George Santayana

Amir investigates Santayana’s statements about Spinoza in Scepticism and Animal Faith. She answers the question of how Santayana can acknowledge Spinoza as “his master” and “hero” while systematically rejecting Spinoza’s philosophy.

Santayana may be read as a conservative in behavior, thought, and feeling, if not in creed. A close reading of Scepticism and Animal Faith (SAF), Santayana’s autobiography, Persons and Places (PP), and Santayana’s ontology as articulated in Realms of Being (RB), supports an interpretation of Santayana’s philosophy as one of human imperfection and limits, which includes a conservative vision of human flourishing.

The first of its kind, this project is a collection of critical and interpretive essays on George Santayana’s seminal work in American philosophy, Scepticism and Animal Faith (1923), 100 years after its first edition. The reader will be guided through the intricacies of Scepticism and Animal Faith by expert scholars. This book is a companion to Scepticism and Animal Faith for both first-time readers and readers intimately familiar with this work.

The question of movement and permanence is the key element representing the transition from scepticism to knowledge—faith—in Santayana’s Scepticism and Animal Faith. This chapter studies the influence of Parmenides’ and Heraclitus’ doctrines over Santayana’s Realms of Matter and Essence, and reflects on some of the epistemological implications of that influence. Using as a metaphor Zeno’s aporias, which deal with the continuum-discrete pair, the theory of divisible leaps is introduced as explanatory of Santayana’s theory of knowledge. As a conclusion, Santayana’s ideas (...) of matter, essence, and knowledge are shown to be deeply connected to some key ancient Greek philosophical and mathematical tenets. (shrink)

Faerna inquires into the ways in which Santayana’s philosophy is part of the tradition of philosophical naturalism. He finds two strains of naturalism at play in Santayana’s system, namely, epistemological naturalism and ontological naturalism, and he helps illuminate Santayana’s philosophy by probing some of the tensions between these two strains.

Flamm examines a dominant theme in Santayana’s philosophy: the spiritual life. He puts Santayana’s philosophy in dialogue with the novella Soul (Dzhan) by Andrey Platonov and examines the various ways Santayana associates crying with a materialist conception of the spiritual life.The association of crying and spiritual life is conspicuous enough in Santayana’s writings to merit exploration. In an astonishing variety of rhetorical modes Santayana writes of the various “cries” of spirit, of psyche, of soul, and of the human heart, emphasizing (...) the idea that it is through moral suffering that humans come to spiritual understanding (Some examples: “An impetuous spirit when betrayed by the world will cry …” (LR2, Chapter VIII, “Ideal Society,” p. 121); “the universal need and cry of human souls …” (LR3, Chapter XII, “Charity,” pp. 130–31); “spirit is physically the voice of the soul crying in the wilderness” (RB/RE, “The Nature of Spirit,” p. 568); “our very soul begins to cry for help” (RB/RE “On Cosmic Animism,” p. 576); “pain,” the “first form of distraction” in the psyche causes it to “awake with a sharp cry, a conscious protest” (RB/RE, “Distraction,” p. 679)). Santayana goes so far in one context to suggest that crying experiences testify to the existence of matter (“The more ecstatic or the more tragic experience is, the more unmistakably it is the voice of matter.” “Cross Lights,” SE, p. 25). In this chapter I link the various ways Santayana associates crying and spiritual life with the novella Soul (Dzhan) by Andrey Platonov (Andrey Platonov (1899–1951) was a Russian author whose works during the Stalinist era were heavily censored and banned and have only recently (relative to their importance, as of the late 1990s) begun appearing in approved English translations. I am a lover of Russian literature and no expert, but am prepared to agree with poet-translator Robert Chandler, who claimed (before he died in 2007) that Russians will come one day to recognize Platonov as their “greatest prose writer” (Chandler’s exquisite co-translation of Platonov’s Soul was chosen in 2004 as “best translation of the year from a Slavonic language” by the American Association of Teachers of Slavic and East European Languages)). Santayana in dialogue with Platonov offers a radiant picture of the materialist conception of spiritual life. (shrink)

Examining Scepticism and Animal Faith (SAF) together with the work of Descartes—first, in terms of structure, style, and substance; and second, in terms of method and purpose—supports a rethinking of Santayana’s philosophical project, supporting the notion that his primary aim was not epistemological but fundamentally moral. Considering the contrasting characters of Cartesian and Santayanan scepticism suggests that Descartes is not so much a foil but an inspiration for Santayana in attempting to order the mind as a sort of personal improvement.

Hodges explores Santayana’s doctrine of matter. Interpreting the realm of matter as the irrational, ineffable counterpart to the realm of essence, he elucidates the function and profound moral significance of materialism in Santayana’s system of philosophy.

Kremplewska discusses how Santayana’s engagement with radical scepticism has a cross-disciplinary import and can be seen as a response to some of the intellectual and moral concerns prominent in the literature of the first half of the twentieth century. She employs Santayana’s analysis of scepticism as the basis for an interpretive philosophical re-reading of Hugo von Hofmannsthal’s “The Lord Chandos Letter.”.

McDermid clarifies the nature of Santayana’s scepticism by examining his response to the traditional sceptical problem of the external world. The chapter explains in what sense we can regard Santayana as a sceptic and in what sense Santayana is a critic of the sceptical method promulgated by Descartes.

Moreno shows that Santayana believed he had found an ally regarding his doctrine of essence in the philosophy of Husserl. He then reveals the parallels and differences between Santayana’s and Husserl’s philosophies, bringing each thinker’s ideas into sharper relief.

Considering Santayana’s treatment of scepticism in relation to Descartes and Hume, as well as twentieth-century philosophers such as Wittgenstein, Moore, and Strawson, helps make the case for the singularity of Santayana’s approach. The analysis of the different positions also reveals some of the commonalities Santayana shares with other (including later) sceptical philosophers.

Abstract:John Lachs considers his major philosophical contributions to be his work on mediation, the love of life, and his explication of George Santayana's philosophical and literary outlooks. All three are undergirded by Lachs's effort to make philosophy relevant to people's lives. This article examines these three contributions with both a critical eye and an admiration for Lachs's efforts. The conclusion provides an assessment often missed in critiques of Lachs's work.

Scepticism and Animal Faith marks a turning point in Santayana’s philosophy leading to the development of his complete naturalism, and, if followed, leads to a decisive change in philosophical inquiry that was a century ahead of his time. Indeed, much of what Santayana explicates in this book is now central to inquiries in the social and biological sciences that attempt to understand human behavior. In short, he turns philosophy on its head. Before Santayana, philosophers often thought humans were distinct from (...) other animals because of their reasoning and their ability to act based on thinking through difficulties and then deciding to proceed in the most beneficial way. This approach was widely endorsed from Plato to American pragmatism. However, Santayana’s orientation is dramatically different focusing on animal faith and not human reason. He is a complete non-reductive naturalist.In this article, I examine the implications of Santayana turning to animal faith as a basis for understanding human action. To the surprise of his contemporaries, he no longer considered humans unique from other animals nor perhaps even more complicated in their interactions with their environment. Mental consciousness or spirit is a reflection, an after effect, of animals acting and responding in a physical environment. He suggests an analogy to the sound of music produced by an orchestra. Consciousness or spirit is not causal. For the most part it is momentary, lasting only so long as it is generated by our physical being, what he calls psyche. Hence, rather than being a philosopher who recognizes reason and mind as unique in causing human action, he notes that our actions, like that of all animals, are caused by our psyche’s physical interaction with its environment. Such a move abandons philosophy as a discipline focusing on reason as the basis for action. One might think this lessens the value of consciousness, but not for Santayana. Spirit is celebrational and to be cherished. Indeed, a principal goal of human life is to cultivate a spiritual life. Santayana’s naturalistic approach also leads to a distinct understanding of human cultures, their value, and the political structures involved in various human organizations. There is no hierarchy of best or better, only the reality of human societies serving their constituents in differing ways, much as we might describe the social structures of other animals. If the goal is to provide the greatest range of opportunities for the greatest number of people, one may find evidence that some societies enable more people to live well, but no one political structure is likely to accomplish that in all human environments. Even so, Santayana explores the natural values of charity and justice as central to human societies enabling individual humans to flourish. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Works of George Santayana, volume IX, Winds of Doctrine: Studies in Contemporary Opinion ed. by Martin A. Coleman, David E. Spiech, and Faedra Lazar WeissKrzysztof (Chris) Piotr SkowrońskiEdited by Martin A. Coleman, David E. Spiech, and Faedra Lazar WeissThe Works of George Santayana, volume IX, Winds of Doctrine: Studies in Contemporary Opinion Cambridge, MA, and London, England: The MIT Press, 2023; 359 pp., incl.indexIt is not merely (...) a re-edition of Santayana’s book that is at stake here. This ninth volume of The MIT Critical Edition of The Works of George Santayana is a next step in showing us his vast output with extensive range, depth, and, most importantly, significant stimulation for our generation of scholars and non-scholars. Just to illustrate the scope of Santayana’s work: volume V of the present MIT Critical Edition, published in the years 2001–2008, consists of eight thick books with Santayana’s correspondence throughout seventy years of intellectual activity (around 3000 letters to roughly 350 recipients, William James, Josiah Royce, Bertrand Russell, Sidney Hook, Horace Kallen, B.A.G. Fuller, Hugo Münsterberg, among them), containing philosophical and cultural insights that substantially compliment the views he expressed in his published texts.The original idea of the MIT Critical Edition was to present the published and unpublished works, followed by an elaborate editorial apparatus. As we can read in the present volume, “The goal of the editors is to produce texts that accurately represent Santayana’s final intentions regarding his works while recording all evidence on which editorial decisions have been based” (p. 307). How complex and fascinating the whole project has been we can also learn from a recently published book by Herman Saatkamp, who edited the Santayana edition for twenty-six years (Charles Padrón and Chris Skowroński, eds., Herman J. Saatkamp Jr., A Life of Scholarship with George Santayana: [End Page 462] Essays and Reflections, Brill/Rodopi, 2021). As we can read in Saatkamp’s book (p. 139), the story goes back to 1976, when John Lachs, top Santayana expert, asked Saatkamp to write the National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH) and put forward a proposal for The Works of George Santayana. As the latest of its results today, we have the ninth volume just published, while future volumes are still being prepared for publication (twenty volumes are currently projected).More specific answers to questions: Do we need a critical edition to do this? Is it not enough just to publish the original volume anew? depend largely on the target audience. For those who are unfamiliar with Santayana, having in hand Volume IX shows that it is just a part, although an important part, of a much larger project, and Paul Forster’s lengthy introduction would be very helpful. Forster competently outlines Santayana’s work and life, and subsequently analyzes the book, chapter by chapter, so that we have a penetrating insight into its whole substance. Also, further down in the volume (pp. 303–306), we find a “Chronology of the Life and Work of George Santayana” that is informative to those unfamiliar with Santayana.I suspect that those audiences who are familiar with Santayana have been waiting for this volume impatiently. The original 1913 publication, by Charles Scribner’s Son (New York)—which itself was a collection of rather independent texts in the form of chapters—has been expanded with Santayana’s preface to the second edition, of 1926. Most importantly, however, the whole text (these two editions: 1913 and 1926) have been re-edited, revised, and corrected according to the criteria of a critical edition. Some terms, phrases, names, as well as other issues are explained extensively in a 140-page part entitled “Notes to the Text” (pp. 159–302). Some of these notes are instructive indeed, not only because they explain passages in the text, but also because they refer to other works by Santayana where he explains the issue at hand into more detail or from a different viewpoint. From these notes we learn much more about the ideas discussed and the figures to which Santayana refers in his reflections than we would by reading... (shrink)

Wahman argues that Santayana’s account of knowledge as a leap of faith is a unique, important, and underappreciated contribution to epistemology. She explains that Santayana’s account of animal faith does not so much express a limitation of knowledge as a characterization of what it actually achieves: a faithful and practical transition of the mind from thoughts to the natural things that undergird them.

This article evaluates the significance of the personal liberation that Santayana offers in relation to previous proposals in Western modern philosophy. These include the ideas of liberation present in the philosophies of Spinoza, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche. I argue that Santayana endorses Spinoza’s project, as Schopenhauer and Nietzsche did, of a philosophic redemption as an alternative to an established religion. Yet, he also follows Schopenhauer in rectifying Spinoza’s attempt of recapturing the philosophic truth of Christianity, a project undertaken in Medieval times (...) for Judaism and Islam, but not for Christianity. The result is an explicit philosophic reconstruction of the esoteric truth of Christianity. This, I argue, is the content of the lay religion and the deliverance it provides that Santayana sees as genuine philosophy and that is exemplified by the work of his hero and master, Spinoza. (shrink)

This article is a commentary and an introduction to the Polish translation of George Santayana’s work, Freedom, which is a chapter in the fourth volume of his series, The Realms of Being, titled The Realm of Spirit (1940). It provides an overview of his previous works, particularly his series The Life of Reason (1905–1906) and Scepticism and Animal Faith (1926). Additionally, it briefly examines the evolution of Santayana’s standpoint and the meaning of the fundamental categories and concepts of his ontology. (...) The analysis of Freedom, along with a comparison to the standpoints of Nicolai Hartmann and Hannah Arendt, enables us to classify it as a form of compatibilism. Within this perspective, natural determinism harmonizes with the teleological self-determination of human will. Human freedom, directed towards an open horizon of the future, unveils an essential tragic aspect of human condition, as the choice of a value is perpetually linked to unfulfillment. Ultimately, any value resides in the realm of ideals, and by making a choice, we neglect other values and select only one of the potential paths in our lives. (shrink)

Niniejszy esej stanowi piąty rozdział tomu The Realm of Spirit kończącego cykl The Realms of Being. Podstawą przekładu jest pierwsze wydanie dzieła: George Santayana, The Realms of Being (London: Constable and Co., Ltd., Toronto: The Macmillan Company, 1940), 67–89. -/- This essay is the fifth chapter of The Realm of Spirit volume concluding The Realms of Being series. The translation is based on the first edition of the work: George Santayana, The Realms of Being (London: Constable and Co., Ltd., Toronto: (...) The Macmillan Company, 1940), 67-89. (shrink)

El fragmento, inédito en español, pertenece al capítulo IX de La razón en el sentido común, libro primero de La vida de la razón, 5 vols. (1905-1906) del filósofo hispano-norteamericano Jorge/George Santayana (Madrid, 1862-Roma, 1953). Santayana aborda aquí la relación entre mente y cerebro desde un naturalismo materialista, que ha asumido por completo la revolución intelectual darwinista, y mostrando ser un fino analista de la experiencia de la acción consciente.

Despite apparently holding diametrically opposed attitudes toward dialectical logic, both George Santayana and the early Frankfurt School critical theorists posit a close link between the concepts of reason and domination. It is argued that a broadly-speaking Hegelian philosophical project can survive Santayana’s critiques, albeit by benefitting from the latter’s, as well as from the Frankfurt School’s, re-centering of nature in the history of domination. In the alternative, Santayanaists who would reject Hegel must reckon with the proximity and affinity, notwithstanding Santayana’s (...) suggestions to the contrary, of their perspectives on the ultimately tragic structure of history. (shrink)

An interesting trend of recent scholarship on Santayana’s thought is focused on his criticism of modernity and brings him together with the major figures of postmodern philosophy, especially with Nietzsche, Heidegger, Derrida, and Rorty. In my opinion, while the criticism of modernity certainly offers a relevant key to understand Santayana’s philosophy, it should be rooted first and foremost in some cultural and philosophical linkages that Santayana himself makes explicit throughout his writings, namely, a classical Latin author such as Lucretius, and (...) a modern author such as Giacomo Leopardi. Answering the question in my title, it seems to me that, ultimately, Santayana is a timely/untimely philosopher, if his concepts of rationality and spirituality can be viewed and understood within the framework labeled by Michel Foucault as epimeleia heautou or cura sui. (shrink)

Although recent work has been done on the Barnes Foundation and its philosophical and pedagogical background, almost all the research effort has been focused on the friendship and intellectual link between John Dewey and Albert C. Barnes. Unfortunately, to the best of our knowledge, the impact of George Santayana’s philosophy on the Foundation has not been systematically examined. The hypothesis that we present and develop in this article is that Santayana’s thought is essential for the aesthetic theories elaborated within the (...) framework of the Barnes Foundation: Barnes’ theory of art criticism; Dewey’s aesthetic theory, and even Lawerence Buermeyer’s aesthetic theory. This article is a first approximation with the purpose of clarifying these philosophical, theoretical and historical relationship so as to start to fill the existing gap in contemporary literature on the topic. (shrink)

The first comprehensive study of Santayana’s political thought as connected to his cultural criticism. It ranges over topics such as Santayana’s political ontology, his criticism of democracy, liberalism, and communism, his views on freedom and forms of human servitude.

I argue that the dichotomous treatment of agency and free will is problematic because it rests on a Cartesian interpretation of self and world that many present-day thinkers take themselves to be denying. I do so in order to reconstruct the concept of human agency using the psychologies of American philosophers John Dewey and George Santayana. Identifying the self with the entire organism, as these thinkers do, allows for an importantly different sense of agency. In embracing an organismic interpretation of (...) the self, we achieve a more realistic yet mitigated sense of agency, where real responsibility for action is placed in a context of biological and environmental (including social, cultural, and historical) influences. (shrink)

Commonsensism is a thesis about commonsense beliefs: our commonsense beliefs are items of knowledge (or should be so regarded) that have epistemic or methodological priority. This account of commonsensism risks making our commonsense beliefs impervious to philosophical argument. But in Santayana's commonsensism, what deserves our trust is not our commonsense beliefs but the development of common sense over successive generations. Our commonsense beliefs deserve only a secondary or subsidiary trust; we trust them only insofar as we trust the momentum of (...) common sense. I examine Santayana's distinctive form of commonsensism and explain why he avoids putting trust primarily in commonsense beliefs. (shrink)

Herman J. Saatkamp’s _A Life of Scholarship with Santayana: Essays and Reflections_ gathers together his work of a lifetime. There are twenty-three pieces, in three sections: “Santayana and Philosophy,” “Editorship,” and “Genetic Concerns and the Future of Philosophy.”.

»Wer die Vergangenheit nicht kennt, ist dazu verurteilt, sie zu wiederholen.« – Ein aphoristisches Diktum, das besonders in Deutschland weit verbreitet als Mahnung nachhallt, dessen Autor George Santayana (1863–1952) aber in Vergessenheit geraten ist. Diese Studie geht erstmals im deutschsprachigen Raum der gesamten philosophischen Spannweite seines Werks und dessen zumeist hintergründiger Systematik nach. Darin fördert sie einen einst eminenten Philosophen des ›Golden Age of American Philosophy‹ zutage, der nicht nur in seinem in vielerlei Hinsicht ›unamerikanischen‹ Denken den Blick auf die (...) amerikanische Geistesgeschichte erweitert. Durch Santayanas Vermittlung vermeintlich widerstreitender Pole wird gleichzeitig deutlich, dass es sich bei ihm um eine einzigartige Gestalt der Philosophie des 20. Jahrhunderts insgesamt handelt – ein konsequenter Materialist, der deswegen »religiös musikalisch« und offen für die Schönheit bleibt; ein kritischer Realist, der darin nicht nur um das unentrinnbar Symbolische und Poetische weiß, sondern es zelebriert. Es ist eine Philosophie, die über isolierte Sentenzen hinaus bis heute denkerische Impulse mit Blick auf Erkenntnistheorie, Ontologie, Religiosität, Kulturkritik sowie die individuelle Lebensführung zu geben vermag. -/- English Translation: -/- "Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it." - An aphoristic dictum that resonates, especially in Germany, widely as a reminder, but whose author George Santayana (1863-1982) has rather been forgotten. This study undertakes the first reconstruction of the entire philosophical range of his work and its mostly enigmatic system in the German-speaking area. This brings to light a once eminent philosopher of the 'Golden Age of American Philosophy', who not only expands the view of American intellectual history with his in many ways 'un-American' thinking. Through Santayana's mediation of supposedly contradictory poles, it becomes clear at the same time that he is a unique figure in the philosophy of the 20th century as a whole – a consequent materialist, who therefore remains "religiously musical" and open to beauty; a critical realist, who thus not only knows about the inescapably symbolic and poetic, but who celebrates it. It is a philosophy that even to this day provides, beyond isolated aphorisms, intellectual stimuli to epistemology, ontology, religiosity, cultural criticism as well as to the individual conduct of life. (shrink)