Applications of Probability

Frente a problemas de decisión colectiva de cierta complejidad, distintos métodos de votación pueden considerarse igualmente democráticos. Ante esta situación, argumento que es posible investigar cuáles de esos métodos producen mejores resultados epistémicos sobre asuntos fácticos. Comienzo ilustrando la relación entre democracia y métodos de votación con un sencillo ejemplo. Muestro cómo el uso de modelos idealizados permite descubrir algunas propiedades de los métodos de votación; varios de estos descubrimientos muestran que, frente a problemas de cierta complejidad, no hay una (...) respuesta clara acerca de cuál es el resultado de una elección democrática. Frente a esto, sugiero que deberíamos tomar en cuenta un rasgo epistémico instrumental de varios métodos de votación: su capacidad para generar respuestas correctas ante varias situaciones. Esta intuición ofrece lecciones importantes para el diseño de instituciones electorales. (shrink)

Traditionally, logic has been the dominant formal method within philosophy. Are logical methods still dominant today, or have the types of formal methods used in philosophy changed in recent times? To address this question, we coded a sample of philosophy papers from the late 2000s and from the late 2010s for the formal methods they used. The results indicate that the proportion of papers using logical methods remained more or less constant over that time period but the proportion of papers (...) using probabilistic methods was approximately three times higher in the late 2010s than it was in the late 2000s. Further analyses explored this change by looking more closely at specific methods, specific levels of technical engagement, and specific subdisciplines within philosophy. These analyses indicate that the increasing proportion of papers using probabilistic methods was pervasive, not confined to particular probabilistic methods, levels of sophistication, or subdisciplines. (shrink)

The goal of this chapter is to show that human behavior is not random but follows principles and laws that result into regular patterns that can be not only observed, but also automatically detected and analyzed. The word “behavior” accounts here for nonverbal behavioral cues (e.g., facial expressions, laughter, gestures, etc.) that people display, typically outside conscious awareness, during social interactions. In particular, the chapter shows that observable behavioral patterns typically account for social and psychological differences that cannot be observed (...) directly. Therefore, the analysis of behavioral patterns is important from a human sciences point of view because it helps to understand how people work. Furthermore, it is becoming increasingly important from a technological point of view because observable behavior can be thought of as the physical, machine detectable trace of social and psychological phenomena. In particular, if it is possible to automatically detect and interpret behavioral patterns, it means that machines can make sense of social and psychological phenomena in the same way as people do. (shrink)

Theorists of rational decision act as though probabilities were ubiquitously available for virtually every sort of possible eventuations. As they see it, the existence of probabilities is cost-free and ever-practicable. The present paper argues that—and illustrates how—this supposition can be mistaken. It shows that the postulation of probabilities can have substantive implications that can transform decision issues into something quite different from their initial situation.

Probability theory is a key tool of the physical, mathematical, and social sciences. It has also been playing an increasingly significant role in philosophy: in epistemology, philosophy of science, ethics, social philosophy, philosophy of religion, and elsewhere. This Handbook encapsulates and furthers the influence of philosophy on probability, and of probability on philosophy. Nearly forty articles summarise the state of play and present new insights in various areas of research at the intersection of these two fields. The articles will be (...) of special interest to practitioners of probability who seek a greater understanding of its mathematical and conceptual foundations, and to philosophers who want to get up to speed on the cutting edge of research in this area. The volume begins with a primer on those parts of probability theory that we believe are most important for philosophers to know, and the rest is divided into seven main sections: History; Formalism; Alternatives to Standard Probability Theory; Interpretations and Interpretive Issues; Probabilistic Judgment and Its Applications; Applications of Probability: Science; and Applications of Probability: Philosophy. (shrink)

Two reverse supertasks—one new and one invented by Pérez Laraudogoitia —are discussed. Contra Kerkvliet and Pérez Laraudogoitia, it is argued that these supertasks cannot be used to conduct fair infinite lotteries, i.e., lotteries on the set of natural numbers with a uniform probability distribution. The new supertask involves an infinity of gods who collectively select a natural number by each removing one ball from a collection of initially infinitely many balls in a reverse omega-sequence of actions.

Uncertainty is recognized as a key issue in water resources research, amongst other sciences. Discussions of uncertainty typically focus on tools and techniques applied within an analysis, e.g. uncertainty quantification and model validation. But uncertainty is also addressed outside the analysis, in writing scientific publications. The language that authors use conveys their perspective of the role of uncertainty when interpreting a claim —what we call here “framing” the uncertainty. This article promotes awareness of uncertainty framing in four ways. 1) It (...) proposes a typology of eighteen uncertainty frames, addressing five questions about uncertainty. 2) It describes the context in which uncertainty framing occurs. This is an interdisciplinary topic, involving philosophy of science, science studies, linguistics, rhetoric, and argumentation. 3) We analyze the use of uncertainty frames in a sample of 177 abstracts from the Water Resources Research journal in 2015. This helped develop and tentatively verify the typology, and provides a snapshot of current practice. 4) Provocative recommendations promote adjustments for a more influential, dynamic science. Current practice in uncertainty framing might be described as carefully-considered incremental science. In addition to uncertainty quantification and degree of belief (present in ~5% of abstracts), uncertainty is addressed by a combination of limiting scope, deferring to further work (~25%) and indicating evidence is sufficient (~40%) – or uncertainty is completely ignored (~8%). There is a need for public debate within our discipline to decide in what context different uncertainty frames are appropriate. Uncertainty framing cannot remain a hidden practice evaluated only by lone reviewers. (shrink)

It is well known that the convex hull of the classical truth value functions contains all and only the probability functions. Work by Paris and Williams has shown that this also holds for various kinds of nonclassical logics too. This note summarises the formal details of this topic and extends the results slightly.

When people are asked to estimate the probabilities of uncertain events, they often neglect the additivity principle, which requires that the probabilities assigned to an exhaustive set of outcomes should add up to 100%. Previous studies indicate that additivity neglect is dependent on response format, self-generated probability estimates being more coherent than estimates on rating scales. The present study made use of eye-tracking methodology, recording the movement, frequency and duration of fixations during the solution of ten additivity problems and two (...) control tasks. Participants produced more non-additive estimates in the Scale format than in the Self-generated format. Self-generated estimates also led to longer decision time and a higher number of repeated inspections, suggesting a deliberate comparison process. In contrast, the Scale format seemed to encourage a case-based approach where each outcome is evaluated in isolation. (shrink)

When causal decision theory was created in the 1970s, access to Howard Sobel’s contribution was available only in a narrowly circulated mimeographed manuscript. After some time, he allowed his ideas to appear in the form of articles. Here we finally have a book length exposition on Sobel’s causal Bayesian point of view consisting of collected, revised, and amplified papers spanning a period of twenty years.

Benveniste’s experiments were at the origin of a scientific controversy that has never been satisfactorily resolved. Hypotheses based on modifications of water structure that were proposed to explain these experiments were generally considered as quite improbable. In the present paper, we show that Benveniste’s experiments violated the law of total probability, one of the pillars of classical probability theory. Although this could suggest that quantum logic was at work, the decoherence process is however at first sight an obstacle to describe (...) this macroscopic experimental situation. Based on the principles of a personalist view of probability, a modeling could nevertheless be built that fitted the outcomes reported in Benveniste’s experiments. Indeed, in QBism, there is no split between microscopic and macroscopic, but between the world where an agent lives and his internal experience of that world. The outcome of an experiment is thus displaced from the object to its perception by an agent. By taking into account both the personalist view of probability and measurement fluctuations, all characteristics of Benveniste’s experiments could be described in a simple modeling: change of the biological system from resting state to “activated” state, concordance of “expected” and observed outcomes and apparent “jumping” of “biological activities” from sample to sample. No hypothesis on change of water structure was necessary. In conclusion, a modeling of Benveniste’s experiments based on a personalist view of probability offers for the first time a logical framework for these experiments that have remained controversial and paradoxical till date. (shrink)

The idea that simplicity matters in science is as old as science itself, with the much cited example of Ockham's Razor, 'entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem': entities are not to be multiplied beyond necessity. A problem with Ockham's razor is that nearly everybody seems to accept it, but few are able to define its exact meaning and to make it operational in a non-arbitrary way. Using a multidisciplinary perspective including philosophers, mathematicians, econometricians and economists, this 2002 monograph examines simplicity (...) by asking six questions: what is meant by simplicity? How is simplicity measured? Is there an optimum trade-off between simplicity and goodness-of-fit? What is the relation between simplicity and empirical modelling? What is the relation between simplicity and prediction? What is the connection between simplicity and convenience? The book concludes with reflections on simplicity by Nobel Laureates in Economics. (shrink)

One of the characteristic features of the dynamic development of science and technology in recent decades is the constantly rising significance of probabilistic, statistical and information-theory methods in research, both theoretical and applied. Nor is the mathematical theory of probability standing still. The internal logic of its development is leading steadily to enrichment of the traditional study of probability with new axioms and constructive formal calculi.

When a doctor tells you there’s a one percent chance that an operation will result in your death, or a scientist claims that his theory is probably true, what exactly does that mean? Understanding probability is clearly very important, if we are to make good theoretical and practical choices. In this engaging and highly accessible introduction to the philosophy of probability, Darrell Rowbottom takes the reader on a journey through all the major interpretations of probability, with reference to real–world situations. (...) In lucid prose, he explores the many fallacies of probabilistic reasoning, such as the ‘gambler’s fallacy’ and the ‘inverse fallacy’, and shows how we can avoid falling into these traps by using the interpretations presented. He also illustrates the relevance of the interpretation of probability across disciplinary boundaries, by examining which interpretations of probability are appropriate in diverse areas such as quantum mechanics, game theory, and genetics. Using entertaining dialogues to draw out the key issues at stake, this unique book will appeal to students and scholars across philosophy, the social sciences, and the natural sciences. (shrink)

Pragmatic arguments seek to demonstrate that you can be placed in a situation in which you will face a sure and foreseeable loss if you do not behave in accordance with some principle P. In this article I show that for every P entailed by the principle of maximizing expected utility you will not be better off from a pragmatic point of view if you accept P than if you don’t, because even if you obey the axioms of expected utility (...) theory it is possible to place you in a situation in which you will face a certain and foreseeable loss. This shows that for a large class of Ps, there is no pragmatic difference between people who accept P and those who don’t. (shrink)

Philosophers have often attempted to use counterfactual conditionals to analyze probability. This article focuses on counterfactual analyzes of epistemic probability by Alvin Plantinga and Peter van Inwagen. I argue that a certain type of counterfactual situation creates problems for these analyses. I then argue that Plantinga's intuition about the role of warrant in epistemic probability is mistaken. Both van Inwagen's and Plantinga's intuitions about epistemic probability are flawed.

‘Probability dynamics’ (PD) is a second-order probabilistic theory in which probability distribution d X = (P(X 1), . . . , P(X m )) on partition U m X of sample space Ω is weighted by ‘credence’ (c) ranging from −∞ to +∞. c is the relative degree of certainty of d X in ‘α-evidence’ α X =[c; d X ] on U m X . It is shown that higher-order probabilities cannot provide a theory of PD. PD applies to (...) both subjectivist and frequentist theories. ‘Straight PD’ (SPD) produces associative and commutative mergers of evidence, in which evidences of positive credence are mutually reinforcing. ‘Offsetting PD’ (OPD) sets off conflicting evidences against each other. Subjectivist PD is a quantified second-order logic of action. Frequentist PD relates to descriptions of physical states of affairs. Acceptance of evidence α 1 X = [c 1; d 1 X ] at t 1 updates α 0 X = [c 0; d 0 X ] at t 0 into SPD-merger or OPD-merger . Given ‘co-evidence’ at t 0 < t 1, ‘indirect’ PD accepts evidence at t 1 and produces support for update α 10 X = [c10;d 10 X α 0 X such that in SPD and in OPD. For binary X and Y, with α 0 X = [c 0; P 0(X)] at t 0 (short-hand for ) and the accepted evidence, the support is ; ; where ρ0(X, Y) is the correlation coefficient of X and Y, and update α 10 X of α 0 X is with ‘accord’ λ = 1 in SPD and in OPD. As , tends toward update P 1(Y) of P 0(Y), but P 10(X) does not converge toward ‘ ’ of ‘probability kinematics’. Therefore PD is not compatible with probability kinematics. A process of ‘normalization’ interprets ‘β-evidence’ [[c 1; q 1]& . . . &[c m ; q m ]; U m X ]] with [c j ; q j ] on and m ≥ 3, as an α-evidence on {X 1, . . . , X m }. It is shown that SPD- and OPD-updates can be derived from updated cumulative functions. Time-biased updates are discussed. A PD-based theory of confirmation (PDCT) is presented. (shrink)

One can interpret the No Probabilities for Acts-Principle, namely that any adequate quantitative decision model must in no way contain subjective probabilities for actions in two ways: it can either refer to actions that are performable now and extend into the future or it can refer to actions that are not performable now, but will be in the future. In this paper, I will show that the former is the better interpretation of the principle.

This is an important collection of essays dealing with the foundations of probability that will be of value to philosophers of science, mathematicians, statisticians, psychologists and educationalists. The collection falls into three parts. Part I comprises five essays on the axiomatic foundations of probability. Part II contains seven articles on probabilistic causality and quantum mechanics, with an emphasis on the existence of hidden variables. The third part consists of a single extended essay applying probabilistic theories of learning to practical questions (...) of education: it incorporates extensive data analysis. Patrick Suppes is one of the world's foremost philosophers in the area of probability, and has made many contributions to both the theoretical and practical side of education. The statistician Mario Zanotti is a long-time collaborator. (shrink)

This book represents a major contribution to game theory. It offers this conception of equilibrium in games: strategic equilibrium. This conception arises from a study of expected utility decision principles, which must be revised to take account of the evidence a choice provides concerning its outcome. The argument for these principles distinguishes reasons for action from incentives, and draws on contemporary analyses of counterfactual conditionals. The book also includes a procedure for identifying strategic equilibria in ideal normal-form games. In synthesizing (...) decision theory and game theory in a powerful way this book will be of particular interest to all philosophers concerned with decision theory and game theory as well as economists and other social scientists. (shrink)