56 found
Order:
See also
Jens Johansson
Uppsala University
  1. The Preemption Problem.Jens Johansson & Olle Risberg - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (2):351-365.
    According to the standard version of the counterfactual comparative account of harm, an event is overall harmful for an individual if and only if she would have been on balance better off if it had not occurred. This view faces the “preemption problem.” In the recent literature, there are various ingenious attempts to deal with this problem, some of which involve slight additions to, or modifications of, the counterfactual comparative account. We argue, however, that none of these attempts work, and (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  2.  25
    Causal Accounts of Harming.Erik Carlson, Jens Johansson & Olle Risberg - 2021 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
    A popular view of harming is the causal account (CA), on which harming is causing harm. CA has several attractive features. In particular, it appears well equipped to deal with the most important problems for its main competitor, the counterfactual comparative account (CCA). However, we argue that, despite its advantages, CA is ultimately an unacceptable theory of harming. Indeed, while CA avoids several counterexamples to CCA, it is vulnerable to close variants of some of the problems that beset CCA.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  3. The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Death.Ben Bradley, Fred Feldman & Jens Johansson (eds.) - 2012 - Oxford University Press USA.
    Death has long been a pre-occupation of philosophers, and this is especially so today. The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Death collects 21 newly commissioned essays that cover current philosophical thinking of death-related topics across the entire range of the discipline. These include metaphysical topics--such as the nature of death, the possibility of an afterlife, the nature of persons, and how our thinking about time affects what we think about death--as well as axiological topics, such as whether death is bad (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  4. Past and Future Non-Existence.Jens Johansson - 2013 - The Journal of Ethics 17 (1-2):51-64.
    According to the “deprivation approach,” a person’s death is bad for her to the extent that it deprives her of goods. This approach faces the Lucretian problem that prenatal non-existence deprives us of goods just as much as death does, but does not seem bad at all. The two most prominent responses to this challenge—one of which is provided by Frederik Kaufman (inspired by Thomas Nagel) and the other by Anthony Brueckner and John Martin Fischer—claim that prenatal non-existence is relevantly (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  5.  53
    Well-Being Counterfactualist Accounts of Harm and Benefit.Erik Carlson, Jens Johansson & Olle Risberg - 2021 - Tandf: Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-11.
    Suppose that, for every possible event and person who would exist whether or not the event were to occur, there is a well-being level that the person would occupy if the event were to occur, and a well-being level that the person would occupy if the event were not to occur. Do facts about such connections between events and wellbeing levels always suffice to determine whether an event would harm or benefit a person? Many seemingly attractive accounts of harm and (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  6. Being and Betterness.Jens Johansson - 2010 - Utilitas 22 (3):285-302.
    In this article I discuss the question of whether a person’s existence can be better (or worse) for him than his non-existence. Recently, Nils Holtug and Melinda A. Roberts have defended an affirmative answer. These defenses, I shall argue, do not succeed. In different ways, Holtug and Roberts have got the metaphysics and axiology wrong. However, I also argue that a person’s existence can after all be better (or worse) for him than his non-existence, though for reasons other than those (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  7. Objections to Virtue Ethics.Jens Johansson & Frans Svensson - 2018 - In Nancy Snow (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Virtue. Oxford University Press.
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  8.  23
    Well-Being Counterfactualist Accounts of Harm and Benefit.Olle Risberg, Jens Johansson & Erik Carlson - 2021 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 99 (1):164-174.
    ABSTRACT Suppose that, for every possible event and person who would exist whether or not the event were to occur, there is a well-being level that the person would occupy if the event were to occur, and a well-being level that the person would occupy if the event were not to occur. Do facts about such connections between events and well-being levels always suffice to determine whether an event would harm or benefit a person? Many seemingly attractive accounts of harm (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  9.  41
    Harming and Failing to Benefit: A Reply to Purves.Jens Johansson & Olle Risberg - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (6):1539-1548.
    A prominent objection to the counterfactual comparative account of harm is that it classifies as harmful some events that are, intuitively, mere failures to benefit. In an attempt to solve this problem, Duncan Purves has recently proposed a novel version of the counterfactual comparative account, which relies on a distinction between making upshots happen and allowing upshots to happen. In this response, we argue that Purves’s account is unsuccessful. It fails in cases where an action makes the subject occupy a (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  10.  50
    The Problem of Justified Harm: A Reply to Gardner.Jens Johansson & Olle Risberg - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (3):735-742.
    In this paper, we critically examine Molly Gardner’s favored solution to what she calls “the problem of justified harm.” We argue that Gardner’s view is false and that her arguments in support of it are unconvincing. Finally, we briefly suggest an alternative solution to the problem which avoids the difficulties that beset Gardner’s proposal.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  11.  51
    Actual and Counterfactual Attitudes: Reply to Brueckner and Fischer.Jens Johansson - 2014 - The Journal of Ethics 18 (1):11-18.
    In a recent article, I criticized Anthony L. Brueckner and John Martin Fischer’s influential argument—appealing to the rationality of our asymmetric attitudes towards past and future pleasures—against the Lucretian claim that death and prenatal non-existence are relevantly similar. Brueckner and Fischer have replied, however, that my critique involves an unjustified shift in temporal perspectives. In this paper, I respond to this charge and also argue that even if it were correct, it would fail to defend Brueckner and Fischer’s proposal against (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  12.  47
    Well-Being Without Being? A Reply to Feit.Erik Carlson & Jens Johansson - 2018 - Utilitas 30 (2):198-208.
    In a recent Utilitas article, Neil Feit argues that every person occupies a well-being level of zero at all times and possible worlds at which she fails to exist. Views like his face the problem of the subject': how can someone have a well-being level in a scenario where she lacks intrinsic properties? Feit argues that this problem can be solved by noting, among other things, that a proposition about a person can be true at a possible world in which (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  13. What is Animalism?Jens Johansson - 2007 - Ratio 20 (2):194–205.
  14. Parfit on Fission.Jens Johansson - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 150 (1):21 - 35.
    Derek Parfit famously defends a number of surprising views about "fission." One is that, in such a scenario, it is indeterminate whether I have survived or not. Another is that the fission case shows that it does not matter, in itself, whether I survive or not. Most critics of the first view contend that fission makes me cease to exist. Most opponents of the second view contend that fission does not preserve everything that matters in ordinary survival. In this paper (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  15.  62
    A Simple Analysis of Harm.Jens Johansson & Olle Risberg - forthcoming - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy.
    In this paper, we present and defend an analysis of harm that we call the Negative Influence on Well-Being Account (NIWA). We argue that NIWA has a number of significant advantages compared to its two main rivals, the Counterfactual Comparative Account (CCA) and the Causal Account (CA), and that it also helps explain why those views go wrong. In addition, we defend NIWA against a class of likely objections, and consider its implications for several questions about harm and its role (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  16. Animal Ethics.Jens Johansson - 2016 - In Stephan Blatti & Paul Snowdon (eds.), Animalism: New Essays on Persons, Animals, and Identity. Oxford University Press.
    Several attractive principles about prudential concern and moral responsibility seem to speak against animalism. I criticize some animalist responses to this kind of problem, and suggest another answer, which has similarites with the most important argument in favor of animalism: the “thinking animal” argument.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  17.  38
    More on the Mirror: Reply to Fischer and Brueckner.Jens Johansson - 2014 - The Journal of Ethics 18 (4):341-351.
    John Martin Fischer and Anthony L. Brueckner have argued that a person’s death is, in many cases, bad for him, whereas a person’s prenatal non-existence is not bad for him. Their suggestion relies on the idea that death deprives the person of pleasant experiences that it is rational for him to care about, whereas prenatal non-existence only deprives him of pleasant experiences that it is not rational for him to care about. In two recent articles in The Journal of Ethics, (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  18.  19
    Bontly on Harm and the Non-Identity Problem.Erik Carlson & Jens Johansson - 2019 - Utilitas 31 (4):477-481.
    The ‘non-identity problem’ raises a well-known challenge to the person-affecting view, according to which an action can be wrong only if it affects someone for the worse. In a recent article, however, Thomas D. Bontly proposes a novel way to solve the non-identity problem in person-affecting terms. Bontly's argument is based on a contrastive causal account of harm. In this response, we argue that Bontly's argument fails even assuming that the contrastive causal account is correct.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  19.  50
    ‘Pure Time Preference’: Reply to Lowry and Peterson.Jens Johansson & Simon Rosenqvist - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (3):435-441.
    A pure time preference is a preference for something to occur at one point in time rather than another, merely because of when it occurs in time. Such preferences are widely regarded as paradigm examples of irrational preferences. However, Rosemary Lowry and Martin Peterson have recently argued that, for instance, a pure time preference to go to the opera tonight rather than next month may be rationally permissible, even if the amounts of intrinsic value realized in both cases are identical. (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  20.  86
    The Importance of a Good Ending: Some Reflections on Samuel Scheffler’s Death and the Afterlife.Jens Johansson - 2015 - The Journal of Ethics 19 (2):185-195.
    In his recent book, Death and the Afterlife, Samuel Scheffler argues that it matters greatly to us that there be other human beings long after our own deaths. In support of this “Afterlife Thesis,” as I call it, he provides a thought experiment—the “doomsday scenario”—in which we learn that, although we ourselves will live a normal life span, 30 days after our death the earth will be completely destroyed. In this paper I question this “doomsday scenario” support for Scheffler’s Afterlife (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  21.  40
    Does Abortion Harm the Fetus?Karl Ekendahl & Jens Johansson - 2021 - Utilitas:1-13.
    A central claim in abortion ethics is what might be called the Harm Claim – the claim that abortion harms the fetus. In this article, we put forward a simple and straightforward reason to reject the Harm Claim. Rather than invoking controversial assumptions about personal identity, or some nonstandard account of harm, as many other critics of the Harm Claim have done, we suggest that the aborted fetus cannot be harmed for the simple reason that it does not occupy any (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  22.  66
    The Benefits and Harms of Existence and Non-Existence: Guest Editor’s Introduction.Jens Johansson - 2013 - The Journal of Ethics 17 (1-2):1-4.
    According to the “deprivation approach,” a person’s death is bad for her to the extent that it deprives her of goods. This approach faces the Lucretian problem that prenatal non-existence deprives us of goods just as much as death does, but does not seem bad at all. The two most prominent responses to this challenge—one of which is provided by Frederik Kaufman and the other by Anthony Brueckner and John Martin Fischer—claim that prenatal non-existence is relevantly different from death. This (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  23.  90
    Kaufman's Response to Lucretius.Jens Johansson - 2008 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (4):470-485.
    Abstract: The symmetry argument is an objection to the 'deprivation approach'– the account of badness favored by nearly all philosophers who take death to be bad for the one who dies. Frederik Kaufman's recent response to the symmetry argument is a development of Thomas Nagel's suggestion that we could not have come into existence substantially earlier than we in fact did. In this paper, I aim to show that Kaufman's suggestion fails. I also consider several possible modifications of his theory, (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  24. Against Pluralism in Metaethics.Jens Johansson & Jonas Olson - 2015 - In Christopher Daly (ed.), Palgrave Handbook on Philosophical Methods. Palgrave Macmillan.
  25.  19
    The Significance of Tiny Contributions : Barnett and Beyond.Erik Carlson, Magnus Jedenheim-Edling & Jens Johansson - forthcoming - Utilitas.
    In a discussion of Parfit's Drops of Water case, Zach Barnett has recently proposed a novel argument against “No Small Improvement”; that is, the claim that a single drop of water cannot affect the magnitude of a thirsty person's suffering. We first show that Barnett's argument can be significantly strengthened, and also that the fundamental idea behind it yields a straightforward argument for the transitivity of equal suffering. We then suggest that defenders of No Small Improvement could reject a Pareto (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  26.  25
    The Lucretian Puzzle and the Nature of Time.Jens Johansson - 2017 - The Journal of Ethics 21 (3):239-250.
    If a person’s death is bad for him for the reason that he would have otherwise been intrinsically better off, as the Deprivation Approach says, does it not follow that his prenatal nonexistence is bad for him as well? Recently, it has been suggested that the “A-theory” of time can be used to support a negative answer to this question. In this paper, I raise some problems for this approach.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  27.  80
    Fitting Attitudes, Welfare, and Time.Jens Johansson - 2009 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (3):247-256.
    Chris Heathwood has recently put forward a novel and ingenious argument against the view that intrinsic value is analyzable in terms of fitting attitudes. According to Heathwood, this view holds water only if the related but distinct concept of welfare—intrinsic value for a person —can be analyzed in terms of fitting attitudes too. Moreover, he argues against such an analysis of welfare by appealing to the rationality of our bias towards the future. In this paper, I argue that so long (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  28.  22
    Asymmetry and Incoherence: A Reply to Cyr.Jens Johansson - 2017 - The Journal of Ethics 21 (2):215-221.
    In defense of the Deprivation Approach to the badness of death against the Lucretian objection that death is relevantly similar to prenatal nonexistence, John Martin Fischer and Anthony L. Brueckner have suggested that whereas death deprives us of things that it is rational for us to care about, prenatal nonexistence does not. I have argued that this suggestion, even if correct, does not make for a successful defense of the Deprivation Approach against the Lucretian objection. My criticism involved a thought (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  29. Constituted Simples?Jens Johansson - 2009 - Philosophia 37 (1):87-89.
    Many philosophers maintain that artworks, such as statues, are constituted by other material objects, such as lumps of marble. I give an argument against this view, an argument which appeals to mereological simples.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  30. Epicureanism, Extrinsic Value, and Prudence.Karl Ekendahl & Jens Johansson - 2016 - In Michael Cholbi (ed.), Immortality and the Philosophy of Death. Rowman & Littlefield.
  31. Non-Reductionism and Special Concern.Jens Johansson - 2007 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (4):641 – 657.
    The so-called 'Extreme Claim' asserts that reductionism about personal identity leaves each of us with no reason to be specially concerned about his or her own future. Both advocates and opponents of the Extreme Claim, whether of a reductionist or non-reductionist stripe, accept that similar problems do not arise for non-reductionism. In this paper I challenge this widely held assumption.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  32.  76
    Dead and Gone? Reply to Jenkins.Jens Johansson & Karl Ekendahl - 2014 - Utilitas 26 (2):1-3.
    In a recent article, Joyce L. Jenkins challenges the common belief that desire satisfactionists are committed to the view that a person's welfare can be affected by posthumous events. Jenkins argues that desire satisfactionists can and should say that posthumous events only play an epistemic role: though such events cannot harm me, they can reveal that I have already been harmed by something else. In this response, however, we show that Jenkins's approach collapses into the view she aims to avoid.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  33.  18
    Dead Wrong: The Ethics of Posthumous Harm David Boonin Oxford University Press: Oxford and New York, 2019. 224 Pp. ISBN 9780198842101, US$65.00 Hbk. [REVIEW]Jens Johansson - 2021 - Bioethics 35 (7):718-719.
    Bioethics, Volume 35, Issue 7, Page 718-719, September 2021.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  34.  72
    The Metaphysics of Everyday Life: An Essay in Practical Realism – Lynne Rudder Baker.Jens Johansson - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (235):365-368.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  35. Am I a Series?Jens Johansson - 2009 - Theoria 75 (3):196-205.
    Scott Campbell has recently defended the psychological approach to personal identity over time by arguing that a person is literally a series of mental events. Rejecting four-dimensionalism about the persistence of physical objects, Campbell regards constitutionalism as the main rival version of the psychological approach. He argues that his "series view" has two clear advantages over constitutionalism: it avoids the "two thinkers" objection and it allows a person to change bodies. In addition, Campbell suggests a reply to the objection, often (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  36.  33
    The Subject of Harm in Non-Identity Cases.Jens Johansson - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 22 (4):1-15.
    In a typical non-identity case, the agent performs an action that causes someone to exist at a low but positive level of well-being, although an alternative was to create another, much happier person instead. There seem to be strong moral reasons against what the agent does, but it is difficult to explain how this can be so. In particular, it seems that on a simple counterfactual account of harm, the action does not harm anyone, as it does not make anyone (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  37.  20
    The Subject of Harm in Non-Identity Cases.Jens Johansson - 2019 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 22 (4):825-839.
    In a typical non-identity case, the agent performs an action that causes someone to exist at a low but positive level of well-being, although an alternative was to create another, much happier person instead. There seem to be strong moral reasons against what the agent does, but it is difficult to explain how this can be so. In particular, it seems that on a simple counterfactual account of harm, the action does not harm anyone, as it does not make anyone (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  38.  69
    Francescotti on Fission.Jens Johansson - 2009 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (4):476-481.
    Most versions of the psychological-continuity approach to personal identity (PCA) contain a 'non-branching' requirement. Recently, Robert Francescotti has argued that while such versions of PCA handle Parfit's standard fission case well, they deliver the wrong result in the case of an intact human brain. To solve this problem, he says, PCA-adherents need to add a clause that runs contrary to the spirit of their theory. In this response, I argue that Francescotti's counterexample fails. As a result, the revision he suggests (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  39.  58
    Persons, Interests, and Justice - By Nils Holtug. [REVIEW]Jens Johansson - 2011 - Theoria 77 (3):284-287.
  40. Nagels argument för asymmetri.Jens Johansson - 2002 - Filosofisk Tidskrift 2.
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  41. Recension av Åsa Nordén, Har nutida fysik religiös betydelse? [REVIEW]Jens Johansson - 2001 - Filosofisk Tidskrift 3.
    No categories
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  42. Recension av tre nya böcker om Ingemar Hedenius. [REVIEW]Jens Johansson - 2003 - Filosofisk Tidskrift 2.
    No categories
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  43. Recension av Torbjörn Tännsjö, Konservatism. [REVIEW]Jens Johansson - 2002 - Filosofisk Tidskrift 4.
  44. Recension av T. H. Eriksen & D. O. Hessen, Egoism. [REVIEW]Jens Johansson - 2002 - Filosofisk Tidskrift 1.
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  45. Recension av Ulf Jonssons Med tanke på Gud. [REVIEW]Jens Johansson - 2005 - Filosofisk Tidskrift 3.
    No categories
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  46. Review of Anders Jeffner, I vetandets gränsmarker: Nio essäer om religion och verklighetstolkning. [REVIEW]Jens Johansson - forthcoming - Filosofisk Tidskrift.
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  47. The Severity of Death.Jens Johansson - 2017 - In John K. Davis (ed.), Ethics at the End of Life: New Issues and Arguments. Routledge. pp. 61-73.
    Just as some illnesses and injuries are worse than others, so some deaths appear to be worse than others. This is so not only for the fairly trivial reason that those deaths that are bad are worse than those deaths that are not bad: less trivially, some bad deaths seem to be worse than other bad deaths. For instance, whereas it may well be bad for an eighty-year-old to die, it is likely to be even worse for a forty-year-old, and (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  48.  57
    Roache’s Argument Against the Cohabitation View.Jens Johansson - 2011 - Philosophia 39 (2):309-310.
    Rebecca Roache’s recent critique of David Lewis’s cohabitation view assumes that a person cannot be properly concerned about something that rules out that she ever exists. In this brief response, I argue against this assumption.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  49. Death: Badness and Prudential Reasons.Jens Johansson - 2016 - In D. Coady K. Brownlee (ed.), The Blackwell Companion to Applied Philosophy. Blackwell.
  50. 8 Filosofiska Texter Red. Kristian Löfgren & Dan Munter Notiser. [REVIEW]Jens Johansson - 2008 - Filosofisk Tidskrift 4.
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
1 — 50 / 56