Causation

The philosophy of superdeterminism is based on a single scientific fact about the universe, namely that cause and effect in physics are not real. The philosophy of superdeterminism is supported by time discreteness, which says that time does not flow continuously, but rather advances in discrete, indivisible units or steps. Planck time places a fundamental limit on the sub-division of time, which means that time most likely consist of discrete indivisible units of time. The establishment of a causal relationship in (...) physics inherently involves a temporal duration for the influence of the cause to manifest as an effect. However, an indivisible unit of time, by its very definition, would lack any internal temporal structure or duration. Consequently, there would be no "time within the time" to connect the instant of the cause with the subsequent instant of the effect. Moreover, if a cause is limited to a single, indivisible moment of time, and its effect appears in the very next such moment, there is no intervening duration of time for the causation to physically occur rendering it impossible. This likelihood of the discreteness of time supports the idea that our subjective experience of a moving present and causal relationships are an illusion of our predetermined static block universe without cause and effect in physics. (shrink)

Evidence-based policymaking (EBP) relies on an epistemological assumption that evidence from randomized controlled trials (RCTs) is the finest evidence for policy formulation, while expert testimony is the poorest one. This paper argues that while RCTs are a valuable source of empirical evidence for policy interventions, they are not sufficient on their own to support evidence-based policy formulation. Through the lens of the INUS framework of causation, we demonstrate that the effectiveness of a policy is influenced by a complex interplay of (...) contextual factors, which RCTs alone cannot capture. We advocate for the integration of contextual and qualitative knowledge, including testimonies from experts and community members, to supplement RCT findings. This additional knowledge provides insights into the social, cultural, and subjective dimensions of the target population, addressing motivations, preferences, and other factors that can significantly impact policy success. By comparing reductionist and non-reductionist perspectives on the use of testimony in evidence-based policy, we argue for a balanced approach that values credible testimonies as essential to understanding context. Ultimately, this paper underscores the importance of a multifaceted evidence approach in crafting effective, context-sensitive public policies. (shrink)

The inception of modern science, in the 17th century, was accompanied by epistemological analyses that see its foundation as laid on observation and experiment — a stance often regarded as excluding (or, at least, devaluating) metaphysics, especially in the English-speaking world. Qualms about metaphysics were already noticeable in Locke’s Essay (1690), and were supposedly deepened by Hume, in the following century. For almost two hundred years, Hume’s philosophy was regarded as radically sceptical concerning metaphysics generally, but particularly about causality and (...) the very existence of an external, objective reality. In this paper, we argue, following a more recent interpretive vein in Hume's scholarship, that Hume’s scepticism about these basic metaphysical issues was effectively “mitigated” (in his own words) by his pioneering adoption of a form of naturalised realism. According to it, belief in both causal relations and in the external world is taken as resulting from the natural operations of the human mind and, in this condition, as being justified, in an epistemologically non-ordinary sense of this notion. As a consequence, epistemology was seen by him as an undertaking akin to the natural sciences, both employing similar empirical methods and metaphysical hypotheses to explore the mind, in the former case, and the physical world, in the latter. Thus, instead of interpreting Hume as one of the forerunners of the anti-metaphysical trend within empiricism, we believe that his wide-ranging project of instituting a “science of man” made some room for metaphysics, as cultivated within the same fallibilistic, naturalistic approach of empirical science itself. (shrink)

Ground physicalism is the view that higher-level properties, such as phenomenal and normative properties, are fully grounded in the fundamental physical properties. Like other non-identity physicalists, ground physicalists face the causal exclusion problem. In this paper, I introduce a new worry for the ground physicalist: the metaphysical exclusion problem. According to the metaphysical exclusion problem, there is something deeply problematic about certain properties having more than one full ground. Furthermore, the causal and metaphysical exclusion problems are shown to work together (...) to create the strengthened exclusion problem, which is significantly more difficult to resist than the causal exclusion problem alone. I then set out a solution to the strengthened exclusion problem that draws on the underexplored notion of indeterministic grounding. I conclude that the ability of indeterministic grounding to solve the strengthened exclusion problem provides us with a new reason to accept indeterministic ground physicalism. (shrink)

This paper categorizes phenomena to derive inferences rather than determine reality, emphasizing a fundamental attribute of the observed world that shapes perception. It posits that early life forms relied on correlation—linking survival to pattern recognition—suggesting correlation precedes causation in cognitive development. The concept of continuity, particularly the persistence of consciousness, emerges as a central human motivator, surpassing procreation, power, or meaning. Pleasure and pain are tied to continuity, with pain arising as a reaction to threats against it, such as death. (...) The fear of death and feelings of unfairness, especially regarding an afterlife, are framed as misattributions of value, rooted in humanity's drive to persist. (shrink)

I explore how endurantists are to handle cases of synchronic bi-location, in which a thing bi-locates at a time (such as by time-travel). I argue that endurantists face significant pressure to posit distinct but structurally identical facts (DSIFs), and critique the fragmentalist approach to bi-location in Simon (2018). Both the positive argument and critique are animated by the observation that handling bi-location cases requires perspicuously describing their spatiotemporal and causal structure. Accordingly, the argument proceeds by considering how endurantists are to (...) think about the metaphysics of place and causation, two issues that are important independent of the thesis about DSIFs. (shrink)

The wide variety of blame presents two difficult puzzles. Why are instances of blame categorized under so many different mental kinds, such as judgment, belief, emotion, action, intention, desire, and combinations of these? Why is “blame” used to describe both interpersonal reactions and mere causal attributions, such as blaming faulty brakes for a car crash? I introduce a new conception of blame, on which blame is attention to something as a source of badness. I argue that this view resolves both (...) puzzles and offers an independently appealing conception of blame. (shrink)

This paper argues in three steps that Mary Somerville changed her views on induction because of Mary Shepherd, with whom Somerville corresponded. First, I demonstrate how Somerville reworks the, call it, ‘induction-passage’ between the first and third edition of Connexion of the Physical Sciences (1834–36). Second, I introduce the fundamentals of Shepherd’s understanding of causation and the ‘causal likeness principle’ (CLP)––i.e., ‘like causes must have like effects’. The third section argues that two of Somerville’s changes are the result of Shepherd’s (...) criticism. First, Somerville ceases to characterize the CLP as an intuitive belief–– consistent with Shepherd’s commitment to the demonstrability of the CLP. Second, Somerville stops to write in a way that suggests she is equating the CLP with induction tout court. Finally, I emphasize the exchange’s significance which contains a still rare example in the history of philosophy of science of two women thinkers engaged in a conversation about their own views. Furthermore, their exchange gives further credence to the notion that Somerville should also be taken seriously as a (natural) philosopher. (shrink)

There is an important but unorthodox view within the philosophy of action that when it comes to certain mental actions of a person—her decisions and choices—these actions cannot be caused by her beliefs and desires or by any prior event or state of her at all. The reason for this, it is said, is that there is something in the very nature of a person’s decisions and choices that entails that they cannot be caused in this way. The arguments for (...) this view, however, have largely gone unexamined. This paper, therefore, critically examines the arguments that have been proposed for this view. It concludes, however, that they are unpersuasive. There is, as yet, no good reason offered as to why we should think that decisions and choices must be uncaused by prior events or states of the agent. (shrink)

Frankfurt‐style action cases have been immensely influential in the free will and moral responsibility literatures because they arguably show that an agent can be morally responsible for a behavior despite lacking the ability to do otherwise. However, even among the philosophers who accept Frankfurt‐style action cases, there remains significant disagreement about whether also to accept Frankfurt‐style omission cases – cases in which an agent omits to do something, is unable to do otherwise, and is allegedly morally responsible for that omission. (...) Settling this debate about Frankfurt‐style omission cases is significant because the resolution entails an important fact about moral responsibility: whether there is there a moral asymmetry between actions and omissions with respect to the ability to do otherwise. My proposal is that both Frankfurt‐style action cases and omission cases involve the same type of causal structure: causal preemption. However, the preemptor and the preemptee differ. In action cases, the Frankfurted agent preempts the neuroscientist and is causally and morally responsibility for the effect. In omission cases, Frankfurted agent is neither causally nor morally responsible for the effect. Instead, the neuroscientist preempts the Frankfurted agent. Thus, there are no Frankfurt‐style omission cases. (shrink)

Hegel contends that judgements are contradictory, finite and untrue. Prominent schol- ars argue that Hegel’s issue with judgements is resolved in the later stages of his Logic. Specifically, Ng suggests that this solution is found in Hegel’s discussion of life. In this article, I argue that not only does life fail to resolve Hegel’s problem with judgement— death highlights its insolubility. To support this claim, I examine Hegel’s discussion of judgements in the Logic, showing that judgements are inherently contradictory because (...) they both unite and separate individuals and universals. Instead of being resolved ret- rospectively, I demonstrate that contradiction, finitude and untruth are intrinsic to judgements. Moreover, since judgements play a constitutive and determinative role in Hegel’s metaphysics, they pass their contradictions, finitude and untruth onto the objects they constitute. Specifically, I argue that for living beings, judgement is literally a matter of life and death, because the contradiction of judgements implies the finitude of the objects they constitute—namely, the perishability of things and the mortality of organisms. (shrink)

Carolina Sartorio argues for a naturalistic conception of agency and free agency that unifies them under the thesis that actions/free actions are behaviors that have the right kinds of causes or explanations. The result is a compelling view of practical agency taking in key metaphysical notions such as causation, grounding, absences, and powers.

The philosophy of superdeterminism is based on a single scientific fact about the universe, namely that cause and effect in physics are not real. In 2020, accomplished Swedish theoretical physicist, Dr. Johan Hansson published a physics proof using Albert Einstein’s Theory of Special Relativity that our universe is superdeterministic meaning a predetermined static block universe without cause and effect in physics. The physics principle of locality states that an object is influenced directly only by its immediate surroundings due to causality. (...) However, the non-local phenomenon of spin measurement correlations observed in entangled particle pairs violates the principle of locality. This violation strongly suggests that the principle of locality and its foundational premise that cause and effect in physics are real are both false. Rather, the laws of physics are non-local or universal describing the organization of our whole static block universe without cause and effect in physics. (shrink)

The philosophy of superdeterminism is based on a single scientific fact about the universe, namely that cause and effect in physics are not real. In 2020, accomplished Swedish theoretical physicist, Dr. Johan Hansson published a physics proof using Albert Einstein’s Theory of Special Relativity that our universe is superdeterministic meaning a predetermined static block universe without cause and effect in physics. There are various grounds for objecting to Dr. Hansson’s version of superdeterminism, but none hold any water. The most common (...) objections are easily dismissed on the basis of the objector’s ignorance that Dr. Hansson’s version of superdeterminism is unique and not subject to the same objections faced by the version of superdeterminism originally put forth by Dr. John Bell. Other objections based on the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics can be dismissed, because Dr. Hansson’s version of superdeterminism disproves the Copenhagen interpretation and there is no direct evidence that the Copenhagen interpretation is true. Finally, a wide range of remaining objections can be dismissed for various specific reasons. (shrink)

The philosophy of superdeterminism is based on a single scientific fact about the universe, namely that cause and effect in physics are not real. In 2020, accomplished Swedish theoretical physicist, Dr. Johan Hansson published a physics proof using Albert Einstein’s Theory of Special Relativity that our universe is superdeterministic meaning a predetermined static block universe without cause and effect in physics. The unity of our universe originates from its creation from the same nothingness under the zero energy universe theory. However, (...) nothingness cannot actually cause a universe to exist on its own under superdeterminism due to the absence of cause and effect in physics. Moreover, nothingness is the absence of anything real and cannot logically be the reality underlying our universe. Consequently, our universe must exist from the reality of the logic or Logos underlying our physical reality resulting from the origination of our universe from the same nothingness or common creation. Because logic allows for a definer of logical states to the exclusion of other logical states, such as “if A, then not B,” then a supremely intelligent definer of those logical states must have the ability to define logical states to the exclusion of other logical states resulting in the creation of physical reality. (shrink)

In this article, I revisit Leibniz's early views on physical causation, more specifically, his relation to physical occasionalism focusing on the period from 1668 to 1676. An in-depth analysis of the Confession of Nature against the Atheists taken together with the Catholic Demonstrations, Leibniz's correspondence with Jakob Thomasius from 1668/69, and the Pacidius Philalethi (1676) serve as evidence that his position leads to physical occasionalism. This receives further confirmation by taking into account Leibniz's familiarity with Weigel's occasionalism in contrast to (...) Leibniz's later encounter of French occasionalism à la Cordemoy, La Forge, or Malebranche. Leibniz's exposure to Weigel's occasionalism, in turn, helps us better understand Leibniz's later critical reaction to occasionalism and how occasionalism helped him develop his own distinct views on causation as expressed in his mature philosophy. (shrink)

The principle of sufficient reason (PSR) says every fact has an explanation. But van Inwagen argues the PSR is false—otherwise all facts are necessary facts. Consider the conjunction of all contingent facts, which we can call the Big Contingent Conjunction. If every fact has an explanation, then presumably the Big Contingent Conjunction had better have an explanation too. But what fact could explain its truth—is the Big Contingent Conjunction explained by a necessary fact or a contingent one? Trouble ensues either (...) way. If the Big Contingent Conjunction is explained by a necessary fact, then it is hard to see why it should be contingent. (After all, if something follows from what is necessary, it too would seem to be necessary.) On the other hand, if the Big Contingent Conjunction is explained by a contingent fact, then the explanation appears circular since the explanans itself is among the facts it explains in the Big Contingent Conjunction. This paper explores an assumption of this argument rarely subjected to scrutiny—namely, the distribution principle, which asserts that if a fact explains a conjunction, then it explains each of its conjuncts. Though superficially plausible, close consideration of this principle reveals some reasons to reject it, potentially saving the PSR from van Inwagen’s challenge. (shrink)

Perhaps beginning of time is the common end of many causal paths (many effects as causal beginnings) and that temporal phenomena compete for somehow finding their way towards one of the beginning of the casual paths. Each casual path starts from a distinct set of parts but they all converge to the same whole at the end of their path. Such a pre-temporal causation is constitution of a whole by the sets. The temporal is de-constitution, the reverse direction, but implicates (...) a second mechanism of causation which enables a pre-temporal effect to somehow cause its pre-temporal cause. Time moves towards its origin. (shrink)

This paper argues that mechanism, occasionalism and finality (the acceptance of final causes) can be and were de facto integrated into a coherent system of natural philosophy by Johann Christoph Sturm (1635–1703). Previous scholarship has left the relation between these three elements understudied. According to Sturm, mechanism, occasionalism and finality can count as explanatorily useful elements of natural philosophy, and they might go some way to dealing with the problem of living beings. Occasionalism, in particular, serves a unifying ground: It (...) will be shown that occasionalism can account for the problems of the source and transmission of motion that mechanism faces, while at the same time explaining the finality of non-rational living beings as designed by God. (shrink)

The rapid rise of generative AI, including LLMs, has prompted a great deal of concern, both within and beyond academia. One of these concerns is that generative models embed, reproduce, and therein potentially perpetuate all manner of bias. The present study offers an alternative perspective: exploring the potential of LLMs to detect bias in human generated text. Our target is genetic essentialism in obesity discourse in Australian print media. We develop and deploy an LLM-based classification model to evaluate a large (...) sample of relevant articles (n=26,163). We show that our model detects genetic essentialist biases as reliably as human experts; and find that, while genes figure less prominently in popular discussions of obesity than previous work might suggest, when genetic information is invoked, it is often presented in a biased way. Implications for future work are discussed. (shrink)

The notion of causation that Mary Shepherd develops in her 1824 An Essay Upon the Relation of Cause and Effect (ERCE) has a number of surprising features that have only recently begun to be studied by scholars. This relation is synchronic, rather than diachronic (ERCE pp. 49–50); it always involves a ‘mixture’ of pre-existing objects (ERCE pp. 46–7); and the effect must be ‘a new nature, capable of exhibiting qualities varying from those of either of the objects unconjoined’ (ERCE p. (...) 63). In this essay, I argue for an emergentist interpretation of Shepherd’s causal theory. On the reading I defend, all effects have qualities that metaphysically emerge from the complex interactions of their constituents. This reading explains the structure of Shepherd’s causal relation and clarifies the central aims of her philosophical project. In response to the problems raised by the science of her time, Shepherd developed a theory of emergence and published it during the period when the concept was first being shaped and adopted by prominent philosophers. Her work thus merits a place in the history of emergentist ideas. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that, contrary to what one might think, early modern rationalism displays an increasing and well-grounded sensitivity to certain metaphysical questions substantial form was designed to answer—despite the fact that the notion itself was in such disrepute, and emphatically banished from natural philosophy. This main thesis is established by examining the thought of Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz through the framework constituted by what have been designated as the two aspects, metaphysical and physical, of substantial form. This (...) examination shows that Descartes ends up assigning to soul a notable metaphysical task formerly assigned to substantial form, whereas Spinoza advances a theory of essences motivated by the philosophical concerns behind the two aspects of substantial form. Leibniz finally makes a sharp distinction between natural philosophy and metaphysics as he develops a dynamistic theory that deliberately aims at understanding substantial form in a new fashion. This line of development is designated as one major factor contributing to the separation of philosophy and natural science. (shrink)

Facts about need play some role in our causal understanding of the world. We understand, for example, that people have basic needs for food, water and shelter, and that people come to be harmed because those needs go unmet. But what are needs? How do explanations in terms of need fit into our broader causal understanding of the world? This paper provides an account of need attribution, their contribution to causal explanations, and their relation to disposition attribution.

According to orthodoxy, the most fundamental kind of causation involves one event causing another event. I argue against this event‐causal view. Instead, the most fundamental kind of causation is thing causation, which involves a thing causing a thing to do something. Event causation is reducible to thing causation, but thing causation is not reducible to event causation, because event causation cannot accommodate cases of fine‐grained causation. I defend my view from objections, including C. D. Broad's influential “timing” argument, and I (...) conclude with implications for agent‐causal theories of free will. (shrink)

This paper argues that unusual coincidences, particularly those involving historical events, can be viewed as design patterns, suggesting an intelligent influence over the course of events. A compelling case examined in detail using probability theory concerns the presidencies of Abraham Lincoln (1809–1865) and John F. Kennedy (1917–1963). This and other coincidences involving historical figures disfavor the materialistic perspective and point to the presence of an intelligent agent acting on a global scale, beyond the arrow of time, influencing human lives and (...) the course of history. (shrink)

This book helps the readers understand the meaning of synchronicity, or remarkable coincidences in people's lives. This work not only explains the mystery of synchronicity, originally introduced by Carl Jung, but it also shows how to make a simple calculation to estimate the chances that coincidences you may encounter in your life are not due to mere randomness. By showing that the role of chance in such phenomena is unlikely, it uniquely connects it with the questions of the Universe's origin, (...) biological evolution, quantum mechanics, elementary particles and with the incredible beauty of the laws of nature. The examples and calculations discussed in this book demonstrate that our world cannot be viewed as purely materialistic, defined by randomness and cause-and-effect chains. (shrink)

Why are quantum correlations so puzzling? A standard answer is that they seem to require either nonlocal influences or conspiratorial coincidences. This suggests that by embracing nonlocal influences we can avoid conspiratorial fine-tuning. But that’s not entirely true. Recent work, leveraging the framework of graphical causal models, shows that even with nonlocal influences, a kind of fine-tuning is needed to recover quantum correlations. This fine-tuning arises because the world has to be just so as to disable the use of nonlocal (...) influences to signal, as required by the no-signaling theorem. This places an extra burden on theories that posit nonlocal influences, such as Bohmian mechanics, of explaining why such influences are inaccessible to causal control. I argue that Everettian Quantum Mechanics suffers no such burden. Not only does it not posit nonlocal influences, it operates outside the causal models framework that was presupposed in raising the fine-tuning worry. Specifically, it represents subsystems with density matrices instead of random variables. This allows it to sidestep all the results (including EPR and Bell) that put quantum correlations in tension with causal models. However, this doesn’t mean one must abandon causal reasoning altogether in a quantum world. When decoherence is rampant and there’s no controlled entanglement, Everettian Quantum Mechanics licenses our continued use of standard causal models. When controlled entanglement is present---such as in Bell-type experiments---we can employ recently-proposed quantum causal models that are consistent with Everettian Quantum Mechanics. We never need invoke any kind of non-local influence or any kind of fine-tuning. (shrink)

This book presents a systematic overview of the major theories of causation: regularity theory, counterfactual theory, process theory, and more recent forms of interventionism. In addition, it develops a new variation on process theory. For this new edition, Andreas Hüttemann has included the latest scholarship and further developed his argument.

Was bedeutet, dass etwas durch mich geschieht, in einer kausal verfassten Welt? Wir verstehen uns als aktiv Handelnde, als Ursache dessen, was wir tun. Aber wir kommen nicht umhin, anzunehmen, dass die Menschen und ihre Handlungen Teil der natürlichen Ordnung von Ursachen und Wirkungen sind und sich hierin nicht von der übrigen Natur unterscheiden. Die kausalen Ereignisfolgen laufen, so scheint es, durch die Personen hindurch, von außen in sie hinein und von innen in Form von Handlungen aus ihnen heraus. Verflüchtigt (...) sich dann aber nicht das Ich, von dem wir glauben, es bestimme, was wir tun? Was bedeuten dann Urheberschaft, Freiheit, Verantwortlichkeit? - In seinem Essay stellt sich Peter Stemmer diesen Fragen, die unser Selbstverständnis elementar berühren. (shrink)

Antiquated Classical pictures of the universe have been formative in shaping the modern idea that, to the extent change is caused, it is fixed in advance. This idea has played a role in making it seem to many that what we are discovering through science supports the exclusion of free will from models for the relevant neural and bodily changes. I argue that giving up this unwarranted notion about causation opens us to the likelihood that how a person expresses free (...) will offers unique explanatory value. I then briefly discuss some further issues with either including or excluding expressions of free will from our explanations, as well as some implications for AI and everyday life. (shrink)

This interdisciplinary book enables scientists and non-specialists from various fields to delve into fascinating historical and recent scientific advancements in physics, astrophysics, genetic evolution, neuroscience, and artificial intelligence. Paradigm shifts are common in science, but some have significantly changed our perception and understanding of the world. This volume not only explores the profound implications of these scientific frontiers but also forecasts their impact on daily life. It delves into ongoing research and the technology that fuels advancements in physics and related (...) fields. Authored by renowned researchers and science communicators, this book appeals to researchers and non-experts seeking a comprehensive overview of emerging developments that challenge ongoing research and will impact education and society in the coming years. Structured into distinct sections - New Physics World, Evolutionary Genetics to Epigenetics, Neurosciences and Neurophilosophy, Applications of Artificial Intelligence, and The Mystery of the Dark Sector - each chapter provides a deep dive into its respective subject, shedding light on the mysteries and implications of cutting-edge science. The book ends with an Epilogue illustrating the limitations of and challenges for our cognitive abilities. (shrink)

This paper attempts to explore theoretical plausibility of a deterministic universe capable of accommodating freedom by postulating certain requisite features for the set of initial conditions (without probing into the nature of deterministic laws). In another sense this paper codifies a reaction to McTaggart’s argument for the unreality of time.

The concept of downward causation is frequently used in an explanatory capacity in biology to account for certain regularities and processes. Some philosophers, however, argue that downward causation is metaphysically incoherent, providing three main objections. Underlying these objections is the assumption that entities are connected by compositional hierarchies of levels of organization. In this paper, I introduce the notions of weak and strong compositional relations using examples from evolutionary developmental biology. I argue that downward causation becomes unproblematic if we use (...) features of interventionist theories of causation to explain the causal relations between levels. I show that an interventionist account of downward causation successfully responds to the three central objections to downward causation in the philosophical literature and I clarify the explanatory usefulness of the concept in biology. As such, this paper provides an epistemic solution to demystify downward causation in the context of scientific practice. The solution proposed is compatible with how biologists seem to use a concept of downward causation fruitfully in their work. (shrink)

Marriage is an institution known for both its virtues and challenges. This study examines marriage not merely as a sociological or theological construct but as a lens to explore the profound philosophical problems of intersubjectivity and interpersonality. By examining both the relational and sacramental dimensions of marriage, we gain insights into how two distinct individuals can form a deep, enduring bond that transcends individual isolation, thus offering a model for understanding both intersubjectivity and interpersonality. The unique perspective offered by Christian (...) theology, which regards marriage as a sacrament, entails a fundamental and irreversible transformation in the individuals involved. This provides a unique venue to address intersubjectivity and interpersonality using unconventional sources and analysis. The objective is not to advocate for Catholic doctrine or any specific religious perspective but to deploy the sacramental understanding of matrimony and its conceptual framework to address these intertwined philosophical issues. (shrink)

The book surveys the major forms of inquiry in the social sciences, including hermeneutic understanding, narrative, reason-action, and causal explanation, to examine how each method changes our perception of social reality. This edition includes a new Preface that discusses the evolution in social sciences since over the last twenty years.

A collection of interdisciplinary essays-across the fields of literature, philosophy, and the history of science-that explore the relationship between seemingly trivial matter and the larger, sometimes monumental conditions to which they give rise, before and beyond the advent of magnification. Essays range in topic from sixteenth-century pathology to twentieth-century architectural theory, natural science, literature, and art.

This book draws on advances in computational neuroscience and theoretical biology to provide a clear and accessible agentive account of the nature of causality and scientific explanations. Instead of attempting to establish the elements of scientific explanation, such as causality, in a reality unadulterated by a human perspective, this book relies on scientific facts about cognition to describe the structure of agency at from a distinctly human perspective. The book draws on the Free Energy Principle to reinforce the agency theory (...) of causality and extend it to an account of explanation as well. This principle The FEP not only provides a theoretical account of how self-organising systems engage with the causal structure of the environment, but it also offers a viable notion of agency and is compatible with the projectivist aspects of the agency theory. Scientific Explanation, Causality, and Agency will appeal to researchers and advanced students working in philosophy of science, philosophy of cognitive science, epistemology, computational neuroscience, and theoretical biology. (shrink)

The philosophical “problem of evil” goes back at least as far as Epicurus and has remained a powerful argument against the existence of God in contemporary philosophy. The argument is rooted in apparent contradictions between God’s divine attributes and various conditions of human existence. But these contradictions arise only given certain assumptions of what we should expect both God and the world to be like given God’s existence. In this paper, I argue that we can utilize the work of the (...) 20th century French philosopher Simone Weil to craft a coherent metaphysical picture of God, creation, and suffering which rejects these common assumptions. Further, I contend that this picture very plausibly follows from commonly-accepted tenets of traditional monotheism. Given this, I argue that this Weil-inspired framework provides serious reasons for reframing the problem of evil and its corresponding theodicies by presenting a radically different view of how God must relate to creation. Yet, this picture does not necessarily vindicate the theist. I argue that this picture may leave us with a new question about creation in the face of evil. Namely, is it possible to understand God’s initial creative act as Weil describes it—as an act of love? (shrink)

Esta es una reseña crítica del libro de John Cowburn "Free Will, Predestination and Determinism".

One of the main challenges faced by Frankfurt-style Cases has been elaborated by Carlos Moya. According to this argument, seemingly insignificant alternatives can become significant and exempting due to the context in which agents find themselves. Given that Frankfurt-style Cases involve extreme situations, seemingly insignificant alternatives become robust, rendering Frankfurt Cases ineffective against the Principle of Alternative Possibilities. This paper provides an overview of the contextual alternatives and Frankfurt Cases debate, presents Moya’s strategy, and ultimately advances an argument to cast (...) doubt on the effectiveness of Moya’s attack on Frankfurt Cases. (shrink)

En 1969 Harry Frankfurt publica su seminal artículo “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility”. Allí ataca la necesidad del principio de posibilidades alternativas (PPA) para la adscripción de responsabilidad moral a los agentes cuando estos realizan una acción. Desde entonces, muchos han sido los intentos de defender el PPA y de mostrar su necesidad para la adscripción de la responsabilidad moral. En este ensayo se examina uno de esos intentos: el que se basa en la causalidad-agencial propuesta por Thomas Reid (1710-1796), (...) y que cuenta con William Rowe como uno de sus defensores dentro de la discusión contemporánea. Esto, con el objetivo de mostrar que, si bien esta defensa podría permitir la aparición de lo que se conoce como un “parpadeo” de libertad, ello no es suficiente para sustentar la atribución de responsabilidad moral. (shrink)

This paper addresses the question of what constitutes an apt interpreted model for the purpose of analyzing causation. I first collect universally adopted aptness principles into a basic account, flagging open questions and choice points along the way. I then explore various additional aptness principles that have been proposed in the literature but have not been widely adopted, the motivations behind their proposals, and the concerns with each that stand in the way of universal adoption. I conclude that the remaining (...) work of articulating aptness for a SEM analysis of causation is tied up with issues to do with modality, ontology, and mereology. Continuing this work is therefore likely to shed light on the relationship between these areas and causation more generally. (shrink)

Robustly realistic metaphysical readings of Kant’s mature views have become popular in recent years, largely because of the apparent coherence of applying unschematized categories like that of causation to things in themselves. There is, however, an overlooked problem that arises even for robust realist readings that privilege unschematized categories. The problem is that Kant provides all the elements for what is now called a ‘debunking explanation’ of metaphysical representations of things in themselves. His account of the categories as arising from (...) mere forms of judgment, and being applied primarily for the unity of consciousness, is detached from the issue of whether there are causes among things in themselves. This detachment seems to imply that it would be a huge coincidence if unschematized categories corresponded to any such causes. After making this argument, using the category of causation as my central case, I consider three potential responses: that Kant’s account implicitly appeals to things in themselves’ causation, that Kant has a separate account of non-coincidental representation, and that Kant’s account is merely incomplete in a way that poses no debunking threat. None of these responses, I argue, are successful, so I conclude that either robustly realistic metaphysical readings are mistaken, or there is internal incoherence in Kant’s views. (shrink)