The ontology of artefacts in Byzantine philosophy is still a terra incognita. One way of mapping this unexplored territory is to delve into Michael of Ephesus’ commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics. Written around 1100, this commentary provides a detailed interpretation of the most important source for Aristotle’s ontological account of artefacts. By highlighting Michael’s main metaphysical tenets and his interpretation of key-passages of the Aristotelian work, this study aims to reconstruct Michael’s ontology of artefacts and present it as one instance, which (...) is perhaps exemplary, of the Byzantine ontology of artefacts. In particular, the study shows that this commentary holds a definite position on the nature of artefacts, according to which they are neither substances nor hylomorphic compounds. Indeed, artefacts lack a form altogether and their forms exist only in thought. As a result, Michael’s commentary provides an ontological interpretation of artefacts as accidental beings, i.e., as matter which acquires a mere property as opposed to a substantial form. While such an interpretation shows originality when compared to the Aristotelian text, it also indicates adherence to the reading established by Alexander of Aphrodisias, despite important departures concerning the status of natural forms. (shrink)

This paper discusses the metaphysical status of artefacts and their forms in the ancient commentators on Aristotle’s Metaphysics. Specifically, it examines the Peripatetic tradition and Alexander of Aphrodisias to then turn to the commentaries of the late Neoplatonist Asclepius of Tralles, and the Byzantine commentator Michael of Ephesus. It argues that Alexander is the pioneer of the interpretation of artefactual forms as qualities and artefacts as accidental beings. The fortune of this solution goes through Asclepius and Michael to influence Thomas (...) Aquinas. (shrink)

In Metaphysics Z 8 Aristotle offers an infinite regress argument to deny that forms come to be. Briefly put, the argument states that, if we assume that every time an x composed of matter (m1) and form (f1) comes to be, f1 also comes to be, then there would be infinitely many xs coming to be – for f1 would itself be a compound, if it comes to be, and the same reasoning would in turn apply to it. This argument (...) has great significance in the history of philosophy, for some later thinkers take Aristotle to allow or make room for the creation ex nihilo of forms. However, the only direct Greek engagement with this argument in its proper context is provided by Asclepius of Tralles’ commentary on Book Z. A close study of Asclepius’ interpretation shows that he endorsed the argument on the tacit condition that it refers to the forms αὐτὰ καθ’ αὑτά as different from both Platonic Ideas and enmattered forms. At the same time, however, its elaboration includes alongside forms αὐτὰ καθ’ αὑτά also eternal separate forms and generated forms. His reconstruction also displays a sophisticated toning-down of the potential disagreements between Plato and Aristotle on the conception of pre-existing form which is assumed in the argument. Asclepius’ interpretation offers yet further proof of the commentators’ camouflaged and stratified way of tackling philosophical issues of paramount importance. (shrink)

The way metaphysicians conceive of inadvertently made objects has consequences for their understanding of the relation between intentions and kinds. Indeed, the very possibility of concrete material objects produced without human intention shakes the common identification of an object’s kind and the intentions of the maker. The disruptive potential of inadvertently made objects also affects historians of philosophy, who have often failed to engage with the issue. In this paper, I shall reconstruct Aristotle’s account of inadvertently made objects and the (...) fortune of his examples. I will argue that Aristotle opens a conceptual space for inadvertent objects and will indicate the consequences for the relation between the intentions of the maker and an object’s essence. Furthermore, I will put Aristotle into conversation with modern accounts and show the extent to which Aristotelian inadvertent objects constitute an instance different from the currently debated cases of appropriation, residues and by-products. (shrink)

Despite an infelicitous tradition downgrading their status, technical artefacts are increasingly acquiring their place in contemporary ontology. However, although most metaphysicians currently allow for an ontological consideration of artefacts, they define the class of artefacts differently and disagree on the essence of artificial objects. In this paper, I present a handful of recent accounts of artefacts, with particular regards to the hylomorphic framework. I make an attempt at reconstructing the debate on the spectrum of artefacts and the ways in which (...) artefacts’ essences are singled out. Moreover, I indicate special cases, such as ready-mades and malfunctioning objects, which seem to constitute a threat for the presented accounts. Thereafter, I propose that Aristotle’s account of artefacts embraces the challenges of the contemporary debate. I also attempt to demonstrate that his theory of artefacts escapes the abovementioned threats. While unfolding Aristotle’s conceptual tools against such threats, I present his account of artefacts as hylomorphic and, hence, essentialist. (shrink)

It is commonly believed that Aristotle merely uses artefacts as examples or analogical cases. This book, however, shows that Aristotle gives a specific, coherent account of artefacts that in various ways owes much to Plato. Moreover, it proposes a new, definitive solution to the problem of artefacts' substantiality, which comprises two controversial positions: (i) that Aristotle holds a binary view of substantiality according to which artefacts are not substances at all; (ii) that artefacts fail to be substances because they exhibit (...) less of a unity than natural wholes. Finally, responding to the contemporary debate on ordinary objects, the book identifies the main propositions for an ontology of artefacts that aspires to use Aristotle as its authority and can serve as a guideline for current metaphysical discussions. (shrink)

This article examines the relation between shame and the notion of the noble starting from Alexander’s Ethical Problems. Problem 21 is prompted by the Aristotelian discussion of the concept of shame. NE 2.7 1108a30–35 and NE 4.9 1128b15–21 present an apparent contradiction that Alexander aspires to solve: in the former passage, Aristotle states that shame is virtue-like in being praiseworthy; in the latter, shame’s praiseworthiness is restricted to young people. Alexander solves this contradiction by rejecting the second passage: shame is (...) not an emotion and its praiseworthiness applies to virtuous adults in particular. This article claims that, although Alexander rightly relates shame to the knowledge of the noble, neither of the Aristotelian passages must be rejected. The emotional status of shame is exhibited by Aristotle’s definition of shame as fear of disrepute. However, by considering shame and fear as ethical motivations, particularly in the case of courageous citizens and learners, the article shows that shame, unlike fear, implies knowledge of as well as sensitivity towards the noble. Moreover, the restriction of shame’s praiseworthiness to young people is defended by showing that shame is the best option in the absence of virtue. By contrast, the fully virtuous adult, i.e. the phronimos, is not supposed to feel shame. Neither does the phronimos act out of shame, nor does he feel prospective or retrospective shame. (shrink)