduction, in Nietzsche’s view, they aim primarily at the “feeling of power” and the “happiness of high tension.” Nietzsche sees the desire for satiation as a symptom of weakness, a secondary, contingent aim that is incompatible with the fundamental drive to sustain and heighten the feeling of tension that accompanies strong desire. While the Freudian subject desires satisfaction, the Nietzschean subject is paradoxically frustrated by satisfaction, finding happiness in desire sustained by resistance and tension. If individuals desire desire as such, then exploitation and immiseration are not necessarily incompatible with their happiness. Consequently, we must reject the view that ideology is fetishistic: capitalism does not depend on an ersatz satisfaction in the commodity, a transferal of value from quality to quantity, use value to exchange value. Capitalism authentically satisfies desire precisely through its exploitative economic structure. The independence and unpredictability of the value of commodities and the immiseration of laborers produces discontents that enhance rather than frustrate desire. By continually introducing new, initially inaccessible commodities, then overcoming their inaccessibility through overproduction, capitalism sustains and intensifies desires. It promotes happiness not by satisfying wants but generating them, feeding the desire for desire, for the intensity of feeling that the brief pleasures of satiation would destroy. The commodity is not, then, a fetish, not a false satisfaction or aim, but a means, a prop that supports and sustains satisfaction as continued desire. Consequently, we must also reject the view that ideology is falsification: capitalism’s efficient production of happiness obviates the need to conceal its nature. Individuals tolerate capitalism not out of ignorance of exploitation but indifference to it; they prefer real happiness to a merely possible justice that might come at its expense. The critique of ideology must begin by acknowledging its truth. Rather than deny the real satisfactions of capitalism, it must demonstrate that they are unsustainable. (shrink)

Kate Crawford presents AI as “both reflecting and producing social relations and understandings of the world”; or again, as “a form of exercising power, and a way of seeing… as a manifestation of highly organized capital backed by vast systems of extraction and logistics, with supply chains that wrap around the entire planet”. I interpret these material insights through a Marxist understanding of ideology, with reference to Marx/Engels, Guy Debord and Louis Althusser. In the German Ideology, Marx and Engels present (...) ideology as the alienated and alienating discourse of exchange, dissimulating the material forces of production and its science. Guy Debord presents the spectacle as the further representation of capital. The spectacle is a total Weltanschauung, pure appearance, where “whatever appears is good and where what is good, appears.” Above all, the spectacle is ideology, representing “the impoverishment, enslavement and negation of real life”. Louis Althusser presents ideology as essential for the reproduction of labor-power and capital. His notion of “interpellation” explains the subjective uptake of ideology, how we respond, “yes!” to its call. The algorithms of AI are enactments of surplus value generating capital as data. The AI data-world is the spectacle, “the autonomous movement of non-life” (Debord) where the proletariat/consumer is the producer of their own ideological subjection. Is resistance possible? What form might it take? And if AI is understood as ideology, i.e. as a language that obscures the true conditions of real life, then what are those true conditions? What is “real life”? (shrink)

After years of neglect, alienation has again reached the agenda of critical thought. In my case, I recognize alienation as a challenge for education in contemporary societies. To obtain conceptual resources to overcome this challenge, I have revisited the comprehensive 20 th century discussion of alienation. Today, alienation is naturally discussed as an existential condition of human being, but still in the 1980s, there was a strong Marxist current that claimed alienation to be implied by capitalism, in particular by the (...) institution of private property and the social division of labor, and that alienation therefore should be criticized as part of the critique of capitalism and political economy and possibly overcome. Today, under the hegemony of neo-liberal capitalism, this critical and processual concept of alienation is more relevant than ever. Hence, in the present work I argue that the basic logic of Marx's idea of alienation still has critical potential. The argument forms a long engagement with mainly 20 th century literature, departing from the very idea of capitalism, considering the ideas of history, education and democracy, discussing how to distinguish and translate key terms, considering why alienation became an object of controversy among Marxists, offering an interpretation of Marx's critique relevant for contemporary society, thus considering alienation a consequence of working under conditions of private property, i.e. being a human being in a capitalist society, and finally presenting Marx's idea of communism as relevant to the contemporary educational agenda. (shrink)

O propósito desse artigo é apresentar o trabalho realizado por José Chasin na elucidação de um aspecto central do pensamento de Marx, que é a crítica à política. Não se trata só da conhecida questão do fim do Estado, uma vez que essa se coloca no interior de uma determinação mais ampla que é a da necessidade, da origem e do significado da política, reflexão desenvolvida por Marx, que conduz à consequente negação da politicidade enquanto atributo inerente à existência social, (...) aspecto que Chasin procura explicitar na obra do autor e que é fundamental para o resgate do sentido profundo da proposição marxiana, qual seja, a possibilidade da emancipação humana, desentranhada das ilusões sobre as quais se sustenta a concepção tradicional da política. (shrink)

This paper provides a reconstruction and analysis of Marx’s early engagements with logic, and especially his studies of Hegel’s logic, on the one hand, and Hegel’s great if often overlooked critic Adolf Trendelenburg, on the other. It itemises the archival evidence that Marx read and planned to compose a Hegelian response to Trendelenburg’s devastating attack on dialectics in his 1840 Logische Untersuchungen – the work that arguably did more than any other single text to destroy the influence of Hegelianism among (...) German intellectuals at the time. It argues that the young Marx was a more sophisticated reader of Hegel and of philosophy in general than is typically acknowledged. Against the backdrop of these claims, it then proposes a new reading of Marx’s work from 1839 to 1842 – one that takes the emphasis off the familiar distinction between materialism and idealism, which was as much an invention of Engels’s later interpretations of the early Marx as it was an invention of Marx himself, and places it instead on what early nineteenth-century thinkers would have understood to be the more comprehensive question of logic. (shrink)

This paper has two purposes: to provide a contextualised account of the Young Hegelian theory of the state, and to argue that Marx began working on the manuscript known as his ‘Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law’, not in the Summer of 1843, as most commentators assume, but at least as early as the Spring of 1842. The established narrative describes the Young Hegelians as ‘liberals’, and suggests that Marx ‘Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law’ represents his rejection of their (...) liberalism and turn towards a more radical democratic and revolutionary position. Conversely, I argue that the Young Hegelians (notably Arnold Ruge and Bruno Bauer) were never liberal (at least not by any standard definition of that term) but articulated a radical and revolutionary theory of the state from the outset – one that understood freedom, not as independence, but as political participation, and that characterised the modern state, not as the guarantor of private rights, but as the institutional framework in which all citizens could realise their public freedom. In this sense, Marx’s ‘Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy Law’ does not represent a break with the Young Hegelians theory of state, but a contribution to it. (shrink)

Ce texte constitue la première partie de l'introduction du recueil de textes de K. Marx, Les Crises du capitalisme, Paris, Demopolis, 2009. Daniel Bensaïd y explique la conception marxienne des crises cycliques du capitalisme, tout en abordant au passage celle de la « temporalité propre du capital ». Le tour de force de Marx, contemporain de la première grande expansion bancaire des années victoriennes et du Second empire, c'est d'avoir traversé les apparences, la surface confuse des choses, pour (...) - (...) Économie – Nouvel article. (shrink)

Marx says of alienated labor that it does not "belong" to the worker, that it issues in a product that does not belong to her, and that it is unfulfilling, unfree, egoistically motivated, and inhuman. He seems to think, moreover, that the first of these features grounds all the others. All of these features seem quite independent, however: they can come apart; they share no obvious common cause or explanation; and if they often occur together this seems accidental. It is (...) not clear, then, how Marx's concept of alienated labor could possess the strong unity which he takes it to have. I defend a reinterpretation of the concept which explains this unity. The various features of alienated labor, I argue, all follow from a single, hitherto underappreciated feature of its formal motivational structure: the fact that such labor is motivated not by its product but by an incentive. (shrink)

Em 25 de maio de 2020 um homem negro americano, chamado George Floyd, morreu após ser asfixiado por mais de oito minutos por um policial branco na cidade de Minneapolis, nos EUA. Violentos protestos se seguiram ao longo do país com cartazes contendo as últimas súplicas de Floyd: “I can’t breathe” (Eu não consigo respirar). Pouco tempo depois, ainda sob o calor dos horrores da hora, outro fato também vinculado ao acontecimento recém-referido roubou a cena e chamou a atenção dos (...) principais meios de comunicação ao redor do planeta: tratava-se de um casal branco americano de moradores de um bairro nobre, em frente ao jardim de sua mansão de dois andares, esbravejando contra um grupo de negros que se dirigia para um protesto e resolveu cortar caminho passando por entre os casarões do bairro onde se encontrava o referido casal. O “detalhe” marcante dessa demonstração gratuita de ódio por parte do casal branco é que, enquanto o homem portava um potente fuzil moderno e a mulher uma pistola automática, ambos apontavam as armas contra os transeuntes negros que tiveram a “audácia” de se deslocar por entre os casarões da elite americana. O mais absurdo da situação foi um momento de transtorno colérico do casal branco que em certa altura do descontrole chegou a apontar a arma um contra o outro, revelando o completo desvario em que ambos se encontravam [...]. (shrink)

Abstract There is a fundamental flaw at the heart of Karl Marx's approach to the alleviation of human suffering. That flaw lies in his commitment to a conception of the person – technically, the ego – that centres on desire-satisfaction, and, deepening the problem, does so in a way that underplays the centrality to all desire-satisfaction beyond that of the most elemental bodily desires, of that element Hegel termed “recognition.” Remedying this failure gives an understanding of desire and suffering that (...) is essentially that of the Buddha. (shrink)

O artigo reexamina a leitura que Marx efetuou, em 1843, do pensamento de Hegel. Depois, são discutidas leituras contemporâneas do texto, além das próprias notas que o autor tomou durante o período. Defende-se a tese de que o texto de Kreuznach é instaurador na trajetória do autor.

Esse texto é um escrito que, ao final, é um termo médio entre um Artigo e um Ensaio. O objetivo é expor nossa compreensão sobre o sentido d“o material” e as implicações onto(epistemo)lógicas desta concepção no pensamento de Karl Marx. Em plano geral, primeiramente, nosso texto discorre sobre o que nomeamos de “a questão primeira”, qual seja: o que é “o material” no interior e no contexto dos escritos de Marx? Para cumprir essa tarefa procedemos com leituras de textos marxianos (...) visando identificar, neles, passagens importantes aonde o conceito de “material” é pressuposto, citado ou implicado. No segundo momento do texto, afirmamos que os resultados das análises do sentido d“o material” nos possibilitam induzir e/ou deduzir que o materialismo de Marx é dialético. Por fim, apresentamos algumas conclusões que decorrem do aceite da validade e veracidade da tese de que Marx pensa dialeticamente, de que seu materialismo é dialético. (shrink)

It is common to assimilate Marx’s and Spinoza’s conceptions of democracy. In this chapter, I assess the relation between Marx’s early idea of “true democracy” and Spinozist democracy, both the historical influence and the theoretical affinity. Drawing on Marx’s student notebooks on Spinoza’s Theological-Political Treatise, I show there was a historical influence. However, at the theoretical level, I argue that a sharp distinction must be drawn. Philosophically, Spinoza’s commitment to understanding politics through real concrete powers does not support with Marx’s (...) anti-institutional conception of true democracy. And as a matter of social theory, the gap between civil society and the state which so troubles Marx is a development of modernity that has not entered Spinoza's premodern field of view. Marx’s true democracy was also influenced by his study of Rousseau, and theoretically, it is just as close if not closer to Rousseau as to Spinoza. (shrink)

O objetivo deste artigo é demonstrar, a partir do pensamento de Marx, como o lucro comercial e a renda fundiária – dois componentes do mais-valor que, juntamente com o salário, correspondem aos rendimentos da fórmula trinitária – pressupõem a exploração do trabalho ou o intercâmbio desigual que mantém o processo de acumulação capitalista. As remunerações do comerciante e do proprietário fundiário, muito embora apareçam na superfície da economia moderna dissociadas do seu fundamento real, como se fossem autônomas e sem qualquer (...) nexo com a espoliação que garante a autovalorização do capital, representam apenas quotas do trabalho excedente obtido na esfera da produção. (shrink)

Marx desenvolve sua teoria da oposição e da contradição em uma discussão crítica com Hegel no seu escrito Crítica da filosofia do direito de Hegel, de 1843. Para delinear seu projeto de transformação da teoria hegeliana da oposição e da contradição, procedo, em forma de teses, em quatro momentos: primeiramente, analiso o contexto da teoria de Marx da oposição e da contradição. Em um segundo momento, a teoria da oposição e da contradição de Marx é discutida em contraste àquela de (...) Hegel na lógica da essência. Em um terceiro momento, destaca-se a diferença entre a teoria das determinações de reflexão de Hegel e de Marx. Por fim, os resultados são apresentados em uma síntese. (shrink)

This is a book of superlatives: the most comprehensive, most detailed, most ambitious, simply the best thing ever written in any language on the Marx–Spinoza connection in the long nineteenth centu...